

Is the two-state solution dead?

Exploring the attitudes of Jews in the UK

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/ Introduction

The two-state solution has long been regarded as the most viable framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The concept – to create a situation in which independent Israeli and Palestinian states coexist peacefully – has been central to international diplomacy for approaching a century. Its origins lie in the older concept of ‘partition’, first seen in the 1937 Peel Commission Plan, and which gained prominence in the UN-approved Partition Plan in November 1947 which envisaged one Jewish and one Arab state to the west of the River Jordan, with Jerusalem under international control. Active discussion of the ‘two-state solution’ began after the Six-Day War of 1967, and particularly during the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. Despite widespread endorsement by many global actors, it has faced persistent obstacles driven variously by security concerns, settlement expansion, ideological opposition and political extremism, fragmentation and violence. Nonetheless, many continue to regard it as the only possible solution to the conflict, even while others display scepticism about its viability, or indeed downright rejection.

This paper explores how British Jewish attitudes toward the idea have evolved recently, drawing on both historical JPR data and the findings from a national survey of British Jews we conducted in summer 2025. The analysis takes place against the backdrop of what may be a significant shift in UK foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood: Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s July 2025 announcement that Britain will recognise a Palestinian state at the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025 unless the Israeli government meets specific conditions, including a ceasefire in Gaza and renewed commitment to peace negotiations.¹ This move, foreshadowed by Norway, Spain, Ireland and Slovenia in May 2024, and now echoed by other Western leaders including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, marks something of a turning point in international diplomacy and reflects a growing international consensus that recognition may be necessary to preserve the possibility of a negotiated solution. Still, strong voices oppose this wave of recognition, not least from the Trump administration in the United States.

The idea of two states for two peoples has historically represented a pragmatic compromise – balancing support for Israel’s security and sovereignty with concern for Palestinian self-determination and human rights. Historically, major Jewish communal institutions have generally endorsed the framework, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm depending on geopolitical circumstances. Events such as the Second Intifada, the 2008/09, 2012, 2014 and 2021 Gaza conflicts, not to mention the October 7 attacks, current war, and other developments in Israeli and UK politics, have influenced sentiment, affecting opinion within the community. These dynamics underscore the importance of tracking attitudinal change among British Jews over time, particularly in light of generational shifts and evolving political identities.

¹ Prime Minister Starmer stated: “So today – as part of this process towards peace – I can confirm the UK will recognise the state of Palestine by the United Nations General Assembly in September unless the Israeli government takes substantive steps to end the appalling situation in Gaza, agree to a ceasefire and commit to a long-term, sustainable peace, reviving the prospect of a Two State Solution.” See: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-words-on-gaza-29-july-2025.

However, following Prime Minister Starmer's July 2025 announcement, the mainstream British Jewish communal leadership largely came out in strong opposition to the UK Government's position, on the grounds that it places the onus of responsibility for a ceasefire solely on the Israeli government, while making no demands of Hamas. This, they argue, removes any incentive on Hamas to release the remaining Israeli hostages, and implicitly rewards Hamas for the October 7 terrorist attacks.²

Beyond the British Jewish leadership, attitudes toward the two-state solution among the British Jewish population are important to consider. They have long been informed by a complex interplay of Jewish religious and ethnic consciousness, communal, national and international developments, and a heavy dose of anxiety, exacerbated recently by the October 7 attacks, the war in Gaza and the rise and evolution of antisemitism at home.

Our own studies at JPR have shown that, fundamentally, British Jews generally express strong emotional and cultural ties to Israel, although their views on specific policy issues – such as settlements, military actions and peace negotiations – vary considerably. Yet support for a two-state solution has historically been high across the Jewish population, especially among liberal and progressive Jewish groups who commonly believe it is the best way to achieve peaceful coexistence in the long-term, even as more hawkish or religiously observant segments have tended to express more scepticism, on security or ideological grounds. Generational differences have also been notable, with younger Jews more likely to advocate for Palestinian rights and critique Israeli government actions.

However, much of the existing data predates recent geopolitical developments, particularly the October 7 attacks and war in Gaza and the wave of international recognition efforts. There remains a gap in understanding how contemporary British Jews interpret and respond to these developments. This paper begins to address that gap by integrating our new survey data with historical trends to offer an up-to-date analysis of communal attitudes toward the two-state solution.

It draws on the small amount of historical survey data that exists alongside new findings collected via the JPR 'research panel', a nationally representative research platform for British Jews. The panel comprises thousands of self-identifying Jewish adults across the UK, recruited over several years through a variety of campaigns, referrals and communal networks, and stratified to reflect denominational, geographic, and demographic diversity. The most recent panel survey was conducted online in June and July 2025 and included targeted questions on attitudes toward the two-state solution, alongside demographic indicators such as age, religious affiliation and political orientation.

Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a proposition in favour of the two-state solution, with options ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement, as well as 'no opinion' and 'don't know' categories. The survey design followed best practices in social research, including randomised question ordering and anonymity assurances to reduce bias. Historical data used for comparison were drawn from previous JPR studies conducted between 2010 and 2024. Quantitative analysis focused on identifying trends and correlations across subgroups.


² See, for examples: '[UK's chief rabbi criticises Labour's Palestine pledge at march for hostages](#)', *The Guardian*, 10 August 2025; '[JLC Chair Writes to the Prime Minister to Oppose Palestine Recognition Plan](#)', Jewish Leadership Council, 30 July 2025, www.thejlc.org/news; '[Statement on recognition of a Palestinian State](#)', *Reform Judaism*, 29 July 2025; '[Instead of rewarding Hamas, the UK should focus on freeing the hostages](#)', Board of Deputies of British Jews, 2 September 2025.

/ Findings

Even though the two-state concept dates back to the 1930s, data on British Jewish attitudes towards it wasn't gathered until the JPR Israel Survey in 2010.³ At that time – in the aftermath of 2008-09 Gaza War⁴ – an overwhelming majority (78%) agreed with the contention that “a two-state solution is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours,” 39% strongly so, and a further 38% tending towards that position. Only 15% disagreed (Figure 1).

However, when we revisited the question in mid-2024, nine months after the October 7 attacks, the proportion agreeing with the contention had fallen dramatically to just 54%, with 33% disagreeing. Equally, the proportion reporting ‘Don't know’ or having ‘No opinion’ had almost doubled from 7% to 13%, implying a significant increase in uncertainty about the issue. Our most recent data, from summer 2025, show that support for it has fallen further still over the course of the past year, to just 49%, with 41% disagreeing. From a situation fifteen years ago where just 15% disagreed with the notion, today 41% hold that position, almost three times as many.

Figure 1. A ‘two state solution’ is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East, Jews in the UK, by year (%)



Ns=4,081 (2010); 4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025).

This is a dramatic change of faith by British Jews in a proposal that has been the bedrock of Western policy on Israel-Palestine for decades. Whilst we cannot know for sure, we can hypothesise that the sheer brutality of the October 7 attacks shattered many British Jews' belief in the idea that Israel could possibly live alongside an independent Palestinian state in the near future; many British Jews now appear to believe that the security risks to Israel are simply too great. We see some evidence of this in how they responded to the contention “Most Palestinians want peace with Israel”: whereas 47% agreed with this idea in 2010, in our most recent data, that proportion had fallen to 36% (not shown graphically).


This shift mirrors what has occurred in Israel too. Pew Research Center data show that support there for the idea that Israel could coexist peacefully with a Palestinian state has plummeted over the past decade or so, and particularly since the October 7 attacks (Figure 2). The data shown are for Israelis as a whole, but it is worth noting that far more Israeli Arabs currently

³ Graham, D. and Boyd, J. (2010). *Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel*. Initial findings from the 2010 Israel Survey. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

⁴ The war took place between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, and was the first to take place in Gaza after Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the territory in 2005 and Hamas had taken over control from Fatah there in June 2007.

think peaceful coexistence is possible in the most recent data (about 40%) than Israeli Jews (16%). This proportion among Israeli Arabs is similar for Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip or West Bank: support for the two-state solution among Palestinians has hovered around the 30% to 40% mark over the course of the past two years, but has climbed slightly overall. Where 32% reported that they support “the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution” in September 2023, 40% said the same in May 2025 (not shown graphically).⁵ Yet in all cases, it remains a minority position.

Figure 2. Percentage of Israeli adults who think a way [can/cannot] be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other (2025,%)⁶



Source: Pew Research Center. Question: *Do you think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other, or not?* [Response options: Yes; No; It depends; Don't know/Refused]. Note that the time gaps between each column are not equal.

Compared to the current views of Israelis or British Jews, attitudes in wider British society align much more closely with the UK Government's current position. According to data gathered by Survation in July 2025, 41% endorsed the idea that Palestine should be “recognised as a state separate from Israel, as part of a two-state solution,” with a further 13% expressing the more radical position that Palestine should be “recognised as part of one state, encompassing the territory of Israel and Palestine.”⁷ These are high proportions given that 31% of respondents did not have a view at all,⁸ and whilst they should not be compared directly with those of Israelis, Palestinians or British Jews above as the propositions offered in the surveys differ, the results do nonetheless capture the overarching mood in each case.

⁵ See: Public Opinion Poll No. 95, 6 May 2025, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, www.pcpsr.org/en/node/997.

⁶ See: Pew Research Center, ‘Israeli Public Is Increasingly Sceptical About Lasting Peace,’ 3 June 2025 (from survey of Israeli adults conducted between 5 February and 11 March 2025; n=998).

⁷ See: ‘Almost half of the public think Palestinian statehood should be recognised,’ Survation survey of UK residents aged 18+; fieldwork conducted on 25 July 2025; n=1053.


⁸ This is a much higher proportion than those found among British Jews, Israelis or Palestinians, all of whom are much more likely to hold an opinion of some kind.

It is important to consider the reasons why attitudes may differ between these groups. For many uninvolved observers viewing the situation from outside, the temptation to reach for the two-state solution has long seemed obvious – only through dividing the land between the two parties can one hope to reach peaceful coexistence. Indeed, as can be seen above, even those more intimately involved typically held this view until recently: the overwhelming majority of British Jews did so fifteen years ago, although if the Israeli data are comparable, that position may have been eroding over time, particularly since the 7 October 2023 attacks.

Indeed, October 7 may have changed something fundamental in the minds of many Jews. Conceptually, in the Jewish imagination, the promise of Israel has long been to serve as the safe haven of the Jewish People. After centuries of persecution in the Diaspora, Israel has come to represent sanctuary, safety and security, as well as a national homecoming for Jews everywhere, in Israel and the Diaspora. Yet the October 7 attacks symbolically broke this promise, bringing the antisemitic nightmares of the Jewish past into the inner sanctum of the Jewish home, both figuratively and, for those directly affected, literally. After such brutal acts of slaughter, rape and abduction, many Israelis appear to have drawn the conclusion that the two-state solution with the Palestinians is simply untenable at present, even unconscionable.⁹

Perhaps unsurprisingly, British Jews, who occupy a place somewhere between uninvolved non-Jewish British observers and Israelis living on the frontline of the conflict, collectively find themselves somewhere between the opinions of these two groups – less convinced of the two-state solution than their fellow Brits, but more open to it than Israelis, and indeed Palestinians, whose lives would be most directly affected by it. Figure 3 breaks down their current position by age and sex, and as previously shown, finds that overall, 49% agree with the contention (17% strongly), where 41% disagree (19% strongly).

Figure 3. A ‘two state solution’ is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East, Jews in the UK by age and sex (2025, %)




N=4,822.

⁹ This can be seen in how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed his position recently: "...the prevailing assumption in this is that the problem we have with the Palestinians is the absence of a Palestinian State. And if they were given a Palestinian State, they would stop the efforts to destroy the Jewish State. But the Palestinians were offered a state many times... and they turned it down... because the Palestinians are not about creating a state, they're about destroying a state... their goal is about the destruction of a state. It defies imagination or understanding how intelligent people around the world, including seasoned diplomats, government leaders and respected journalists, fall for this absurdity." See: Israel PM Press Conference, 10 August 2025: https://www.youtube.com/live/1ebXvF9MOKc?si=AI4AkylZIE0w3_93.

Examining British Jewish attitudes in a little more detail, we find that younger age bands today are found to be *less* likely to believe in the two-state solution than their elders; indeed, support for the two-state solution increases with age (Figure 3). This runs counter to what might typically be expected; as a rule, younger Jews tend to be more dovish than older ones. Here, the youngest age band (16-29-year-olds) is the only one more likely to *disagree* with the contention (49%) than agree with it (41%). We explore why this may be the case below.

Orthodox Jews – both modern orthodox and particularly the strictly orthodox – also tend to be sceptical about the two-state solution today. 49% of the former group disagree with the idea compared to 41% who agree with it; among the strictly orthodox the equivalent proportions are 76% (disagree) to 15% (agree) (Figure 4). On the other side of the denominational fence – among the progressives and ‘unaffiliated’ (i.e. those who do not belong to any type of synagogue and are most likely to be secular) – we see the opposite: 62% of progressives agree with the idea (29% disagree), and 51% of the unaffiliated agree (39% disagree). We have seen this division over attitudes towards political issues in Israel in the British Jewish community many times before, including in our 2010 study (footnote 3) – the line very commonly lies somewhere between its more orthodox and more progressive/secular parts.¹⁰ Israeli Jews are much the same, albeit far more sceptical overall – the Pew Research Center data referenced earlier show that 25% of secular Jews today believe that peaceful coexistence is possible, compared with 9% of ‘Haredim’ (strictly Orthodox) and ‘Datiim’ (religious), and 11% of ‘Masortiim’ (traditional) (not shown graphically).¹¹

Figure 4. A ‘two state solution’ is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East, Jews in the UK by denominational group (2025, %)




N=4,822. Denominational categories based on current synagogue membership: ‘Strictly orthodox’ = Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations synagogue or independent shtiebel; ‘Mainstream orthodox’ includes United Synagogue, Federation of Synagogues, other independent orthodox synagogues or S&P Sephardi Community; Progressive = Reform Judaism, Liberal Judaism, or Masorti Judaism; ‘No affiliation’ = no synagogue membership.

We also see a notable and familiar divide along political lines (Figure 5). British Jews who currently support Labour or the Liberal Democrats overwhelmingly support the two-state solution (76% of both groups), whereas Conservative or Reform supporters – i.e. those on the political right – show far lower levels of support (36% and 22% agree respectively). Only Green Party supporters buck this trend – despite being on the left-wing of British politics, they are also sceptical (38% agree whilst 53% disagree), but as we shall see, any similarity seen here with Conservative and Reform voters masks very different underlying opinions.

¹⁰ See: Boyd, J. (2024). *A year after October 7: British Jewish views on Israel, antisemitism and Jewish life*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

¹¹ Pew, June 2025, op. cit.


Figure 5. A 'two state solution' is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East, Jews in the UK, by current political voting preference (2025, %)



N=4,822. Political position based on the question: *If a general election was held tomorrow, how would you vote?* [Response options as listed, plus Plaid Cymru; Scottish National Party; Undecided; I would be eligible to vote but would not do so; I would not be eligible to vote; Prefer not to say; Other].

It is also worth examining the data through the lens of Zionist self-identification. Respondents were invited to identify either as a 'Zionist,' 'non-Zionist,' or 'anti-Zionist' (see text under Figure 6).¹² More detailed analysis about the proportions of British Jews who identify in these different ways will be discussed in a forthcoming report; here we are interested in understanding the extent to which these different subgroups within the Jewish population view the two-state solution. 'Zionists' (who constitute a strong majority of British Jews) continue to lean towards supporting the concept – 50% agree with it, whilst 42% disagree – but this is hardly an overwhelming endorsement. 'Non-Zionists' are more supportive still: 60% agree and 27% disagree (albeit with 14% unsure). On the other hand, 'Anti-Zionists' (the smallest group proportionally among British Jews as a whole) are the clear anomaly here: just a quarter (25%) agree, whilst two-thirds (66%) disagree (Figure 6).

Figure 6. A 'two state solution' is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East, by self-identification as Zionist or not (2025, %)



N=4,822. Questions: *Although there are different opinions about what the term Zionist means, in general, do you consider yourself to be a Zionist?* [Yes; No; Don't know]. If 'No' or 'Don't know': *You said you do not consider yourself to be a Zionist or do not if you are. Which of the following is closest to your position?* [I am an anti-Zionist; I am a non-Zionist; I am not sure what Zionism means; Don't know; Other].

¹² In standard Jewish terms, a Zionist is someone who supports the idea that the Jewish People should have their own independent state in their ancestral homeland, which is today the modern State of Israel.

This response from anti-Zionists raises an important question. In disagreeing with the contention, what are they saying? Past research has indicated that Jews who do not self-identify as Zionists tend to do so not because they are opposed to the concept of Jewish statehood at all, but rather because they are highly critical of Israeli government policy, particularly around West Bank settlements and treatment of Palestinian civilians. Yet this would suggest that they should be *more* likely than Zionists to endorse the two-state solution. In these data, we see this is the case for ‘non-Zionist’ Jews, but not for ‘anti-Zionist’ ones, who are clearly a very different sub-group. This distinction is important: whilst further analysis on these new data is required to confirm this, it is likely that most non-Zionists are expressing a political critique of the current Israel government rather than a more fundamental rejection of Jewish statehood *per se*, whereas many anti-Zionists appear to be adopting the more radical position – denunciation of the Jewish national project as a whole. We will explore this issue in greater depth in a future report.

That stated, there is another hypothesis which may be playing into the dynamics of how British Jews responded to the two-state proposition offered in the 2025 survey. The wording and response scheme (which we deliberately replicated from the 2010 JPR Israel Survey to allow us to make the direct comparison) – “a ‘two state solution’ is the only way Israel will achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East” – has arguably become more ambiguous than it once was. In the past it would have been most likely understood by respondents as simply testing support or opposition to the concept. However today, there is far more public discussion of alternative solutions to the conflict than two states, from President Trump’s ‘riviera’ musings,¹³ through postures from more extreme Israeli politicians to take over the Gaza Strip (temporarily or otherwise)¹⁴ to bi-nationalist options,¹⁵ to various confederation possibilities.¹⁶ In this context, it is possible that in disagreeing with the contention, a number of respondents may be questioning the idea that two states is the *only* solution, rather than entirely rejecting the idea itself.

In response to these political dynamics and to explore this further, we invited respondents to consider other possible ‘solutions’ to the conflict, ranging from a strongly ‘hawkish’ option (‘Israel should take over full control of Gaza’) to a strongly ‘dovish’ alternative (‘A shared bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state is the only way to achieve peace’).

On the former contention (‘Israel should take over full control of Gaza’), we find widespread disapproval among British Jews both in mid-2025 and mid-2024 (Figure 7).¹⁷ On both occasions, more than seven-in-ten rejected this idea and less than two-in-ten agreed with it. Looking at the 2025 data in more depth (Figure 8), it only seems to garner higher levels of support among the most orthodox respondents. Whilst self-identifying ‘Zionists’ are marginally more likely than average to endorse it, most do not: indeed, over 70% of those who expressed a view reject it. By contrast, anti-Zionists reject it overwhelmingly: 97% strongly disagree.

¹³ President Trump raised this possibility at a joint press conference in Washington DC with Prime Minister Netanyahu on 4 February 2025. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QeZfWQ76x3s>.


¹⁴ Some Israeli political leaders – most notably Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir – have advocated for the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip in recent times.

¹⁵ Several prominent characters have advocated for a shared, binational, secular democratic state, including, for example: Edward Said, ‘The One-State Solution (Truth and Reconciliation)’, *New York Times* magazine, 10 January 1999; and Tony Judt, ‘Israel: The Alternative’, *The New York Review of Books*, 25 September 2003.

¹⁶ For example, the concept of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, which would consist of two parts – the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and a Palestinian federation in the West Bank – with autonomy for both but military and security affairs managed by the Jordanian government. First proposed by King Hussein of Jordan in 1972, it was roundly rejected by Israel and the Palestinians at the time, but has resurfaced in some academic and policy circles in recent years.


¹⁷ The statement was not used in surveys of British Jews prior to 2024.

Figure 7. British Jewish attitudes to the contention 'Israel should take over full control of Gaza' (2024 and 2025 comparison, %)



Ns=4,641 (2024); 4,822 (2025).


Figure 8. British Jewish attitudes to the contention 'Israel should take over full control of Gaza', by sex, age, self-identification as Zionist and denominational alignment (2025, %)



N=4,822. To understand more about the Zionist and Jewish denominational labels, see notes under Figures 4 and 6.

How do British Jews relate to the option of “a shared bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state” as “the only way to achieve peace”? This concept dates back to the 1920s and was seriously proposed by Jewish thinkers of the time such as Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem and Judah Magnes, yet it has long been seen as marginal in Jewish circles, and has never previously been tested in surveys of British Jews. Yet we found that about a third (34%) of all British Jews agree with it at some level today, 11% strongly so, even while most (53%) disagree (Figure 9).

Figure 9. A shared bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state is the only way to achieve peace (2025, %)



N=4,822. To understand more about the Zionist and Jewish denominational labels, see notes under Figures 4 and 6.

Importantly, it is those who identify as ‘anti-Zionist’ who are most likely to agree with the bi-national state concept. 81% of them see it as the “only way to achieve peace,” and a majority (54%) of the ‘non-Zionist’ group agrees. Yet intriguingly, while most self-identifying as ‘Zionist’ (about seven in ten) disagree, a minority (20%) appears perhaps to feel resigned to their sense that this may ultimately be the ‘only’ option. However, those identifying as anti-Zionist are likely to be expressing a clear ideological stance against Zionism, arguing that the very concept of Jewish statehood is untenable, and only a shared governance model can work.¹⁸

¹⁸ A future report will examine in detail what the labels ‘Zionist’, ‘non-Zionist’ and ‘anti-Zionist’ mean for British Jews when they identify in these different ways.

Returning to the 16-29-year-old respondents, could it be that their low levels of agreement with the two-state solution contention might reflect a similar sentiment? Might the generation born post the Oslo Accords whose lived experience of Israel has been punctuated by an endless stream of wars in Gaza, share the anti-Zionist rejection of two states in favour of some kind of idealistic bi-national alternative? Certainly, they are notably more likely than their elders to self-identify as anti-Zionist, and more likely to endorse bi-nationalism, which more than two-in-five support.

More work is required to understand exactly how young British Jews view the State of Israel and their relationship with it today, but this initial look at the latest data appears to indicate that the repercussions of the October 7 attacks may be prompting a growing proportion of them to develop a very different outlook about Israel and the prospects for peace with the Palestinians, when compared to the older generations.

Reflections

It is important to state that investigating people's relationship with Israel through these very emotive, nuanced and complex issues risks oversimplifying reality. We have seen in more detailed previous studies that Jews' relationship with Israel tends to be multi-faceted, and that many expressing highly critical ideological or political views nonetheless feel emotionally connected to the country and its people.¹⁹ Yet these new data provide the most up-to-date lens we have through which to understand how the events on and since 7 October 2023 are shaping British Jewish attitudes to Israel in general, and with regard to the two-state solution in particular. As we undertake further analysis of the data from the summer 2025 survey, we will learn more.

In considering the findings, it is also important to consider the overarching context of the present moment. British Jews are living through a highly turbulent, emotionally challenging and psychologically traumatic period²⁰ – not only in Israel, Gaza and the wider Middle East, but also in the UK, where antisemitism is rising and evolving. Antisemitism in the diaspora has long played a key role in Zionist thought – it helped to fuel the Zionist movement in the first place, and the State of Israel was established in large part as a haven from it. The dynamics around antisemitism are thus tied to those around the Israel-Diaspora relationship; a deteriorating situation in the UK may well affect British Jewish attitudes towards Israel.

At the same time, Israel itself is changing. Demographically, it is growing and becoming an ever-larger part of the Jewish world as a whole; it is currently close to passing the 50% threshold of the global Jewish population. This is critical to understand. Israel is already home to the largest Jewish population in the world, and whereas most national Jewish populations are in a state of demographic decline, Israel is one of a small number of exceptions. Despite a recent increase in emigration levels, its population continues to grow through natural means and is projected to continue to do so. Indeed, with a total Jewish fertility rate (TFR) of around 3.0, it is not only something of an anomaly in the Jewish world, but in the wider Western world as a whole.²¹ Demographically, not to mention culturally, spiritually and indeed philosophically, Israel represents the future of Jewish life worldwide, so what it is and what it becomes is of tremendous importance to Jews everywhere.

¹⁹ See: Graham and Boyd (2010), op. cit.; Boyd (2024), op. cit.

²⁰ See, for example: Bar-Halpern, M. and Wolfman, J. (2025). 'Traumatic invalidation in the Jewish community after October 7', *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment*, pp.1-28. doi: 10.1080/10911359.2025.2503441.

²¹ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics data: <https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/cbsnewbrand/Pages/default.aspx>.

Israel is also shifting rightwards politically and religiously. As the demographics of Israeli society evolve, it is projected to become more orthodox over time, and probably more right-wing too as these positions tend to align. Certainly, one can clearly observe how the Overton Window (i.e. the range of public policy ideas that are considered politically mainstream or acceptable at a given point in time) has shifted rightwards in Israel over many decades; the political left that ruled Israel exclusively over the first three decades of its existence has limited influence today. These political dynamics are not unique to Israel; they can be seen in many Western democracies as their populations grapple with the uncertainties fuelled by increased immigration and concerns about Islamist terrorism. Yet they inevitably manifest themselves differently in Israel, a country that has experienced many of the worst excesses of Islamist extremism in recent decades, faced attacks on seven fronts²² over the past two years, and is made up of a population that has a long history of being at the wrong end of racist hostility, persecution and violence. The challenge of maintaining liberal democratic systems and norms can be seen throughout the West, but these factors make it all the more challenging in Israel.

These dynamics help to explain the data outlined in this report. Not only are many British Jews experiencing an increase and change in the antisemitism they see around them, they are also grappling with intense challenges to their Jewish identities from both within and beyond the Jewish community. One of the less understood parts of the October 7 attacks and their repercussions is how the past two years have affected the internal worlds of Jewish communities and individuals, both in terms of building greater solidarity and resilience for some, greater isolation and alienation for others, and raising the overall temperature of intra-communal relations as a whole.²³

Critically, this is the backdrop to the debates about the two-state solution or the merits of recognising Palestinian statehood. For many Jews, these questions are not simply about technical resolutions to a seemingly endless political conflict. They are about existential safety and insecurity, social inclusion or exclusion, Jewish values and identity, and to a degree, the very future of Jewish life in Britain. That is what is beginning to feel at stake to many British Jews today, and the sense of pain that overwhelms them can be seen just under the surface of their survey question answers.²⁴ Whether their responses today simply reflect the emotional strains of the current moment – the aftermath of the October 7 attacks and the ongoing war in Gaza – or point to more permanent attitudinal and identificational shifts over time, remains to be seen.

²² Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has identified these seven fronts as Iran, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militants in Iraq, militant groups in Syria, and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.

²³ Boyd (2024), op. cit.; and Graham, D. (2025, forthcoming), *What changed? The impact of October 7 on the identity, attachments and attitudes of UK Jews: a longitudinal analysis*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

²⁴ See: Boyd, J. '[What exactly is the Jewish 'majority' view on Israel?](#)' *Jewish News*, 28 April 2025.

/ Methodological notes

The JPR Jews in Uncertain Times Survey (JUTS) was conducted using the JPR Jewish Population Research Panel, our core research mechanism for exploring the attitudes and experiences of Jews in the UK on a variety of issues. The panel contains over 12,000 individuals who are UK residents aged 16 or above who self-identify as Jewish. The 2025 data presented here are based on 4,822 individuals who participated in JUTS, which was conducted between 8 June and 21 July 2025. Respondents completed the questionnaire online, by computer, smartphone or tablet, or in a handful of cases, by telephone. The questionnaire was developed by JPR, drawing on a range of existing surveys, and were programmed in-house using Forsta software. The survey data were cleaned and weighted to adjust for the age, sex and geographical distribution of the Jewish population based on the 2021 Census, and on information about Jewish denomination based on a combination of administrative and JPR survey data. Statistical analysis was carried out using IBM SPSS.

Data from 2024 come from the JPR Jewish Current Affairs Survey (JCAS), which was also conducted among self-identifying Jews aged 16 or above living in the UK, sampled using the JPR Jewish Population Research Panel using the same methodology as JUTS. JCAS was conducted between 14 June and 14 July 2024; n= 4,641.

Data from 2010 come from the JPR Israel Survey, a study of British Jewish attitudes towards Israel conducted in January and February 2010 (n=4,081). Full details of the methodology can be found in [this report](#) (see pp.38-40). In brief, a convenience sample was built using the mailing lists of a range of Jewish communal organisations, carefully selected and managed to reach into different parts of the Jewish population by age, sex, geography and denomination, and snowballing methods were utilised to help access particularly hard-to-reach Jewish subpopulations. Data were subsequently cleaned and calibrated using three sources of data: the 2001 Census, records from the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and key survey datasets held by JPR.

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/ About the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to influence Jewish life positively. Web: www.jpr.org.uk.

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