

'October 8 Jews':

The impact of October 7 on British Jewish identity

Dr David Graham

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Executive summary

October 7, 2023 and its aftermath have been a watershed for Jews around the world. The Hamas attacks on Israel, the ensuing war, and the increase in antisemitism that followed have raised profound questions about the impact of these events on Diaspora Jewish life. Have they fundamentally changed how Jews see themselves? Have they fundamentally altered the nature of Jewish life? And have they triggered the kind of Jewish awakening some commentators have described as the 'October 8 Jew' or 'the Surge'?

This study provides a unique empirical perspective on these questions. Drawing on JPR's longitudinal survey panel, it follows the same group of several thousand British Jews over a six-year period, allowing us to robustly measure actual change before and after October 7, and avoiding the need to rely on retrospective accounts or snapshots taken at a single point in time.

The findings reveal significant change alongside striking continuity. Over the period of analysis, British Jews became notably more attached to Israel, more likely to identify as Zionist, more inclined to consider *aliyah* (emigrating to Israel), and more likely to prioritise Israel-related charitable causes. Feelings of Jewish peoplehood and solidarity also strengthened, at least in the short term. At the same time, concern about and experience of antisemitism rose sharply, feelings of safety declined, and levels of anxiety increased remaining elevated long after the attacks.

Yet beyond these developments, the overall picture is one of remarkable Jewish stability. There is little evidence of a broad transformation in Jewish identity. Indicators of religiosity, synagogue participation, Jewish learning, charitable giving in general, and overall strength of Jewish identity did not measurably change. Nor is there evidence that previously disengaged Jews became substantially more involved in Jewish life. The story is one of continuity and resilience.

The British Jewish response to October 7 and its aftermath is therefore nuanced. The watershed did not produce a wholesale reinvention of Jewish identity. Rather, it reinforced two existing pillars of it: attachment to Israel and a sense of belonging to the Jewish People, with only the former clearly enduring. Both emerged in the context of heightened feelings of insecurity and vulnerability.

The challenge facing Jewish leaders, educators and policymakers is how to translate these modest changes into deeper forms of participation, engagement and Jewish flourishing in the years ahead.

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/ Introduction

The catastrophe of October 7 and the multifront war that ensued is a trauma that will be remembered as a watershed not only for Israel but also for the Jewish Diaspora. The conflict began on the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah with a devastating infiltration into Israel by Hamas early in the morning of October 7, 2023. An army of 3,000 Hamas-led terrorists invaded the Jewish State, killed 1,200 people of all ages and religions, raped and mutilated many others and abducted 251 living and deceased hostages back into Gaza. The enormous loss of mainly civilian life in a single day was unlike anything experienced in Israel since the founding of the State in 1948 and indeed, since the Holocaust itself. The last twenty living hostages were not released until October 13, 2025, two years and one week after being abducted.

This particular episode of the long-running conflict between Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East was different not only because of the scale of violence unleashed on Israel but also because within 24 hours, before Israel had initiated any military response at all, a flood¹ of anti-Israel, antizionist and antisemitic hatred poured out across western countries where Jews had been living freely and safely for generations. As the journalist, Bret Stephens, noted in an opinion piece for the *New York Times*,² “On October 8, Jews woke up to discover who our friends are not.” His meaning was this: just one day after October 7, many people and groups not only failed to condemn Hamas’s attack, but some outright celebrated it, to the visceral shock and dismay of Jews who had previously considered these people friends and allies. October 7 and its aftermath was not just an assault on Israel; it was an assault on Jews the world over.

The term ‘October 8 Jews’ has stayed with us, but it has evolved to mean something broader and more positive, referring to a *resurgence* of Jewish feeling, identity and engagement in light of these events.³ In the United States, for example, a 2024 study by the Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) pointed to “increased engagement in Jewish life.”^{4, 5} The authors described this phenomenon as ‘the Surge’, a rise in Jewish activity and engagement of previously less engaged and unengaged Jews in response to the trauma of October 7.⁶ In the UK, some anecdotal evidence indicated higher than normal attendance levels at community events, with some claims of Jews “flocking back” to synagogues in the immediate aftermath.⁷ And in Australia, empirical evidence of an increase in feelings of closer attachment to Israel was observed just five weeks after October 7.⁸

But as mentioned, in addition to this reawakening following October 7, what also ‘surged’ was anti-Israel protests. In the UK, as elsewhere, these became regular fixtures in town centres

¹ Hamas codenamed the attacks Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.

² Stephens, B. 7 November 2023. For America’s Jews, Every Day Must Be Oct. 8. *New York Times* <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/07/opinion/us-jewish-israel-sept-11.html>

³ Kelin Z 2026 *Editor’s Notes: Future of Jewish Diaspora should follow spirit of ‘October 8 Jewry’*, Jerusalem Post; Stephens 2023, op. cit.

⁴ JFNA 2024, *Israel-Hamas War Sentiment Survey: Findings from a poll of Americans – General Public and Jewish* (pdf); JFNA 2025a *New Federations’ study shows American Jews still surging into Jewish life*, Blog 29 April 2025. See also: Finley M. 2026 *The October 8th and October 9th Jew*, *Jewish Journal*, <https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/blogs/seeking-the-good/387046/the-october-8th-and-october-9th-jew/>

⁵ JFNA 2025a, op cit.; JFNA 2025b *‘Survey of Jewish life since October 7 - Findings from a poll of Americans – General Public and Jewish Americans’* 5-25 March, 2025.

⁶ The JFNA authors define ‘The Surge’ as “those who have been less engaged until now and are showing up more in this moment, make up 30% of the Jewish community.” p.35 JFNA 2024, op. cit.

⁷ Bray E. October 19 2023 *As news from Israel rolls in, Jews are flocking back to shul*. *The Jewish Chronicle*.

⁸ Bankier-Karp A. and Graham D. 2024. *Australian Jews in the shadow of war survey: Main Findings*, Monash University and JCA.

from London to Leeds and indeed, Manchester, which subsequently experienced a deadly terrorist attack on a synagogue on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, in October 2025. Alongside this development were massive increases in reports of antisemitic incidents breaking all records and redefining 'normal'.^{9, 10}

A watershed indeed. In this challenging and fast-changing context, new research questions arose. Was the notion of an 'October 8 Jew' universal? Was there a British Jewish 'Surge' and if so, what did it look like? Ultimately, how, if at all, had October 7 and its aftermath changed British Jews; what was the nature of the October 7 watershed?

An empirical opportunity

Serendipitously, JPR found itself in a position where it could address these questions head on. Its survey panel, which had been running for several years prior to October 7, presented an opportunity to assess change, not simply by comparing one set of survey results with another (i.e. cross-sectionally), but by examining the data longitudinally, following *the same group of people, the same set of questions, and linking their responses* from one wave to the next, over time. In many respects, longitudinal data are the gold standard of quantitative survey methodology. Obviously, JPR had no prior insight into the calamity, and while hindsight is a wonderful thing, not every question we might like to have asked prior to October 7 was asked, but enough questions were included before October 7 to allow a robust and detailed picture to be painted of *longitudinal* change among UK Jews.

Therefore, this analysis focuses on those measures that allow us to compare responses before and after October 7. In some cases that means just two comparative datapoints, whilst in others, as many as five datapoints are available for examination several years apart. The data therefore provide empirical insight into how Jewish life and identity changed either side of October 7. That potentially makes the data and this analysis unique.

Structure of this report

This report contains three analytical sections. In Section 1, we examine change across variables that measure British Jews' connections to Israel in four different ways, including emotional attachment and whether respondents identify as Zionist. In Section 2, the focus shifts to antisemitism and vulnerability, where we look at British Jews' experiences and perceptions of antisemitism and how these frame the way they feel both in terms of their safety in the UK and their mental wellbeing. Finally, Section 3 addresses Jewish identity taking multiple approaches: Jewish identity as a general concept; Jewish peoplehood and community attachment; Jewish values; and Jewish religiosity and Jewish behaviour. Following this, some concluding thoughts are presented summarising the findings raised by this analysis of British Jews and discussing whether and in what sense they experienced any kind of Jewish reawakening or surge following October 7.

⁹ CST 2025 [Antisemitic Incidents 2024](#).

¹⁰ TOI Staff 2025, [London cop who worked in hate crimes unit sacked for antisemitic posts after Oct. 7](#), *The Times of Israel*, 14 April 2025; Rich D. 2025 [OPINION: Neo-Nazi ideology is being embraced by the 'anti-Zionist' movement](#), *Jewish News*, 22 August 2025; Stub Z. 2025 ['An unrelenting wave of Jew hatred': UK Jews say terror attack was only a matter of time](#), *The Times of Israel*, 3 October 2025.

Methodological note

A full methodological overview of JPR's research panel has been published previously,¹¹ so here the focus is on the specific aspect of the present report: longitudinal data analysis.

There are various ways in which change can be measured quantitatively. A weak but common approach is *retrospective*. An example might be to ask respondents about the past and compare it with the present, such as how they voted recently and how they would vote today, or how they felt about Israel six months ago and how they feel about it now. A variant is to ask how they feel their attitudes have changed over a specified period. While the retrospective approach provides an indication of change, the results can be unreliable because memory is imperfect while intervening events can systematically skew responses.

A second, more robust method is a cross-sectional approach where surveys occur at intervals but are based on different samples each time. This lowers the risk of inaccuracy due to concerns about recollection but risks any observed differences being the result of changes in sample composition rather than real change. For example, if a poll asks respondents, on two or more occasions, "how would you vote if an election was held today?" change may be inferred more confidently. But while this avoids the 'retrospective problem' and provides correlations between variables over time, causation will always be, at best, only implied because the observed difference may simply be a result of, for example, a change in sample composition between surveys.

Longitudinal data on the other hand, have several important advantages over cross-sectional data. They measure actual change in opinions and behaviours over time and can be confidently anchored to a particular trigger. Longitudinal data are unambiguous about chronology, and therefore, cause, because the extent to which any event triggers change will be clearly seen in the sample between the different timepoints either side of an event.

In JPR's initial report on the impact of October 7,¹² a cross-sectional approach was taken, even though JPR's panel data were used. So while the sample was broadly stable over time, it did not use purely longitudinal data—that is, it did not follow the exact same group of people between sample waves.¹³ In the present analysis, each comparison is strictly longitudinal, comparing the exact same group of people, linked from wave to wave, over time. In addition, a broader range of variables is examined over a longer timeframe. This is a far more robust approach to the data and allows causal inference to be claimed more confidently. That said, an important drawback of longitudinal data (other than high running costs) is attrition – that is, panel members dropping out over time – especially if it occurs systematically. The main statistical issue this raises for the present study is that the sample shrinks as the time period grows.

When interpreting the longitudinal data, readers should be aware that unweighted sample sizes (reported as 'n') vary depending on which waves have been linked and are being compared. For example, 2,522 people are longitudinally linked between the 2023 and 2024 waves, whereas 2,164 people are longitudinally linked between the 2022, 2023 and 2024 waves.

¹¹ JPR 2021, [Methodology: COVID-19 online panel survey, July 2020](#). Institute for Jewish Policy Research, London.

¹² Boyd J. 2024. [A year after October 7: British Jewish views on Israel, antisemitism and Jewish life](#), Institute for Jewish Policy Research, London.

¹³ Other cross-sectional surveys carried out very soon after October 7 are: Bankier-Karp A. and Graham D. 2024 [Australian Jews in the shadow of war survey: Main Findings](#), Monash University and JCA; and Wright G.W., Volodarsky D., Hecht S. and Saxe L., 2023 [In the Shadow of War: Hotspots of Antisemitism on US College Campuses](#), Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University.

Another complicating issue relates to longitudinal change by sub-category. Taking age as an example, the composition of the group aged 30-39 in the first wave will be slightly different to the composition of the group aged 30-39 in the second wave taken one year later—a few will leave (i.e. turn 40), and a few will join (i.e. turn 30). This becomes more problematic as the time gap between waves increases, for example, to five years. In this example, half of those aged 30-39 in the subsequent wave will have left the cohort and half will have joined. On occasion in this report where sub-samples are compared, the approach taken is to anchor the examination on the position in the initial wave. (Although not part of the present analysis, the data could also be used to examine how individuals within the sample changed over time.)

Finally, the time gap between waves can also pose challenges. If the gap is long, it is possible a significant change or spike might be missed entirely (also a concern for cross-sectional analyses). On the other hand, if a wave takes place *during* such a spike, the opposite problem arises: a temporary spike may look like an enduring change. JPR's longitudinal data were collected over a period of up to five years from July 2020 to June 2025, some twenty months after October 7, 2023. This somewhat abates concern about the possibility of misinterpreting longer term change but cannot remove it entirely.

Understanding the data

The data explored in this report come from five surveys or 'waves' from JPR's Research Panel:

Wave*	Date	Notes
1 (w1; a)	July 2020	Methodology: COVID-19 online panel survey, July 2020
2 (w2; b)	August 2021	
3 (w3; c)	November to December 2022	Jews in the UK today: Key findings from the JPR National Jewish Identity Survey
4 (w4; d)	May 2023	Experience of antisemitism
6 (w6; f)	June 2024	Current Affairs Survey
7 (w7; g)	June/July 2025	Uncertain Times Survey

* The fifth round (w5) focused solely on the haredi (strictly Orthodox) community and does not form part of this analysis.

Since the UK census asks a question on religion, the survey data have been weighted by age, sex, and geography using the 2021 Census. In addition, a fourth baseline has also been included in the weighting variable using data on synagogue affiliation from a survey of synagogue membership in the UK.¹⁴

As noted, JPR's first report on these data¹⁵ took a cross-sectional approach to the panel so care should be taken when comparing results between the two studies. In addition, the data used here have been re-weighted for greater consistency of comparison between various wave combinations.

In this report, 'October 7' refers not only to the attack on Israel on that day in 2023 but also the ensuing war between Israel, Hamas, other armed Palestinian entities, and Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah.

¹⁴ JPR 2021, op. cit.

¹⁵ Boyd J. 2024, op. cit.

Statistical significance

Throughout this report statements are made about the statistical significance in terms of the difference between two scores recorded at different timepoints. This indicates whether any observed differences were more likely to have occurred by chance or more likely to reflect actual change. Statistical significance does *not* refer directly to the magnitude of any observed change. When we state that a finding is 'statistically significant' we are generally referring to the result of a Chi-squared significance test. A high level of significance is defined as ' $p < .01$ ' or ' $p < .001$ ',¹⁶ which in the report is referred to as 'significant.' A lower level of statistical significance is defined as $p < 0.05$ and in this report is labelled as weakly statistically significant. In addition, 95% confidence intervals were also examined as a secondary test of non-random change. To minimise complexity, significance test results have not been included here but are available on request.

¹⁶ For example, $p < .01$ means that if the test was run 100 times, the observed result is likely to have occurred at least 99 times, so we conclude it is significant at the 99% level and very unlikely to be the result of chance.

1 / Israel attachment

In this first section we look at four different indicators of Israel attachment and engagement. The first is a generalised question about emotional attachment to Israel.


Emotional attachment to Israel

Respondents in our longitudinal sample were asked on multiple occasions how 'emotionally attached' they were to Israel. In May 2023, five months prior to October 7, 72% of respondents said they felt either 'very' or 'somewhat' emotionally attached to Israel (Figure 1). When they were asked this question again in June 2024, nine months after October 7, the equivalent proportion was 76%, a small increase and only a weakly statistically significant one. By June 2025 the proportion remained elevated at 78% although this was not a statistically significant rise from the June 2024 level. However, this proportion was 8-percentage points higher than the 70% value recorded in November 2022 among the *same group of people*, indicating a steadily increasing level of Israel attachment over the two-and-a-half-year period.

Yet of greater significance, both statistically and in terms of importance, are the changes that took place regarding the category 'very' emotionally attached. In this longitudinal group, the proportion expressing this view stood at 38% in both November 2020 and May 2023 (i.e. stable), but it rose to 50% in June 2024 nine months after October 7, fully 12-percentage points higher than just over a year earlier. Importantly, this elevated proportion of 'very attached' remained at this level in June 2025 (51%).

In summary, we observe three things in relation to emotional attachment to Israel following October 7: first, Israel attachment rose overall but only modestly, however, second, the *intensity* of emotional attachment to Israel changed dramatically with far more people identifying at the very attached level. And third, this was no momentary spike but rather a more enduring change which lasted for at least twenty months following October 7.

Figure 1. Emotional attachment to Israel, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1,689)



Question: And in general, how emotionally attached are you to Israel?


* This question was also asked in August 2021. Although the results are very similar to November 2022 and May 2023 (suggesting no real change in the run up to October 7) they have not been included for statistical reasons.

VA+SA = 'Very attached' plus 'Somewhat attached'

Question in each survey: How emotionally attached are you to Israel? *Answer options:* as per chart.

Looking at the longitudinal *net* change in this position in the two datapoints either side of October 7 – that is, calculating the total change after taking both positive (i.e. becoming more emotionally attached) and negative (i.e. becoming less emotionally attached) movements into account – we see that 24% of respondents moved in the direction of more emotional attachment to Israel while 7% moved in the direction of less emotional attachment (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the majority, 69%, did not change their position at all (although this partly reflects the fact that those who already said they were ‘very attached’ or ‘not at all attached’ could not switch to a more (or less) attached position). This therefore tells us that the overall *net change* in terms of emotional attachment to Israel from May 2023 to June 2024 was a 17-percentage point movement, or swing, in the direction of more emotionally attached (this being the difference between the 24% who moved to a more attached position and the 7% who moved to a less attached position).

Figure 2. Net change in emotional attachment to Israel from May 2023 to June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2,522)



The data also allow us to explore changes at the sub-group level, demographically, denominationally and politically.

From a demographic perspective, little changed either side of October 7 in terms of those saying they were ‘very’ emotionally attached to Israel (Figure 3). In terms of sex, while emotional attachment to Israel increased for both men and women, it was proportionately greater among women than men. Men remained more likely than women to feel emotionally attached to Israel, but the pre-October 7 gap between them narrowed. This is also reflected in the data on net change (i.e. the balance between those who became more attached and those who became less attached), which was greater for women (+20%) than for men (+13%) (Figure 4).

Examining the data by age, while the youngest cohort (age 16-29) was most likely to increase its levels of emotional attachment to Israel, this group continued to lag considerably behind all other age cohorts in this regard after October 7. Separately, those in the 50-59 age group posted both the largest absolute increase (rising 19-percentage points from 38% to 57%) in emotional attachment and the largest net increase (30%), thereby moving from one of the more weakly attached groups to the most strongly attached.


In terms of synagogue denominational alignment, patterns existing prior to October 7 largely remained in place, with the more orthodox groups generally being more emotionally attached to Israel. However, in terms of net change, the greatest movement was among the unaffiliated (20%) followed by members of the members of the United Synagogue (17%). The overall picture regarding self-defined current Jewish position¹⁷ was also similar either side of October 7 with the largest net changes being for Jews identifying as Secular/cultural (20%) or Traditional (19%).

In terms of Jewish people’s political party alignments, the pattern of change is one of groups moving further apart from each other. Importantly, a notable gap emerged between Jewish Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters who were neck and neck on levels of emotional

¹⁷ This differs slightly from synagogue alignment, insofar as it relates not to the type of synagogue the respondent belongs to, but rather the denomination they feel best represents their Jewish identity.

attachment to Israel before October 7, but in very different positions subsequently, with much higher levels of attachment found among Labour supporters. Meanwhile, Jewish Green Party supporters, very few of whom felt very attached to Israel prior to October 7, found themselves even more aloof on this measure afterwards (Figure 3).¹⁸ In terms of net change, Labour supporters moved +21-percentage points towards greater attachment, somewhat further than Conservative supporters who moved +13-percentage points in that direction (Figure 4).

Figure 3. 'Very emotionally attached' to Israel, May 2023 (blue) and June 2024 (orange), by various characteristics, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2,522)



Question asked in both surveys (w4 and w6): How emotionally attached are you to Israel? Answer options: Very attached; Somewhat attached; Not too attached; Not at all attached.


* UOHC = Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations

^^ The Reform Judaism and Liberal Judaism movements merged together into a new movement known as 'Progressive Judaism' after the period of longitudinal analysis. Technically, the data on the two movements could be merged too, but we retain the distinction in our analysis as it remained in place during the period under analysis, and the data allow us to do so. We will review this issue for future surveys.

^ 'Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on light on Shabbat)'.

¹⁸ It is possible that part of the explanation for this moving apart is that people who are more supportive of Israel *switched allegiance* from one party to another thereby exaggerating the change. While longitudinal data are ideally suited to investigating such a notion, this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Figure 4.. Change in attachment to Israel from May 2023 to June 2024 including net change, by various characteristics, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2,522)



* UOHC = Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations

^^ The Reform Judaism and Liberal Judaism movements merged together into a new movement known as 'Progressive Judaism' after the period of longitudinal analysis. Technically, the data on the two movements could be merged too, but we retain the distinction in our analysis as it remained in place during the period under analysis, and the data allow us to do so. We will review this issue for future surveys.


^ 'Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on light on Shabbat)'.

The importance of supporting Israel as part of respondents' Jewish identities

At four different points in time between late 2022 and mid-2025, respondents were asked how important 'supporting Israel' was to their sense of Jewish self. Prior to October 7, the proportion of the longitudinal sample saying supporting Israel was either 'very' or 'fairly' important increased slightly from 63% in November 2022, to 67% in May 2023 (a statistically significant rise). In June 2024, nine months after October 7, the overall proportion had increased to 71%, a further modest, and still statistically significant rise. By June 2025, the proportion fell back slightly to 69%, although this was not statistically significant, indicating that the proportion still remained relatively elevated twenty months after October 7.

However, as with the above findings on those who were 'very' and 'somewhat' emotionally attached to Israel (see Figure 1), we also see a far greater change *within* the two more supportive positions (i.e. 'very' and 'fairly' important) (Figure 5). Prior to October 7, the proportion saying that supporting Israel was a 'very important' part of their Jewish identity remained stable—34% in November 2022 and 35% in May 2023. But nine months after October 7, in June 2024, the proportion had risen sharply to 48%, a statistically significant 13-percentage point rise. Moreover, this elevated value was maintained at 45% twenty months afterwards (the slight decline shown from 48% to 45% not being statistically significant). As with emotional attachment to Israel this points to three insights. First, following October 7, the overall importance of supporting Israel as part of people's Jewish identities rose but only modestly. However, second, the *intensity* of feeling increased dramatically, with far more people selecting 'very important.' And third, this was not a momentary increase, but rather a more enduring change.


Figure 5. The importance of 'Supporting Israel' to how you see yourself as a Jewish person, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1644)



Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?

Looking at the net change in this position—calculating the total average change after taking all movements into account—we see that 27% moved to a position where Israel was now more important to their Jewish identity than it had been previously, compared with 12% who moved in the opposite direction (Figure 6). The remainder, 62%, did not change their position (which partly reflects the fact that those who already said ‘very important’ or ‘very unimportant’ could not switch to a ‘more (or less) important position on the scale offered.) Thus, the overall net change in terms of the place of supporting Israel to Jewish identity was a 15-percentage point movement, or swing, in the direction of more important.

Figure 6. Net change in level of importance respondents placed on ‘supporting Israel’ to how you see yourself as a Jewish person, May 2023 and June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2526)



We can also investigate which subgroups within the Jewish population changed position concerning the place of supporting Israel within their Jewish identity (Figure 7).¹⁹ Demographically, women, who had previously lagged behind men on this measure, ‘caught up’ with them, moving from 40% to 53%. Women also exhibited a larger net change than men (17% vs. 13% respectively – not shown in the chart). In terms of age, prior to October 7, the pattern was one of older people being more supportive of Israel than younger people, and while this pattern remained, it is notable that the youngest group, aged under 30, moved *even further away* from the rest to become a cohort apart. The largest net change was among the 40-49 age group which exhibited a movement of 24-percentage-points toward important (not shown).

Denominationally, the pre-existing pattern also remained. Except for the strictly Orthodox members of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations (UOHC), saying supporting Israel is very important to one’s Jewish identity remained more likely the more Orthodox the denomination. Following October 7, all denominations saw a notable increase overall in this aspect of their members’ Jewish identities, although the Liberal Judaism membership stood somewhat apart from this pattern, barely registering any increase and becoming the least likely of all groups shown to say this post October 7 at 32%.²⁰ The largest net change was among United Synagogue members, with a movement of 24-percentage-points in the direction of important (not shown).


Politically the pattern of change either side of October 7 can be described as ‘the same but more so.’ The large pre-existing difference between Jews on the political right and the political left remained but became even wider. The increase in people saying supporting Israel was ‘very important’ to their Jewish identity was far greater among Jewish Conservative Party

¹⁹ While this still uses longitudinal data, the sample linking 2023 to 2024 is not the same as the sample linking 2022, 2023 and 2024, hence the rise here is different (from 42% to 54%) to the one just discussed (from 36% to 37% to 49%).

²⁰ Note that the Reform Judaism and Liberal Judaism movements merged together into a new movement known as ‘Progressive Judaism’ after the period of longitudinal analysis. Technically, the data on the two movements could be merged too, but we retain the distinction in our analysis as it remained in place during the period under analysis, and the data allow us to do so. We will review this issue for future surveys.

supporters than among Jewish supporters of left-of-centre parties. Indeed, respondents supporting the Green Party *decreased* their propensity to do so, thereby drifting even further away from the majority than they had previously been. But even among the Green Party supporters there was a net movement of 4-percentage-points toward more important (not shown).

Figure 7. Proportion of respondents who said supporting Israel is 'very important' to how they see themselves as a Jewish person, May 2023 and June 2024, longitudinal data (n=2528)




* Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations (strictly Orthodox).

Identifying as Zionist

JPR's longitudinal data, tracking and linking the same group of Jewish people over time, show that there was a modest and statistically significant increase in the numbers self-identifying as Zionist, rising from 59% ten months prior to October 7 to 65% nine months after, a statistically significant increase (Figure 8). It is also the case that among those who did not identify as Zionist before or after October 7, most did not see regard themselves as 'anti-Zionist'; indeed, the number identifying as anti-Zionist remained at 9-10% at each successive snapshot. The largest change in proportionate terms occurred among those who said they were 'non-Zionist,' declining from 17% to 14% either side of October 7.²¹ The June 2025 data indicate that these changes endured for at least twenty months after October 7.

Figure 8. Do you consider yourself to be a Zionist? November 2022, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1689)



Question: Although there are different opinions about what the term Zionism means, in general, do you consider yourself to be a Zionist?; *Answer options:* Yes; No; Don't know.

Question (if not Yes): You said you do not consider yourself to be a Zionist or do not know if you are. Which of the following is closest to your position? *Answer options:* I am an anti-Zionist; I am a non-Zionist; I am not sure what Zionism means; Don't know; Other, please specify.

Focusing on the two sampling points either side of October 7, overall, most respondents (77%) did *not* switch their position on their identification with Zionism. This is the sum of the orange shaded cells in Table 1. Yet 23% *did* switch positions. The Zionist gains are shown in blue font, and losses are in brown font. Zionist losses totalled 3.1%; Zionist gains totalled 9.0%. The net result of all these switches was an overall increase in the Zionist position from 61.3% (2022) to 67.3% (2024). The table shows the largest individual switch *to* Zionist was from non-Zionist (3.0% of the sample made this switch) followed by Don't know (with 2.6% switching). It also shows that the net change in the anti-Zionist position was almost nil (from 8.1% in 2022 to 8.3% in 2024). In general, while the majority did not change positions on this measure following October 7, those who did tended to move from uncertain or non-committal positions towards self-identification as Zionist.²²

²¹ While this change was not statistically significant, the change between November 2022 and June 2025 was weakly statistically significant.


²² The change in both the Zionist and non-Zionist positions were statistically significant (based on 95% confidence intervals). The small differences between the figures reported in Table 1 and Figure 8 are a result of us using slightly different samples for analysis: in Table 1 (n=2834), analysis is conducted over two waves, whereas in Figure 8 (n=1689), it is over three waves.

Table 1. Detailed change in Zionist self-identification, November 2022 and June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2834)

		Position after October 7 (June 2024)						Total
		Zionist	Anti-Zionist	Non-Zionist	Not sure what Zionism means	Don't know	Other	
Position before October 7 (November 2022)	Zionist	58.3%	-	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.6%	61.3%
	Anti-Zionist	0.5%	6.3%	1.0%	0.1%	-	0.2%	8.1%
	Non-Zionist	3.0%	1.4%	8.6%	1.4%	0.9%	1.2%	16.5%
	Not sure what Zionism means	1.7%	0.2%	0.7%	1.2%	0.5%	0.2%	4.5%
	Don't know	2.6%	0.1%	0.7%	0.2%	1.5%	0.2%	5.4%
	Other	1.3%	0.2%	1.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.9%	4.2%
Total		67.3%	8.3%	13.1%	3.9%	4.1%	3.4%	100.0%

The total Zionist gains (blue figures in Table 1) sum to 9.0% and losses (brown figures) sum to 3.1%. Thus, the net is the difference between the two which is +5.9%—indicating that just under 6% of people switched to the Zionist position. This is shown graphically in Figure 9 which also shows the net change for all the other positions including the anti-Zionist one. This exhibited a net gain too but of just 0.2% with all other positions showing net losses. This picture reflects a small overall shift in attitudes, with those who were previously more hesitant, perhaps because they felt uncomfortable doing so or were confused about the meanings of these labels, now choosing a position. In this sense the level of clarity on whether people see themselves as Zionists or not increased, but so did polarisation, with fewer people opting to ‘sit on the fence’ on this matter.

Figure 9. Net change in Zionist self-identification from November 2022 to June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2834)




See note below Figure 8 for question wording.

When we look at longitudinal change in people's tendency to identify as a Zionist or not by sub-group, we see that demographically, there have been minimal shifts. Women increased their likelihood of identifying as Zionist very slightly more than men, but the overall age pattern barely changed, with the middle age groups remaining the most likely to identify as Zionist (Figure 10).

Similarly, in terms of Jewish denomination, little changed overall, although members of Liberal Judaism,²³ which had comparatively few members identifying as Zionist before October 7 (51%), stood further apart from other denominational groups afterwards, including non-synagogue members. The pre-existing pattern in terms of religiosity also barely changed, although the gap between the 'very' weakly religious and the rest extended further.

Politically, the relative positions of Jewish supporters of all three main parties remained the same, but supporters of the Green Party stood even further apart from the rest in terms of their likelihood to identify as a Zionist after October 7.

Figure 10. Proportion who identify as Zionist, November 2022 and June 2024 by various characteristics, longitudinal data (n=2834)



See note below Figure 8 for question wording.


²³ See footnote 20.

Aliyah (emigrating to Israel)

JPR's longitudinal cohort was asked on five occasions how likely it is that they will 'make aliyah'—that is, emigrate to Israel—in the "next five years." This has been recorded each time on a scale from 0 (extremely unlikely) to 10 (extremely likely). The mean (average) scores for respondents to this question are presented in Figure 11. In November 2022, the mean score was 1.38, but by July 2024, nine months after October 7, the equivalent score had climbed to 1.95, a statistically significant rise. This level persisted (1.99) when the group was asked again in June 2025. However, even this score was lower than in July 2020, when the UK was in COVID-19 lockdown, when it stood at 2.29, which was statistically significantly higher.²⁴

To reiterate, this is the same group of Jewish people measured and linked over time. These changes in aliyah sentiment likely reflect people's responses to a combination of factors. On the one hand, we see a genuine increase in Israel attachment and Zionist sentiment as noted above. Yet on the other, it is also likely to reflect how comfortable and settled people felt living in the UK, something explored more deeply in the next section.

Figure 11. Likelihood of 'making aliyah', mean score, July 2020, August 2021, November 2022, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1312)



Question: How likely, if at all, is it that you will live permanently in Israel ('make aliyah' or return there) in the next five years, where 0 is 'Extremely unlikely' and 10 is 'Extremely likely'?

At the sub-group level, changes in aliyah sentiment show minimal sensitivity in terms of demography—with men and women increasing in equal proportion. The slight demographic exception is the 80+ age group, where sentiment rose less than in other groups and it remained the group least likely to be considering aliyah after October 7 (Figure 12).


Denominationally, the pre-existing pattern whereby Orthodox Jews were more likely to be considering aliyah than non-Orthodox Jews, also remained after October 7. This was also the

²⁴ It is possible this high score reflects differences between how the pandemic was being handled in UK compared to Israel at that time, but it also likely reflects economic circumstances for many in the UK (for example due to work furloughing), which are commonly a driver of migration.

case for the religiosity measure, although the distance between the weakest and strongest positions grew.

Politically, this 'stretching' pattern is also seen, with Jewish supporters of the Conservative Party increasing their likelihood of aliyah far beyond other groups. But whereas Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were fairly similar to one another on this issue prior to October 7, they moved somewhat apart from each other afterwards, with Liberal Democrat supports falling back. Jewish Green Party supporters remained the least likely to be considering aliyah; indeed, their mean score fell even further, from 0.7 to just 0.2.

Figure 12. Likelihood of making aliyah, mean score, longitudinal data N=2843



Question: How likely, if at all, is it that you will live permanently in Israel ('make aliyah') in the next five years, where 0 is 'Extremely unlikely' and 10 is 'Extremely likely'?

2 / Antisemitism and vulnerability


When considering the impact of October 7 and its aftermath on Jewish identity, it is valuable to contextualise this with respect to Jewish peoples' experience of antisemitism. Data consistently indicate that when tensions between Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East rise, there is a concomitant increase in antisemitic incidents in the Diaspora, including in the UK.²⁵ So while antisemitism *per se* is not an aspect of Jewish identity, its presence can impact how Jewish people see themselves and interpret their experiences.

In the following section, we firstly consider respondents' personal experiences of antisemitism, followed by their general perceptions of it. We then look at extent to which the idea of combatting antisemitism as a sentiment, informs peoples' understanding of their own Jewish identity. Finally, we assess the extent to which antisemitism impacts them as Jewish people in the UK.

Experience of antisemitism

Respondents were asked whether they had personally experienced an antisemitic incident either in the preceding calendar year or during a specified period. In the three years prior to 2023, between 17% and 20% of these respondents reported experiencing at least one such incident. When asked in June 2024 if they had experienced an antisemitic incident in the preceding eighteen months (half of which included the post-October 7 period), 29% had done so—an almost doubling of this indicator (Figure 13). There are, however, at least two important caveats to consider here. First, the periods to which these figures relate are not of equal length, and second, October 7 took place in the middle of the final period, so this column conflates two potentially very different time periods. To help contextualise these findings, incident data from the Community Security Trust (CST) are reproduced in Figure 14 showing antisemitic incidents reported to that organisation over the entire period, revealing not only a spike in October 2023 but a long, elevated tail following it.²⁶

Figure 13. Proportion of respondents who experienced at least one antisemitic incident, longitudinal data, Jewish population, various time periods (n=1619)




Question: Now we want to ask about any incidents of antisemitism you may have experienced that were directed at you personally. Thinking about the period since the 1st January 2023, have you experienced any of the following? **Response options:** A physical antisemitic attack; A verbal antisemitic attack; Antisemitic discrimination at work or other venue or institution; Antisemitic damage to your property; Online antisemitic abuse or harassment directed at you personally; Other type of antisemitic incident(s); None of these; I am unsure if an incident I experienced was antisemitic.

²⁵ Community Security Trust, 2021. [Research Briefing - The Month of Hate](#); Boyd J. 2024. [Antisemitism in the aftermath of October 7: What do the data tell us, and what more do we still need to know?](#) London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; FRA, 2018. [Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism](#), Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, p.43.

²⁶ The CST is the UK Jewish community's main body monitoring antisemitic incidents.


Figure 14. Data from the CST (Community Security Trust) showing the number of antisemitic incidents recorded by month, for the period April 2021 to October 2024



Source: CST 2025, op. cit, p.5.

To better understand the difference October 7 made, respondents to JPR's panel were asked in June 2024 to report, retrospectively, on their experiences of antisemitism during the previous eighteen months, by time period. While these are therefore not longitudinal data (see Methodological note on page 6), they are indicative of the changes that occurred in Jewish people's experience of antisemitism in the UK (Figure 15). They also reflect the pattern of data collected by CST (Figure 14). The JPR data show that the most common types of antisemitic experience were verbal attacks and online abuse or harassment. The likelihood of respondents saying they experienced a verbal antisemitic attack increased five-fold (2% up to 10%) either side of October 7 and the number experiencing an online attack more than trebled (from 2% up to 7%). Moreover, a heightened level of antisemitic abuse continued well into 2024 and was still double pre-October 7 levels by at least June of that year (also reflected in the CST data).

Figure 15. Experience of antisemitic incidents prior to and following October 7, (not longitudinal) N=4651



Question: You said you experienced one or more antisemitic incident(s) since the beginning of 2023. When did this incident or incidents happen?


Perception of antisemitism in the UK

Our longitudinal sample was asked at four different points in time whether they considered antisemitism to be a problem in the UK (Figure 16). Even in May 2023, five months before the events of October 7, a clear majority (70%) regarded antisemitism as being either a 'very' or 'fairly' big problem. Even so, concern increased markedly thereafter. By June 2024, nine months after October 7, 87% held this view—a statistically significant increase on the May 2023 figure.

This heightened level of concern was also higher than the equivalent one recorded in August 2021, when 82% of this longitudinal sample had said antisemitism was a very or fairly big problem. While the increase from 2021 to 2024 was narrower, it remained statistically significant. Notably, the August 2021 survey was conducted during a period in which the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded what was then the highest level of antisemitic incidents it had ever recorded in the UK.

The heightened sense that antisemitism is a serious problem did not dissipate over time. By June 2025, twenty months on from October 7, 85% still described antisemitism as a very or fairly big problem in the UK. The small decline of two percentage points from the June 2024 level was not statistically significant, indicating that perceptions remained at essentially the same elevated level. (Note that the June 2025 survey was conducted before the terrorist attack on Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.)

Figure 16. To what extent do you think antisemitism is a problem in the UK? August 2021, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025. UK Jewish population, longitudinal data (n=1117)




Question: To what extent do you think the following are a problem in the UK? *Categories:* Crime level (e.g. assault, theft); Unemployment; Racism; Antisemitism; Immigration; Government corruption; Intolerance towards Muslims. *Response options:* A very big problem; A fairly big problem; Not a very big problem; Not a problem at all; Don't know. (VB+FB = 'very big' + 'fairly big').

The picture of change in this measure is especially dramatic if we focus solely on responses saying antisemitism is a 'very big problem' in the UK. This proportion rose from 17% in May

2023 to 47% in June 2024—*almost a three-fold increase*—following October 7 (Figure 16). Again, this elevated picture persisted to at least June 2025, twenty months after October 7, with half of all respondents (50%) by then saying they felt it was a very big problem. This count is also a 13-percentage point (and statistically significant) rise from 33% recorded in August 2021. This sharp rise reflects how concern about antisemitism in the UK not only increased but also *intensified* following October 7.

Since the data are longitudinal, we can measure net change either side of October 7. Half (50%) of respondents changed their position on whether they thought antisemitism was a problem in the UK. Of those, seven times more (44%) switched to a position that indicated they felt antisemitism was ‘more of a problem’ than before; just 6% moved in the other direction. The net change—the difference between all those who moved in the direction of more of a problem minus all those who moved in the direction of less of a problem—was 38% towards more of a problem (Figure 17). We can contrast this with the data on emotional attachment to Israel which showed (see Figure 2) first, that 31% changed their position on this sentiment—whereas 50% did so here—and second, that the net movement was 17% in the direction of greater attachment, compared with 38% moving towards more of a problem. In other words, following October 7 *while the dial shifted considerably in terms of Israel attachment, it shifted much more in terms of concern about antisemitism in the UK.*

Figure 17. Net change in whether respondents feel antisemitism is a problem in the UK, May 2023 and June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2,528)




Turning to sub-group analysis and focusing on those who felt that antisemitism is a ‘very’ big problem in the UK, women continued to be more likely to feel this than men, although both exhibited large rises following October 7 (Figure 18). Examining the data by age, prior to October 7, younger people were notably more likely to feel that antisemitism was a very big problem than older people, but that picture more or less reversed by June 2024, when older people were more likely than younger people to say this. Nevertheless, all age bands were still far more likely to feel that antisemitism was a very big problem in June 2024 compared to May 2023.

Denominationally, a notable shift can also be seen following October 7. In 2023, there was little to differentiate between the various groupings, except for the membership of Masorti communities who, collectively, had the lowest likelihood by far. Yet the post-October 7 picture is very different, with the more Orthodox denominations moving the most and becoming *much* more likely than the less Orthodox to think that antisemitism is a very big problem in the UK.

Politically, higher proportions of Jewish supporters of all major political parties perceived antisemitism to be a problem in the UK after October 7 compared to before it, more or less in direct proportion to the pre-October 7 pattern. Following October 7, the proportion of Labour Party and Liberal Democrat party supporters who thought antisemitism was a problem increased dramatically; almost three times more likely in each case. Meanwhile, Green Party supporters stepped *backwards* on this issue and became half as likely to see antisemitism as a problem (from 14% down to 7%).

Figure 18. Proportion who say antisemitism is 'A very big problem' in the UK by various characteristics, longitudinal data, May 2023 and June 2024, Jewish population, N=2528



The importance of 'combatting antisemitism' as a part of people's Jewish identities


In addition to asking respondents the extent to which they regard antisemitism to be a problem, we have also explored at three separate points in time whether the concept of 'combatting antisemitism' is considered an important aspect of how people see themselves Jewishly. We should note this is not a measure of the extent to which antisemitism itself (somehow) informs respondents' Jewish identity, but rather how the notion of combatting antisemitism is important to them as Jews. Survey data show consistently that 'combatting antisemitism' is almost universally seen as being important.

Very high proportions of longitudinal respondents (nine out of ten) see 'combatting antisemitism' as an important aspect of their Jewish identity. Yet either side of October 7, there was still a small, but statistically significant rise, with the combined score for 'very' and 'fairly' important increasing from 89% in May 2023 to 92% in June 2024 (Figure 19). Moreover, we see that this elevated proportion persisted when the next pulse was taken in June 2025

(91%). It may also be that the May 2023 measure was unusual (i.e. low) as there was no difference between the June 2024 (92%) measure and an earlier one taken in November 2022 (92%).

Shifting focus to the strongest 'very important' scores, there was also a statistically significant increase from 61% in May 2023 to 67% in June 2024. Meanwhile the decline to 63% in June 2025 was *not* statistically significant. In other words, looking at the longer view, October 7 does *not* seem to have been a significant factor in changing the place of combatting antisemitism in British Jewish identity; it was already high well before October 7 and remained so for some time after. (And we note again that the June 2025 survey took place before the terrorist attack on Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.)

Figure 19. The importance of 'Combatting antisemitism' to respondents' Jewish identity, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025 (n=1696)




Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person? (VI+FI = 'very important' + 'fairly important').

Feeling safe in the UK

On multiple occasions, this group of respondents was asked how safe they felt as Jews living in the UK. This question took the form of an agree/disagree statement 'I feel safe as a Jewish person living in the UK', where 0 is 'Strongly disagree' (feel very *unsafe*) and 10 is 'Strongly agree' (feel very *safe*).* In May 2023, five months prior to October 7, the average (or mean) score on this scale was 7.4 in the direction of feeling more safe, the highest recorded in our series. However, by July 2024 this had fallen considerably to a mean score of 6.2, a statistically significant change (Figure 20). By June 2025, the score had fallen further still to 5.8, a further statistically significant decline from June 2024. In other words, respondents felt *increasingly unsafe* in the UK following October 7.

Figure 20. Whether respondents feel safe as Jews living in the UK*, mean score, longitudinal data, August 2021, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025 (n=1097)



* Don't know responses are excluded in all waves.


Question: As a Jewish person living in the UK, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement by selecting a number between 0 and 10, where 0 is 'Strongly disagree' and 10 is 'Strongly agree'. Statement: I feel safe as a Jewish person living in the UK

Exploring this deterioration in how secure Jews felt following October 7 by sub-group, we see declines equally among men and women, with women feeling less safe than men before and after (Figure 21). Similarly, all age groups experienced a deterioration in feelings of safety, with younger age groups feeling less safe than older age groups.

Denominationally, a decline was also observed across all Jewish subgroups. However, prior to October 7 there was little difference between denominations, but after October 7, the more Orthodox groups felt noticeably less safe than the less Orthodox groups (Figure 21). This parallels data on perceptions of antisemitism (Figure 18, page 25). Turning to respondents' degrees of religiosity and looking at the change between 2022 (as 2023 data were unavailable) and the post-October 7 position, we similarly see that the more religious respondents are, the greater the decline in how safe they felt. Indeed, the very weakly religious felt very slightly *safer* by this point, aligning with the denominational data in Figure 21.

Politically, this overall deterioration in feeling safe was greater for Jewish Conservative Party supporters than for Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters.

Figure 21. How safe do you feel as a Jewish person living in the UK? by various characteristics, 2023 and 2024, mean score, longitudinal data N=2156




Question: As a Jewish person living in the UK, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement by selecting a number between 0 and 10, where 0 is 'Strongly disagree' and 10 is 'Strongly agree'. Statement: I feel safe as a Jewish person living in the UK.

^ Data for religiosity relate to the period 2022 to 2023, n=2821.

Anxiety

Respondents' mental health has also been measured at several time points. One measure investigated how anxious respondents felt 'yesterday' at four separate points in time, based on a scale from 0 - Not at all anxious to 10 - Completely anxious on each occasion. Measured this way, the longitudinal data reveal striking changes. In August 2021, the mean score was 2.99, rising to 3.76 in June 2024, a statistically significant increase. Anxiety levels had eased a little by June 2025, a statistically significant decline, although this measure was still statistically indistinguishable from the mean of 3.22 in July 2020 measured during the COVID-19 pandemic. In brief, we can see that anxiety levels remained elevated 20 months after October 7.

Figure 22. Mean scores for the anxiety index, July 2020, August 2021, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1333)



Question: Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday? Answer scale: 0 - Not at all anxious to 10 - Completely anxious.

If we assume that anxiety levels remained broadly stable between August 2021 and October 2023 (JPR does not have data on this measure for that period), an important question arises: what accounts for the sharp increase in anxiety observed in June 2024? Several possible explanations merit consideration.


One is that rising levels of antisemitism in the UK were a key driver. However, it is important to distinguish between directly experiencing antisemitism and perceiving or anticipating it. Both may contribute to anxiety, but they may do so in different ways and to different degrees. Related to this is the marked decline in feelings of safety in the UK. Feeling less safe would be expected to increase anxiety, but it remains unclear how far these concerns are rooted in personal experiences of antisemitism, broader perceptions of threat, or both.

Another possible explanation is concern for Israel. The attacks of October 7 exposed a level of vulnerability in Israel that many Diaspora Jews may not previously have fully appreciated. Anxiety may therefore have been driven not only by fears about Jewish life in the UK, but also by concerns about the security and future of the Jewish State. Moreover, given the overall enhanced place of Israel in respondents' Jewish identities, these two emotions are likely linked – concern about antisemitism in the UK, concern for Israel's future, and how the two interact and shape people's perceptions of their own personal safety and security, are likely to influence how they respond to the question on anxiety. At the same time, other external factors could also be involved – a wider sense of malaise about the state of the world and the

future. Further statistical analysis is needed to assess the relative importance of these different factors and develop a clearer understanding of what was driving anxiety among Jews at this time.

To provide context, JPR's data can also be directly compared with figures gathered by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for the national general population. These show that during the pandemic, in June 2020 and August 2021, levels of anxiety among Jews were almost identical to those of the general populations (Figure 23). However, by June 2024, nine months after October 7, a sudden and substantial divergence could be seen, with anxiety levels among Jews far exceeding those of the general population. Though smaller, this gap was still clearly observable in June 2025, twenty months after October 7. Given how similar mean anxiety scores had been historically, and how flat they have been for the general population over the entire period, the size of the gap following October 7 is striking.

Figure 23. Mean scores for the anxiety index, July 2020, August 2021, June 2024, June 2025, longitudinal data, UK, Jewish population (blue, n=1333), general population (orange, n>150,000)



Question: Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday? Answer scale: 0 - Not at all anxious to 10 - Completely anxious.

Source: General population data are from ONS's Annual Population Survey (<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/datasets/quarterlypersonalwellbeingestimatesnonseasonallyadjusted>)


JPR tracked an increase in anxiety from 2021 to 2024 for all sub-groups measured (Figure 24). Although women continued to feel more anxious than men after October 7, anxiety increased more among men than among women. It also increased among all age groups, but the increase was proportionately much greater among older than younger respondents.

All Jewish denominational groupings experienced increased anxiety, with the exception of the strictly Orthodox (UOHC members) who were also the least likely to feel anxious by far. That is despite the Orthodox being most likely to say antisemitism was a very big problem in the UK (Figure 18), and indeed their greater likelihood than other denominational groups to experience antisemitism directly. However, separately, anxiety increased regardless of respondents' level of Jewish religiosity.

Emotional attachment to Israel was not associated with anxiety levels. Anxiety increased quite uniformly across the sample irrespective of respondents' emotional attachment to Israel. Given the war was ongoing in 2024, it might have been expected that those who were more emotionally attached to Israel would have been more concerned for Israel's safety and therefore exhibited greater levels of anxiety. But since this is not the case, it suggests that the elevated anxiety levels have been driven by concerns about antisemitism in the UK over and above concerns about Israel's security.

Politically, increases in anxiety were experienced among Jewish supporters of all three traditional political parties, but the increase was greatest among Conservative Party supporters. In 2021, Labour Party supporters were more likely to be anxious than Conservative Party supporters, but by 2024 this difference had disappeared.

Figure 24. How anxious did you feel yesterday? Mean scores by various characteristics, longitudinal data, 2021 and 2024 (n=1754)



Question: Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday? *Response scale:* 0 - Not at all anxious to 10 - Completely anxious.


3 / Jewish identity

We now examine several indicators of Jewish identity to see how these changed among our longitudinal sample, if at all: Jewish peoplehood, Jewish values, and Jewish religiosity. However, to begin, we can look at a generalised measure simply called ‘strength of Jewish identity.’

3.1 Strength of Jewish identity

At three* points in time, respondents were asked to say where they felt they sat on a scale of Jewish identity, running from 0 (meaning their Jewish identity had ‘very low strength’) to 10 (meaning it had ‘very high strength’). More than half of respondents (55%) chose 9 or 10 in November 2022, and the sample as a whole had a mean score of 8.29, i.e. leaning heavily towards the high strength end of the scale. Figure 25 shows the equivalent mean scores for June 2024 (8.31) nine months after October 7, and for June 2025 (8.32) twenty months after. (The proportions scoring 9-10 were 54.4% and 55.7% respectively indicating minimal change in the spread.) This shows that in contrast to the rise in Israel attachment in this group, this generalised measure shows there was no overall change in the strength of respondents’ Jewish identity either side of October 7.

Figure 25. Strength of Jewish identity, mean scores, November 2022, June 2024, June 2025, UK Jewish population, longitudinal data (n=1689)*



* This question was also asked in wave 4 (May 2023) however, unlike the other three occasions, this wave included a Don't know option. Because this is longitudinal data, even removing the respondents who reported Don't know, the data for this wave are not strictly comparable with the other datapoints. In the interests of transparency, the mean score (excluding Don't know) was 8.05 in w4.

Question: Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 according to the strength of your Jewish identity, where 0 means ‘very low strength’ and 10 means ‘very high strength.’

3.2 Jewish peoplehood


A second aspect of Jewish identity we can examine using JPR's longitudinal data is broadly defined as 'Jewish peoplehood.' This incorporates an abstract notion of Jewish connectedness and in-group solidarity and responsibility, as well as more tangible feelings of attachment to a local Jewish community.

Feeling part of the Jewish People

To measure sentiment towards 'feeling part of the Jewish People', respondents were asked how important or unimportant this concept was to their own Jewish identity. Surveys find a consistently high proportion of Jews consider this to be important. In May 2023, 90% of respondents said this was 'very' or 'fairly' important, rising slightly to 92% in June 2024, nine months after October 7 (a small but still statistically significant increase) (Figure 26). By June 2025 the proportion had fallen slightly to 89%, and although it was also small, the decline was again statistically significant. That said, these changes for the combined scores are negligible.

Looking at 'very important' responses, the increase either side of October 7 from 63% in May 2023 to 66% in June 2024 was not statistically significant, nor were any of the other changes from survey to survey. Again, changes on this measure of Jewish peoplehood are minimal.

Figure 26. The importance of 'Feeling part of the Jewish people' to respondents' Jewish identity, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024 (n=1696)



VI + FI = Very important + Fairly important.


The picture here is very similar to the one examined above on the importance of combatting antisemitism to respondents' Jewish identities—a measure that also strikes a near-universal chord (Figure 19). Can any parallels therefore be drawn between the prominence of these two indicators in Jewish identity, neither of which changed much following October 7? One technical point is that there was not much room for an increase in either measure—the scores were very high to begin with—but that doesn't explain why the intensity of feeling, that is, a

movement from fairly to very important, was so similar in both measures as well. Perhaps there is some underlying association between the two statements? Since feeling part of the Jewish People is a clear expression of Jewish peoplehood, these results may be suggesting that combatting antisemitism is an expression of a similar sentiment, i.e. Jewish peoplehood. Further analysis might help clarify whether this is indeed the case.

Jewish community attachment

JPR's longitudinal respondents were asked at multiple points in time a more specific question about how attached they feel to their local Jewish community.²⁷ In November 2022, 64% of respondents said they felt either 'strongly' or 'moderately' attached to their local Jewish community (Figure 27); a year and a half later, and nine months after October 7, this had risen to 71%, a statistically significant increase. By June 2025 it had declined to 67%, although this was not a statistically significant decline nor was it statistically different to the November 2022 level (64%). Indeed, looking further back, November 2022 seems to be something of an anomaly, perhaps a 'hangover' from the pandemic. Either way, even the June 2024 boost to 71% is statistically no different to the position recorded in August 2021 (68%) suggesting we shouldn't read too much into these changes.

Figure 27. How attached (or otherwise) do you currently feel to your local Jewish community? July 2020, August 2021, November 2022, June 2024, June 2025. Longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1321)




* SA+MA = Strongly attached + Moderately attached.

²⁷ The term 'local Jewish community' is deliberately ambiguous to capture the reality that Jewish community means different things to different people. For some it means a local synagogue, while for others it could be understood as attachment to another local Jewish organisation/s, or, in its loosest form, social attachment to a group of local Jewish people.

Measured in terms of ‘strongly attached’ only, the overall picture is similar. There was a strong rise from 36% to 46%, either side of the October 7, but the decline to 40% in June 2025, twenty months after October 7, was statistically significant. Essentially any additional boost to sentiment about communal attachment had more or less vanished by this point; the post October 7 rise was temporary and soon passed.

Focusing only on the changes that took place between November 2022 and June 2024, we see that most people (61%) didn't change their position, whereas 28% moved towards a *more* communally attached position and 12% moved towards a *less* communally attached position (Figure 28). The resulting net change therefore was a 16-percentage point swing towards the more attached position, but as we have seen, as time passed this proved to be a temporary positive swing.

Figure 28. Net change in feelings of attachment to your local Jewish community*, longitudinal data, November 2022 and June 2024, UK Jewish population (n=2,834)



* Excluding ‘There is no local Jewish community where I live’, 2022=9%, 2024=7%.

Looking in greater detail at the change either side of October 7, we see that feelings of strong communal attachment increased for both men and women, although the increase was greater among women (from 30% to 42%) (Figure 29). In terms of age, all age groups experienced an increase, with older people remaining more communally attached than younger people. Attachment increased most strongly for those aged in their forties and fifties.


While communal attachment tends to be stronger among the more Orthodox than the less Orthodox denominations, it increased more strongly among the more Orthodox. However, examining the data through the lens of religiosity, we observe a somewhat different dynamic. Although we see that the more religious respondents are, the more strongly attached they feel to their local Jewish community, people’s levels of attachment to their local Jewish community rose among all stratas after October 7, but it rose most strongly in the *middle* of the religiosity spectrum. This finding challenges the notion of a British ‘Surge,’ or the ‘October 8 Jew’: i.e. the idea that less engaged Jews in particular ‘woke up’ after October 7.²⁸ On this evidence there is little to suggest that the less engaged or less religious moved more than any others.

Local community attachment may also be demonstrated by people’s charitable giving priorities, and here we see that attachment is strongest, and increased the most, among those prioritising Jewish and Israeli causes (Figure 29). While feelings of communal attachment also increased among those whose priorities lie elsewhere (i.e. general UK charities and overseas aid), these increases were much more modest, suggesting, at least in relative terms, these people grew more distant from the Jewish community.

²⁸ JFNA 2025a, op cit.; JFNA 2025b, op cit.

Supporters of the Conservatives and the Labour Party also experienced enhanced feelings of communal attachment, whereas supporters of other parties remained more or less unchanged in this respect although the large gap between Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters on this measure almost vanished after October 7.

Figure 29. Currently feel 'Strongly attached' to your local Jewish community, longitudinal data, November 2022 and June 2024, UK Jewish population (n=2,834)



* Excluding 'There is no local Jewish community where I live', 2022=9%, 2024=7%.


3.3. Jewish values

We have seen that while Israel attachment increased strongly following October 7, increases in several measures of Jewish identity and Jewish peoplehood were more muted. The third dimension of Jewish identity we now examine relates to Jewish values and ethical positions. First, we look at a generalised measure of Jewish ethical behaviour, then at attitudes towards social justice. Finally, we move to more specific examples of ethical behaviour, focusing on charitable donations both in general and to Israel in particular.

Ethical behaviour

Respondents were asked how important or unimportant 'Strong moral and ethical behaviour' is to how they see themselves as Jews. Surveys consistently find a very high proportion of Jews consider this to be important, suggesting it is considered a universal trait. We explored this question among our longitudinal respondents at two separate points in time. On the first occasion, in November 2022, 96% said this was 'very' or 'fairly' important to them. On the second occasion, in June 2025, the same proportion said this. While we cannot know if the picture changed between these two points in time (they are over two and a half years apart), perhaps particularly in the immediate aftermath of October 7, the similarity of the two readings indicates there was likely no overall change to this sentiment. However, looking at 'very important' responses, we do see a small measurable change, moving from 73% in November 2022 to 76% in June 2025. This modest change is statistically significant and suggests a slight increase in this sentiment.

Figure 30. The importance of 'Strong moral and ethical behaviour' to respondents' Jewish identity, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, June 2025 (n=2590)




Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person? (VI = 'very important'; FI = 'fairly important').

Supporting social justice causes

Another measure of Jewish values that we investigated considered the place of ‘supporting social justice causes’ as a component of respondents’ Jewish identities. Measured in November 2022 and June 2024, either side of October 7, a small but statistically significant *decline* was recorded from 86% to 82% (Figure 31). Moreover, this decline persisted twenty months after October 7 (81%). In terms of respondents selecting ‘very important’, a decline is also evident, and while it is not statistically significant either side of October 7, it becomes so when measured between November 2022 and June 2025. Being careful to not read too deeply into this result, whilst high throughout, sentiment clearly and significantly weakened, perhaps reflecting a Jewish inward turn, with slightly less enthusiasm among Jews for *tikkun olam* or ‘healing the world.’ If so, this may reflect, among some respondents, a sense of alienation from social justice organisations in which they had previously felt welcomed, included and at home—organisations that, in a number of cases, were even founded by Jews.

Figure 31. The importance of ‘Supporting social justice causes (helping the poor or homeless, aid to the developing world)’ to respondents’ Jewish identity – longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, June 2024, June 2025 (n=2070)




Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person? [Option: ‘Supporting social justice causes’].

Donating funds to charity

A second question respondents were asked in the arena of Jewish values was how important ‘donating funds to charity’ was to their sense of Jewish self. The longitudinal data show that either side of October 7, the combined proportion reporting ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important rose from 82% in May 2023 to 86% in June 2024, a small, but statistically significant increase which was maintained in June 2025, twenty months after October 7 (Figure 32). That said, the November 2022 figure (84%) is not statistically different from either the June 2024 (86%) or

June 2025 (89%) figures. Indeed, there was a very slight but statistically significant *fall* in 'very important' scores between May 2023 (46%) and June 2024 (41%). Overall, despite small fluctuations, it is difficult to conclude that much really changed in Jewish people's sentiment towards making charitable donations either side of October 7.

Figure 32. The importance of 'Donating funds to charity' to respondents' Jewish identity, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024, June 2025 (n=1635)



Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?


Israel as a charitable priority

While little moved in terms of a generalised sentiment towards charitable giving as a component of people's Jewish identities, the picture is very different when the focus switches to specific charitable priorities. In November 2022, our longitudinal sample was asked a question about how they prioritise their charitable giving (Figure 33). Four options were offered plus 'None of these': Jewish charities in the UK, general charities in the UK, Israel charities, and charities concerned with overseas aid, and respondents were asked to select one of these as their primary charitable priority. It revealed that 40% prioritised Jewish charities in the UK, a significantly higher proportion than those prioritising general (non-Jewish) UK charities (32%). At that time, in 2022, just 6% prioritised Israel charities. Yet when the same group was asked this question again in June 2024, nine months after October 7, striking and statistically significant changes were observed. First, the proportion prioritising Israel charities almost doubled (up from 6% to 11%), and second, the proportion saying 'None of these' (i.e. those who prioritise something else or who give two or more options equal weight), more than halved (down from 13% to 6%). (Note this is unrelated to the *amount* of donations made.)

This question was asked for a third time in June 2025*, twenty months after October 7 and, intriguingly, this showed a profound longer-term shift had taken place. The proportion of respondents prioritising Israel had *risen again* to 16%, almost three times higher than the pre-October 7 proportion of 6%. Meanwhile little change occurred in terms of respondents'

prioritisation of Jewish charities in the UK, overseas aid to the poor, or ‘None of these’, but the proportion prioritising general charities in the UK *declined* from 32% to 28% (a small, but statistically significant result). By 2025, Israel had become the third most prioritised category having been the least popular choice among these options before October 7. All this strongly suggests something fundamentally changed about Jewish peoples’ charitable priorities following October 7: a substantial rise in supporting charities and causes related to Israel, alongside a decline in supporting “General charities and causes in the UK.’

Figure 33. Charitable priorities in November 2022, June 2024, June 2025*, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1039*)



* Only half of respondents were asked this question in June 2025 as part of an experiment. The other half were asked a similar question but in a different way. Statistically the results remain comparable although the June data only report half of the longitudinal sample.

Question: To which of the following, if any, do you give the highest priority? Answer options: Jewish charities in the UK; General charities in the UK; Aid for the poor in other countries (outside the UK); Israel charities; None of these.

In brief, while a sharp and sustained rise in the prioritisation of Israel charities occurred, prioritisation of UK Jewish charities still remained stable at around 40%. In addition, ‘None of these’ halved, while the proportion prioritising General UK charities declined. Although the data do not allow us to determine whether the actual amounts donated also changed, they do suggest that October 7 did not significantly weaken overall commitment to UK Jewish causes. Moreover, taking the proportions prioritising either UK Jewish charities or Israel ones (i.e. charities likely to have a focus on particular Jewish interests and concerns), we see that the combined counts increased from 46% to 51% and then to 56% over the period shown, suggesting Jewish charitable priorities became rather more particularist following October 7.

The shift towards Israel charities parallels earlier findings about other Israel-related indicators. All of these rose significantly and remained elevated following October 7. However, only this measure—Israel as a charitable priority—exhibits a *second* significant rise beyond the initial spike recorded in June 2024. We can only speculate as to why this later jump occurred here and not with the other Israel indicators, although the longitudinal data do shed further light on this result.

In Table 2, switching across two different time points is presented for two different periods: Table 2A shows the movement between 2022 and 2024, while Table 2B shows the movement from 2024 to 2025. In both time periods, a total of about two in three respondents (64%) did not change their charitable priority (orange shading). The corollary is that about one in three respondents did switch each time. Either side of October 7, from November 2022 to June 2024 (Table 2A), Israel charities primarily gained at the expense of Jewish UK charities (4.6%). Meanwhile, a complex interplay occurred, with General UK charities gaining from Jewish UK charities (3.8%) and None (4.6%). But the 3.8% switch away from UK Jewish charities was more than compensated for by a 6.3% switch gained from General UK charities.

Moving to Table 2B, from June 2024 to June 2025, Israel charities again gained from Jewish UK charities (5.7%), and the same 'compensatory' interplay occurred between Jewish UK and General UK charities. Thus, the broad pattern appears to be some movement away from support for UK Jewish charities towards support for Israel charities, but, at the same time, some movement away from support for general UK charities towards UK Jewish ones, which, from the perspective UK Jewish charities, offset any losses they may have experienced. The primary losers in these shifting sands are likely to have been general UK charities; post-October 7 realities in both the UK and Israel appear to have driven the Jewish population as a whole towards more particular Jewish causes than more universal general ones.

Table 2. Detailed change in charitable priorities from November 2022 to June 2024 (2A) and from June 2024 to June 2025 (2B), longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=1039)

Table 2A		Position 9 months after October 7 (June 2024)					Total in 2022
		Jewish charities in the UK	General charities in the UK	Aid for the poor in other countries (outside the UK)	Israel charities	None of these	
Position before October 7 (November 2022)	Jewish charities in the UK	29.9%	3.8%	0.4%	4.6%	0.9%	39.6%
	General charities in the UK	6.3%	20.6%	2.8%	1.2%	1.5%	32.3%
	Aid for the poor (outside the UK)	0.6%	2.3%	6.1%	0.3%	0.0%	9.3%
	Israel charities	1.5%	0.5%	0.0%	3.9%	0.0%	5.8%
	None of these	2.2%	4.6%	1.1%	1.3%	3.8%	13.0%
Total in 2024 >>		40.5%	31.8%	10.4%	11.2%	6.1%	100.0%

Table 2B		Position 20 months after October 7 (June 2025)					Total in 2024
		Jewish charities in the UK	General charities in the UK	Aid for the poor in other countries (outside the UK)	Israel charities	None of these	
Position 9 months after October 7 (June 2024)	Jewish charities in the UK	29.4%	4.1%	0.3%	5.7%	1.0%	40.5%
	General charities in the UK	5.3%	19.2%	3.3%	2.4%	1.6%	31.8%
	Aid for the poor (outside the UK)	0.5%	2.5%	6.1%	0.1%	1.2%	10.4%
	Israel charities	3.2%	0.3%	0.1%	7.4%	0.3%	11.2%
	None of these	1.3%	1.5%	1.1%	0.1%	2.1%	6.1%
Total in 2025 >>		39.7%	27.6%	10.8%	15.7%	6.2%	100.0%


Which subgroups were more likely to switch to Israel charities following October 7? Women were more likely to do so than men—indeed, they switched in both relative and absolute terms having been slightly behind men prior to October 7 (Figure 34). But in terms of age,

while all groups switched in this direction, the pre-existing pattern was largely unchanged either side of October 7.

Turning to Jewish denomination, the picture was complex in 2022 prior to October 7 although there was some relationship between level of orthodoxy and likelihood of prioritising Israel charities. Yet after October 7, that situation changed, with Masorti members moving from 6% to 20%, and becoming the group most likely to prioritise Israel charities. By contrast, the strictly Orthodox position *declined* slightly. However, in terms of religiosity, large increases were observed in all groups except the most weakly religious one, which also declined.

Supporters of the two main UK political parties increased their likelihood of supporting Israel charities—Jewish Labour supporters tripled their likelihood from 3% to 9%. Conversely, Jewish supporters of the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party moved in the opposite direction, becoming notably less likely to support Israel charities.

Figure 34. Highest priority given to 'Israel charities,' November 2022, June 2024, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population (n=2834)




3.4. Jewish religiosity and behaviour

The fourth and final dimension of Jewish identity (outside of Israel attachment) that we can examine longitudinally concerns Jewish religiosity and Jewish religious behaviour. In a period of trauma and crisis, one could hypothesise that many people might seek comfort and solace in spirituality and religious observance by increasing their levels of practice and religious engagement. On the other hand, one could also postulate that people may turn away from it, out of a sense of disillusionment about growing conflict or division over religion. What do the data in this instance tell us?

Synagogue engagement

Despite some anecdotal claims soon after October 7,²⁹ and in contrast to the clear strengthening of feelings of Jewish communal attachment and Jewish peoplehood, changes in Jewish community engagement and synagogue participation were negligible. Our longitudinal data indicate that while there was a slight shift towards greater Jewish synagogue participation, it was modest at best and, even though the proportion of respondents who said they never participate in a synagogue service fell from 28% in 2022 to 26% in 2024, this was not a statistically significant change (Figure 35). Looking at the data twenty months after October 7 it is even more apparent that no clear, long-term change in synagogue participation took place.

Figure 35. Participation in synagogue prayer services in previous 12 months; longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, June 2024*, June 2025 (n=2053)



Question: In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in a synagogue prayer service whether in person and/or online? Answer options: Not at all; Only on the High Holy Days; On High Holy Days and/or some other festivals; About once a month; Most or every Shabbat; Most or every Shabbat and other daily prayer services.


* The question wording relates to 12 months prior to June 2024 which includes October 7 2023, which may have distorted this datapoint.

²⁹ *The Jewish Chronicle*, October 19 2023, "As news from Israel rolls in, Jews are flocking back to shul" <https://www.thejc.com/news/as-news-from-israel-rolls-in-jews-are-flocking-back-to-shul-nq42u4fh>.

Self-described religiosity

As can be seen in several of the previous charts, JPR regularly asks its panel members a generalised question about their religiosity. Measured on a four-point scale from very strong to very weak religiosity, typically about half the respondents place themselves on the more strongly religious side and about half place themselves on the more weakly religious one. The change in the combined very strong and quite strong positions from November 2022 (49%) to July 2024 (51%)—i.e. the measures taken either side of October 7—was not statistically significant (Figure 36). Measured from further back in August 2021, when the combined score was 46%, there was a weakly statistically significant increase by June 2024, but looking even further back to July 2020 this vanishes. Focusing just on the very strongly religious position makes little difference either, with no significant increase either side of October 7 (from 14% to 15%). And while the very strong position steadily increased from August 2021 to June 2025 across four data points, the rise is modest and not clearly related to October 7, as it was rising before this point, perhaps due to a more general demographic shift occurring in the Jewish population. Overall, this unique set of five consecutive longitudinal measures shows that nothing substantive changed either side of October 7 in terms of self-described Jewish religiosity.

Figure 36. Current self-described level of religiosity; longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, July 2020, August 2021, November 2022, July 2024, July 2025 (n=1321)



Question: How would you describe your current level of religiosity?


* VS+QS = Very strong plus Quite strong religiosity

Studying Jewish religious texts

The final longitudinal measure we have regarding an aspect of Jewish life often associated with Jewish religiosity is one that asked respondents how important 'Studying Jewish religious texts' was to how they see themselves as Jews. As shown in Figure 37, hardly any

measurable change occurred between the two datapoints shown, and however one measures it, none of the changes observed was statistically significant. In addition, the *combined* score for the 'very' and 'fairly' important markers are lower on this measure than they are for just the 'very important' scores on most other indicators (e.g. see Figure 5, Figure 19, and Figure 26), indicating that this sentiment is generally relatively unimportant to most respondents.

Figure 37. The importance of 'Studying Jewish religious texts' to respondents' Jewish identity, longitudinal data, UK Jewish population, November 2022, May 2023, June 2024 (n=2164)



Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?
 VI + FI = Very important plus Fairly important.

Conclusion: How did October 7 change Jews in Britain?

Since October 7, two phrases have entered parts of Jewish global lexicon: ‘October 8 Jews’ and ‘the Surge.’ The first was popularised by Bret Stephens, a *New York Times* columnist, and later developed by others to describe Jews who, in the wake of the Hamas attacks and the reactions that followed, experienced a renewed sense of Jewish consciousness.³⁰ In its original formulation, October 8 Jews referred to those who discovered that individuals, institutions, or political spaces with whom and in which they had previously felt at home, were no longer reliable sources of solidarity or protection. But it soon morphed to more broadly describe Jews who discovered or reconnected with their Jewish identities, Israel or their local Jewish community following October 7. David Bernstein, writing in *SAPIR*, characterised the October 8 Jew particularly as a left-leaning Jewish person who came to recognise that progressive politics offered no guarantee against antisemitism.³¹

Meanwhile, ‘the Surge’ emerged as another post-October 7 term, but unlike the ‘October 8 Jew’ was more empirically grounded, developed most clearly in research by the Jewish Federations of North America. It describes a slightly different phenomenon: an increase in Jewish activity and engagement, especially of previously less engaged or unengaged Jews, in response to October 7.³²

The question this analysis asks is whether anything similar occurred in Britain. Did October 7 produce a British version of the ‘October 8 Jew’? Was there a British Jewish ‘Surge’? And if so, what exactly changed?

JPR is unusually well placed to address these questions because it was already following the same sample of British Jews across multiple survey waves, repeating a standardised set of questions, well before October 7. By continuing this longitudinal study beyond October 7, JPR has been able to examine directly what changed as a result of the attacks in terms of respondents’ views, feelings and behaviours.

The evidence suggests that October 7 did have a significant impact, but crucially, not in all the ways implied by the language of the ‘October 8 Jew’ or ‘the Surge.’ The clearest change was an overall strengthening of attachment to Israel, accompanied by a heightened sense of Jewish ‘peoplehood’—i.e. commonality and solidarity with Jews at home, in Israel and around the world. By contrast, most other aspects of Jewish identity remained remarkably stable. At the same time, these dynamics took place against a backdrop of rising antisemitism in Britain, declining feelings of safety, and increased anxiety.

If there was an ‘October 8 Jew’ in Britain, therefore, this person was *not* someone who became markedly more religious, or more observant, or more engaged in Jewish communal life following October 7. Nor is there evidence that the formerly less engaged increased their involvement appreciably—or any more than the formerly more engaged—suggesting that the ‘Surge’, if there was one at all, was quite a different and very specific phenomenon in Britain. The only indication of any kind of surge that occurred is among Jews who developed a deeper appreciation of Israel’s significance alongside a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish People.

³⁰ Stephens 2023, op. cit.

³¹ Bernstein, D. ‘[Jewish Community Relations and the October 8 Jew](#)’, *Sapir* Special Edition: October 2023-February 2024.

³² JFNA 2025b, op. cit.

What changed after October 7?

JPR's longitudinal data show a clear and sustained increase in attachment to Israel after October 7. This is evident not only in measures of emotional attachment, but also in the growing importance attached to supporting Israel, rising levels of Zionist identification, increased consideration of *aliyah*, and increased prioritisation of Israel-related charitable giving.

Moreover, these were not temporary responses. All Israel-related measures remained elevated for at least twenty months after October 7, and in the case of charitable giving to Israel, support continued to grow over time. The most significant shift observed in the data is therefore a reassessment of Israel's place in the lives and identity of British Jews. Overall, rather than weakening attachment to Israel, the events of October 7 and its aftermath have strengthened it.

Alongside this, indicators of Jewish peoplehood also increased, at least initially. More respondents said that feeling part of the Jewish People was important to their identity, and attachment to local Jewish community strengthened. Together, these findings suggest a heightened feeling of belonging to a wider Jewish collective although this waned over time.

But it is also important to realise this occurred against dramatic negative change to the environment in which Jews were living. Respondents reported increased experiences of antisemitism, growing concern about antisemitism as a problem in the UK, declining feelings of safety, and higher levels of anxiety. These developments are important because they help contextualise the other changes observed. Increased attachment to Israel and Jewish peoplehood emerged alongside a heightened sense of vulnerability and insecurity.

What did not change after October 7?

Most of these changes, however, were emotional rather than behavioural. While British Jews felt more connected to Israel and to one another, this did *not* translate into a broader increase in religious observance or communal participation. So despite widespread discussion of 'the October 8 Jew', there is little evidence of any broad-based transformation in Jewish identity, at least in the British context. Overall measures of Jewish identity have remained largely unchanged, as have levels of religiosity and religious observance.

There was no measurable increase in synagogue attendance, no sign that previously unaffiliated Jews joined synagogues in significant numbers, and no evidence that existing members attended more frequently. And while *feelings* of attachment to the local Jewish community did rise following October 7, they were observed to fall back again subsequently, suggesting even this was a temporary phenomenon. In addition, measures of Jewish learning remained stable; respondents were no more likely after October 7 than before it to say that studying Jewish religious texts was important to their Jewish identity. Such changes might theoretically have been expected in the context of external threats and pressures—Jews and others have been known to seek solace in spirituality and reflection at such times—but we see no evidence of this in the data.

Nor is there evidence of a wider shift in fundamental Jewish ethical commitments. Although support for Israel-related causes increased substantially and there was something of a shift from more universal giving to more particular Jewish concerns, the overall importance Jews attached to charitable giving or to social justice causes remained essentially unchanged.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the impact of October 7 while substantial, was narrowly focused. Overall, British Jews became more attached to Israel and more conscious

of Jewish peoplehood, but they did not become noticeably more religious, more observant, more Jewishly knowledgeable, or more engaged in Jewish communal life.

Understanding the British Jewish response

October 7 was unquestionably a watershed in contemporary Jewish experience. Yet the question is, what kind of watershed was it?

In general, British Jews did not wake up on October 8 with an enduring and fundamentally different sense of their Jewish identity. Rather, their consciousness of, and appreciation for, Israel and Jewish peoplehood grew within the context of their heightened awareness of Jewish vulnerability. Israel became more central emotionally, and, for a brief period, feelings of solidarity with other Jews intensified. Beyond this, however, most dimensions of Jewish identity remained largely unchanged.

Is that concerning? Not necessarily, since it points to continuity and a considerable degree of Jewish resilience. Faced with exceptional levels of antisemitism and insecurity, British Jews did not withdraw from Jewish life, and people's Jewish identity did not erode. Jewish life continued and identity endured. Indeed, with the notable exceptions of Israel attachment and Jewish peoplehood, both of which increased, Jewish identity proved to be remarkably immune to the external shock of October 7 and its aftermath.

Yet resilience is not the same as renewal. The idea of 'the Surge' implies a broad expansion of Jewish engagement. In Britain, the evidence points to something far more limited: stronger attachment and solidarity, but little evidence of substantial behavioural change.

Insofar as any changes have occurred, they might be characterised by some as problematic because they appear to have been driven largely by crisis rather than anything more positive or constructive. The rise in Jewish solidarity occurred alongside increases in anxiety, fear and feelings of Jewish vulnerability. While such conditions can powerfully strengthen collective bonds, they are a fragile foundation upon which to build Jewish life. For when the anxiety and fear subside, as they eventually will, what will be left to support the newfound increased solidarity?

This is not to diminish the significance of what has occurred. In general, British Jews emerged from October 7 with a clearer appreciation of Israel's importance to them personally and, arguably, a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish People. But these should not be mistaken for a broader revival of Jewish engagement.

In conclusion, while October 7 appears to have produced some enduring and meaningful changes among British Jews, key elements of Jewish identity remained largely unchanged. This evidence therefore tempers some of the bolder claims associated with the 'October 8 Jew' and 'the Surge.' Yes, something important changed, but in Britain at least, it was far from a wholesale transformation of Jewish life.

The challenge for community leaders and educators now is to shape these strengthened feelings of connection into something more broadly impactful. There were no easy answers to strengthening Jewish identity before October 7, and there are none today. But there is now an opportunity to convert solidarity into participation, concern into commitment, and attachment into engagement. Resilience in a time of crisis is valuable, but it is not the same as flourishing. The longer-term test will be whether this moment, forged as it is in the face of vulnerability and crisis, can generate a richer, more confident and more engaged and engaging Jewish future.

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/ About the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to influence Jewish life positively. Web: www.jpr.org.uk.

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