

The end of two-party politics?

Emerging changes in the political preferences of British Jews

Dr Jonathan Boyd

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/ Introduction

British Jews, like the British electorate as a whole, have long been far more likely to support one of the two main political parties in the UK – Labour or Conservative – than any other party. This is partly due to the nature of the UK electoral system – it has been over a century since any party other than Labour or Conservative formed the government alone – but it also likely reflects a common desire among many Jews for mainstream political centrism; Jews have rarely, if ever, fared well under more extreme right- or left-wing governments. Yet the latest evidence suggests that voting preferences are changing, both among Jews and the wider population, raising questions about the future stability and cohesiveness of the Jewish community and the country more generally. While the data about the UK population as a whole is well-known – it is produced and monitored by multiple polling companies on an almost daily basis – data on Jews is far less available, not least because of the methodological challenges involved in creating representative samples of any sub-population that is small, difficult-to-define, and geographically skewed to specific parts of the country. This paper seeks to rectify that by sharing JPR's research on British Jewish voting behaviour and intentions in recent years, exploring the nature of the recent shift, the reasons behind it, and the implications for the future.


/ Findings

Over the past few years, the JPR research team has carefully monitored the voting intentions of British Jews on an annual basis as one of the many varied ways we track shifts in Jewish attitudes, behaviours and feelings. It has been a turbulent period, affected by significant changes in the leadership of both the Labour and Conservative parties, the aftershocks of the Brexit referendum, the Covid 19 pandemic, the 7 October 2023 attacks in Israel, the war in Gaza and the wider Middle East, and rising concern about antisemitism, culminating most recently with the killing of two Jewish people in a terrorist attack at Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester in October 2025. Amidst such volatility, one might expect to see parallel volatility in British Jewish opinions. But is that the case?

Figure 1 shows how the voting behaviour and intentions of British Jews have evolved over the 2019-2025 period, looking at levels of support for the two main parties (Labour and Conservative), the Liberal Democrats, and other smaller parties. The proportions shown are for those who expressed a preference; they are calculated as percentages excluding those who responded by using a non-committal response option (e.g. 'would not/did not vote', 'ineligible to vote,' 'undecided' or 'prefer not to say'). In 2019 there was a clear preference for the Conservative Party over the Labour Party among Jews, but by 2022 that situation had reversed. Support for the Liberal Democrats, which was abnormally high in 2019, declined thereafter and has remained low and stable ever since. 2019 was exceptional in this respect because many traditional Jewish supporters of the Labour Party voted for the Liberal Democrats or Conservatives instead due to concerns about antisemitism in the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party. Yet Jewish support for the Labour Party increased after 2019, when Sir Keir Starmer replaced Jeremy Corbyn as leader, only to decline again after the Starmer-led

Labour Party won the 2024 General Election. In the most recent data – from June/July 2025 – it is more or less equal with support for the Conservative Party. That, in and of itself, is not unusual – similar splits have been seen in the past.¹ What is more unusual is the *combined* low level of support for either the Conservative or Labour Party. Indeed, the proportion of British Jews specifically expressing a preference for one of these two parties in 2025 was just 58% – the lowest level we have ever recorded by some distance (over the rest of the period shown, it has typically been around 75% to 80%). Expressed differently, when asked about their voting intention in mid-2025, about four in ten (42%) of British Jewish adults who expressed a preference, supported a party other than Labour or Conservative.

Figure 1. British Jewish voting behaviour (2019 and 2024) and voting intention (2020-23 and 2025)




Source: All data from the JPR Research Panel, wave 1 (2019 and 2020 data); wave 2 (2021 data); wave 3 (2022 data); wave 4 (2023 data); and wave 7 (2024 and 2025 data). Proportions shown only reflect those who expressed a preference for a specific political party; they exclude those who chose other non-committal options, such as 'did not/would not vote', 'ineligible to vote', 'undecided' and 'prefer not to say.' Further details can be found in the methodology section at the end of this report.

In considering this shift, it is worth noting that the overarching pattern shown in British Jewish voting behaviour and intention in Figure 1 is remarkably similar to the pattern seen among the British population as a whole (Figure 2), certainly prior to the 2024 General Election. Support for the Conservative Party among the general population of the UK was also higher than support for the Labour Party between 2019 and 2021; that situation also changed between 2021 and 2022, and support for Labour remained higher than for the Conservatives thereafter. Yet in the case of the wider population, we already see clear evidence of a shift towards 'other' parties in the 2024 General Election. Those voting for one of these collectively outstripped those voting Conservative for the first time, and in the most recent data – from June 2025 – this group vastly outstrips not only Labour and Conservative individually, but also the combined total supporting *either* Labour *or* Conservative (40%). We see similar patterns in the most recent data on Jewish people's preferences (Figure 1), but they are notably less pronounced than among the wider population. An additional distinction can be seen in support for the Liberal Democrats, which has grown significantly in the wider population of the UK, but has remained steady among Jews.

¹ See, for example: Graham, D. (2010). ['The political leanings of British Jews.'](#) London; Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

Figure 2. Voting behaviour (2019 and 2024) and voting intention (2020-23 and 2025) among the general population of the UK



Source: UK Parliament (2019 and 2024 General Elections), and YouGov (2020-2023 and 2025). YouGov polling data have been selected to correspond as closely as possible to align with when the equivalent JPR data were gathered. Further details can be found in the methodology section at the end of this report.

The recent growth in support for 'other' parties that can be seen in both the Jewish and wider populations of the UK, raises a question about which party or parties people are lending their support to. The three panels comprising Figure 3 help us to understand what has been going on over the past year or so. Panel A shows how Jews who cast a vote in the General Election in 2024 voted, compared to the UK population as a whole.² As has already been seen, it shows that Jews were more likely than the general population to vote for either of the two main parties: Labour (44% vs. 34%) or Conservative (32% vs. 24%), and less likely to vote Liberal Democrat (8% vs. 12%). Examining support for the next two most popular parties – Reform UK and the Green Party – both among Jews and the wider population, we see that Jews were considerably less likely to vote for Reform (3% vs. 14%) in that General Election, but more likely to vote Green (9% vs. 6%).


Panel B shows voting intentions in June 2025 and reveals a similar overarching picture. Again, Jews are more likely than the general population to vote Labour or Conservative (albeit at the lower levels of 58% vs. 44%), and their slight preference for Labour over the Conservatives mirrors the general picture. One can also see that preferences across both populations are now somewhat more equally distributed across the options offered than in the 2024 election, illustrating that both groups are turning away from the traditional two main parties. Yet that is happening in different ways: Jews remain less likely than the wider population to vote for Reform UK (11% vs. 28%), but more likely to vote for the Green Party (18% vs. 7%).

Panel C shows the percentage point change in preferences in both populations over this period. Whilst the magnitude of the change seen in both groups differs in most cases, in no instance do we see Jews moving in an opposite direction to the population as a whole. Jews,

² Figures for the UK's general population exclude those who did not vote, and, for the Jewish population, exclude both those who did not vote and those who did but did not disclose to JPR the party they voted for.

like others, are shifting away from the traditional two large parties, and lending their support to others, most notably the Green Party and, to a lesser extent, Reform UK.


Figure 3. Voting behaviour and preferences in the general and Jewish populations of the UK, 2024 General Election and June 2025



Source: Data on Jews comes from the JPR Research Panel, wave 7 (June/July 2025), n=4,822. Data on the UK population comes from UK Parliament (2024 General Election) and More in Common (June 2025, n=1559).

This is a new phenomenon, and it remains to be seen whether it is a temporary blip or the first signs of a major revolution in British and/or in Jewish political sentiment. As Figure 4 shows, when we quantify those who explicitly voted for Labour or Conservative (in 2019 and 2024) among the Jewish and general populations, or those who expressed a preference for them in the other years shown, the most recent data show a particularly unusual level of movement away from the traditional big two. In general, it has been more pronounced among the UK population as a whole than among the Jewish population since 2021; the main exception was the 2019 General Election when levels of concern about antisemitism in the Labour Party were sufficiently high among Jews to cause a shift, most notably away from Labour towards the Liberal Democrats.

Figure 4. Proportions of UK Jews and UK general population voting for, or preferring, the Labour and Conservative parties vs. other parties, 2019-2025



Note. Data exclude those providing responses other than specific mention of a particular party. GE=general election.

As shown above, the recent shift away from Labour and Conservative is towards two parties in particular: Reform UK on the political right and the Green Party on the left. Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage – a champion of the 2016 ‘Brexit’ campaign that saw the UK leave the European Union – is generally seen as a right-wing, anti-immigration party, described variously as populist, neoliberal, nationalist and/or, in some contexts, far- or radical-right. Founded in 2018, it only won representation in parliament for the first time in the 2024 General Election and currently has just five MPs (out of 650) and no representation in the House of Lords. Yet extraordinarily, as can be seen in Figure 3 Panel B, it is currently polling at a higher level than either the Labour or the Conservative parties among the general population and recent projections indicate that it could conceivably win the next general election, which must take place by 2029 at the latest.³ And whilst British Jews are far less likely than the general population to support Reform (11% vs. 29%), some are nonetheless clearly being attracted to it: support among them almost quadrupled in less than a year, rising from 3% in the 2024 General Election to 11% in the most recent figures. Notably, Farage has been largely supportive of Israel’s position in the war in Gaza: he rejects the genocide claim against Israel,

³ See: ‘YouGov MRP shows a Reform UK government a near-certainty if an election were held tomorrow’ - <https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/53059-yougov-mrp-shows-a-reform-uk-government-a-near-certainty-if-an-election-were-held-tomorrow>, 26 September 2025, accessed 11 November 2025. See also: Electoral Calculus General Election Prediction, 28 October 2025: https://www.electoralcalculus.co.uk/prediction_main.html, accessed 11 November 2025.

supports arms sales to the Jewish state, and opposed the Labour Government's recognition of Palestinian statehood in September 2025.⁴

The Green Party has been around for much longer – it was founded in 1990. Ideologically, it combines environmentalism with left-wing anti-capitalist economic policies and a progressive approach to social issues such as civil liberties, LGBTQ rights and drug policy reform. It won four seats in parliament in the 2024 General Election – a significant achievement as it had only ever previously won one or none. Thus, its star appears to be rising – it garnered close to 7% of the national vote in 2024 compared to about 2% to 4% in the previous few elections, and the very latest data (from October and November 2025 – not shown graphically) now show it polling nationally at around 15%.⁵ As shown above, our June 2025 data indicate that it enjoys higher levels of support among Jews than among the wider population – close to one in five Jews (18%) said they would vote Green if an election was held tomorrow, compared to about one in ten (11%) of the wider population at the same time. This is particularly notable given the Green Party's position on Israel: at its 2024 conference it became the first political party in Britain to officially describe Israel as an "apartheid state" and its military actions in Gaza as a "genocide."^{6 7}

Given the very different political platforms of these two parties, it is unsurprising to find that those Jews who are voting for them come from very different demographic, religious, and socioeconomic positions, and indeed Zionist orientations. Figure 5 shows the proportions of all British Jewish adults favouring each of them, broken down by sex, age, synagogue affiliation and Zionist self-identification.

As can be seen, Reform UK is more likely to attract male, older, orthodox, and Zionist Jews, whereas the Greens are more likely to attract younger, unaffiliated and anti-Zionist ones. Perhaps the most striking finding shown is for British Jews who self-identify as 'anti-Zionist.' They are a small group in the British Jewish population as a whole – only about 12%⁸ – yet of this group, close to two-thirds (62%) of them would currently vote Green. In considering this, it is reasonable to assume that Jewish people's recent increased associations with both of these two parties is driven in part by their views on the war in Gaza their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in Britain, and indeed the nature and strength of their Jewish identities, but it is important to note that it is also part of a larger more general trend driving the UK population as a whole away from the two traditional mainstream parties, Labour and Conservative, and towards other parties that until recently, have stood very much on the fringes.

⁴ See: <https://www.thenational.scot/news/25207925.nigel-farage-denies-gaza-genocide-backs-weapons-exports-israel/>, accessed on 7 November 2025.


⁵ See YouGov data for 10 November 2025: <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/voting-intention/>, accessed 11 November 2025.

⁶ See: <https://greenparty.org.uk/2024/09/09/greens-become-first-political-party-in-england-and-wales-to-recognise-israeli-government-conduct-as-apartheid-and-genocide/>, accessed on 12 November 2025.

⁷ It is worth noting that our data were gathered prior to the appointment of Zack Polanski as leader of the Green Party in September 2025. Polanski is openly and proudly Jewish, but is also on record supporting the party's deeply critical view of Israel during the war in Gaza, calling it a genocide and arguing that the Labour Government is complicit in that. See: <https://greenparty.org.uk/2025/06/21/labour-government-not-just-complicit-they-are-active-participants-in-genocide-says-polanski/>, accessed on 7 November 2025.

⁸ See: Boyd, J. (2025). *Two years after the October 7 attacks: British Jewish views on antisemitism, Israel and Jewish life*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, pp.18-20.

Figure 5. Proportions of all British Jews showing preference for Reform UK and the Green Party, totals, and by sex, age, synagogue affiliation and Zionist self-identification, June 2025.



N=4,822.

The increased levels of support for Reform UK and the Green Party among Jews with very different profiles from one another, are illustrative of how recent dynamics in both British and Israeli politics are affecting communal dynamics. We have long seen differences between Jews politically, with more religiously observant Jews tending to lean Conservative and more progressive or secular Jews tending to lean Labour, but the current perceived weakness of both the Conservative and Labour parties combined with the more politically explicit language about Israel and immigration employed by Reform UK and the Green Party, form part of the backdrop to an increase in intra-Jewish political division that we have discussed in previous work.⁹ A fraught political climate, a common lack of trust in political parties and other major national institutions in general,¹⁰ and significant concerns about antisemitism,¹¹ are all adding to a broader disillusionment with the Labour and Conservative parties, a splintering of political preferences, and the attraction of simpler and more populist solutions to contemporary issues.

/ Summary and reflections

Drawing together the data and analysis from this short study highlights the following issues:

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.13-14.

¹¹ Ibid., pp.6-7.

- For the first time in recent British Jewish history, support for the Labour and Conservative parties combined has fallen below 60% among Jews. Given that this is reflected in wider society too, it is not just a statistical anomaly – it may signal a medium- to long-term structural shift in political identity which could change the nature of British politics and have significant consequences for Jewish life.
- Three forces appear to be driving this fragmentation among Jews: the war in Gaza and its effects on Jewish attitudes; rising antisemitism, culminating in the Heaton Park Synagogue terrorist attack in October 2025; and a broader breakdown of trust in mainstream political parties. Together, these factors are pushing more Jews than usual toward parties that offer clarity, whether through more nationalist or progressivist rhetoric.
- While the UK electorate has already crossed the threshold where ‘other parties’ collectively outpoll Labour and Conservative, Jews remain more anchored to the traditional two, although the gap is closing. If recent developments persist over time, British Jews could become more politically polarised, prompting further internal community tensions and division within a broader context of political volatility.
- Among the more striking findings here is that nearly one in five Jews now favours the Green Party – the same party that officially labels Israel an ‘apartheid state.’ This suggests that for a small but significant minority of Jews, domestic priorities and progressive values outweigh foreign policy concerns that touch directly on Israeli governmental and military behaviour, and, in at least some cases, the country’s very nature and legitimacy.
- Equally striking is the surge in Jewish support for Reform UK – a party whose rhetoric on immigration might typically be expected to alienate minority communities, including Jews. That 11% of Jews now favour a party often framed as anti-immigrant underscores deep fears and disillusionment. This includes anxiety about antisemitism, and worry about mainstream parties’ hostility towards, or inadequacies to address, Jewish concerns.

These developments, seen both within the Jewish population and wider society, not only in Britain but around the world, should be of considerable concern to British Jews. History demonstrates that Jews fare better in stable, moderate political climates, so any trends showing significant movement away from the moderate centre ground, whether to the right or left, should raise alarm bells. Volatile shifts in one direction almost inevitably come with volatile shifts in the opposite one – the temptation to reach for more radical, populist positions typically encourages opponents to express their positions in more radical populist terms too. These dynamics, in turn, lead to more fractious, uncompromising politics, where beyond day-to-day issues such as the economy, health and education, Jews and/or Israel become more likely to be stereotyped or instrumentalised as pawns in larger political battles. It may be that the signs of political polarisation we are witnessing, among Jews and wider society, is more a reflection of the current weakness of the Labour and Conservative parties (real or perceived) rather than a new-found quest for more radical solutions to the country’s and community’s challenges, and that one, other or both of these parties are able to rebuild a sense of trust in them by the next general election. Yet there are many reasons to think this will not be the case, not least that these trends are far from unique to the UK. As a result, it is critical to monitor them over time in order to guide community policy going forward. Jews are already asking themselves questions about how secure Jewish life is in Britain; the more volatile political dynamics become, the more unsafe the UK could become for its Jewish population.

/ Methodological notes

The data on British Jews contained within this report come from the JPR Jewish Population Research Panel, our core research mechanism for exploring the attitudes and experiences of Jews in the UK on a variety of issues. The panel contains close to 11,000 individuals who are UK residents aged 16 or above who self-identify as Jewish and have agreed to be recontacted for JPR research purposes. These individuals have been carefully recruited and retained over several years to ensure that all parts of the self-identifying adult Jewish population are included, across gender, all age bands, geographical areas, denominational groups and affiliations. Particular effort has been made to include the hardest-to-reach parts of the Jewish population, notably young adults, the most Orthodox, and those least likely to be affiliated with the organised Jewish community. All panel members have completed a sign-up survey to assess their eligibility and have shared their email address to gain access to JPR questionnaires.

The most recent data presented here – for Jewish people’s preferences in 2025 and for their voting behaviour in the 2024 General Election – come from the 2025 ‘Jews in Uncertain Times Survey’ (wave 7 of the JPR Research Panel) and are based on 4,822 individuals who participated in that survey which was conducted between 8 June and 20 July 2025. Respondents completed the questionnaire online, by computer, smartphone or tablet, and in a handful of cases, by telephone. The questionnaire was developed by JPR, drawing on a range of existing surveys, and was programmed in-house using Forsta software. The survey data were cleaned and weighted to adjust for the age, sex and geographical distribution of the Jewish population based on the 2021 Census, and on information about Jewish denomination based on a combination of administrative and JPR survey data. Statistical analysis was carried out using IBM SPSS Version 30.0.

All survey data about Jewish opinion presented here for years 2019-2023 also come from the JPR Research Panel. JPR has run a full survey of the UK Jewish population in each calendar year since 2020, using the same fundamental method outlined above. The 2020 survey (wave 1) was conducted between July 9-31 (n=6,984) – a detailed methodological report can be found [here](#) – and includes the data presented for voting behaviour in the 2019 General Election and voting preferences in 2020; the 2021 survey (wave 2 – data for 2021) took place between 23 July and 1 September (n=4,152); the 2022 survey (wave 3 – the National Jewish Identity Survey – data for 2022) ran between 16 November and 23 December (n=4,891) – a more detailed methodological summary can be found at the end of [this report](#); the 2023 survey (wave 4 – data for 2023) took place between 16 April and 31 May (n=3,767).

In all cases, the survey questions asked have either been ‘How did you vote in the last general election on [date]?’ (for years 2019 and 2024), or ‘If a general election was held tomorrow, how would you vote?’ (for years 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2025). Response options offered have included Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Green, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party in all cases; Reform UK was offered for the first time for 2024 and then again in 2025; the Brexit Party and Change UK were included for 2019. Additional response options listed in all cases were: ‘Other, please specify’; ‘Undecided’; ‘I [would be/was] eligible to vote but [would/did] not do so’; ‘I [would not be/was not] eligible to vote’; and ‘prefer not to say’; questions asked about actual voting behaviour in the general elections of 2019 and 2024 also included ‘I can’t remember’.

Survey data for the general population come from YouGov and More in Common. YouGov runs a weekly tracker using the question ‘If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?’ with respondents drawn from its research panel. It prompts respondents with the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Reform UK, Green, the SNP, Plaid Cymru or ‘some other party’. People selecting some other party are then shown a second

screen offering the choice of other smaller political parties or 'other'. The selection of which parties it prompts for is kept under regular review to reflect changes in the party system. The data used in this report were identified to align temporally with when JPR data were gathered on Jews, so the specific figures used are from polls conducted on 9 July 2020 (n=1196); 29 July 2021 (n=1145); 16 November 2022 (n=1183); 19 April 2023 (n=1415); and 9 June 2025 (n=1611). More details can be found at: <https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology>.

More in Common also tracks voting intention on a weekly basis, using the question "If a general election was called tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" Its response options include: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Reform UK, Green, SNP, Plaid Cymru, and 'Another party/independent candidate' plus 'I would not vote' and 'Don't know'. The specific data used in this report come from its poll conducted between 6-9 June 2025 (n=1559). Data used are its 'voting intention (headline) figures, which can be found at <https://www.moreincommon.org.uk/our-work/polling-tables/june-2025-polling-tables/>.

The data for how the UK population voted in the 2019 and 2024 General Elections come from the UK Parliament (see: <https://electionresults.parliament.uk/general-elections/4> for 2019, and <https://electionresults.parliament.uk/general-elections/6> for 2024).

Note that all comparisons across different surveys in this report have been made using cross-sectional data rather than analysing a consistent sample of those who participated in several waves, so differences in the composition of the samples at each wave may affect the results. Sensitivity analyses have been carried out on previous studies of JPR data and have shown that any such differences tend to be very small, so we are confident that the changes shown over time are broadly accurate.

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/ About the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to influence Jewish life positively. Web: www.jpr.org.uk.

/ Author

Dr Jonathan Boyd is the Executive Director of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Honorary Research Fellow at University College London, and a former Jerusalem Fellow at the Mandel Institute in Israel. A specialist in contemporary Jewry and antisemitism with expertise in the study of Jews in the UK and across Europe, he is a Board member of the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry, and a regular columnist in the Jewish press. He was the academic director for the 2012 and 2018 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) studies of Jewish perceptions and experiences of antisemitism and is currently Project Director for the first ever European Commission survey of antisemitic attitudes across the EU. He holds a doctorate in education from the University of Nottingham, and an MA and BA in Jewish history from University College London.