Two years after the October 7 attacks: British Jewish views on antisemitism, Israel and Jewish life

In this report:

This report is looking at British Jewish life two years after the October 7 attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza. It presents a nuanced and data-driven account of how British Jews are navigating a period of profound challenge and instability. It demonstrates the far-reaching impact the events since October 7, 2023, have had on Jews in the UK, their feelings of safety and belonging, their attachments to Israel and opinions on its politics, and their everyday Jewish life. 

The report analyses the responses of over 4,800 adult British Jews, members of the JPR Research Panel, to the Jews in Uncertain Times Survey conducted in June/July 2025 – the largest survey of British Jews since October 7, 2023.

Some of the key findings in this report:

• Perceptions of antisemitism have intensified: 82% of British Jews now see antisemitism as a “very big” or “fairly big” problem, with 47% saying it is a “very big” problem — up from just 11% in 2012.
• Direct experiences of antisemitism have become more common, especially verbal and online abuse. In calendar year 2024, 32% of Jews reported experiencing at least one antisemitic incident.
• Feelings of safety have declined sharply: In 2025, 35% of Jews rated their safety in Britain between 0–4 on a 10-point scale compared to just 9% in 2023 before the October 7 attacks.
• ‘Ambient antisemitism’ is rising: indirect experiences (e.g. hostile media coverage, online comments, microaggressions, etc.) are increasingly common, with 45% experiencing them ‘frequently’ or ‘regularly’ in 2025, compared to 8% before the October 7 attacks.
• Trust in UK institutions is low, with only the legal system and parliament scoring above average. Trust in political parties and the BBC is notably poor.
• Emotional attachment to Israel has increased: 75% of British Jews feel emotionally attached, with 49% “very attached” (equivalent figures just before the October 7 attacks were 72% and 40%). Attachment varies by age and denomination.
• 45% now say ‘Support for Israel’ is “very important” to their Jewish identity, up from 38% in 2022. Charitable giving has shifted, with 15% now prioritising Israel-focused charities compared to 5% in 2022, while support for UK Jewish charities has declined.
• Zionist identification remains stable overall (64%), but anti-Zionist identification has risen from 8% in 2022 to 12% in 2025, and most notably among younger Jews.
• Younger Jews are also more critical of Israel: a quarter (24%) of 20-29-year-olds identify as anti-Zionist, while a further 20% are non-Zionist, and significant minorities appear to be questioning foundational Zionist ideas.
• Criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza is growing: 40% say the war has weakened their attachment to Israel; 51% say it clashes with their Jewish values.
• The strength of Jewish identity, synagogue attendance, and community attachment has remained broadly stable since October 7. At the same time, about one in three Jews reports increased involvement in Jewish life since October 7, compared to 9% who report less.
• Jews are six times more likely to feel closer to Jewish friends than less close since the October 7 attacks, and three times more likely to feel less close to non-Jewish friends than closer.
• Internal community tensions are rising: 17% of Jews feel not well accepted by the community, mainly due to their views on Israel/Zionism — up from 11% in 2022.
• Generational divides are evident: younger Jews tend to see a broad commitment to social justice as a more important part of their Jewish identity than support for Israel, while older Jews tend to reverse that hierarchy.
• Optimism about the future of Jewish life in the UK is muted: most Jews score below the midpoint on a 0–10 optimism scale.
• Migration to Israel (‘aliyah’) remains stable and low, but Jews who experience antisemitism or ambient antisemitism are notably more likely to be considering it.

DOI: 10.64359/ocifmez9g