Israel's destiny is tied to its demography

The dominant factors that make a difference

In contemporary societies, where birth control is a matter of common sense and widely practised, fertility – to use the somewhat dry terminology of demographers, or more simply the act of having children – is determined first and foremost in people's minds. However, the significant annual fluctuations in this phenomenon, as well as the persistent disparities between countries and between different social strata within a single country, call for an explanation. An in-depth study of behavioural patterns in Israel – across time and social strata – helps us pinpoint the dominant factors that shed light on these differences.

The factors to be considered naturally include norms linked to religious beliefs – whether among Jews, Muslims, Christians, or other groups, or among Jews with varying religious outlooks; the ongoing regional military conflict in the Middle East; the desire for a large family, often associated with an optimistic view of the future; the feasibility of such a plan, linked to collective and individual standards of living; and government social policies, depending on whether or not they provide the public with resources, economic incentives, and support structures.

When examining the issue of material resources – not only family income but also anything that helps limit or reduce the costs associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing – one observes a direct, positive correlation in Israel today between economic means and family size. This situation contrasts with past patterns, where having children was a characteristic of the poor, while the wealthy had smaller families. Today, given equal motivation, those with greater economic resources – whether direct or indirect – are more likely to be able to realise the goal of having children. The relative prosperity enjoyed by all strata of Israeli society – at least since the economic reforms of the 1980s – along with the marked rise in living standards that began in the mid-1990s, has fostered stable or even rising birth rates. Improved economic conditions and full employment have enabled – particularly among the wealthiest classes – significant improvements in housing, education, and opportunities for children to thrive, thereby boosting fertility. Conversely, since the 1970s, declining birth rates have become widespread across developed nations. It is worth noting that in Israel, women's labour force participation and social mobility have reached record highs, completely refuting the theory that a woman's economic life and family life are incompatible. Moreover, opinion polls reveal that Israeli women envision a larger ideal family size than men do.

However, financial means alone are insufficient without the motivation to have an additional child. In this regard, normative values – foremost among them religiosity, though not limited to it – play a role just as decisive as the economy. Clearly, adherence to the injunction to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ (a commandment addressed in the Torah to all living beings, not merely to humans) exerts a primarily psychological influence on family behaviour. Precise scriptural exegesis holds that this commandment is considered fulfilled upon the birth of at least one boy and one girl; consequently, most families might stop – not after a single child, certainly, but after two, three, or even four births – leaving it to a tiny minority to continue until the mission is fully accomplished. Nevertheless, in the collective imagination, traditional Judaism is indeed pronatalist. A crucial cross-cutting factor, extending beyond the influence of religiosity, is optimism. The question arises: what is the purpose of giving life if that life is to be neither happy nor fulfilling? This is precisely where the dividing line between Israel and most developed countries lies; Israeli society stands out by consistently ranking high in international surveys measuring optimism.

Thus, material resources and optimism constitute the two pillars that both support and stem from current birth rates. While the direct link between increased resources and heightened optimism is evident, the reverse relationship – where greater optimism fosters an increase in resources – may also hold true. Moreover, it is undeniable that, in a reciprocal dynamic, having more children fosters greater optimism and – in certain cases and types of societies (though not invariably) – can also help increase resources. In any event, regarding motivational factors, Israel has arguably the world’s highest rate of births resulting from medically assisted reproduction; this clearly demonstrates both a deliberate intent and the capacity to shoulder the high costs involved. Economic policies regarding this specific (and ultimately minor) aspect are generous to users in Israel, even though the country’s broader socioeconomic policies concerning childbirth remain very limited and modest compared to the support measures offered by France or the Scandinavian nations (for instance, Sweden offers sixteen months of paid parental leave per birth, with at least three months reserved for the father).

All of the above holds true, of course, only as long as the situation persists. Indeed, a people’s vitality can be stifled by misguided policies, irresponsible choices and omissions, petty favouritism, a relentless struggle against the driving elites of the workforce, and the cynicism of those who place personal power above the national interest, prioritising national division over unity, cohesion, and solidarity. In this regard, one might wonder whether the final years of the Netanyahu governments were marked by a fiercely anti-natalist policy. Indeed, a longer-term analysis shows that Israel’s fertility rate has been in slow, steady decline for several years, just as the negative net migration balance among Israeli residents has been slowly but steadily increasing.

The differences within Israeli – and Jewish - society

While this represents the general picture of birth rates in Israel, the issue of internal disparities remains. Israel’s high fertility rate undoubtedly stems in part from the ‘specialisation’ of certain social groups in having larger families: groups that strongly assert specific family and reproductive norms – such as the most religious Jews or the staunchest proponents of political nationalism – or groups not yet fully integrated into the dominant processes of modernisation and fertility control, such as a segment of the semi-nomadic Muslim population in the Negev Desert. In the past, these disparities were dramatic, as evidenced by the average fertility rate exceeding 10 children among Israeli Muslims in the early 1960s, compared to the average of 1.5 children observed among immigrants from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Over time, however, a broad process of convergence has taken place – first regarding normative family ideals, and subsequently in terms of actual behaviour.

The gap – initially very pronounced – between Jews of Sephardic and Ashkenazi origin disappeared many years ago. Even more significant is the disappearance of the gap between Israeli Jews and Arabs – a gap that was still notable in the early 2000s. In 2024, the average fertility rate among Jews and their non-Jewish immigrant relatives stood at 2.94, while the rate for the Arab population was 2.59 (ranging from a low of 1.50 in Haifa to a high of 4.59 in the Negev). Thus, the Jewish birth rate (driven by the most religious groups) has now surpassed the Arab birth rate (driven by Bedouin tribes). For anyone closely monitoring the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel (excluding Gaza and the West Bank from this discussion), growth trends appear to be maintaining the status quo, although one must account for the Arab population's age structure – which is younger – as this favours a higher number of births.

The situation is more complex regarding the quantitative balance within the Jewish population itself – specifically between the Haredim (strictly Orthodox) and the rest of the population. Here, too, we observe a certain convergence – or rather, a parallel sensitivity of birth rates to economic fluctuations. The difference is that while families in Tel Aviv carefully plan to have between one and three children, in Bnei Brak that same deliberate planning results, with equal precision, in families of five to nine children. Over time, these disparities are driving a structural transformation of Israeli society. The Haredi share of the total population, which stood at 13% in 2020, is projected to reach 24% by 2050. Within the working-age bracket (20–64 years old), the proportion of Haredim is expected to double, rising from 10% to 20%. Among those under 18, this figure would climb from 20% in 2020 to 38% in 2050. Regarding potential contributions to the defence forces, out of an additional 200,000 young people aged 18–19 expected between 2020 and 2050 compared to current numbers, Haredi recruits would account for 51%.

These projections imply a radical structural transformation of the Israeli population – one bordering on the unimaginable and the unsustainable. Haredim exhibit very low labour force participation rates among men (whereas the rate for women does not differ from the average of other groups) and widespread opposition to military service, from which they have long been exempt following convoluted political manoeuvring. The National Insurance Institute (Bituach Leumi), which manages income transfers from the wealthy to the needy (a group largely comprising Haredim), is headed for bankruptcy within a few years unless demographic trends undergo profound changes – or, better yet, unless an ethic of work and national defence service takes hold among all citizens.

Yeladím ze beracha – ‘children are a blessing,’ goes the old popular adage. For now, Israeli society remains faithful to this conception, which is a deeply rooted way of interpreting and living life, but also poses a major existential challenge.