

# What, why and how

# L. Daniel Staetsky



The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research** is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life. Its European Jewish Demography Unit exists to generate demographic data and analysis to support Jewish community planning and development throughout the continent.

## Authors

**Professor Sergio DellaPergola** is Professor Emeritus and former Chairman of the Hebrew University's Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, and Chairman of JPR's European Jewish Demography Unit. Born in Italy 1942, he has lived in Israel since 1966. He has an MA in Political Sciences from the University of Pavia, and a PhD in Social Sciences and Contemporary Jewry from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A specialist in the demography of world Jewry, he has published or edited sixty books and monographs including *Jewish Demographic Policies: Population Trends and Options* (2011), *Jewish Population and Identity: Concept and Reality* (with Uzi Rebhun, 2018), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews in Europe, 2018: A New Structural Look* (2020), and *Diaspora vs. Homeland: Development, Unemployment and Ethnic Migration to Israel, 1991–2019* (2020), besides over 300 papers on historical demography, the family, international migration, Jewish identification, antisemitism, and projections in the Diaspora and in Israel. He has lectured at over 100 universities and research centres all over the world and was senior policy consultant to the President of Israel, the Israeli Government, the Jerusalem Municipality, and major national and international organisations. A winner of the Marshall Sklare Award for distinguished achievement in the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (1999), and the Michael Landau Prize for Demography and Migration (2013), he is chief editor of *Hagira – Israel Journal of Migration*, a member of Yad Vashem's Committee for the Righteous of the Nations, and a Board Member of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

**Dr Daniel Staetsky** is a Senior Research Fellow at JPR and Director of its European Jewish Demography Unit. His expertise spans the disciplines of demography, applied statistics and history, and he is a former researcher and analyst at the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel and at RAND Europe. He holds an MA in demography from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a PhD in social statistics from the University of Southampton. He specialises in Jewish, European, Israeli and Middle Eastern demography. His work in demography has been widely published, and he focuses particularly on the major puzzles of contemporary demography, such as the relatively high Jewish longevity, the divergence of longevity paths between different Western countries and the stagnating fertility in the context of the developing world. He has authored and co-authored forty manuscripts covering the topics of demography, survey methodology, social statistics and the quantitative study of antisemitism.

JPR is particularly indebted to the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe for its generous support for the European Jewish Demography Unit.

## Contents

	About this report	2
1	Identities in Europe	4
2	The predicament of Jewish identity	7
3	The 2018 FRA Survey of Jews in the EU: who participated?	12
4	The What: definitions of Judaism	21
5	The Why: main aspects considered essential to personal Jewish identity	26
6	More on country differences: a structural look	33
7	The How: modes of expression of personal Jewishness	39
8	Stability and change: lifetime transitions	47
9	More on traditional Jewish behaviours	59
10	Jewish and national: attachment to geopolitical frameworks	66
11	Some intercontinental comparisons	78
12	Overview and conclusions	81
	Appendices	93

## / About this report

This report, issued by the European Jewish Demography Unit at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), complements and much expands the publication by the same authors: *Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium: Population trends and estimates*.<sup>1</sup> Most of the information in it derives from new processing of the data collected in the *Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU* undertaken in 2018 under the sponsorship of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).<sup>2</sup> The online survey covered a sample of 16,359 Jews in twelve EU countries (including the United Kingdom, which was still an EU Member State at the time), and whilst it was mainly devoted to uncovering perceptions of antisemitism and discrimination among Jews, the information collected also included a significant array of questions about the demographic, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the respondents.

The focus of this report is on Jewish identification, to provide an updated profile of the ideational characteristics of the more than one million Jews who currently live in the European Union and the UK. Some of the data presented here can be compared with previously published analyses, but we have introduced a number of new analytic approaches to generate a more complex and sophisticated picture. In so doing, we are seeking to detail a better assessment of what it means to be a Jew in Europe today, how Judaism is perceived as a broader definitional framework, which of its many possible aspects are considered most important in shaping one's own Jewish identity, and how that identity

is manifested in public through personal behaviours and associations with others. The data also allow us to see current trends within a certain time perspective, so that the findings are not presented as a merely static picture of the present but also portray some of the dynamics of ongoing change.

The report is organised as a sequence of chapters, some of which are plain and descriptive, while others are more technical. We include the more technical parts to ensure that we share as much information as possible that might otherwise be invisible or lost; these more specialised parts can be skipped through if required without losing the main thread of the narrative. Our main purpose is to create a thorough description of the Jewish identity of European Jews, and we do it in greater detail and employing a methodology not attempted before. The central message is that Jewish identity is not a simple linear progression based on one criterion only. The emerging picture is rather one of complexity, of multiple threads of Jewishness, of consonance and contrast between the different possible components of that unique cluster of ideas, beliefs, behaviours, informal networks and institutions which constitute the essential nature of Judaism and Jewishness. The concluding chapter presents a review of the main findings, alongside some observations that should be of value to European Jewish community leaders and indeed, to all policy makers whose work involves supporting Jewish communities.

The report does not deal with a variety of other topics of interest in the study of contemporary Jewish identity, such as Jewish education and the Jewish school system, or the patterns of

1 DellaPergola, S., and Staetsky, L. D. (2020). *Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium: Population trends and estimates*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

2 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018). *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union (Publications Office).

participation in Jewish organisations. It is hoped that these subjects can be investigated in future JPR publications.

The authors are indebted to the team at JPR, led by Dr Jonathan Boyd, who fulfilled a central role in the planning and execution of the 2018 FRA survey and carefully reviewed the manuscript. Richard Goldstein directed the contacts with European Jewish communities during the initial stages of the survey. Ioannis Dimitrakopoulos, Chief Scientific Adviser at FRA, provided constant support to our work. Vida Beresneviciute and Sami Nevala were

in charge of creating the original data file at FRA. Judith Russell edited the manuscript with her usual attention to detail. Professor Stephen Miller of City University, London and a Senior Research Adviser to JPR, contributed useful remarks to an earlier draft. Thanks, too, to the team at Soapbox, led by Autumn Forecast, for designing the report to help make the findings as readable as possible. Last but not least, our thanks to the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe, particularly Sally Berkovic and Daniela Greiber, for believing in the importance of this work, investing in it and being thoughtful and helpful partners in this endeavour.

# 1 / Identities in Europe

Any study of the Jewish population of Europe, or indeed of any other sub-population defined by religion, ethnicity or other symbolic criteria, cannot ignore the broader cultural and geopolitical framework of the wider continental society in which it exists. Jews in Europe constitute small minorities, ranging – among the twelve countries covered in the 2018 FRA survey – from 6.9 per 1,000 inhabitants in France to 0.1 per 1,000 in Poland. The majority of societies in these countries, and in Europe in general, are overwhelmingly identified with the Christian faith. According to studies conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2015–2017, among the countries included in the FRA survey, Italy, Austria and Poland were the ones with the highest proportions of self-defined Christians (80–88%), followed by the UK and Germany in the range of 70–75%, Spain, France and Denmark around 65%, Belgium, Sweden and Hungary around 55%, and lastly, the Netherlands with the lowest share at 41%.<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that these survey data – while fully comparable because of the shared methodology – may not conform with the national censuses of individual countries. Christian, in particular, is a label whose meaning and relevance are a matter for deeper scrutiny. If measured as a generic acknowledgement of a sense of belonging stemming from parentage and the environment, it is likely to render a rather different result than if measured as an adherence to the theological tenets of Christianity in its different versions of Catholicism, the various forms of Protestantism, or the Eastern Orthodox churches. According to the 2017 Pew survey of Western Europe, 27% among the general population believed

in God as described in the Bible, but this varied between 64% of church-attending Christians, 24% of non-practising Christians, and 1% of the religiously unaffiliated.

Beyond its religious salience, Christianity was also one of the foundational elements in the consolidation of national identities in many European states. The salience of religion has diminished over time through steady processes of secularisation, but it has not disappeared altogether. According to Pew studies, in response to a question about what is important to their national identity, 34% in Western Europe and 56–70% in Eastern and Central Europe answered ‘to be a Christian’.<sup>4</sup> In Western Europe, other significant elements in national identity that Pew found were respect for the country’s institutions and laws (94%), being able to speak the national language (87%), having a family background from that country (52%), and having been born in the country (51%). In Eastern Europe, the hierarchy of significant elements was fundamentally similar.<sup>5</sup> In sum, religion is neither a dominant, nor yet an unimportant element of national identities across Europe, irrespective of which part of the continent one chooses to focus on.

In recent years, steady immigration from outside of Europe has generated a growing amount of heterogeneity in European societies. Many of the new immigrants arrived from Muslim majority countries, and this – while producing some tensions and fuelling xenophobia and racism in certain quarters – created a more diverse panorama in terms of religion and national origins in European countries. Muslims constituted

3 Pew Research Center. 2017. *Being Christian in Western Europe*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center. 2017. *Religious belief and national belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.

4 Ibid., p. 56 (*Being Christian in Western Europe*) and p. 12 (*Religious belief and national belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*).

5 Ibid., p. 56 (*Being Christian in Western Europe*) and p. 153 (*Religious belief and national belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*).

about 7% of the European population around 2020 with strong regional contrasts: 6–9% in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, less than 1% in many countries of Eastern and Central Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkans) and 2–6% in Southern Europe (excluding Cyprus). Muslims comprise a much stronger numerical minority, or even a majority, in the Balkans: 80–94% in Albania and Kosovo, and 20–47% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. In Bulgaria and Russia, the share of Muslims is 11–14%. The proportional share of Muslims in Europe as a whole is projected to increase to 11% by around 2050. In the medium term, the Christian population is projected to decline somewhat (from 72% around 2020 to 65% around 2050) and the religiously unaffiliated population is expected to increase slightly (from 20% to 23%).<sup>6</sup> In sum, the salience of religion in Europe as a whole is not set to decrease dramatically in the foreseeable future, although its modes of expression are bound to change over time.

The same is true of the gamut of European ethnicities. The rise of the European nation state involved a long process of consolidation along territorial, linguistic, ethnic and religious boundaries, out of preexisting broader geopolitical entities, often under the authority and control of multinational empires. This consolidation occurred through bloody conflicts that lasted many centuries and were periodically revived up to the end of the twentieth century (for example, the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia into its component republics). In the past 120 years, ethnic divisions have been no less salient, and at times have been more prominent than religious ones. At the turn of the twentieth century, about 25 sovereign states governed the area of Europe situated between Russia in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west. By 2020, the same territory was occupied by 46 states exhibiting greater linguistic and ethnic internal homogeneity compared to past political entities.

The history of the last 120 years in Europe is one of progressing ethnic and political fragmentation, often achieved through war and unrest. The effort since the 1950s to create an overarching geopolitical entity – the European Community, later Union – signalled a strong willingness to overcome such rivalries and conflicts and to open the national boundaries to the circulation of people, ideas, goods and services. The European project expanded from the initial group of six founders to 28 members at its height, before falling to 27 following the withdrawal of the UK in 2020.



**The proportional share of Muslims in Europe as a whole is projected to increase from 7% to 11% between 2020 and 2050. The Christian population is projected to decline somewhat from 72% to 65% over the same period, and the religiously unaffiliated population is expected to increase slightly from 20% to 23%**

The many provisions made by the EU in the financial and administrative realms were not followed by a real flattening of social and economic gaps, or a withdrawal from the national interests of member states, or affinities to local cultures and traditions. What is certain is that the emergence of a united European identity has not yet superseded the existence and predominance of separate national identities. One striking manifestation has been a lack of a unified EU foreign and defence policy, or, more significantly, a unified social policy. The growing monetary and technical integration of member states was significantly enhanced through the adoption of the Euro as the common currency by many countries, though not all. Yet, at the same time, new forms of nationalism have emerged in numerous countries, militating against the overarching EU political framework

6 The definition of Europe used here includes Russia. Sources: *Europe's growing Muslim population*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017; *The future of world religions: population growth projections 2010-2050*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015.

and reviving the older spirit of local particularistic and autarchic values and institutions. At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, significant conflicts of interest emerged between the health policies of different EU member states. Disharmony appears not only at the national level, but also at the regional level, as demonstrated by the assertive separatist movements active in Spain, Belgium, the UK and Italy, among other places. Brexit, in particular, sent an important sobering signal to the supporters of a broader European framework.

The future of the EU as a significant geopolitical actor, as a powerful container of socioeconomic development, and as a framework for the successful incorporation of religious and ethnic minorities is not entirely clear at the time of writing this report. The premises for the continuation and quality of Jewish life within the EU depend decisively on what the fate of the Union will be. More specifically, the amount of Jewish

freedom and security depends, among other things, on the extent of anti-Jewish prejudice, and whether it increases or decreases in the longer term. According to the 2017 Pew survey, 21% of Western Europeans felt that Jews always pursue their own interests over and above the interests of the country in which they live, while 66% disagreed; 21% felt Jews always overstate how much they have suffered, while 70% disagreed.<sup>7</sup> These perceptions – of Jews as people inclined to overstate their suffering and with interests unaligned with their countries' majorities – are commonly perceived by Jews as dangerously antisemitic. According to the 2018 FRA survey, 22% of European Jews had personally heard or seen the first of these statements made by non-Jewish people, and 35% had heard or seen the second.<sup>8</sup> The amount of racism, xenophobia and antisemitism observed (and tolerated) across European societies may constitute another important factor in determining the future directions of the Jewish presence and experience in Europe.

7 Ibid., p. 74.

8 FRA, *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, cit., p.26.



## 2 / The predicament of Jewish identity

In light of the general features and developments across Europe, and more specifically in the EU, is Jewish identity comparable with other religious or national identities? The answer is not straightforward because Judaism and Jewishness, and the related patterns of individual and collective identification, do not involve a linear, unidimensional variable. In general terms, religion and nationhood are separate features in Europe and elsewhere, each in its own realm. Once the respective assumptions and main aspects of religious and/or national identity have been defined, one can agree with them more or less, engage with them more or less intensively, remain inside them or drift away. At one extreme one can find a position of unreserved and complete acceptance of religious orthodoxy; at the other, of total rejection of, and alienation from, religion. Regarding national identity, one can be a militant nationalist at one end of the spectrum, or a cosmopolitan transnationalist at the other. Some people may express their feelings of alienation toward their country of residence by emigrating from it. Each of the defining variables – religion, nationhood and other possible ones – can operate somewhat independently from the others, although there are clear indications, both in historical and contemporary societies, that some amount of interdependence and mutual influence does exist. To provide a somewhat extreme example, at the time of the Inquisition the concept of ‘purity of blood’ could be used to question the legitimacy of Jewish converts to belong both to the Catholic Church *and* to the Spanish nation. Jews were in fact excluded, persecuted and expelled on both grounds by the ruling religious and national authorities.

The situation regarding Jewish identity is far more complex, at least from a normative point of view. According to its own primary sources, Judaism is an indivisible mix of peoplehood and religion. According to Jewish tradition, the ancient Jewish People was born through an endogenous process of (divinely inspired) self-determination, together with the recognition of its collective existence by external observers (such as the Egyptian Pharaoh). Soon after becoming conscious of its collective existence and fate, again according to Jewish tradition, the Jewish People received the Jewish Law. According to this point of view, the continued existence of the Jewish nation is supposed to be conditional upon its observance of these laws. It is possible to infer that there cannot be a Jewish People without a Jewish Law, but equally, there cannot be a Jewish Law without a Jewish People. It is interesting to note that the inseparable nature of Jewish nationhood (otherwise known as ethnicity, a concept suggestive of common ancestry) and religion is implicit in the Jewish legal (*halachic*) definition of ‘Who is a Jew?’ According to Jewish law, one is a Jew by virtue of being born to a Jewish mother or by converting to Judaism. While the strictly matrilineal inheritance of Jewishness is contested outside of Orthodox Judaism and some non-Orthodox Jewish denominations accept patrilineal descent, the very principle of Jewishness as both an inheritable and accessible quality is a matter of broad consensus, involving eminent Jewish religious figures and scholars in the domain of the social scientific study of Jews.<sup>9</sup>


In modern and contemporary societies, the appraisal of Jewish identity has become rather

9 For illustrations and policy perspectives see: Ben-Rafael, E. 2002. *Jewish identities: Fifty intellectuals answer Ben-Gurion*. Leiden/Boston/Koln: Brill; Kosmin, B. 1999. *Ethnic and religious question in 2001 UK census of population: policy recommendations*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

more complex and nuanced. In general, processes of secularisation have challenged many people's religious beliefs and practices. However, in the case of Judaism, a diminished religious allegiance was often accompanied by a substitution of perceptions of national belonging of no lesser salience. Zionism, the memory of the Shoah (Holocaust), and assimilation into non-Jewish societies and polities are all relevant examples. Additional definitional domains of primary relevance emerged over the course of time following certain paramount historical events, such as the Shoah<sup>10</sup> or the establishment of the State of Israel, as well as other cultural, social and political developments which tended to epitomise some of the other cardinal domains of reference. Moreover, following the emancipation, significant processes of integration of Jews into broader societies brought them into closer proximity with non-Jews, allowing for friendship and marriage, and, in practice, putting an end to the pristine assumption that a neat dichotomy exists between Jews and others. A neat dichotomy may be true, or desirable, from a Jewish legal perspective, but is rather less true in terms of a realistic sociological picture of contemporary societies.

An updated analysis of the modes of expression of contemporary Jewish identification can neither be bound by normative perceptions nor can it reject them altogether. Instead, it needs to explore the whole cluster of manifestations and opportunities that are observable nowadays among living Jewish persons, local communities, and countrywide populations. Figure 1 attempts to exemplify the position of the contemporary Jewish individual facing a vast array of possible identificational avenues whose main prerogative is that they are diverse but not mutually exclusive. Once the individual at stake places the self, the Jew, in front or, actually, at the centre of the several possible options, three main spheres, or fields, emerge: (i) **What** is Jewishness to me? (ii) **Why** is Jewishness important to me? and (iii) **How** do I express my Jewishness?

**Figure 1. Scheme of main fields of being Jewish**



**What is Jewishness?** addresses the broader perception of the field, in the sense that the individual defines Judaism as a religion, or alternatively, as an ethnicity, or a culture, or maybe just the product of parentage and upbringing. This does not involve more specific patterns of belief or behaviour, but it delineates a stance, a personal meaning, a basic approach to what being Jewish is about. It also delineates where the perceived supreme authority of Jewish identification lies: in a transcendental power – translated into the commandments and the prohibitions of codified religion; in a transnational peoplehood – manifested through a shared belonging to a nation and ethnic group solidarity; or in a more limited community or family frame of reference – derived from habits and mores absorbed at home during early socialisation or borrowed from the immediate environment.

**Why is Jewishness relevant?** pertains to the *motivation* perception field, in the sense that certain specific patterns of Jewish thought, historical memory, relation to others, participation

10 Etymologically, 'Shoah' means a tragic total destruction, whilst the word 'Holocaust' is a ritual offering. Whilst we consider the word 'Shoah' to be the more appropriate of the two, for purposes of simplicity we use both terms interchangeably in this report.

and affiliation generate some special resonance in the hearts and minds of the persons at stake. Whilst *What is Jewishness?* is probably more a matter of the mind, *Why is Jewishness?* is probably more about the heart, albeit perhaps not exclusively so. Examples can be the importance attributed to the memory of the Shoah, the desire or need to combat antisemitism, belief in God, social activism in or beyond a Jewish community, supporting the State of Israel, participating in family occasions prompted by ritual events, and various other focal points of Jewish identification. The importance an individual attaches to these ideas can rarely be explained or quantified rationally but nonetheless, appears to be more or less salient, and sometimes very important in determining the person's involvement with being Jewish.

**How** is Jewishness expressed? pertains to the field of personal life, in the sense that through personal choices and often through associational networks, the individual declares, performs and represents in public a model of how, in his or her view, one can or should behave as a Jew. The emphasis here is on what Jews do rather than what they think or feel. Adherents to each mode of Jewish expression may feel they embody an ideal type believed to be more truly and authentically Jewish than other types – hence a certain amount of tension and confrontation between the different types. Alternative models nowadays can be that of the Haredi (strictly Orthodox) Jew, the modern Orthodox Jew, the Reform or Progressive Jew (and the Conservative in the US), the agnostic Jew, the 'Just Jewish' Jew (who does not associate with any particular denomination), the 'none of these' Jew (who stands even more distant from any form of recognised Jewish association), or even the mixed Jewish/non-Jewish Jew, regardless of further specifications.

It is tempting to attribute the definitional aspect of Judaism (i.e. the *what* is Judaism?)

to a *cognitive* dimension of the mind; the preference for certain more essential aspects of Jewish identity (i.e. the *why* is Jewishness?) to an *affective* dimension; and the chosen mode of presentation of the Jewish self (i.e. the *how* is Judaism?) to a *behavioural* dimension. However, the reality of Jewish perceptions, being and belonging is actually rather more complex.<sup>11</sup> If you ask individual Jews **what** is Jewishness for them, they may say "It's my religion or ethnicity or culture" or some other paradigmatic approach to the world. Yet they may (and often do) maintain that "It's a feeling of being Jewish inside" or "It's a feeling of being different from others in society" or "It's my keeping of the *mitzvot* (commandments)" or "It's my nostalgia for my parents or my childhood." Thus, the perceived definition of Jewishness is, almost self-evidently, a combination of cognitive, affective and behavioural strands. As to **why** is Jewishness important to me?, the *feeling* of importance is affective, but the *reason* for that feeling could be affective, cognitive or behavioural. For example, individuals may variously say that it's important to them "because Judaism helps me to make sense of the world" or "because I enjoy being with other Jews and especially with my family" or "because Judaism tells me how to conduct myself" or "because a great injustice has been (and is being) committed against the Jews" or "because I am committed to helping others in need." So again, we find a mixture of the cognitive, the affective and the behavioural. We encounter the same when considering the question of **how** do I express my Jewishness? Jews respond in a variety of ways: "by abiding by a set of religious prescriptions" or "by mystically sensing a Superior presence" or "by feeling loyalty to other Jews like me" or "by going to synagogue on Shabbat". Once again, it is cognitive, affective, or behavioural.<sup>12</sup> Thus, having recognised the simultaneous presence of the three main components of human perception in each of the major fields of Jewishness, and having also recognised that each field addresses a particular

11 Miller, S.H. 2003. Changing patterns of Jewish identity among British Jews. In *New Jewish identities: Contemporary Europe and beyond*, ed. Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin, and András Kovács, 45–60. Budapest: CEU Press.

12 We appreciate Professor Stephen Miller's comments and suggestions in this respect.

component of Jewish identity, we can attribute the **what** to the main *definition* of Jewishness, the **why** to the *motivation* of the main aspects of Jewishness, and the **how** to the *expression* of Jewishness in one's personal life (see again Figure 1).



**We can attribute the *what* to the main definition of Jewishness, the *why* to the motivation of the main aspects of Jewishness, and the *how* to the expression of Jewishness in one's personal life**

Most of the existing literature on contemporary Jewry refers to one or more of these aspects, most often treating each separately from the others. However, in the present world of multiple and sometimes conflicting options, the various possible identificational alternatives cannot be understood unless they are analysed jointly, verifying their overlaps, intersections and combinations, and assessing the cumulative or mutually eliding effect of such multiplicity. To provide one simple example, how many Jews think Judaism is a religion (as opposed to its other definitional alternatives?). How many Jews believe

in God? How many of those who think Judaism is their religion believe in God? How many of those who believe in God also think Judaism is something beyond or other than a religion? Answering such questions should be relatively straightforward when appropriate sources of reliable quality exist. Indeed, some of them have been answered in the context of different Jewish communities.<sup>13</sup> A far more intriguing question is the exact content and meaning of Jewishness of the different subgroups among Jews. Do those Jews who are less involved in religious life put a greater emphasis on other, presumably non-religious, aspects within the whole range of Jewish identification possibilities? This would conform with a model of 'identificational substitution': less of one element may transform to become more of another element. But it might also be that the model sometimes defined as 'more is more and less is less' is true: the same people who are more religious are also those who are more involved with other aspects of Jewishness. These theoretical dilemmas should be adjudicated on the basis of the empirical evidence.

It is also important to consider any variation that exists across the Jewish communities of Europe. Jewish life in Europe has developed and is unfolding in particular national frameworks. Clearly, Jewish communities developed differently

13 Graham, D. 2018. *European Jewish identity: Mosaic or monolith? An empirical assessment of eight European countries*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Dencik, L. 2003. *'Jewishness' in postmodernity: The case of Sweden, Paideia report*. Stockholm: The European Institute for Jewish Studies; van Solinge, H., and C. van Praag. 2010. *De Joden in Nederland anno 2009 continueit en verandering*. Diemen: AMB; Cohen, E.H. 2011. *The Jews of France Today*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Ben Rafael, E., O. Gloeckner, and Y. Sternberg. 2011. *Jews and Jewish education in Germany today*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Ben Rafael, E. 2014. *Confronting Antisemitism in Europe. The Case of Belgian Jews*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Staetsky, L.D., and J. Boyd. 2015. *Strictly Orthodox Rising: what the demography of British Jew tells us about the future of the community*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; DellaPergola, S., and L.D. Staetsky. 2015. *From Old and New Directions: Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism among Jews in Italy*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Kovács, A., and I. Barna. 2018. *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017. Ben egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei*. Budapest: Szombat; Staetsky, L.D., and S. DellaPergola. 2020. *Jews in Austria: A demographic and social portrait*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research; DellaPergola, S., and L.D. Staetsky. 2020. *Jews in Europe at the turn of the millennium*, cit.; Fireberg, H., O. Glöckner and M. Menachem Zoufalà, eds. 2020. *Being Jewish in 21st Century Central Europe*. Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter; Pew Research Center. 2013. *A portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center survey of U.S. Jews*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center; Keysar, A., and S. DellaPergola. 2019. 'Demographic and Religious Dimensions of Jewish Identification: Millennials in the U.S. and Israel.' *Journal of Religion and Demography*, 6, 1, 149–188; Brym, R., K. Neuman, and R. Lenton. 2019. *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada. Final Report*. Toronto: Environics Institute for Survey Research, University of Toronto, and York University; Bokser Liwerant, J., S. DellaPergola, L. Senkman, Y. Goldstein. 2015. *El educador judío latinoamericano en un mundo transnacional. Vol. 1. Informe de investigación. Vol. 2. Síntesis, conclusiones y recomendaciones del informe de investigación*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Centro Liwerant para el estudio de América Latina, España, Portugal y suyas comunidades judías – Mexico: Universidad Hebreaica – Buenos Aires: AMIA; Graham, D., and A. Markus. 2018. *GEN17 Australian Jewish Community Survey: Preliminary Findings*. Melbourne: Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Faculty of Arts, Monash University; Graham, D. 2020. *The Jews in South Africa in 2019. Identity, community, society, demography*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Cape Town: Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies.

over time, in different geopolitical contexts, each of which had its own particular legal framework, religious hegemony, social order and type of interaction between the majority and the minority. Jews absorbed many significant values from the non-Jewish environment in which they were situated, which also deeply conditioned their existential options and their outlook. Our data allow us to look at the influence of these regional and local differences in the dominant patterns of Jewishness today. Other important

Jewish identification differentials may relate to demographic characteristics such as age, gender/sex and marital status, namely in relation to intermarriage.

Some of the answers to these and many other intriguing questions will be dealt with in the following chapters. They will provide an updated and multidimensional profile of the *what*, the *why*, and the *how* of Jewish identification among Jews in Europe today.

### 3 / The 2018 FRA Survey of Jews in the EU: who participated?

In considering the findings contained within this report, it is important first to fully understand where the data investigated come from. This chapter seeks to explore this issue in some detail, explaining how the data were gathered, for what purpose, and how the research sample should ultimately be understood.

This study develops a new and independent analysis of data collected in the second survey of Jewish people's experiences and perceptions of hate crime, discrimination and antisemitism, undertaken in 2018 at the initiative of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The main results from that study, concerning antisemitism, were published in 2018.<sup>14</sup> However, the survey collected a vast array of information about other topics, including the sociodemographic characteristics of European Jews and their Jewish identity. Most of those data were not published in the original FRA report. The study collected data through an online survey that allowed respondents to participate voluntarily over a period of seven weeks in May-June 2018. Eligible participants were all self-defining Jews, aged 16 or over, and resident in one of the survey countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The questionnaire was administered online and could be accessed via an open web link that was publicised on the FRA website, as well as through extensive advertising in Jewish organisations, Jewish media outlets and social networks. People who were aware of the survey were invited to snowball to acquaintances who might not have been informed about it. A consortium of Ipsos MORI and the Institute for Jewish

Policy Research (JPR) managed the survey data collection under the administrative supervision of FRA staff in Vienna. National research teams of academic experts and local researchers and community liaison points in each survey country supported the survey implementation under the guidance of JPR.

The data collection outcomes confirmed the experience of similar online surveys that the launch day is critical. In this case, over 4,000 responses were obtained on the first day alone, constituting nearly a quarter of the total sample. Following the operations implemented to assess the data quality and cleaning, the final dataset included 16,395 completed questionnaires across the twelve valid survey countries, excluding Latvia. The average time for survey completion was 33 minutes, and the median duration was 27 minutes. The response rate in 2018 was significantly higher than for a similar survey that had been conducted in 2012, due to the extensive preliminary work undertaken by the JPR team building buy-in and support from Jewish community leaders across the continent. In the seven countries where data could be compared for both dates, the number of valid respondents increased from 5,663 in 2012 to 13,083 in 2018, an increase of 131%, or more than double. The number of respondents increased especially in France (+233%), the UK (+222%), Germany (+103%), Belgium (+79%), and Sweden (+47%). Such improved coverage of the Jewish population testifies to vastly more efficient advertising of the survey, enhanced access to the web, and probably a greater awareness of and interest in the main topic investigated – the perceptions of antisemitism among Jews.

14 FRA, *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, cit.



In surveys such as the one drawn on here, one may fear that all sectors of a given Jewish population are not covered, or at least are not adequately covered. The doubt might be raised, in particular, that the survey reached a sample quite selectively confined to the more clearly identified sectors of a Jewish community, thus missing the more distant and loosely connected parts of the target population. The 2018 FRA survey from which the main findings of this report derive was planned first and foremost to investigate the perceptions of discrimination and antisemitism among Jews. It was not a study of Jewish identity, but it focused on a topic somewhat related to it, yet nonetheless conceptually different. The total number of cases investigated, 16,395, is extremely high for a Jewish population survey, and in most of the twelve EU countries studied here, the number of cases was sufficiently large to allow for quite detailed analyses of the situation at the individual country level. Appendix A provides details about the sample size and its distribution across the twelve participating countries.

To avoid such biases as far as possible, throughout this report the data presented were weighted by an array of variables to ensure closer representativeness of the underlying Jewish population. The weighted data aimed to reflect a truer image of the population investigated and its characteristics. One of the factors used to balance the sample was comparing the rate of affiliation with Jewish communities, as reported in the FRA survey, as against the effective rate of affiliation, as reported by independent Jewish sources. Compared to the actual rates of communal affiliation, the FRA survey estimates of it were significantly higher in the UK, Spain, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark; they were somewhat higher in France and Hungary; they corresponded to the actual rate of affiliation

in Italy, Austria and Germany and were lower in Belgium. All in all, the original sample somewhat overrepresented Jews who were closely affiliated to the community.<sup>15</sup>

The composition of the sample could also be compared to sociodemographic benchmarks of the Jewish populations, specifically with respect to sex, age and Jewish identity. The interested reader can turn to detailed comparisons published in the FRA final report, which we choose not to reproduce here.<sup>16</sup> Weights were developed to redress the sample and to ensure its better alignment with the Jewish population. The sample size and demographic composition are reported in Appendix A. The weighted and unweighted results were compared, and can be found in Appendix C. It should be noted that the weighted and unweighted results are very close to each other, thereby hinting that the degree of Jewish community affiliation and other demographic biases of the sample are not necessarily a decisive correlate of Jewish behaviours and attitudes, at least not regarding the dimensions explored in this report.

The weighted sample may still not entirely reflect the realities of the Jewish population at large, but neither is it a narrowly defined communal sample. We prefer to relate to it as a *hybrid*. In brief, we can say that the state of Jewish identity documented by the sample reflects: (a) the identity of the organised Jewish community in a broad sense (including the members, affiliates and subscribers of various Jewish communities, organisations and media outlets); and (b) the identity of those who are not part of the organised Jewish community but who encircle its members and affiliates at a reachable distance, and are connected to the organised community through family and other social or organisational networks.<sup>17</sup>

15 See: FRA, *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, cit.

16 Ibid.

17 This is a paraphrase of the conclusions regarding the composition of the earlier FRA survey of Jews in Europe, conducted in 2012. See: Staetsky, L.D. 2019. 'Can convenience samples be trusted?' *Contemporary Jewry* 39: 115–153.

It is important to stress again that the FRA survey upon which this report is based was concerned primarily with antisemitism. The public reached was interested in addressing the issue of antisemitism, which is one of the more salient political issues for Jews and constituted the bulk of the survey questionnaire. Only tangentially did respondents have to answer a number of background questions which included a sufficiently detailed array of Jewish identification issues, as discussed in this report. Most of these questions were placed at the end section of the questionnaire. Our assumption is that concern about antisemitism is a sufficiently broad and diffuse issue among Jews, not particularly affected by the types, main aspects or modes of expression of Jewish identity. This assumption seems to be validated by the analysis that will follow. Therefore, no particular bias attached to personal Jewish identity should be suspected to affect *a priori* the answers reported in this study. As we shall see, the 2018 FRA survey dataset contains a significant number of people who, it can be assumed, may not necessarily be a part of the core of the Jewish community, e.g. people who self-defined as 'Mixed' or who did not see themselves as bearing one of the conventional labels of Jewish identity (i.e. those answering 'None of these' to the question about the mode of expression of their current Jewishness). These two groups combined comprise about 8% of the original sample. Further, over one third of the original sample is intermarried.<sup>18</sup>


## Mode of participation in the 2018 FRA survey

How did different subgroups of Jews – all part of the heterogeneous collective of European Jewry – find their way into the survey?

In Figure 2 we present the role of the different channels of survey distribution among different subgroups of Jews, with an emphasis on the likelihood of reaching each subgroup.

The primary channel was via a mailing from Jewish organisations – either a direct email specifically about the survey or a notice about the survey in an electronic newsletter using their mailing lists (66% of respondents) – thus, by definition, from the affiliated core (although it is worth noting that those on such lists range significantly in terms of their levels of community engagement from the highly involved to the occasionally curious). Other respondents learned about the survey from seeing an advertisement about it in a Jewish newspaper or another online advertisement (7% and 5%, respectively) – also from media primarily accessed by people who keep in contact with the organised community. It was also possible to forward the survey link to other people through a process of snowballing, which was encouraged by the organisers of the study. The link was received this way by 24% of the respondents. Further evidence not reported here in detail shows that the share of non-affiliated was significantly higher among respondents who accessed the link after receiving it from others, as well as among those who found it in an advertisement or somewhere else. Figure 2 shows the distribution of respondents by the main channels through which they received the internet link to the survey. Multiple answers were allowed.

**Figure 2. Channels of access to the FRA survey, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**




18 DellaPergola, S. and Staetsky L.D. 2020. *Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium*, cit.




Figures 3 and 4 and Table 1 present the frequencies of access to the various channels of the participants by a variety of background characteristics. An email sent from a Jewish organisation was the dominant channel of contact in each country, with Austria followed by Spain and France showing the highest efficiency (74–76% of respondents). Hungary had the fewest contacts through this medium (43%), followed by Belgium (49%). The second most frequent channel of distribution of the survey link was an informal contact, namely being referred to the survey by somebody. This was highest in Belgium (40%), followed by Italy, Denmark and Sweden (30–34%). Other minor channels of distribution of the survey link were advertisements in a Jewish newspaper (with the Netherlands highest at 19%), online advertisements (Poland, 13%), or ‘somewhere else’ (Hungary, 19%). All in all, the share of participants not directly contacted through the active intervention of Jewish organisations was substantial, providing a fair amount of extension of the surveyed respondents beyond the core of the more strongly affiliated.

Gender differences were minimal, but women were slightly more likely than men to receive the invitation to participate in the survey directly from the organised community. Age differentials unveil important information on the functioning of communication networks within the Jewish public (Figure 3). The incidence of the main channel through which respondents had access to the survey (receiving an email from a Jewish organisation) sharply diminished when passing from the older age bands to the younger ones. While 77% of those over 70 received the internet link this way, this was the case for only 42% of those under 30. This points to a clearly diminishing reach of the organised community among the younger generations. However, through robust patterns of informal snowballing, many younger people gained access to the survey too. Among the under 30s, 44% accessed the link thanks to someone’s referral, i.e. a private communications network, versus 16% of those 70 and over. The younger bands were also more likely to gain access to the survey through the less significant channels of a newspaper or online advertisement – 17% overall, versus 8% among the over 70s.


**Figure 3. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by age, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**



**Figure 4. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by type of marriage, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**



**Figure 5. Percentage out-married by channel of access to the FRA survey, 2018**



What is no less significant is that among the out-married, fewer respondents had access through a Jewish organisation email contact (66% versus 75% among the in-married) than one might expect. At the same time, keeping in mind that multiple answers were allowed, 39% of the out-married accessed the survey in any other ways, versus 33% of the in-married (Figure 4).

Symmetrically (Figure 5), among those who received notice of the survey via an email from an organisation or a newspaper, a third were out-married, versus 40–42% of those who received notice from someone else or somewhere else, and 49% who found it in an online advertisement. In other words, the organised community’s more limited formal reach to the more marginally involved and the younger sections of the Jewish population was

significantly compensated for through informal communications between people. This speaks favourably for the survey’s distribution across different Jewish subgroups and audiences, including those more distanced from the inner circle of the Jewish community.



**The organised community’s more limited formal reach to the more marginally involved and the younger sections of the Jewish population was significantly compensated for through informal communications between people**

Table 1 contains a summary of the frequencies of the different channels of access used by respondents to the 2018 FRA survey by various sociodemographic characteristics. In this and in the following tables for each characteristic, we mark in **bold** the one with the highest frequency of access.


The channels of access to the survey in the different countries seen in Table 1 are graphically represented in Figure 6. The higher the proportion who participated in response to a Jewish community solicitation, the greater the risk of some bias in the sense of a greater proximity to the organised and more Jewish core of the community. That said, some communities are more centralised and organised than others, so that factor also has a bearing on this. The differences across countries are not dramatic, but all in all, access to the survey was sufficiently different to ensure a wide representation of the more marginal sectors and fringes of the Jewish collective.

**Table 1. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by background characteristics, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**

Background characteristics	Channel of access				
	Email from organisation	Told by somebody/ somebody sent a link	In a newspaper	Online advertisement	Somewhere else
<b>Total</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	65	24	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	5
Female	<b>67</b>	<b>25</b>	5	5	<b>6</b>
<b>Age</b>					
16–29	42	<b>44</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>
30–49	63	26	6	7	<b>8</b>
50–69	75	17	7	4	4
70+	<b>77</b>	16	6	2	3
<b>Marital status</b>					
In-married	<b>75</b>	19	<b>7</b>	3	4
Out-married	66	22	6	6	5
Non-married <50	46	<b>39</b>	6	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
Non-married >50	73	17	<b>7</b>	4	4
<b>Country</b>					
Austria	<b>76</b>	27	3	2	2
Belgium	49	<b>40</b>	12	4	7
Denmark	65	31	2	6	7
France	73	19	4	5	3
Germany	66	21	6	10	4
Hungary	43	25	4	10	<b>19</b>
Italy	61	34	12	4	5
Netherlands	60	19	<b>19</b>	7	9
Poland	62	27	1	<b>13</b>	9
Spain	75	23	2	4	5
Sweden	64	30	2	6	5
UK	67	24	7	3	6

Note: the highest value in each section of each column is denoted in **bold**.

**Figure 6. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by country, 2018 (%)**  
(multiple answers allowed)



Note: figures inside bars do not sum to 100% due to multiple answers allowed.

In Table 2 and Figure 7 we examine the channels through which the respondents had access to the survey, distinguishing between the various measures of Jewish identity reviewed later in this report. The differences are generally minor but point to interesting internal variations. Looking first at the

access to the survey by definitions of Judaism, Jews by religion were most likely to receive the survey via emailing from an organisation (70%). All the other channels of distribution of the survey were somewhat more frequent among the weakest definitional option – ‘Other.’

**Table 2. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by definition of Judaism, main aspect of Jewish identity, and mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**

	Channel of access				
	Email from organisation	Told by somebody/ somebody sent a link	In a newspaper	Online advertisement	Somewhere else
<b>Total sample</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Definitions of Judaism</b>					
Religion	<b>70</b>	22	7	5	5
Parentage	66	24	7	5	6
Culture	67	25	6	5	5
Heritage	67	25	7	5	5
Upbringing	67	25	7	5	5
Ethnicity	63	<b>26</b>	7	6	7
Other	61	<b>26</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Main aspects of Jewish identity (very important)</b>					
Holocaust	<b>61</b>	22	13	7	<b>10</b>
Antisemitism	57	25	<b>15</b>	<b>8</b>	5
People	50	35	4	7	7
Festivals	58	25	7	4	8
Israel	48	<b>38</b>	6	6	7
Culture	55	30	6	5	6
God	58	30	6	5	6
Charity	51	34	5	6	7
<b>Modes of expression of Jewishness</b>					
Haredi	56	25	<b>27</b>	5	8
Orthodox	70	23	9	4	3
Traditional	<b>75</b>	21	4	4	4
Reform/Progressive	69	22	6	6	5
Just Jewish	62	26	6	5	6
None of these	54	<b>29</b>	5	5	<b>9</b>
Mixed	57	24	5	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>

Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**.

Regarding the main aspects of Jewish identification (reported as 'very important'), the relation with the channels of distribution of the survey shows more significant differentials. Gaining access to the survey via an email from an organisation, or from an unspecified source ('somewhere else'), was somewhat more frequent among those stressing memory of the Holocaust (61%). Those stressing 'combating

antisemitism' were the most likely to find out about the survey via the Jewish press or an online advertisement. Those stressing support for Israel were most likely to receive the internet link via a personal connection (i.e. told by somebody/ somebody sent a link, 38%).

Regarding the mode of expression of Jewishness, the main avenue of an email from an organisation


was most frequent among the Orthodox (70%) and much less frequent among the Haredi (56%) as well as the more marginal sectors of the Nones (54%) and the Mixed (57%). The Nones (29%), the Just Jewish (26%) and the Haredi (25%) were most likely to gain access via a social contact ('told by somebody/somebody sent a link'). Among the Haredi, a newspaper was a much more likely source (27%) than for any other group. This is an interesting trait of this sector of the Jewish public, which supposedly tends to have less frequent access to, and use of the internet. Finally, the Nones and Mixed were the most likely to hear about the survey via an online advertisement or the unspecified option of 'somewhere else'. This information reinforces the notion that different sectors of the overall Jewish population could have access to the survey through different channels, thus ensuring a fair representativity of the total target population.

In order to better appreciate the possible relationship between the channels of participation

in the FRA survey and the portrayed characteristics of Jewish identity, we compared the incidence of each major channel among respondents by mode of expression of their Jewishness (Figure 7). This is the symmetrical version of the data in Table 2. Overall, the differences are quite minor, although there are some interesting particularities. The 'Traditional' were more likely to have received an email from a community organisation and the 'Just Jewish' were more often notified by somebody, whereas the Haredi and the 'Mixed' were both most likely to receive notice of the survey through other printed or internet sources, albeit for very different reasons.

Very similar findings are obtained when comparing the channels of participation with regard to the definitions of Judaism and the main aspects of Jewish identity. The main indication from this check is that the fundamental profile of the respondents as portrayed in this report was not significantly affected by the channels through which they accessed the questionnaire.

**Figure 7. Channels of access to the FRA survey, by mode of expression of personal Jewishness by, 2018 (%) (multiple answers allowed)**



Note: figures inside bars do not sum to 100% due to multiple answers allowed.

## 4 / The What: definitions of Judaism

In Jewish social research and in general discourse, the question of “Who is a Jew?” has been the subject of infinite discussion. In the 2018 FRA survey the personal definitional issue was simply solved by allowing respondents to self-identify, after the following statement had been presented in the introduction to the survey questionnaire:

“The **purpose of this survey** is to better understand how antisemitism impacts on the life of Jews in the European countries selected for this survey. The survey is conducted by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Ipsos on behalf of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. **We are interested in the views and experiences of all people who consider themselves Jewish** in any way (this could be based on religion, culture, upbringing, ethnicity, parentage or any other basis) and are aged 16 years or over. **Critical to the success of this survey is making sure that as wide a range of Jewish people as possible take part;** this will make sure that all voices are heard and the experiences of Jews in your country and across Europe are better understood. The outcome of the survey will provide important evidence to EU and national policy makers, as well as organisations working within Jewish and wider civil society, to ensure that the rights of Jewish people are respected, protected and fulfilled across the EU. Taking part in this survey is completely voluntary.”

This was followed by the question:

“Do you consider yourself to be Jewish in any way – this could be on the grounds of your religion, culture, upbringing, ethnicity, parentage or any other reasons?”

The answer suggested was binary: Yes/No. On the one hand, this was designed to ensure that participation in the survey was limited to Jewish people. On the other, it reflected a desire to attract all conceivable types of Jews, considering the various definitions of Jewishness that exist across different countries, traditions and personal situations.


Later in the questionnaire the following question appeared:

“People identify as Jewish in different ways. On what basis would you say you are Jewish?”

The suggested response categories comprised a number of alternative (but not mutually exclusive) definitions of the nature of Judaism in the mind of the respondent. All the definitions previously listed by the introductory question as examples of grounds for considering oneself as Jewish (i.e. religion, culture, upbringing, ethnicity, parentage or something else) were offered. Each respondent could select one or more of these definitions to describe their grounds for considering themselves Jewish.

Figure 8 shows the distributions of definitions of Judaism for those who provided a single answer (summing to 100%), as well as the cumulative totals, including those respondents who provided more than one answer. A minority of respondents (24% of the total sample, about 4,000 cases) gave a single answer, and it is reasonable to assume that this group included two types of respondents: (1) those who self-defined in an exclusive way and who genuinely thought that only one definition of Jewishness was relevant to them; and (2) those who may have simply overlooked the fact that they were offered a question with multiple responses allowed. Among single answers, Religion attracted the higher preference with 35%, followed by

**Figure 8. Definitions of Judaism (single answers only and multiple answers), 2018 (%)**



Parentage (26%), Culture (11%), Heritage (10%), Ethnicity (9%), Upbringing (3%) and Other (6%). Certain categories referring to the implicit criterion of common ancestry can be combined. Parentage, Upbringing and Ethnicity (three ancestry or descent-based definitions) may be merged to reach 38%, and the same can be done with Culture and Heritage for a cumulated 21%.

When our respondents are examined as a whole, it is notable how Religion clearly dominates over Ethnicity. This was not the case in the recent past in Eastern Europe, especially in the Former Soviet Union, where Jews were defined (or perhaps were constrained to define themselves) as an ethnic-national group. There are two possible reasons for the relatively modest use of ethnicity as a definition. First, it is possible that the concept of ethnicity is simply not as readily understood as, say, the concepts of parentage or upbringing. Ethnicity is a term widely used in social scientific discourse, but far less in common parlance. Second, its lesser attractiveness in some places in Western Europe may be due to the

mode of formation of the Western European states as national civic entities, and the modes of incorporation of Jews as religious minorities with little or no option for national autonomy. In contrast, in Eastern Europe and Central Europe, dominated by multilingual and multi-ethnic empires throughout much of the nineteenth century and by communist regimes throughout much of the twentieth, ethnicity continued to be a more salient category of self-identification. The reality of multilingual and multi-ethnic empires made ethnicity an intuitively clear category, while the communist realities contributed later on to the suppression of religious identities and/or the absence of their use as legitimate categories of self-definition. We will return to this issue later in this chapter.

In reality, Jewishness is multidimensional. Looking at the data including multiple answers, Parentage, Culture, Heritage and Religion, in this order, all receive around 60% or more of the preferences. Ethnicity lies significantly behind. In initially evaluating these different definitions, one might possibly argue that Religion and Ethnicity represent two more clearly defined extremes among the several alternatives which distinguish Jews from mainstream society in the various countries of residence. Culture and Heritage are also distinctive options, although perhaps more difficult to explain and document. In any case, all of these options imply an adherence to something culturally and attitudinally distinctive and separate from the surrounding environment. On the other hand, Parentage and Upbringing appear as more passive, and hence conceptually weaker options. They do not imply a voluntary choice from the point of view of specific Jewish norms, beliefs and behaviours that might be characteristic of an individual Jew or Jewish community, but simply acknowledge a genealogical reality from which one cannot escape. All of these observations, at this stage, are in reality only hypotheses to be proven through a more intensive analysis of the data later in this report.

The same answers can be disaggregated according to several background characteristics: gender, age, marital status and country of residence (Figure 9 and Table 3).





**Figure 9. Definitions of Judaism (multiple answers), by age, 2018 (%)**


Figure 9 shows the distribution of the different Jewish definitions across age groups. All definitions show a definite increase in use with the passage from older to younger age groups. This might be attributed to a reinforcement of Jewish identification in the transition from older to younger age cohorts. But a confounding effect might also derive from a higher propensity among the younger age respondents to provide more answers to the question. This would signal a growing propensity to perceive their Jewishness as multifaceted rather than one-dimensional. Two additional findings are noteworthy. First, the gaps between most of the options remain quite constant across ages. This would signal that both the young and the old share the fundamental ranking of the various options that are available to define Judaism. However, it also clearly appears that two of the options – Parentage and Religion – are much more prevalent among the younger. There is a real increase in the relevance of these two definitions, relative to the others, among the younger as compared to the older respondents. It may be noted that the Ethnicity option is consistently the lowest of the lot.

**Figure 10. Definitions of Judaism (multiple answers), by type of marriage, 2018 (%)**

Unlike age, gender has no effect at all on the choice of the definitional domain of what is Judaism. The effect of marital status is also insignificant. However, intermarriage (being married to a non-Jew) does have an effect: there is a visible difference between the in-marrieds and the out-marrieds with respect to the preference for two definitions in particular – Religion (mentioned by 74% of the in-marrieds vs. 36% of the out-marrieds) and Upbringing (57% vs. 39%, respectively). There is no significant effect of out-marriage on the frequency of mentioning the other definitions (Figure 10).

Looking at the data the other way around, the percentage of out-married among respondents who preferred each definitional category is reported in Figure 11. This confirms the somewhat more traditional family choices of those who define Judaism as Religion or Upbringing.

**Figure 11. Percentage out-married by preferred definition of Judaism (multiple answers), 2018**




Among the non-married, those younger than 50 ticked significantly more choices on all definitions than those above 50, confirming the tendency to mention more options among the younger age groups.

Table 3 contains a summary of the popularity of different definitions of Judaism by various sociodemographic characteristics.

Turning to intercountry differences shown towards the bottom of Table 3 (see also Figure 12), very significant variations in the perception of the definitions of personal Jewishness appear across the twelve countries examined in this study. Defining oneself as Jewish by religion is popular in many countries, but most popular in the UK, Belgium, Italy and Spain. It is least popular in Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands, where ancestry-based definitions dominate. Self-definition by ethnicity is most popular in Hungary, UK and Sweden, and least popular in France and Italy. The observation concerning France is notable in view of the strong tendency in French political and social culture to stress the unity of the French nation,

**Figure 12. Definitions of Judaism by country (multiple answers), 2018 (%)**



Note: Ancestry-based identity is Jewish identity based on Parentage, Upbringing or Ethnicity.

and to firmly oppose any forms of what is called *communautarisme*, i.e. the preference for separate sub-identities and allegiances beyond mainstream French national identity. We also find that Eastern and Central Europe tend to be quite different in this regard from Western Europe. Furthermore, it is clear that in certain Western European countries, ancestry and ethnicity are more readily used by Jews, due to the existence of certain national traditions relating to the status of Jews or advanced secularism, or indeed, both (Sweden and the Netherlands). Jews in the Netherlands and the UK are the highest in choosing Parentage as a defining element of their Jewishness, with the UK also highest on Heritage and Upbringing. Jews in Spain are the highest in mentioning Culture. Hungary shows the lowest propensities on all options, with the exception of Parentage (where Italy is lowest), and Ethnicity (where France is lowest).

**Table 3. Definitions of Judaism (multiple answers), by background characteristics, 2018 (%)**

Background characteristics	Definition of Judaism						
	Religion	Parentage	Culture	Heritage	Upbringing	Ethnicity	Other
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>6</b>
Thereof: single answer	35	26	14	10	3	9	6
<b>Gender</b>							
Male	<b>59</b>	68	64	58	49	42	6
Female	56	68	64	<b>59</b>	<b>50</b>	40	6
<b>Age</b>							
16–29	<b>67</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>49</b>	6
30–49	64	66	66	59	51	44	<b>7</b>
50–69	54	67	62	58	48	37	<b>7</b>
70+	43	40	58	53	42	35	4
<b>Marital status</b>							
In-married	<b>74</b>	67	66	59	<b>57</b>	40	5
Out-married	36	69	60	57	39	39	6
Non-married <50	61	<b>70</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>63</b>	54	<b>48</b>	<b>8</b>
Non-married >50	44	65	58	54	42	35	7
<b>Country</b>							
Austria	60	69	60	54	40	41	5
Belgium	67	66	60	54	56	31	6
Denmark	60	73	61	61	41	44	6
France	61	60	70	55	48	17	6
Germany	57	70	54	47	39	42	7
Hungary	17	49	41	26	21	<b>77</b>	11
Italy	62	42	63	58	44	18	8
Netherlands	39	<b>79</b>	54	49	45	44	5
Poland	32	62	61	51	29	35	11
Spain	62	60	<b>71</b>	46	40	25	<b>14</b>
Sweden	38	61	56	56	36	51	6
UK	<b>71</b>	<b>79</b>	70	<b>75</b>	<b>67</b>	59	5

Note: the highest value in each section of each column is shown in **bold**.

These differences should be kept in mind when considering how to label Jews correctly in a given national context. Intercountry differences in the perception of Judaism are valuable when considering the potential policy uses of this information beyond scientific-analytical work, when it comes to elucidating ‘Who is a Jew?’ In many countries today, government agencies responsible for the production of official statistics

and private survey firms consider the introduction of questions on religion and ethnicity in their administrative forms or survey questionnaires. To be successful, such work should consider the ways in which Jews identify in any particular country, e.g. by religion or by ethnicity, and should formulate questions or introduce the Jewish options so that Jewish respondents can best understand and respond to them.

## 5 / The Why: main aspects considered essential to personal Jewish identity


In the preceding chapter we clarified how European Jews define themselves in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture and/or family background. We defined that question: *What does Judaism mean to the respondent?* in the broadest possible sense. We now approach the question of Jewish feelings, with respect to various main aspects of their history, religion, tradition, interaction with the non-Jewish environment, and concern for Israel. The question here is: *Why is Jewish identity important to the respondent?* Several main aspects of Jewish identity (evidently selected from a much broader range of possible topics) were proposed in the FRA survey, and the respondents were asked to mark each of them as ‘very important’, ‘fairly important’, ‘fairly unimportant’ or ‘very unimportant’. In our presentation here

we focus only on the ‘Very important’ option, instead of combining it with ‘Fairly Important’. Combining both of these would provide much higher values but, in our view, would also signal a sort of conformist compliance with an expected normative attitude, which would be of limited analytic significance. The results are shown in Figure 13.


At the top we find ‘Remembering the Holocaust’ (78%), closely followed by ‘Combating antisemitism’ (73%). In third place comes ‘Feeling part of the Jewish people’ (66%). The two next markers are very close: ‘Sharing Jewish festivals with the family’ (52%) and ‘Supporting Israel’ (51%). An ‘Attachment to Jewish culture’, including literature and the arts, follows (42%). The lowest levels of importance are attached to ‘Believing in God’ (33%) and ‘Donating to charity’ (32%). The context of the question makes it likely that respondents thought *Jewish* charity was meant. It should be stressed again that these are the percentages of those who signalled ‘very important’. As noted, by adding the mere ‘fairly important’ category, the percentages of support greatly increase for all options.

Figures 14–16 and Table 4 provide a picture of the variation of these eight markers of Jewish identity across different background characteristics. Regarding gender, women tend to express a slightly stronger preference than men concerning five of the eight Jewish identification markers: remembering the Holocaust, combating antisemitism, feeling part of the Jewish people, celebrating Jewish festivals with the family, and appreciating Jewish culture. No gender differences appear regarding the three other markers: supporting Israel, believing in God, and donating to charity. With regard to age, a slight weakening

**Figure 13. Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity, 2018 (% ‘very important’)**




**Figure 14. Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity, by age, 2018 (% 'very important')**



of the intensity of expressed preferences appears for five of the eight main aspects examined, contrary to what was seen with the definitions of Judaism. This redirects us toward appreciating the intrinsic meaning of these choices, beyond the tendency to tick one or more of the options. 50 to 69-year-olds display the highest value on five of the eight options and share it with the youngest on a sixth. The exceptions are celebrating Jewish festivals with the family and believing in God, where the highest values are found among the 16 to 29 age group. This confirms the tendency among the younger participants in the FRA survey toward a more religiously oriented definition of their Jewishness. A slight decline associated with younger age is visible concerning support for Israel and combating antisemitism.

Concerning marital status, those who are out-married are very different from those who are in-married in several respects. (Figure 15 and Table 4). The out-married attach significantly lower levels of importance to feeling part of the Jewish People, celebrating Jewish festivals with


**Figure 15. Main aspects of personal Jewish identity, by type of marriage, 2018 (% 'very important')**



the family, supporting Israel, believing in God and donating to charity. On the other hand, there is no apparent association between out-marriage and remembering the Holocaust, combating antisemitism and interest in Jewish culture. To put it differently, out-marriage seems to be associated with emotional distancing from communal and collective practices as well as from Jewish peoplehood, but not from historical memory, political awareness, ethnocentric concern or defence (or perhaps feelings of vulnerability), and interest in Jewish culture.

Observed the other way around, Figure 16 provides rates of out-marriage for each group of respondents who marked a given Jewish identification option as very important. The percentages are lower than the overall average since those who feel *very importantly* about an identification option selectively represent the more Jewishly oriented segment of the total Jewish population. Differences in out-marriage

**Figure 16. Percentage out-married by main aspect very important to personal Jewish identity, 2018**



frequency seem to overlap with three basic outlooks: *Religion* (Jewish festivals, Charity and Believing in God), *Peoplehood* (Jewish people and Israel), and *Culture-memory* (culture, antisemitism, and Holocaust).

Looking now at comparisons across different countries, the rankings of different main aspects tend to be quite similar. The memory of the Holocaust is highest in the Netherlands, the country in Western Europe most hard hit by the Shoah. Poland and Hungary were the places with the highest numbers of Shoah victims, but whereas remembering the Holocaust is high among the small residue of Polish Jewry, in Hungary its reporting is remarkably moderate. It nearly competes with the lowest, in Denmark – whose Jewish community was, for the most part, rescued during the Second World War. Combating antisemitism is highest in France, where, along with Belgium, Poland and Germany,

the same 2018 FRA survey found the highest levels of anxiety about antisemitism among the Jewish public. Jews in Belgium display the highest sensitivity to three markers more closely related to religious belief and practice: observing the Jewish festivals with the family, believing in God and giving to charity. This may be explained by the high proportion of religious observance in the strictly Orthodox community of Antwerp. Spain displays higher values on three options: feeling part of the Jewish people, supporting Israel, and the importance of Jewish culture. We note that the Eastern European countries (Poland and Hungary) and the Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Sweden) quite often display the lowest values. The only main aspects where this pattern is not well defined are the memory of the Holocaust and Jewish culture, in keeping with the very secular nature of the Jewish communities in these countries. As to the other lower frequencies, Denmark is lowest on donating to charity, Sweden on believing in God, Austria on Jewish culture, and Hungary on four markers: combating antisemitism, feeling part of the Jewish people, celebrating Jewish festivals with the family and supporting Israel. The intercountry gaps are particularly strong concerning the variables associated with a more religious outlook.

Overall, it seems there is little relationship between what actually happened historically in a given country, and the place of the Holocaust in the contemporary identity of Jews in that country. Something else must be driving it – maybe a universalisation of the consciousness of the fatal role of the Shoah in Jewish history, whether or not directly experienced by the respondents' own families, or some coalescence of the recent past with the perceptions of contemporary antisemitism. This may generate emotional feelings of vulnerability, periodically rekindled by the re-emergence of anti-Jewish prejudice or hostility encountered in the wider non-Jewish environment.

**Table 4. Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity, 2018 (% 'very important')**

Background characteristics	% very important							
	Remem-bering the Holocaust	Combat-ing anti-semitism	Feeling part of Jewish people	Sharing Jewish festivals with family	Support-ing Israel	Jewish culture	Believing in God	Donating to charity
<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Gender</b>								
Male	74	69	64	49	<b>52</b>	38	<b>34</b>	31
Female	<b>82</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>55</b>	51	<b>45</b>	33	<b>32</b>
<b>Age</b>								
16–29	76	68	<b>67</b>	<b>61</b>	43	40	<b>39</b>	31
30–49	74	68	65	60	48	39	37	<b>32</b>
50–69	<b>81</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>67</b>	47	<b>57</b>	<b>45</b>	32	<b>32</b>
70+	<b>81</b>	76	61	37	52	43	24	31
<b>Marital status</b>								
In-married	79	74	<b>77</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>60</b>	42	<b>44</b>	<b>43</b>
Out-married	78	73	52	28	42	40	20	19
Non-married <50	74	69	62	53	44	40	33	27
Non-married >50	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	62	36	52	<b>45</b>	28	28
<b>Country</b>								
Austria	72	70	60	49	48	32	31	27
Belgium	82	78	76	<b>71</b>	55	43	<b>49</b>	<b>47</b>
Denmark	53	64	53	38	42	42	18	14
France	84	<b>80</b>	77	60	59	49	38	34
Germany	76	71	63	42	53	39	37	24
Hungary	58	61	41	18	25	36	20	26
Italy	73	76	49	63	52	53	39	23
Netherlands	<b>85</b>	78	67	41	62	44	26	32
Poland	83	65	43	21	31	51	25	18
Spain	78	79	<b>82</b>	57	<b>66</b>	<b>58</b>	43	28
Sweden	79	76	56	41	45	42	16	20
UK	78	68	64	55	48	33	35	38


Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**.

## Country-specific differences

The ranking of essential Jewish identification across countries is astonishingly similar (Figure 17). The top of the hierarchy is nearly universally occupied by the memory of the Holocaust, combating antisemitism and feeling part of the Jewish people; the bottom, by belief in God and donating to charity, with support for Israel in the middle. In Figure 17 we use

the following colour scheme to highlight these regularities: black for Holocaust and antisemitism, orange for support of Israel, green for belief in God, and grey for the other options. Memory and survival are consistently at the top, Israel is in the middle and faith is at the bottom, and that general characterisation holds across Europe: in the east, west, north and south of Europe.


**Figure 17. Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity, by country, 2018**  
 (% 'very important')



Note: in this exhibit, shortened labels for aspects of Jewish identity are used to facilitate presentation. Full labels are found in the previous exhibit.



**Figure 17. (cont.) Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity, by country, 2018**  
 (% 'very important')



Note: in this exhibit, shortened labels for aspects of Jewish identity are used to facilitate presentation. Full labels are found in the previous exhibit.

From the foregoing analysis we learn that despite historical and geopolitical differences, there is a great deal of commonality across these communities, as demonstrated by the hierarchies in Figure 17. Looking at the hierarchy, it seems that the *why* of Jewish identity is driven strongly by a persistent memory and fear of oppression,

accompanied by a sense (no matter how vague) of belonging to a broad transnational Jewish people, as well as a certain feeling of warmth around family, community, festivals, etc. The more cogent and binding requirements of religious belief and actions (such as *tzedakah*, donating to charity) generally appear at the bottom of the scale.

## 6 / More on country differences: a structural look

The data on priorities, or matters of importance to Jews, outlined in the previous chapter can be re-analysed using a different technique known as Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA).<sup>19</sup> Instead of focusing separately on the frequencies of each Jewish identification option or variable, this approach aims to create an integrated perception of all the variables together. The SSA procedure measures the respective similarities or proximities, and dissimilarities or distances between the various responses. This is achieved by calculating the intercorrelations between the different variables and translating the respective numerical values into physical distances on a map in which each variable is represented by a point. The higher the correlation, i.e. the intrinsic similarity of the contents, the shorter the distance between the points on the map, and vice versa – the lower the correlation, the longer the distance. When looking at the points on the map and seeing two next to each other (e.g. Holocaust and Antisemitism), the observer can conclude that respondents who attach great importance to memory of the Holocaust also tend to attach great importance to combating antisemitism. On the other hand, if two items appear in diametrically opposed parts of the map, this means that very different people consider each of these items very important in defining their Jewish identity.

Figure 18 represents the SSA maps for similar sets of variables concerning the essential main aspects of Jewish identity, as found previously


in 2012 – when the first FRA survey of Jewish perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in Europe was conducted – and in the 2018 FRA survey. The number of variables included in 2012 was larger than in 2018, but the two maps are perfectly comparable. In fact, in the SSA concept, each point is located within a space which can be conceived as representative of a broader conceptual domain. It is these broader domains, rather than the individual variables, in which we are interested. The variables actually displayed are a sort of sample among a significantly larger repertoire of similar questions that might have been asked and may resonate in the same or similar way among the respondents.<sup>20</sup> The number of countries investigated changed too, increasing from eight in 2012 to twelve in 2018, as five countries (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) were added, and one (Latvia) was dropped from the 2018 data analysis. Given the relatively small Jewish population of these countries, this had a minor influence in determining the continental totals.

The content domains in Figure 18 are clearly recognisable, from the upper right corner in circular clockwise ordering. We first see spending Jewish festivals together with one's own family. This is a proxy for family and possibly also friends' networks and the desire to spend time together on traditional Jewish occasions. This is followed by a domain of religious rituals and beliefs, represented by believing in God and respecting

19 Guttman, L. 1968. A general nonmetric technique for finding the smallest coordinate space for a configuration of points. *Psychometrika*, 33, 4, 469–506; Amar, R., and S. Levy. 2014. SSA-Similarity Structure Analysis, in A.C. Michalos (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Wellbeing Research*, 6306–6313. Dordrecht: Springer; Shye, S., D. Elizur, with M. Hoffman. 1994. *Introduction to Facet Theory. Content Design and Intrinsic Data Analysis in Behavioral Research*. Thousand Oaks-London-New Delhi: Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Methods Series, 35.

20 Shye, S., D. Elizur, with M. Hoffman. 1994. *Introduction to Facet Theory. Content Design and Intrinsic Data Analysis in Behavioral Research*. Thousand Oaks-London-New Delhi: Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Methods Series, 35.

**Figure 18. Similarity Structure (SSA) maps of eight main aspects essential to Jewish identity of European Jews, 2012 and 2018\***



\* The results refer to eight countries in 2012 and to twelve countries in 2018.

other Jewish religious norms. The next domain includes donating to charity, philanthropy, and, extending the concept, support for a Jewish community. In 2012, the next domains that follow in a clockwise order are: moral and ethical concerns, i.e. keeping to a high standard of human behaviour as prescribed by Jewish tradition; being interested in Jewish culture, in the sense of secular and general expressions of knowledge, literature and the arts; fighting antisemitism and remembering the Holocaust, i.e. keeping alive consciousness of recent Jewish history and translating it into advocacy and action to face the challenges of the present; caring for Israel, by acknowledging one's own emotional attachment and supportive advocacy on behalf of the Jewish state; and feeling part of the Jewish people, stressing the sense of belonging to the broader global collective beyond national borders.

There is considerable proximity in the 2012 map between Israel and Jewish peoplehood. In the 2018 map, the ordering of the main domains of Jewish identity is quite similar. After Jewish festivals, believing in God and donating to charity, we find, going clockwise, on the left side of the

map fighting antisemitism and remembering the Holocaust, as in 2018, but interest in Jewish culture has moved to a different spot. However, what really calls for attention is how caring for Israel and feeling part of the Jewish people has moved to a much more central spot in the map. In other words, these highly correlated variables, which, in 2012, were part of the ordinary circular pattern, occupy a position in 2018 which seems to be more central in the map. What does this mean?

The central spot of the map is not necessarily where the highest frequencies of response are recorded, but rather where the sum of distances from all other points is smaller. In other words, the map centre serves as a sort of coordinating element of the other parts when the minds of all respondents are taken as a collective. To clarify further, whereas belief in God and attachment to Jewish culture – which are, in themselves, very important elements in one's own Jewish identity – seem to be quite differently distributed across the Jewish population, attachment to Israel and the Jewish people are more compatible with the other types of interests. Another important feature is that the position of concern with

combating antisemitism and with remembering the Shoah stand in apparent antithesis of belief in God and celebrating Jewish festivals together with the family. This reflects well the data already seen above, showing a greater affinity that some Jews have with a more secular, historical-cultural approach to Jewish identity, versus some others for whom Judaism has a closer affinity with a religious, transcendental and family-oriented approach.

The quite extraordinary shift in the position of the dyad Israel/Jewish peoplehood requires an explanation. The observed change cannot be understood without considering the negative changes in the atmosphere surrounding the Jewish community, as reported by Jews, which are clearly documented in the two FRA studies of the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews. Both in 2012 and in 2018, over 75% of the respondents reported a perceived increase in antisemitism, which was probably, at least in part, due to the cumulated effect of the number of negative acts committed, multiplied by the efficiency of the networks of transmission of such hostile messages and notions. The hostile pressure is perceived through three forms of denial: of the right of Jews to equal civil rights and respect in society; of the right of Jews to their own memory of the Shoah; and of the right of Jews to their own sovereign state – Israel (regardless of the willingness of Jews to participate directly in that enterprise or of their right to criticise it).<sup>21</sup> These perceptions may have prompted many Jews who were at the periphery of the Jewish community to seek more contacts with its organised centre, and also to express more explicitly their concern for Israel and their solidarity with the Jewish people as a central part of their Jewish identity.


## Country-specific differences

Figure 19 proposes the same SSA analytic approach separately for each of the twelve countries surveyed in 2018. The country-specific visual patterns show many similarities but also some significant differences across the European Union. The basic circular configuration of Jewish identity options appears in all twelve countries and, with minor differences, the ordering of the variables is quite similar, although distinctions can be seen in the central portion of the map. In two countries, Belgium and Poland, the central spot is occupied by feeling part of the Jewish People; in three countries, Austria, Germany and Sweden, it is occupied by supporting Israel; and in another three countries (France, UK and Denmark) it is occupied by the dyad Israel/Jewish people. Therefore, this dyad, or part of it, is central to the Jewish identity perceptions of Jews in eight out of the twelve countries. However, one country, Italy, has a quite unusual configuration, with donating to charity (to be understood in this particular case as a proxy for being part of an officially recognised Jewish community) at the centre, and it is also the only one among the twelve in which the Israel/Jewish people dyad is separated out into its components. The original Italian model confirms previous observations<sup>22</sup> and plausibly reflects the unique legal situation of Italian Jewry which, between the 1930s and the 1980s, made Jewish community membership compulsory by an Italian state law. In three other countries – the Netherlands, Spain and Hungary – the central spot on the map remains empty, indicating a lack of consensus about what might be a shared element in the Jewish identification priorities of local Jews, or perhaps more deeply, the lack of a sense of belonging to a Jewish community at the national level.


21 DellaPergola, S. 2020. 'Contemporary Antisemitism: National or Transnational?' In: I. Altman with I. Kotler (eds.) *Protecting the Future. Second Moscow International Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, and Racism*. Moscow, Russian Jewish Congress, 2020, 88-115. DellaPergola, S. 2020. 'Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look.' *Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism ACTA*. Berlin: De Gruyter, and Jerusalem: SICSA, 40, 2, 1–86.

22 Campelli, E. 2013. *Comunità va cercando, ch'è sì cara...* *Sociologia dell'Italia ebraica*. Milano: Franco Angeli; DellaPergola, S. 2017. Popolitudine ebraica nel mondo e in Italia: Marcatori forti, deboli e interattivi, in U.G. Pacifici Noja and G. Pacifici (eds.) *Ebreo chi? Sociologia degli ebrei italiani oggi*. Milano: Jaca Books, 31–71.

Figure 19. SSA maps of aspects essential to personal Jewish identity in 12 EU countries, 2018



**Figure 19. (cont.) SSA maps of aspects essential to personal Jewish identity in 12 EU countries, 2018**



Summing up the maps of the twelve countries, the essential main aspects of Jewish identity can be regrouped into four main domains: supporting Israel/Jewish peoplehood; antisemitism/Shoah; believing in God/Jewish festivals, sometimes with the addition of charity; and (secular) Jewish culture. In international comparison, it is remarkable how the patterns that prevail in most European countries are similar to many non-European ones. The predominant centrality of Israel and/or the Jewish people also prevails in Latin America, Canada, Australia and most significantly in Israel.<sup>23</sup> The only non-European country which appears to be centreless, like some of the European countries, is the United States.

This, as such, is quite a significant finding, suggesting that “the category of peoplehood is not developed in American Jewish culture, even though it is an important concept for Judaism.”<sup>24</sup> The question remains open as to what might be the particular variable capable of filling the central spot of Jewish identification perceptions in the three European countries (as well as in the United States) where the centre of the map remains empty, if anything at all. The absence of such a variable suggests a certain lack of Jewish coherence or commonality – or plausibility structure holding the collective together – across the Jewish populations of those countries, itself an indicator of potential weakness over time.

23 DellaPergola, S., A. Keysar, and S. Levy. 2019. ‘Jewish Identification Differentials in Israel and in the United States: Similarity Structure Analysis.’ *Contemporary Jewry*, 2019, 39, 1, 55–90. doi.org/10.1007/s12397-019-09283-5.

24 See Thompson, J.A. 2014. *Jewish on Their Own Terms. How Intermarried Couples are Changing American Judaism*. New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press.




## 7 / The How: modes of expression of personal Jewishness

Being Jewish can be manifested through an array of beliefs, as we have seen above, as well as through specific behaviours, as we shall see below. Jews make individual choices about whether or not to adhere to these beliefs and to practice these behaviours. However, one significant dimension of Jewishness is the associations of certain individuals with others. Such associations can happen within organisations and formal frameworks, such as in particular synagogues or synagogue networks following different rituals and practices, but can also exist within codified modes of expression or expressed preferences which may or may not take the shape of actual physical meetings between the people involved. Most often these associations actually occur through getting together in specific places of encounter, such as synagogues, Jewish cultural centres or other frameworks not specifically marked as Jewish. There can also be a virtual or symbolic meeting of minds, which responds to an inner need and feeling, by which a person knows he or she belongs to a given framework even if this does not involve a physical venue. The division of Jews into what is commonly described as religious *denominations* or *streams* is essentially ideological, but it also expresses in fundamental ways codified patterns of behaviour which are quite openly presented or advocated for as ideal models for others.

The distribution of these modes, or denominations, of how to present oneself as Jewish is shown in Figure 20. At this stage, we present the frequency distribution in a sort of hierarchical ordering of religiosity, from what is commonly understood as the most to the least intensive, before assessing whether this ordering is empirically justifiable. Further validation will be shown below. In 2018, 5% of the respondents

**Figure 20. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (%)**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

defined themselves as Haredi – namely, very religiously observant and quite segregated both residentially and organisationally; 8% as Orthodox – e.g. not switching on lights on Shabbat, as specified in the survey questionnaire, to indicate adherence to Jewish law; 24% as Traditional – not necessarily in reference to a particular organisation or movement; 15% as Reform or Progressive – in this case, plausibly having in mind the respective organisations or movements; 38% as 'Just Jewish' – relatively the largest portion of the total, and meaning a lack of association with one of these particular aforementioned modes or denominations; 6% as 'None of these' – probably alluding to a very peripheral and

non-involved part of the public at stake; and 5% as 'Mixed' – indicating a partly Jewish and partly non-Jewish parentage and leaving the adjudication of personal Jewishness somewhat open.


Variations in these frequencies of the modes, by selected background variables, appear in Figure 21 and Table 5. Gender differences are very minor, besides a slight predominance of males among the more strongly religiously oriented. Age differences, in contrast, are quite significant. What mainly emerges is a steady strengthening of the Haredi and Orthodox options with the passage from older to younger age groups, albeit from relatively low bases. The size of the group combining the Haredi and the Orthodox rises from 5% among those aged 70 years and over, to 22% among those below 30 years. This draws mainly from a steady decline of the weakly defined Just Jewish group from 49% above 70 years to 32% below 30 years, as well as a decline of the Traditional among the youngest group (aged 16–29 years),

who have commonly been termed *Millennials*. The preference for Reform/Progressive remains relatively stable across the age spectrum.

The apparent increase in religiosity among those of younger age confirms what we already saw regarding the question of the main aspects of Jewish identity, in particular, believing in God, spending the Jewish festivals with the family, and donating to charity. It might be thought that the FRA survey did not pick up many younger Jews who were quite distant from the community because these people essentially disappeared from Jewish life. However, it is significant to recall that on other identity accounts, such as support for Israel and combating antisemitism, the younger generation displayed weakening frequencies. The apparent reinforcing of the religious component seems to reflect a reordering of identity options. A fuller answer to this question will be provided in the next chapter on lifecycle identity changes.



**Figure 21. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by age, 2018 (%)**




Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

**The apparent increase in religiosity among those of younger age confirms what we already saw regarding the question of the main aspects of Jewish identity, in particular, believing in God, spending the Jewish festivals with the family, and donating to charity**

As to marital status and its relationship to modes of Jewish expression, there are, once again, striking differences between the in-married and the out-married (Figure 22 and Table 5). Among the former, 59% are found in the range between Haredi and Traditional; among the latter, 72% are found in the range between Just Jewish and Mixed. The Reform/Progressive comprise 12% of the in-married and 17% of the out-married. Among the non-married, the age gradient replicates the picture presented in Figure 21, namely a strengthening of the Haredi and Orthodox share of the total among the younger.


**Figure 22. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by type of marriage, 2018 (%)**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

The same data are presented symmetrically as the percentage out-married in each group of respondents by modes of expression of Jewishness (Figure 23). With an overall out-marriage level of 36% for total respondents, the range of variation is extreme, with only 1% out-married among the Haredi and 3% among the Orthodox, increasing to 14%

**Figure 23. Percentage out-married, by mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

among the Traditional, 45% among the Reform/Progressive, 54% among the Just Jewish, rising to 72% among the Nones, and 75% among the Mixed. This gradient across the different modes of expressing personal Jewishness probably constitutes one of the most important factors underlying other aspects and measures of Jewish identity.

**Table 5. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by background characteristics, 2018 (%)**

Background characteristics	Modes							Total
	Haredi	Orthodox	Traditional	Reform/Progressive	Just Jewish	None of these	Mixed	
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Gender</b>								
Male	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	23	14	37	6	5	100
Female	4	7	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>38</b>	6	5	100
<b>Age</b>								
16–29	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	19	<b>16</b>	32	6	5	100
30–49	6	10	<b>25</b>	14	34	6	5	100
50–69	3	6	<b>25</b>	<b>16</b>	39	6	<b>6</b>	100
70+	1	4	24	14	<b>49</b>	<b>7</b>	3	100
<b>Marital status</b>								
In-married	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>35</b>	12	25	2	2	100
Out-married	0	1	10	<b>17</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	100
Non-married <50	3	9	21	16	38	7	6	100
Non-married >50	1	3	22	16	45	7	6	100
<b>Country</b>								
Austria*	2	9	26	19	35	6	4	100
Belgium	<b>31</b>	<b>11</b>	20	8	23	2	4	100
Denmark	0	5	19	11	52	9	4	100
France	1	10	<b>33</b>	12	33	6	5	100
Germany	1	6	25	20	38	5	5	100
Hungary	1	1	9	5	<b>59</b>	9	<b>15</b>	100
Italy	1	<b>11</b>	15	10	53	6	4	100
Netherlands	1	7	14	20	41	10	8	100
Poland	1	3	5	14	51	<b>18</b>	9	100
Spain	0	5	30	<b>24</b>	32	6	3	100
Sweden	0	4	19	15	47	6	9	100
UK	8	10	25	16	33	5	3	100

Note: the highest value in each section of each column is in **bold**. The category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

\* The estimates for Austria derived from the FRA survey were revised in a JPR report on Jews in Austria, which contains corrected estimations of denominational shares generated on the basis of communal statistics and Jewish school data. The original FRA 2018 survey in Austria significantly underestimated the Haredi population. The revised estimates were as follows: Haredi 11%, Orthodox 7%, Traditional 22%, Reform/Progressive 18%, Just Jewish 42%. No estimates were provided for 'None of these' and 'Mixed'. All estimates for denominational shares relate to the adult population. See D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola. 2020. *Jews in Austria*, cit., p.40.

## Country-specific differences

Turning to country differences in modes of expression of one's personal Jewishness, these are quite striking (Table 5 and Figure 24). Belgium – due to the Jewish community in Antwerp – has the highest presence of Haredi Jews with 31% (compared to less than 1% in Denmark, Sweden and Spain). It is followed by the UK and Austria – two other countries with significant Haredi populations. Belgium, Italy, France and the UK all have 10–11% of 'Orthodox' Jews (versus 1% in Hungary). The Traditional mode is more frequent in France (33%) and Spain (30%), and least visible in Poland (5%) and Hungary (9%). The propensity toward the Reform/Progressive option is more prominent in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands (all 20% or more), and least visible in Belgium (8%) and Hungary (5%). When comparing the sum of the reported preferences for Haredi and Orthodox combined versus Reform/Progressive – ignoring for a moment the Traditional mode which commonly sits in between these two groupings – in four countries the former is larger or exactly equal to the latter: Belgium (42% vs. 8%), Italy (11% vs. 10%), the UK (18% vs. 16%) and Austria (18% vs. 18%). In the other eight countries the Reform/Progressive persuasion prevails over the Haredi/Orthodox, with a narrow margin in France (11% vs. 10%) and Hungary (5% vs. 2%) and larger margins elsewhere, the biggest being in Spain (24% vs. 5%). It should be stressed that these are not percentages of the officially affiliated with one or another orientation, but simply individual preferences as expressed by the respondents. In this context it is important to note that with only three exceptions, the Traditional choice attracts more respondents than either the Haredi/Orthodox or the Reform/Progressive. The exceptions are Belgium with a definite propensity for Haredi, and the Netherlands and Poland with a clear propensity for Reform/Progressive.

In Belgium, the UK, Austria, Spain and France, the Just Jewish are in the range of 23–33%. By comparison, they are the absolute majority in Hungary, Poland, Denmark and Italy, and approach half of the total in Sweden and the

Netherlands. On the other hand, the None or Mixed options combined reach higher frequencies of 27% in Poland, 24% in Hungary, 18% in the Netherlands, and lower frequencies of 9% in Spain, 8% in the UK, and 6% in Belgium.


There emerges a clear subdivision of the European continent into major geographical divisions, with Central-Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland) at the more secularised and agnostic end, followed by Northern Europe (Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands). Mediterranean Europe (Italy and Spain, but also Germany) is characterised by a moderately traditional outlook, Austria, France and the UK are more markedly traditionalist, with Belgium at the more religious end. Above all though, the non-committal category of Just Jewish appears to be the strongest in eleven of the twelve countries (in the case of France on a par with Traditional), with the exception of Belgium where Haredi is stronger.



**Arguably, the greatest homogeneity of lifestyles is observed across the less religious countries**

The significant fragmentation of lifestyles that we observed earlier at the level of European Jewry as a whole is replicated across many countries. The less traditionally observant lifestyles (maximally defined as a broad combination of Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish, Nones and Mixed) form 36–60% in the more religious Jewish communities of Europe. In the less religious communities, they naturally form greater majorities; they are in the range of 74–78% in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, and they reach the mark of 90% in Hungary and Poland. Arguably, the greatest homogeneity of lifestyles is observed across the less religious countries, but the grouping together of Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish, Nones and

Figure 24. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by country, 2018 (%)



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

Mixed modes may or may not be defensible conceptually and empirically – much depends upon what one is trying to measure or elucidate. What is clear is that these different modes


still feature significant disagreements in terms of views and preferences, so their combined numerical predominance is in no way an indicator of political and cultural harmony.

## Strength of Jewish identity

Jewish identity is created, and can recede, in many ways. It can also evolve by strengthening, weakening or changing orientation over time, particularly across a person's lifetime and the collective accumulation of individual experiences. The Jewish identificational changes already outlined across different age groups point to a steady increase in the more strongly religiously identified segment of the Jewish population when moving from the older to the younger age bands.

As an illustration of the general mood of European Jewry, the respondents to the 2018 FRA survey were asked to rank the "strength of their Jewish identity" (in the wording of the FRA questionnaire) on a scale between 1 and 10. This approach can be criticised as too blunt and oversimplified – Jewishness is more complex than can be measured on a scale of 1–10, and this may therefore look misleading in some way. Whatever its bias, the index is consistent all along the way and therefore usable for comparisons between different countries or population groups. The results are presented in Figure 25. Taken at face value, they reflect a strong attachment to Judaism, with an average value of 7.8 out of 10 when considering the


**Figure 25. Strength of Jewish identity among Jews in 2018, total twelve countries (%)**



total sample of 16,190 respondents, and an unweighted 7.7 average of the twelve country averages reported here below. The most frequent value indicated was 10, and the second most frequent was 8, while the least frequently reported was 1.


The country variation in the strength of Jewish identity is reflected in Figure 26. It is reportedly highest in Belgium (8.80 out of 10) and lowest in Poland (6.44). A very clear geographical pattern prevails which moves in decreasing strength of Jewish identity from Southern to Western to Northern to Central-Eastern Europe.

**Figure 26. Rating of the strength of Jewish identity among Jews in 2018, by country – average (scale 1 to 10)**



A substantially stronger variation can be obtained by disaggregating the total Jewish population according to modes of expression of Jewishness (Figure 27). The ranking faithfully follows the conventional expectation, with the highest strength of Jewish identity among the Haredi and Orthodox (above 9 out of 10), followed by the Traditional, Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish (7 to 9 out of 10), and the Nones and Mixed (5 to 6 out of 10). If anything, the Mixed have a score slightly higher than the Nones. It is interesting to note that even the lowest scores still denote that some visible attachment to Jewish identity has not disappeared from the most marginal sections of the Jewish collective in Europe. As a general caveat, we shall recall that respondents participated in a survey about antisemitism, and not specifically about Jewish identity. Communally disengaged Jews who did not hear about or were not sufficiently interested in the survey were not included in the sample, and they might have contributed some lowering of the averages reported here.

**Figure 27. Rating of strength of Jewish identity among Jews in 2018, total 12 countries, by mode of expression of personal Jewishness – average (scale 1 to 10)**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.




## 8 / Stability and change: lifetime transitions

In the previous chapter we presented the basic typology of European Jewish communities, with particular attention paid to the internal composition of the Jewish population by ideological streams or, as we have defined them here, modes of expression of personal Jewishness. A more cogent illustration of the ongoing changes comes from comparing the self-reported characteristics of respondents at two points in time: during their childhood and in 2018. The meaning of these data should be clarified from the onset. What we display here is the changes that occurred over the lifecycle of respondents. These changes can be imagined as a sort of internal migration between different options, in this case not spatial but intellectual or spiritual. The changes reported here refer only to the closed set of respondents covered in the 2018 survey and cannot be assumed to portray

with equal accuracy the whole set of persons inclusive of those who could not be reached in the survey. The caveat relates in particular to that segment of the population who had very weak Jewish identities at childhood and who, in the course of time, completely disappeared from the Jewish scene. Nevertheless, changes occurring over the lifecycle are of interest. This is probably the first time that these processes of internal identificational mobility are clearly documented for the whole of the Jewish population of Europe.

Figure 28 presents the respective distributions of modes of expression of Jewishness according to the present and to the reconstruction of their past as reported by the respondents. The distribution at childhood is dominated by two modalities, Traditional (29%) and Just Jewish (27%). At the more religious

**Figure 28. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness at childhood and in 2018, total 12 countries (%)**




Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

end, there were 4% Haredi and 7% Orthodox. Another 10% report a Reform/Progressive orientation at childhood. On the weaker part of the distribution, 8% reported None of these, 7% a Mixed Jewish/non-Jewish status, and 8% were raised in non-Jewish families.

The same data shown in Figure 28 are represented in Figure 29 using a different graphical technique that shows more clearly the net result of any intervening changes.

When comparing the distributions at childhood and in 2018, both the Haredi and the Orthodox mode had each obtained a lifetime net gain of 1%, reaching 5% and 8% respectively; the Reform/Progressive mode had gained 5%, reaching 15%;

**Figure 29. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness at childhood and in 2018, total 12 countries (%)**




Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

the Just Jewish mode had gained more than other modes, 9%, reaching 38% of all respondents. The Traditional mode lost 5%, declining to 24%; 'None of these' lost 2%, declining to 6%; and Mixed lost 2%, declining to 5%. The non-Jewish group of origin had disappeared, naturally, as the survey – on which this analysis is based – was designed to capture current Jews, and former non-Jews were incorporated into one of the Jewish modes.

Regarding the distribution in 2018, one striking realisation is that, although the most religious are clearly a minority, European Jewry lacks a clear majority lifestyle. This holds true irrespective of how one decides to regroup together the modes presented in Figures 28 and 29. Just Jewish forms the largest group but they are just above one third in proportional terms. If, for example, one groups together the Reform/Progressive and the Just Jewish, the modernised, less traditionally observant groups combined reach just above 50%. Adding the Nones and the Mixed modes would bring the less or non-traditionally observant to 64% – a majority but not an imposing one. The more observant from Haredi to Traditional comprise 37% of the total – a minority but a sufficiently large one to be able to significantly influence the overall atmosphere and style of the Jewish community. Adding the Reform/Progressive to this group to incorporate all those who indicate some form of denominational affiliation, we achieve a very slight majority: 52%. Thus, we see considerable fragmentation of Jewish lifestyles across Jewish Europe, which points to the likelihood of diversity in terms of social and political views and preferences. Later in this chapter we show that this fragmentation does not characterise Jewish Europe as a whole, but many Jewish communities at the level of each individual country.

For those who were raised as non-Jewish or mixed during childhood, Figure 30 illustrates the current distribution across the various modes of Jewishness. The left panel of the figure includes the 'None of these' and Mixed modes, the right panel excludes them. It is surprising to see that the majority of those who shifted from non-Jewishness to Jewishness, were still quite weakly identified in 2018: 28%

**Figure 30. Current distribution of non-Jews or Mixed at childhood, 2018 (%)**

Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

indicated Just Jewish, 10% None of these, 27% Mixed, and just 6% Haredi or Orthodox. Once we exclude the Mixed and the None of these and recalculate the percentages, we find that of these new joiners, in 2018 2% defined themselves as Haredi, 8% Orthodox, 15% Traditional, 32% Reform/Progressive, and 44% Just Jewish. In short, no matter how we look at it, a relatively small minority (only 6–10%) took up the most religiously committed forms of Jewishness.


Looking at those who were Traditional, Reform/Progressive or Just Jewish in childhood (Figure 31), the scope of the movement towards the most observant modes in this group was also small (up to 10%), on the same scale as among the None of These, Mixed and Non-Jews. On the face of these data, the aggregate total of the Reform/Progressive with the Just Jewish at childhood were more likely than the Traditional to remain in the same category or to move towards more traditional observance in 2018.<sup>25</sup> Overall, transition

to the most religious modes is an infrequent scenario for former non-Jews and Jews alike, yet, cumulatively, it has a considerable impact on the community in that it generates a sizeable minority of former non-Jews and formerly-less-religious Jews among the current Haredi and Orthodox.

The issue of *deseccularisation* tends to receive far less attention than secularisation, assimilation and loss of Jewish identity, and much of the empirical work in this realm commonly focuses on the demographic growth of the haredi population. Scant attention has been given to the deseccularisation happening via behavioural and attitudinal change among groups of people during their lifetime. The 2018 FRA survey presents a unique opportunity in this respect, and it shows that deseccularisation has left an important mark on the map of the current Jewish modes. For example, 25% of the current Haredi/Orthodox population comes from elsewhere; their childhood was spent in a less religiously-observant place than their current place.

25 The UK National Jewish Community Study (2013) essentially found identical rates of continuity in these two groups – about half of those brought up Reform/Progressive and half brought up Traditional remained in those groups in adulthood. See Graham, D., Staetsky, L. D., and Boyd, J. (2014). *Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013. Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.


**Figure 31. Current distribution of Traditional, Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish in childhood, 2018 (%)**



It is interesting to examine separately the incidence of new joiners versus those who chose to leave a particular mode of Jewishness. For each mode of Jewish expression, Figure 32 indicates the amount of retention as a percentage of the size of the same category at childhood. It also indicates

the extent of new joiners as a percentage of the original size of the same group.

**Figure 32. Lifetime retention and acquisition by modes of expressions of personal Jewishness, 2018 versus childhood – percentages relative to size of group at childhood**




Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.


The Haredi group displays the highest retention capability (86% of those who were raised in this mode remained inside the group). It also shows one of the lowest capabilities for acquiring new followers (equal to 23% of the original group). The Orthodox, Traditional, and Reform/Progressive groups all show retention rates of about 60% of their original adherents, but they displayed very different acquisition capabilities. The Orthodox added 63% new followers to their original numbers, and the Reform/Progressive added 94% – or nearly doubled. By contrast, the Traditional mode only added 20%. These patterns of change underlie the net changes described above. Regarding the weaker and more marginal modes, most of those raised as Just Jewish remained as such (79%), with a relatively high contingent of new people associating in this way (63%). Both the 'None of these' and Mixed modes had relatively low rates of retention and of acquisition.

Figures 33, 34, and 35 illustrate in greater detail the net product of these changes across detailed age groups for the Haredi/Orthodox, the Reform/Progressive, and the Traditional modes. In each figure, each age group is represented by a different line. The bottom scale represents the different life stages from childhood to current age. For each age group, the figures represent the percentages belonging at childhood and up to the current age. It is worth recalling that the data refer to the same persons that could be assessed both at childhood and in 2018.

**Figure 33. Lifetime identificational change – Haredi and Orthodox combined, 2018 vs. childhood, by current age and lifetime stage (%)**




**Figure 34. Lifetime identificational change – Reform/Progressive, 2018 vs. childhood, by current age and lifetime stage (%)**



In Figure 33, the lifetime identificational changes for the sum of the Haredi/Orthodox are portrayed. With great regularity, it appears that the younger cohorts portrayed at childhood include a gradually growing percentage of Haredi/Orthodox. Whereas 5% of those aged 70 and over were Haredi/Orthodox in childhood, the equivalent proportion

for those now aged 16–19 has grown to over 20%. Along with this regular increase in the share of Haredi/Orthodox at childhood, increases also occurred among those belonging to the same groups between childhood and their respective ages in 2018. This reflects the positive balance between ‘leavers’ and ‘joiners’ all along the

**Figure 35. Lifetime identificational change – Traditional, 2018 vs. childhood, by current age and lifetime stage (%)**

way, or, in other words, the balance between those adopting stricter or more lenient modes of expression of their Jewishness.

Figure 34 replicates the same cohort analysis for the Reform/Progressive mode. The progression is nearly the same. Successive cohorts of children include a growing percentage of people self-defining as Reform/Progressive. With the passage of time, each cohort has become larger thanks to the positive balance between joiners and leavers. Among older people, the effect is even more visible than among the Haredi/Orthodox.

Figure 35 illustrates the same process among those identifying as 'Traditional'. However, here the results are the reverse of the two preceding cases. Each childhood cohort includes a declining share of Traditional, and each cohort lost people over time, through a negative lifetime balance of joiners and leavers.

Clearly, Figure 35 is somewhat complementary to Figures 33 and 34. The gains observed in the former two groups are due in large part to the losses seen in the others. In other words, we are witnessing a passage from what might be called


the Traditional mainstream or the centre of the more identified part of the Jewish community, to the modes that subjectively appear to be more stringent (Haredi/Orthodox) on the one hand, and more liberal (Reform/Progressive) on the other. A certain amount of ideological polarisation is inherent in this analysis of European Jewish communities. We return to this theme below.

We already noted that modes of expression of personal Jewishness can change over the course of one's own lifetime. There may be numerous causes for such mutations: the influences of the family environment during childhood; changes in religious outlook related to age and life experiences; changes of geographical and socioeconomic environments which may affect different Jewish norms and opportunities; or different meanings attributed by a person to their past outlook as filtered through personal memory. Remembering one's own childhood and comparing it to the present may also be biased through filters of a cognitive or affective nature. In spite of these limitations, it is interesting to compare the ways in which respondents reconstruct their modes of expressing their Jewishness when they were children and contrast them with the present. Table 6 reports

**Table 6. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness at childhood by mode in 2018 (%)**

During childhood	In 2018							Total %	Total n
	Haredi	Orthodox	Tradit- ional	Reform/ Progres- sive	Just Jewish	None of these	Mixed		
Haredi	<b>86</b>	7	2	0	4	0	0	100	673
Orthodox	7	<b>59</b>	17	3	11	2	0	100	1,085
Traditional	1	7	<b>62</b>	9	18	2	1	100	4,725
Reform/ Progressive	0	2	7	<b>60</b>	26	4	1	100	1,564
Just Jewish	0	2	8	8	<b>79</b>	3	1	100	4,368
None of these	1	3	7	11	44	<b>31</b>	4	100	1,365
Mixed	0	1	5	15	28	10	<b>40</b>	100	1,210
Not Jewish	2	8	13	25	27	10	15	100	1,372
Total %	5	8	24	15	38	6	5	100	16,362
Total n	738	1,325	3,900	2,410	6,170	999	820	16,362	

Note: values along the diagonal of the table, signalling the percentage who remained in the same category as during childhood are marked in **bold**. The category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

**Figure 36. Lifetime net directions of Jewish identificational change, from childhood origins to 2018 outcome (%)**

Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

for each type of Jewish childhood socialisation (see the labels of each row in the table) the distribution of preferred modes of expression in 2018 (see the labels in each column). In other words, we see *where children have gone* over the course of their lifetime. In each row in the table the percentages that have remained in the same category are shown in **bold**.


Figure 36 is derived from Table 6, i.e. the complete matrix of all passages from each of the initial eight modes to each of the others over the timespan between childhood and 2018. To determine a ranking of the different modes we followed the same ranking as displayed in the labels in Figure 27 about strength of attachment to Judaism. For simplicity, any lifetime change of orientation was labelled as becoming “More traditionally observant” or “Less traditionally observant”. All in all, 58% of all respondents remained in the same mode over their lifetime from childhood to 2018. As against this, 27% of respondents passed from a less observant to a more observant mode of expression of Jewishness, including conversions to Judaism, and 16% passed from a more observant to a less observant mode. However, the modes at childhood with a positive balance from ‘less’ to ‘more’ include Not Jewish, Mixed, None of these and Just Jewish. Children socialised along these modes, in fact, have nowhere to go in the sense of becoming less Jewish – unless they became so distanced that they were not covered in the 2018 survey.

Critically, in the balance of those who were Reform/Progressive, Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi at childhood, more passed from stronger traditional observance to weaker, than from weaker traditional observance to stronger. As previously noted, the mode with the highest percent of permanence within the group of origin was the Haredi (86%).

Figure 37 repeats the same comparison for a highly simplified set of three broader groups: the current Haredi and Orthodox (the most traditionally observant combined), the current Traditional (the intermediate level of traditional observance), and the current Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish (the less traditionally observant, combined). There is one important difference to be noted here as against Figure 36, which shows where the children *have gone* versus the environment in which they grew up. In Figure 37 (and in Figure 38) the data show, within each type of religious environment, *where the current people come from*. It is the reverse observation of the same phenomenon of mobility from one environment to another. Both types of observation are relevant to understanding the possible gains and losses of each mode of expression of personal Jewishness.

The first word that springs to mind is *continuity*. All three groups contain a majority (60–75%) whose childhood religious orientation was no different from their current one. Acquisitions, or new joiners, are not insignificant, but

**Figure 37. Modes of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 outcome according to childhood origins (%)**



Note: the category ‘None of these’ describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category ‘Mixed’ describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.



secondary. All three groups have acquisitions, yet each is different. The Haredi/Orthodox group has a considerable share of Jews (25%) of lesser religiosity in childhood and a small but non-negligible proportion of former non-Jews (7%). The Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish have a significant share of former non-Jews (14%) and an almost equally large share of Jews coming from the more traditionally observant backgrounds (17%). The Traditional have the highest share of continuity (75%) and incorporate 11% of formerly less and 5% of formerly more traditionally observant. In sum, all three groups are impacted by an identificational re-shuffling of Jews and by the arrival of non-Jews. The Haredi/Orthodox form a metaphorical meeting place for those whose levels of observance are strengthening and for the new joiners from outside the Jewish community. Just Jewish/Reform/Progressive are places where new arrivals meet those with weakening levels of traditional observance. The degree and types of diversity should be of value to policy makers who develop educational and cultural programmes that target Jews across different modes. It is certainly preferable to consider the past history and motivations of Jews currently populating different modes, than to be blind to these aspects.



**The degree and types of diversity across groups should be of interest to policy makers who develop educational and cultural programmes that target Jews across different modes**

Another point to be considered closely, both analytically and in terms of policy, is *differential diversity*. The Traditional mode, the communal middle ground, appears less diverse in terms of origins than the Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish, and the Haredi/Orthodox modes. The proportion of ‘stayers’ there is 75%, in contrast to 60%-66% among the other two modes. One interpretation that could be easily attached to this finding is the greater popularity of the


middle, compared to the less and more religious tails. However, that would probably be the opposite of what has been happening. The greater comparative stability of any given group in terms of composition can stem not just from the tendency of people to stay in their group, but from the tendency of others, representing other groups, to join this group, in this case the middle ground. If others do not join, the proportion of old-timers will remain high. As shown above, this is precisely what has been happening to the Traditional. People left it whilst the quantity of new joiners could not compensate for the quantity of leavers. The current Haredi/Orthodox modes contain a quarter of people from the less traditionally observant backgrounds, almost all of whom are derived from the Traditional mode. The current Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish modes contain about one fifth of people from the more observant backgrounds – again, almost all of them Traditional.

Can we describe this development as the ‘erosion’ of the middle ground and the rise of the ‘extremes’? It would be premature, in our view, to make a strong statement to this effect, although the results are suggestive of this possibility. Theoretically, the middle ground could be very large, and even significant departures unaccompanied by arrivals from elsewhere may not be sufficient for significant erosion (i.e. downsizing in proportional terms). To make a definitive statement about the behaviour of the middle ground we would need a few snapshots of data showing the current modes at different points in time. These may become available in the future, but do not exist at the moment. In the meantime, the possibility of such erosion should continue to be investigated.


## Country-specific differences

Just as we did for all countries combined in Figures 36 and 37, in Figure 38 we document the origins of the current composition of different Jewish modes for each country separately.

The most salient points regarding the issues of continuity, desecularisation and secularisation

**Figure 38. Current modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by mode at childhood and country, 2018 (%)**

Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

**Figure 38. (cont.) Current modes of expression of personal Jewishness, by mode at childhood and country, 2018 (%)**

Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

have already been highlighted. Whilst we found continuity to be strong for all modes all across European countries, the picture is diverse for each individual country. In the most traditionally observant communities, such as Belgium and the UK, the current Haredi and Orthodox groups reveal the greatest levels of continuity: large proportions among them were brought up as Haredi or Orthodox. This is not the case in Hungary, Poland, Scandinavia, the Netherlands or Germany, where larger proportions of the current Haredi and Orthodox were less observant in their childhood. The difference reflects the history of Jewish communities in these contexts: the long-established Haredi and Orthodox presence in the former group of countries and the later development of their presence in the latter, after a significant time spent under conditions of secularism typical of the culture of the countries as a whole. In the latter group of countries, the Haredi/Orthodox presence is relatively scant, growing among other routes through religious switching, i.e. attracting members from the less observant groups. A similar process is also underway in certain countries with a relatively high share of the most observant, namely Austria and France. They may have had a less imposing Haredi and Orthodox presence in the past, but the Jewish populations there are also exhibiting some degree of desecularisation. The migration histories and demographic realities of these Jewish communities can account for these processes.

Secularisation (i.e. religious switching from more to less observant modes) is especially visible in the composition of the current Reform/

Progressive and Just Jewish groups. It is present in many European Jewish communities, but is less pronounced in the most secular ones, such as Hungary and Poland as well as the Netherlands and Germany. Secularisation in the past affected these communities in such a profound manner that, arguably, they have reached a point where there is little scope for further secularisation, and Jewish identificational movement can only remain stable or move towards *desecularisation*.




**Secularisation in the past affected some communities in such a profound manner that, arguably, they have reached a point where there is little scope for further secularisation, and Jewish identificational movement can only remain stable or move towards *desecularisation***

Finally, the presence of former non-Jews and people who currently self-identify as Mixed is visible everywhere. It is most significant in Scandinavia, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Germany. The presence of this group in each place testifies to the existence of diverse routes for non-Jews towards Jewishness. Two of the main processes in this regard are the return to Jewishness of the descendants of past Jewish converts to Christianity, and the desire of non-Jewish partners of Jews to associate themselves with Judaism or Jewish communities.

## 9 / More on traditional Jewish behaviours

Most often, sociological, demographic and sociopsychological research on Jews focuses on the frequencies of performing certain Jewish rituals, which are supposed to represent the core of normative Jewish belief and behaviour. The previous pages provided an in-depth overview of the options, the variation, the dilemmas and sometimes the contradictions that exist in the particular group identification of Jews in Europe. In this chapter we explore traditional measures and indicators of Jewish identification, most of which relate to Jewish behaviours rooted in religious belief. Other indicators – over time and at least among certain subgroups of Jews – have become widespread cultural traditions with limited religious content. Figure 39 displays the frequency of the main Jewish rituals that were investigated in the 2018 survey. Our data only confirm what has been the standard finding in many previous Jewish population studies. The most popular Jewish ritual is attending a Passover seder (74%), followed by fasting on Yom Kippur (62%).

**Figure 39. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, 2018 (%)**



None of the other rituals passes the 50% mark. Interestingly, 47% light candles regularly on Friday nights, and 34% keep kosher at home, but only 15% do not turn on lights on Shabbat (a strong indicator of adherence to *halacha* – Jewish law). This points to one of the most characteristic traits of Jewish identity and observance, namely, the selective choice of traditional Jewish rituals observed on a regular basis by Jewish individuals and families. This is perhaps the crucial indication that Jewish religious practices do not follow a simple dichotomic division of do/not do. A better characterisation is that of a continuum where different people make choices about the threshold of their observance that best conform to their beliefs and lifestyles. A relatively minor portion of Jews (17%) report not performing any of the six rituals mentioned.

Note further that the most popular ritual practices are those that require the smallest sacrifices of time and energy. Attending a Passover seder, fasting on Yom Kippur and lighting candles on Friday night are, arguably, sporadic and infrequent in nature, and do not interfere or compete with other activities. The opposite is true of keeping kosher at home, attending synagogue weekly and not turning on lights on Shabbat. These practices require greater attention dedicated to them and place a greater demand on time and limits on activities. Being in competition with more general activities and opportunities, they are more likely to be dropped or avoided than less demanding rituals, particularly in the absence of strong religious conviction. Greater adherence to attendance at a Passover seder, fasting on Yom Kippur and lighting candles on Friday night has often been interpreted as a result of their social, communal and family nature. The economic perspective, i.e. an interpretation focusing on the amount of time and energy required to perform the rituals and the alternative uses of that time,

has rarely been considered, but there are good reasons to take it seriously given the significant progress made by economists with regard to explaining human behaviour.<sup>26</sup>

The frequency of observance can also be explored by various sociodemographic variables, such as gender, age and whether one is married to a Jewish or non-Jewish spouse. In terms of gender, the differences between men and women are small, with the main exception being weekly synagogue attendance, which is more prevalent among men (28%) than among women (18%) (see Table 7). By contrast, the differences by age are very marked. Providing further evidence for our earlier findings (see Tables 3, 4 and 5), there appears to be a steady process of intensified Jewish traditional belief and practice when moving from the older to the younger Jewish population cohorts (Figure 40). This involves all the rituals examined here, and their respective ranking remains consistent across age groups. For example, while 65% of those aged over 70 attend a Passover seder, the equivalent proportion among those aged under 30 is notably higher, at 82%. Similarly, 6% of those over 70 do not use electricity on Shabbat, compared to 26% of those under 30. Part of these changes may be explained by higher birth rates among the more religious sectors within the Jewish population which generate a higher representation of the more religious among the younger age group. An additional explanation may be the effect of the drifting away of the Jewish population's most assimilated sectors, including the younger age group, which, by default, leaves inside the more committed. A third explanation may possibly be related to the diminishing mobility and social contact options among the elderly. Many older people live alone after their offspring have left the household and may be less motivated to observe rituals on their own. However, the patterns portrayed here may point to a more significant factor: a genuine increase in the interest of many Jews in Europe in a more committed and sustained manifestation of their Jewish identity.

**Figure 40. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by age, 2018 (%)**






Figure 41 and Table 7 also indicate the variation of Jewish traditional ritual observance across different types of marital status. The gaps between the in-married and the out-married are substantial, but it should also be noted that neither group reaches the potential maximum (100%) or minimum (0%) ritual performance. Those who do not perform any of the six rituals selected here constitute 6% of the in-married and 36% of the out-married. Among the latter, therefore, the majority do engage in some form of Jewish life. The dominant experience is attending a Passover seder. This attracts 90% of the in-married but also a slight majority (52%) of the out-married. The gaps concerning all other rituals are much larger, although the ranking of rituals remains the same. For example, at the top of the range, 80% of the in-married fast regularly on Yom Kippur, compared to 37% of the out-married; at the bottom, 26% of all in-married do not turn on lights on Shabbat, compared to 3% of the out-married.

**Figure 41. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by marital status and intermarriage, 2018 (%)**



**Figure 42. Proportions out-married among Jews observing selected Jewish religious rituals, 2018 (%)**




Among the non-married, the division into two major age groups, above and below 50, confirms the trends already noted about the intensification of Jewish religious practice among younger people.

Seen symmetrically, the same data provide the following rates of out-marriage among those who observe each type of Jewish ritual (Figure 42). The more diffused the practice of a ritual, the somewhat higher are the rates of out-married Jews who practise it, the range being between 6% out-married among those who do not turn on lights on Shabbat versus 25% among those who attend a Seder. Over three quarters (78%) of those who do not observe any of the rituals are out-married.

The frequency of observance of Jewish rituals varies across different European Jewish populations (Figure 43 and Table 7), but remarkably, the ranking of ritual observance shown previously for Jews across Europe (Figure 43) holds in each individual country. The inter-country range of variation in the observance of all the Jewish rituals examined here is approximately 40%, delimited by the highest frequency in Belgium and the lowest frequency in Hungary. The actual levels of adherence to rituals differ, but the greatest popularity of the less demanding practices (attending a Passover seder, fasting on Yom Kippur and lighting candles on Friday night) is present everywhere.

As previously noted, the Jewish community in Belgium stands out as particularly traditionalist, largely due to the sizeable haredi population in Antwerp. As a result, Belgium has the highest rate of performance on four of the rituals listed and is second highest on the other two (attending a Passover seder and fasting on Yom Kippur). The highest on these last two items is Italy, despite it appearing to be medium or, at the most, medium-high on other items. The lowest frequencies are mostly displayed in Hungary, with the exceptions of weekly synagogue attendance (Denmark and Sweden) and attending a Passover seder (Poland, which is also the highest on not performing any of the six rituals – 44%). Broad regional patterns can be seen too, with Belgium at the top, followed by the UK and France, the Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain), Central



**Figure 43. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by country, 2018 (%)**

Europe, Northern Europe, and Central-Eastern Europe. This pattern fits well with the pattern of religiosity documented in the chapter about modes of expression of personal Jewishness.

To obtain a clearer perspective on the intersection between the observance of certain Jewish rituals and the thinking undertaken about what it means to be Jewish, why it is important, and how it is manifested, the respective frequencies are cross classified in Table 8 and Figure 44. We first check the relationship between choosing a given definition of Judaism, and the frequency of performing the six Jewish traditional rituals selected here. It clearly appears that those who choose Religion as the definition of their Judaism also practise each of the Jewish rituals selected in this analysis more frequently. However, the ranking in the practice of the different rituals is remarkably consistent across all types of definitions. Those mentioning a definition other than the principal ones consistently display the lowest level of ritual performance.

Second, we cross-check the observance of certain Jewish rituals with the importance of key ideas in people's Jewish identity. Here again, the ranking of ritual observance is consistently the same across all major aspects

of Jewish identity surveyed. Believing in God is generally associated with more frequent ritual practice, with the exception of the Passover seder which appears to be even more frequent among those who stress celebrating Jewish festivals with the family. The lower frequencies of ritual observance consistently appear among those who stress the importance of remembering the Shoah and combating antisemitism.

Third, when it comes to comparing the self-reported mode of being Jewish and practising the selected Jewish rituals, we again find a high degree of consistency, albeit with some interesting surprises. The clear hierarchical order along both dimensions allows us to outline a neat typology of prevailing religious norms and behaviours among European Jews. There exists a very clear gradient concerning what people think is essential for them to manifest their personal Jewishness. The boundaries between practising or not are quite different among people who prefer different modes of expression of their Jewishness. Thus, attending a Passover seder largely prevails among all types of Jews, from Haredi (99%) to Just Jewish (61%). Fasting on Yom Kippur involves a vast majority of the public from Haredi (99%) to Reform/Progressive (68%). Lighting candles



**Table 7. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by background characteristics, 2018 (%)**

Background characteristics	Jewish rituals						
	Attend Passover Seder most or all years	Fast on Yom Kippur most or all years	Light candles most Friday nights	Eat only kosher meat at home	Attend synagogue weekly or more often	Do not switch on lights on the Sabbath	None of these
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Gender</b>							
Male	74	<b>63</b>	45	<b>36</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>
Female	<b>75</b>	61	<b>48</b>	32	18	14	17
<b>Age</b>							
16–29	<b>82</b>	<b>71</b>	52	<b>45</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>26</b>	10
30–49	80	67	<b>53</b>	40	26	19	13
50–69	70	59	44	29	20	11	21
70+	65	51	34	23	18	6	<b>26</b>
<b>Marital status</b>							
In-married	<b>90</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26</b>	6
Out-married	52	37	24	8	8	3	<b>36</b>
Non-married <50	78	66	43	36	22	16	13
Non-married >50	64	52	36	20	15	6	24
<b>Country</b>							
Austria	77	65	44	30	21	15	14
Belgium	86	77	<b>64</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>42</b>	9
Denmark	71	35	35	17	8	8	21
France	77	77	45	42	23	17	14
Germany	71	59	46	22	28	10	17
Hungary	54	31	21	9	12	4	37
Italy	<b>88</b>	<b>81</b>	42	39	26	13	8
Netherlands	63	44	44	22	14	9	24
Poland	45	34	29	16	14	9	<b>44</b>
Spain	73	62	45	24	23	12	18
Sweden	71	35	38	10	8	6	24
UK	77	66	54	45	27	19	16

Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**.

on Friday night prevails among the Haredi (97%) through to the Traditional (66%), and keeping kosher at home ranges from 96% to 57% of these two groups respectively. Not turning on lights on Shabbat prevails among the Haredi (97%) and Orthodox (88%), while weekly synagogue attendance involves 86% and 80% of these two groups respectively, but is much lower among all others, beginning with the Traditional. The small

percentages missing to complete the expected 100% among the Haredim and the Orthodox plausibly relate to elderly persons who are limited in their ability to observe these rituals.

At the opposite end in the range of the Nones and Mixed, the Passover seder, Yom Kippur fast, and, to some extent, candle lighting on Friday night, attract some degree of reported

**Table 8. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by definition of Judaism, main aspect essential to Jewish identity, and mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (%)**

	Jewish rituals						
	Attend Passover Seder most or all years	Fast on Yom Kippur most or all years	Light candles most Friday nights	Eat only kosher meat at home	Attend synagogue weekly or more often	Do not switch on lights on the Sabbath	None of these
<b>Total sample</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Definition of Judaism</b>							
Religion	<b>90</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>24</b>	4
Parentage	75	61	46	34	22	15	18
Culture	80	66	48	35	21	13	13
Heritage	79	65	48	35	21	14	14
Upbringing	85	72	53	42	25	17	9
Ethnicity	76	61	48	35	22	14	17
Other	65	55	44	28	21	13	<b>20</b>
<b>Main aspects of Jewish identity (very important)</b>							
Remembering the Holocaust	75	64	48	34	23	15	<b>16</b>
Combating antisemitism	75	64	48	34	23	14	<b>16</b>
Feeling part of the Jewish people	83	74	56	43	30	20	10
Sharing Jewish festivals with family	<b>95</b>	85	68	53	36	25	1
Supporting Israel	81	73	57	43	29	18	10
Jewish culture	78	66	51	35	24	14	13
Believing in God	87	<b>87</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>36</b>	5
Donating to charity	87	81	69	57	41	31	6
<b>Modes of expression of Jewishness</b>							
Haredi	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>97</b>	0
Orthodox	98	97	92	93	80	88	0
Traditional	95	90	66	57	26	7	1
Reform/Progressive	82	68	50	18	19	4	8
Just Jewish	61	42	25	13	7	3	28
None of these	39	21	14	8	5	3	<b>53</b>
Mixed	40	28	25	10	9	3	41

Note: the highest value in each section of each column is in **bold**. The thick line separates cells with above and below 50% of respondents.

Note: with respect to the modes of expression of Jewishness, the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.


observance. Part of this may be due to the strength of Jewish family networks. This also seems to apply to the tiny percentages of those belonging to the more marginal sectors of the Jewish population who report performing more binding rituals such as keeping kosher at home, not turning on lights on Shabbat, and weekly synagogue attendance. The Reform/Progressive and, to a lesser extent the Just Jewish eloquently exemplify the range of possible choices and the variable setting of the boundary between what is compulsory and what is not in people's personal perception of normative Jewishness.

It is also notable that among those for whom believing in God is a very important component of their Jewish identity, slightly fewer than 90% attend the Passover seder and fast on Yom Kippur, nearly three quarters light candles on Friday night, over 60% keep kosher at home, just under 50% go to a synagogue every week, and just over a third refrain from turning on lights on Shabbat. Five percent of those for whom believing in God is very important do not perform any of the mentioned rituals. In other words, the correspondence between

belief and practice is far from absolute. Within the general orientation of Jewish faith, there appears to be a clear hierarchy in all of the various practices.

As expected, if there exists a ranking of intensities regarding modes of expression of Jewishness, there also exists a largely overlapping one in terms of religious rituals. Figure 44 graphically shows the patterns of resilience and dropping out of the sequence of the various rituals among the different Jewish population types. It is as if persons choosing different modes of expression of their Jewishness were saying: up to this point I am in, beyond this point it is too much for me and I drop off. The Haredi and Orthodox never fall below 80% on any ritual. The Traditional stay above 50% with keeping kosher at home but drop much below when it comes to attending synagogue at least weekly. The Reform/Progressive are still around 50% with lighting candles on Friday night but fall much below with keeping kosher. Among the Just Jewish, 60% celebrate the seder but drop to 40% for fasting on Yom Kippur. The Nones and Mixed start dropping out from observing rituals, beginning with a 40% participation rate in the seder.

**Figure 44. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals, by mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (%)**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.


## 10 / Jewish and national: attachment to geopolitical frameworks

Beyond the internal paths and hierarchies of Jewish identification, it is also important to explore the amount of attachment to different geopolitical frameworks within which the lives of the people investigated unfold, and to compare it to their degree of attachment to Judaism and to Jewish identity. The survey asked about the intensity of the attachment of respondents to their country of residence, to the more specific region of the country where they live, and to the European Union. Figure 45 shows the respective frequencies. A 'very' strong attachment to their country of residence is expressed by 39% of the respondents, versus 24% very strongly attached to their region of residence, and 19% very strongly attached to the European Union. Thus, the respondents' country is clearly a leading focus

of attachment. The same is true in essentials of the total population living in the European Union, of whom 56% are very strongly attached to their country and 14% to the European Union.<sup>27</sup>

For comparative purposes, we also calculated a second version of the degree of attachment for Jews to their country and the European Union. This is because the question on attachment was asked differently in the 2018 FRA survey and the Eurobarometer survey from which we draw our comparisons with the general populations as a whole. In the former, Jews had five response categories, while the national population in the latter had four response categories. The use of the extreme categories (e.g. very strongly attached) is more limited with five response categories, and the adjusted version of the degree of attachment for Jews takes this into account.<sup>28</sup> We learn that among Jews, the levels of very strong attachment to their country are somewhat lower than among the national populations of the European Union, but not very far off – perhaps ten per cent units or so. The levels of very strong attachment to the European Union among Jews are very close to the levels observed in the national populations. We can conclude that with respect to attachment patterns, Jews and non-Jews in Europe are by and large similar, albeit with some small distinctions. In Figure 46 the data are represented again after adjustment.


**Figure 45. Attachment of Jews to geopolitical frameworks, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached', original data)**



27 Eurobarometer survey 2018 (GESIS Study ID ZA6963).

28 The question on attachment in the 2018 FRA survey offered respondents five categories: 1 (Not at all attached), 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Very strongly attached). The question on attachment in the Eurobarometer survey featured a response schedule with four meaningful categories: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached. The 2018 FRA version has a middle category which often attracts people who are unsure how to respond. When these people are forced to choose the non-neutral categories, most of them (though not all) would select non-extreme categories, such as 'Fairly attached' or 'Not very attached'; however, the extreme categories may also grow proportionately. Bearing in mind these realities, we re-estimated the proportion of Jews strongly attached to their country by first removing the middle category and recalculating the proportion of those 'very strongly attached' with the middle category excluded, and second, by calculating the average of the original proportion of 'very strongly attached' and the new re-estimated proportion, assuming the total absence of the middle category. We call it an 'adjusted' estimate.

**Figure 46. Attachment of Jews and national populations to geopolitical frameworks, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached', adjusted data)**




Source for total population: Eurobarometer survey 2018 (GESIS Study ID ZA6963). Data relate to twelve European countries covered by 2018 FRA survey.


Figures 47 and 48 and Table 9 illustrate the main differences among Jews according to their background characteristics. Looking at gender, women appear to have a somewhat stronger attachment than men to their region of residence and to the EU. Age differentials generally point to a decline when passing from older to younger people. The erosion is more clearly visible regarding the country of residence, from 48% among those aged 70 and older to 31% among those aged under 30.

Regarding marital status, the only notable difference concerns a higher attachment of the out-marrieds towards the EU. Slightly over 35% of those very strongly attached to their country and to their region of residence are out-married, versus over 45% of those strongly attached to the European Union. In other words, those Jews who are more strongly attached to a broader European concept of geopolitical identity also appear to be

**Figure 47. Attachment of Jews to geopolitical frameworks, by age, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached', original data)**



**Figure 48. Percentage out-married by very strong attachment to geopolitical frameworks**



those with a weaker attachment to a nuclear and endogamous Jewish community.

Regarding country differentials, Jews in Denmark show the highest percentage of attachment to their country of residence (57% are 'very strongly' attached), followed by France (50%) and the

UK (42%). At the low end we find Germany and Austria (21%) – two countries with high or very high shares of recent Jewish immigrants, including many from the FSU, but also from Israel and an array of other countries from within and outside the EU. Besides the fact that many have only lived in the country for a relatively short period, an additional

explanation might be related to the memory of the role played by these two countries in the persecution of Jews during the Second World War.

The levels of attachment to Israel are also shown in Table 9, and discussion of that issue is explored in the sections that follow.

**Table 9. Attachment of Jews and total national populations to geopolitical frameworks, by background characteristics, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached', original data)**

Background characteristics	Jews very strongly attached			
	Country of residence	Region of residence	The European Union	Israel
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	<b>40</b>	22	17	<b>39</b>
Female	39	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Age</b>				
16–29	31	23	16	34
30–49	37	24	16	35
50–69	40	24	20	<b>43</b>
70+	<b>48</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26</b>	41
<b>Marital status</b>				
In-married	<b>41</b>	24	15	<b>47</b>
Out-married	40	24	<b>23</b>	29
Non-married <50	33	25	18	32
Non-married >50	<b>41</b>	<b>27</b>	22	41
<b>Country</b>				
Austria	21	<b>31</b>	29	39
Belgium	28	24	20	47
Denmark	<b>57</b>	24	14	36
France	50	24	20	49
Germany	21	18	21	40
Hungary	34	30	<b>51</b>	19
Italy	33	18	22	41
Netherlands	36	22	8	38
Poland	37	29	45	19
Spain	25	28	19	<b>52</b>
Sweden	34	23	14	31
UK	42	27	14	33


Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**.

## Country-specific differences

The pattern of variation among Jews in having a strong attachment to their country of residence is strongly correlated with the pattern exhibited by the general population (Figure 49). Note that often, Jews with lower/higher levels of strong attachment live in countries where such levels of attachment in the population as a whole are rather low/high. For example, the top end of the ranking among Jews and in the national populations include Denmark and Poland, and the bottom end include Belgium, Spain and Italy (compare panels A and B of Figure 49).<sup>29</sup> The gap between Jews and non-Jews with respect to their very strong attachment is rather large

in some countries (Scandinavian, Central and Eastern European countries and Germany, the top part of panel C in Figure 49), while in other countries it is rather small (countries of Western and Southern Europe, bottom part of panel C). The analysis is likely to underestimate the levels of Jewish attachment somewhat: the real levels of the attachment among Jews for each country are likely to be five percent units above the stated levels (see below).<sup>30</sup> In view of this, it appears that in some countries (e.g. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, UK) the difference between Jews and non-Jews is either non-existent or trivial.

**Figure 49. Attachment of Jews and national populations to country, 2018**  
(% 'very strongly attached', original data)




Note. Data for attachment of Jews are unadjusted, the real levels of attachment may be five per cent units higher than shown.

Source for total population: Eurobarometer survey 2018 (GESIS Study ID ZA6963).

29 After excluding Austria and Germany, a correlation of 0.72 obtained between the level of strong attachment to country among Jews and among the total population.

30 Please refer to note 28 for clarification of reasons.

**Figure 50. Attachment of Jews and national populations to European Union by country, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached')**



Note. Data for attachment of Jews are unadjusted; the real levels of attachment may be five per cent units higher than shown.  
Source for total population: Eurobarometer survey 2018 (GESIS Study ID ZA6963).


The attachment of Jews to a particular region or metropolitan area of residence within a given country is generally lower than their attachment to the country in general (Table 9). The higher values appear in Austria (31%), Hungary (30%), Sweden (29%) and Spain (28%). Jewish communities in Austria and Hungary are overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital cities – Vienna and Budapest. Spain has a strong dual pattern of concentration, with an overwhelming majority being split between Madrid and Barcelona. It is possible that subnational political dynamics and the strength of regional identities in Spain also impact on the patterns of attachment among Jews. The least attached to their region of residence appear to be Jews in Germany and Italy (both 18%). The former can be explained by their recent arrival in the country: most Jews in Germany today are post-1990 migrants from the Former Soviet Union, or the children of such migrants. The Italian

figure is less understandable in the light of the ancient roots of this community in its surroundings.

Turning now to the differentials in attachment to the European Union, the strongest levels of attachment among Jews are observed in Central-Eastern Europe (especially in Hungary and Poland, where 45–51% are very strongly attached). The weakest are in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (below 10%). The pattern of variation in a strong attachment to the EU among Jews is strongly correlated with the pattern exhibited by the general population (Figure 50), as was previously observed regarding the attachment to one's country. The gap between Jews and non-Jews is largest in the Eastern and Central European countries investigated, as well as in Italy, with Jews clearly being more strongly attached to the EU compared to non-Jews. Everywhere else the levels of attachment among



**Figure 51. Attachment to country and to Europe/the European Union, by background characteristics, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached')**




Source: data on non-Jews come from the European Social Survey (years 2016–2018). They relate to twelve European countries covered by 2018 FRA survey. The original scale is 0 (weakest attachment) to 10 (strongest attachment); the category of 'very strongly attached' comprises those who scored 9–10 on the original scale. An interactive tool for online analysis was used to obtain these findings: Nesstar WebView (uib.no). Belonging to an ethnic minority is based on self-definition, the question asked: 'Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?'. The category 'Christian' relates to those who stated that they are Catholics or Protestants at present. The attachment for non-Jews is for Europe, while for Jews (based on the 2018 FRA survey) it is for the European Union - we consider these data to be fundamentally comparable despite this difference.

Jews and non-Jews are comparable. Certainly, the moderate to low levels of attachment to the EU among Jews do not appear to be exceptional when viewed in their wider national context.

At this stage we may ask how Jews compare to other religious and ethnic minorities in Europe when it comes to their levels of attachment to their country? To explore this, we turn to recent data from the European Social Survey which included questions on attachment to one's country and to Europe/the European Union, as well as questions on the country of birth, religion and ancestry of the respondents. Answers from each of these questions are reported in Figure 51. Jews are perfectly aligned with the European average regarding their attachment to their country and display higher rates regarding their attachment to the EU. In general, the weakest levels of attachment to their country are found among religious and ethnic minorities, notably Muslims, ethnic minorities and those born abroad.

Another group with a relatively weak attachment is people who declared themselves to have no religion. At the same time, as is the case with Jews, the gap between the minorities and the majorities is relatively modest. With respect to attachment to Europe/the European Union, minorities do not seem to differ very significantly from the majorities at all, although Jews score slightly higher than all other groups identified.

Table 9 includes a reference to the attachment of European Jews to a fourth geopolitical framework – the State of Israel. There is evidently a difference between a place in which respondents actually live, for the most part, versus a place which may be emotionally resonant but is physically far away. Israel may engender an emotional and intellectual affinity, especially when there is a family connection, but on the whole, it has no operative local relevance for the day-to-day experience, immediate contacts, civil rights and duties of Jews living in Europe. Of course, Israelis living in Europe

**Figure 52. Attachment of Jews to Israel and to country, 2018 (% 'very strongly attached')**

may affect the results, but they are a small minority of all respondents. It is interesting to note that, on average, among Jews in Europe the level of a very strong attachment to Israel is identical to the level of a strong attachment to their country – 39% in both cases. Variation by age shows some decline among the younger people, as already noted in the chapter on the essential main aspects of Jewish identity. A very strong attachment to Israel is also considerably lower among the out-married compared to the in-married.


There also appears to be a considerable variation in a strong attachment to Israel across countries (Figure 52). Jews are most attached to Israel in Spain (52%), France (49%), Belgium (47%), followed by Italy (41%) and Germany (40%). They are least attached in Hungary and Poland (19%). It is striking to see that in six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the

Netherlands), slightly higher proportions of Jews are attached to Israel than to the countries in which they live, while in six others (Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the UK), attachment to their own country is higher than to Israel.

We attempted to clarify the nature of this very strong attachment of Jews to Israel found in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Spain, countries in which the proportion of Jews feeling very strongly attached to Israel is considerably higher than the proportion of Jews who are very strongly attached to their country of residence. One potential factor is the number of recent immigrants in these countries, whose degree of acculturation may not yet have reached the levels they likely will over time. The share of Israelis among the local Jewish population is also a factor to be considered. In 2018 that presence was relatively more visible in Spain, Austria and the Netherlands, as well as Denmark.<sup>31</sup>

31 DellaPergola and Staetsky, *Jews in Europe at the Turn of the Millennium*, cit, pp.42–43.

**Figure 53. Attachment to geopolitical frameworks by mode of expression of Jewishness (% 'very strongly attached')**



Note: the category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

When we limited the analyses to those Jews who were born in these countries, thereby excluding Israelis and other immigrants, the level of attachment to Israel decreased but not to the point where the gap with the level of attachment to their country was closed. We are inclined to think that, in the particular cases of Germany and Austria, the explanation for the greater appeal of Israel is the especially fraught history of Jews in those countries. As for Belgium and Spain, the relatively modest levels of very strong attachment to their country in the national populations should be noted again. This, in itself, suggests that in an atmosphere where attachment to the country is generally low among the national populations, religious and ethnic groups may more readily turn to alternative centres of attachment.

Another theoretical explanation may relate to the levels of alienation perceived by Jews in their respective countries. However, in the FRA assessment of the perceptions of antisemitism

among Jews, the highest levels of concern were found in France, Germany and Belgium, as well as in Poland, while Jews in Spain, Italy and Hungary expressed somewhat lower levels of concern. So we find no apparent correlation between the perceived levels of antisemitism and the attachment to Israel. Levels of attachment seem to be more related to broad regional patterns (Southern and Western Europe vs. Northern and Central-Eastern Europe).

Figure 53 and Table 10 examine the levels of attachment to geopolitical frameworks according to the different expressions of Jewish identity of the respondents. Overall, there is a minor variation in the amount of very strong attachment to the country of residence across the different Jewish identity categories. The same is true of the attachment to one's local region. However, the differences in attachment to the EU show a lot of variation. In addition, very strong levels of attachment to Israel are observed among

those who identify as Jews by religion, while those identifying in other ways all show lower levels of attachment. Regarding preferences for the different definitions of Judaism, similar levels of attachment to one's country of residence can be found among those who are Jewish by parentage, heritage and upbringing (for each definition, 40% are very attached to their country), i.e. mostly categories not involving a particular engagement with a specific aspect of Jewish identity. A strong attachment to the region of residence is higher (27%) among the 'Other' definition of Judaism (clearly the weakest conceptually). The same applies to a very strong attachment to the European Union (23%). This brings some (not overwhelming) evidence of a stronger degree of attachment among the more assimilated sections of European Jewry towards the geographical frameworks central to their daily life, i.e. their country and regions of residence.

The relationship between describing certain notions of Jewishness as 'very important' and feeling a strong sense of attachment to one's country or region, generally displays very minor variations. It appears to be very slightly stronger among those stressing the importance of donating to charity (41% to country and 27% to region, respectively), and those stressing culture (40% and 27% respectively). Minimally, a stronger attachment to the European Union appears among those stressing the importance of remembering the Holocaust and combating antisemitism (both 19%).

Finally, looking at the modes of expression of one's own Jewishness (Figure 59), the 'Traditional' show the highest levels of strong attachment to their country at 42%, and the Orthodox the lowest (at 32%), but the differences are small. Attachment to the region of residence is highest among the Haredi (30%) and lowest among the Orthodox (18%), but again, the distinctions are fairly small. Attachment to the European Union shows greater variation by mode of Jewishness,

ranging from a high of 26% among the Reform/Progressive, to lows among the Orthodox (6%) and the Haredi (8%). Overall, we can observe that while the levels of attachment to one's country and region are almost uniform across the modes of Jewish identity, this is not the case with the attachment to the European Union or to Israel. A majority among the more observant Jews (Haredi, Orthodox and Traditional) are very strongly attached to Israel, compared to a minority among the Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish, Nones and Mixed. At the same time, a small proportion of the more observant Jewish groups is strongly attached to the EU compared to a greater proportion of the Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish, Nones and Mixed (though still not a majority among the latter).

Figure 53 and Table 10 confirm the mostly identificational – rather than civic – roots and meaning of European Jews' attachment to Israel. It is clearly higher among those who define Judaism as their religion, those who perceive believing in God as an essential part of their Jewish identity, and those with a Traditional mode of expressing their own Jewishness (although slightly less so among the most religiously observant). As one would expect, attachment to Israel is highest in absolute terms among those who see supporting Israel as a central part of their Jewish identity, but not to the detriment of their attachment to their country of residence.

Our findings about the most traditionalist sectors of the Jewish population are interesting because they hint at a locally delimited perception of the geopolitical space, whereas a greater attachment to the national and meta-national geopolitical frameworks is generally more visible among the more progressive, secular or even marginally Jewish. It is true, however, that the notion of *eretz Yisrael* (literally, the 'Land of Israel', but containing within it the idea of a sacred homeland) plays a central role in the outlook of the more religious, and this may translate into their higher attachment to Israel, in the symbolic rather than in the geopolitical sense.

**Table 10. Attachment of Jews to geopolitical frameworks, by definition of Judaism, main aspect essential to Jewish identity, and mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (% 'strongly attached')**

	Place			
	Country of residence	Region of residence	The European Union	Israel
<b>Total sample</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Definitions of Judaism</b>				
Religion	39	23	15	<b>47</b>
Parentage	<b>40</b>	25	19	38
Culture	39	24	19	40
Heritage	<b>40</b>	24	18	39
Upbringing	<b>40</b>	24	16	42
Ethnicity	37	25	18	39
Other	38	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	32
<b>Main aspects of Jewish identity (very important)</b>				
Remembering the Holocaust	40	25	<b>19</b>	43
Combating antisemitism	40	25	<b>19</b>	44
Feeling part of the Jewish people	40	24	17	51
Sharing Jewish festivals with family	39	25	15	51
Supporting Israel	38	24	14	<b>63</b>
Jewish culture	40	<b>27</b>	12	49
Believing in God	38	24	12	56
Donating to charity	<b>41</b>	<b>27</b>	17	55
<b>Modes of expression</b>				
Haredi	36	<b>30</b>	8	54
Orthodox	32	18	6	<b>61</b>
Traditional	<b>42</b>	24	13	54
Reform/Progressive	39	26	<b>26</b>	31
Just Jewish	39	24	23	32
None of these	40	27	25	18
Mixed	40	27	23	21

Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**. The category 'None of these' describes those who did not choose any of the meaningful categories of Jewish identification (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish). The category 'Mixed' describes those who indicated that they are both Jewish and another religion.

As our final point, it is interesting to observe that the attachment to Israel among European Jews appears to have no bearing on their other attachments, be they to their country, region, or the EU. In essence, a strong attachment to Israel does not entail a weak attachment to other entities,

and a strong attachment to other entities does not translate into a weak attachment to Israel. An attachment to Israel and an attachment to one's country are neither competing nor complementary; rather, they tend to coexist in European Jews and are unrelated to each other.

## Jewish integration versus separation

By combining the amount of support for, and self-identification with one's country of residence, and to one's Jewish identity, it is possible to obtain a pattern of integration versus separation of Jews vis-à-vis society at large in the respective countries. This is an application of Berry's model of minority assimilation versus segregation.<sup>32</sup> He defines the combination of a high attachment both to one's country of residence and to one's group identity as *integration*; a high attachment to one's country and a low attachment to one's group identity as *assimilation*; a low attachment to one's country and a high attachment to one's group identity as *separation*; and a low attachment to both one's country and to one's group identity as *marginalisation*. The distributions for each country reflect the answers provided by respondents. In this case, positive attachment ranges from somewhat positive to strongly positive, and negative attachment ranges from somewhat negative to strongly negative. Regarding countries, attachment was measured on a five-point scale: the two at each extreme were combined to compute the index, while the intermediate category was excluded and the percentages recalculated. Regarding Jewish identity, attachment was measured on a ten-point scale. The five at each extreme were combined to compute the index. This differs from Tables 9 and 10 above, where only a very strong attachment to one's country was considered.

In 2012, on the occasion of the first FRA survey of the perceptions of antisemitism in eight EU countries, the overall distribution of Jewish respondents was: 65% integrated, 11% assimilated, 21% separated, and 4% marginal (see Table 11). The highest levels of integration were found in France and the UK (74%), followed by Sweden (70%), Italy (66%), Belgium (58%), and Hungary (53%). Hungary also had the highest level of assimilation (20%). The lowest level of integration was found in Germany (35%). This low level of integration

in Germany, which was accompanied by a high level of separation (44%) and a relatively higher level of marginalisation (10%), is understandable in view of the high proportion of recent Jewish immigrants from the FSU and the persisting dominance of Russian speakers among Jews there, especially among the elderly. The data were very similar for the small Jewish community of Latvia where most of the Jews were also Russian speaking. Belgium was second highest on separation (31%), in accordance with the expected Jewish community patterns in Antwerp, which is home to a large Haredi community.

In 2018, out of an expanded framework of twelve countries, higher proportions of Jews were found to be integrated (70%) and assimilated (14%), whilst 13% were separated, and 3% were marginal (Table 11). However, the amount of variation across countries was still substantial. Reported levels of integration were stable or higher in 2018 versus 2012, with Jews in Italy showing the highest (82%), followed by France (79% – both higher than in 2012), Denmark (75%), the UK and Belgium (both 73%, the latter higher than in 2012). The Netherlands (70%) and Sweden (66%) followed. Somewhat lower levels of integration were reported for Spain (57%), Germany (56%, significantly higher than in 2012) and Austria (52%), with the lowest shares in the two Central-Eastern European countries – Hungary and Poland (both 47%).

Patterns of assimilation and separation in 2018 were distributed quite differently across countries. Assimilation was the most frequent in Hungary (31%, considerably higher than in 2012) and Poland (29%), followed by the Scandinavian countries – Denmark (20%) and Sweden (17%). The lowest levels of assimilation were reported in Belgium, Italy, and Spain (all 5%). As to separation, the highest level was reported in Spain (34%), followed by Austria (27%), Germany (26%, much less than in 2012), and Belgium (20%, also less), with the lowest levels reported in the UK (9%), France (8%), and Denmark (5%). Finally, the highest level of marginalisation was found in Poland (12%).

32 Berry, J.W. 1997. Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation. *Applied Psychology*, 46, 1, 5–34.

**Table 11. Combined perceptions of attachment to country of residence and to Jewish identity, 2012 and 2018 (%)**

Country	Country – high Jewish identity – high	Country – high Jewish identity – low	Country – low Jewish identity – high	Country – low Jewish identity – low	Total
	Integrated	Assimilated	Separated	Marginal	
2012					
Total	65	11	21	4	100
Belgium	58	7	31	4	100
France	74	10	15	1	100
Germany	35	10	44	10	100
Hungary	53	20	22	5	100
Italy	66	9	21	4	100
Latvia	38	6	40	15	100
Sweden	70	15	13	2	100
UK	74	10	15	2	100
2018					
Total	70	14	13	3	100
Austria	52	13	27	7	100
Belgium	73	5	20	2	100
Denmark	75	20	5	0	100
France	79	11	8	1	100
Germany	56	13	26	6	100
Hungary	47	31	15	7	100
Italy	82	5	11	2	100
Netherlands	70	14	13	3	100
Poland	47	29	12	12	100
Spain	57	5	34	4	100
Sweden	66	17	12	4	100
UK	73	14	9	4	100

Note: the highest value in each section of each column in **bold**.

Note: 2012, 8 countries; 2018, 12 countries.

It should be recalled that the typology reflects the combination of two evaluations – attachment (i) to one's country of residence, and (ii) to one's Jewish identity. The typology does not address other personal beliefs, behaviours or social networks. One apparently general finding is an ongoing process of growing integration and declining separation of Jews in their respective societies between 2012 and 2018. The former condition reflects the widespread process of fusion with the mainstream majority,


namely through high percentages of intermarriage. The latter process, leading to a situation of Jewish enclaves within society at large, is more complex and reflects quite different determinants. Marginal otherness can be a condition either imposed by wider society or freely chosen by Jews. The causes may be multiple, from negative prejudice emanating from society at large, to recent Jewish immigration to the current country, to an ideological choice to operate within a self-contained bubble.



## 11 / Some intercontinental comparisons

Jews in Europe – besides their continental and country location – are part of a broader global collective. As such, it is of interest to compare them with major Jewish communities in other parts of the world. In principle, the major distinctions and typologies which we were able to draw up for the Jewish population on the European continent apply equally to Jewish communities in other continents of the world, with the obvious provision that some or even significant regional variation can be expected – not so much on the options available, but rather on the frequencies of their manifestations.

**Figure 54. Definitions of Judaism: Jews in Europe, 2018, the US, 2013, and Israel, 2015 (%)**



Note. Europe relates to the twelve countries in the 2018 FRA dataset.

Sources: Israel: 2015 Pew Research Center survey; USA: 2013 Pew Research Center survey of US Jews.

In this chapter we compare European Jews with the two main centres of contemporary Jewish life – the United States and Israel – with respect to: (a) the definition of Judaism; (b) the main aspects of Jewish identity; and (c) the main modes of expression of personal Jewishness and the observance of selected Jewish traditional behaviours.


In Figure 54 we present a comparison of religion-based and ancestry/culture-based identities among Jews in Europe versus Jews in the US in 2013<sup>33</sup> and Israel in 2015 (see note under Figure 54 for references). The ancestry-based definition for Europe represents responses where parentage, upbringing or ethnicity were mentioned. In the US and Israel, the surveys inquired directly about ancestry. Across world Jewry, it seems, and not just in Europe, religion and ancestry-based definitions are mentioned at similar frequencies, with ancestry obtaining the higher share of respondents. Furthermore, wherever we look, neither religion nor ancestry is an exclusive basis for identity: it is very frequent to see both mentioned together.

Figure 55 explores how European Jews compare to other Jewish populations with respect to rating some of the main aspects of Jewish identity as 'very important'. This comparison reveals fairly similar rankings in the four selected markers: memory of the Holocaust; belonging to the Jewish People; Israel; and believing in God. Regarding the topic of Israel in particular, the data are not strictly comparable since the question in Europe related to 'support' for Israel, in the US to 'care about Israel', and in Israel to 'living in Israel'. European Jews are stronger with respect to the memory of the Holocaust than Jews in the US and Israel,

33 In 2020 the Pew Research Center undertook a new survey of Jews in the US: *Jewish Americans in 2020*. Washington, DC, 2021. The detailed database was not yet available at the time of writing.



**Figure 55. Main aspects essential to personal Jewish identity: Jews in Europe, 2018, the US, 2013, and Israel, 2015 (% saying 'very important'/'essential')**



Note: Europe relates to the twelve countries in the 2018 FRA dataset. The question on Jewish people in Europe relates to the importance of 'feeling part of the Jewish people', in the US and Israel it is about a 'strong sense of belonging to Jewish people'. The question on Israel in Europe relates to 'support' for Israel, and in the US to 'care about Israel'. In Israel it is about 'living in Israel' and is not directly comparable. Religiosity is represented by 'Believing in God' in Europe and 'Observing Jewish law' in the US and Israel. Sources: Europe: FRA 2018 (12 European countries); Israel: 2015 Pew Research Center survey; USA: 2013 Pew Research Center survey of U.S. Jews.


and slightly weaker on Jewish peoplehood and religiosity. As for attachment to Israel, European Jews attribute slightly greater importance to this than American Jews, although the difference is not very significant.

Figure 56 compares the main modes of expression of personal Jewishness. It should be stressed that to some extent the division into main denominational/ideological groupings across the main continents does not do justice to historical and institutional concepts and practices which are well entrenched in the Jewish cultural tradition of each geographical area. For example, one might

argue that Conservative in the US sits rather close to Reform and belongs more to the progressive world today than to the traditional one; in the UK and France that group is mainly comprised of the 'Traditional', who are either mostly Sephardi traditional (France) or United Synagogue (UK). In Israel, the Traditional largely refers to Sephardi/Mizrachi Jews who would not define themselves as Orthodox, but who tend to be much more observant than the typical American Conservative Jew, and more in line with Sephardi Traditional Jews in France or United Synagogue Jews in the UK. On the other hand, those formally indicating Conservative as their denominational preference are rather closer to the Reform in their general attitude to and relations with Israel's central rabbinate, whose orientation tends to be more Haredi than modern Orthodox. Finally, among many secular Israelis, the level of religious practice is far higher than among many diaspora Jews formally affiliated with one of the various religious denominations.

Keeping in mind the limited scope of these comparisons, we regrouped the originally more detailed classifications into four categories: Haredi/Orthodox, Traditional/Conservative, Reform/Progressive, and Secular/Just Jewish. The combined Haredi/Orthodox group in Europe (13%) sits between the higher share (22%) in Israel and the lower share in the US (10%). The same can be said of the Traditional mode, which attracts 25% in Europe versus 29% in Israel and 18% in the US (represented here as a proxy by the Conservative movement). And again, the proportion of Reform/Progressive in Europe (16%) sits between the very small representation in Israel (7%) and its dominant presence in the US (36% plus 6% of respondents adhering to other minor denominations, such as Reconstructionist). Finally, Europe displays the highest proportion of the Secular, Just Jewish and Nones – 46%, versus 42% in Israel and 30% in the US. We shall add here that in the 2020 Pew survey of Jewish Americans, very minor changes appeared in the distribution by main Jewish denominations: Orthodox 9%, Conservative 17%, Reform 41%, None 32%.<sup>34</sup>

**Figure 56. Main modes of expression of personal Jewishness, Europe, 2018, the US, 2013, and Israel, 2015 (%)**




Note: Europe relates to twelve countries in the 2018 FRA dataset. Europe: 'None of these' included with 'Just Jewish'; 'Mixed-both Jewish and another religion' not included. US: data on denominational affinity; 'Other' included with 'Reform'. Israel: 'Conservative' included with 'Reform'.

Sources: Europe: FRA 2018; US: Pew Research Center, 2013; Israel: Pew Research Center, 2015.

The observance of selected Jewish religious rituals is outlined in Figure 57. All in all, there is remarkable consistency in the ranking of rituals observed, with the Passover Seder by far the most popular in Europe, the US and Israel. In second place we find fasting on Yom Kippur, followed by lighting candles on Friday night, keeping kosher at home and going to synagogue at least once a week. The only remarkable exception to the general pattern is the significantly higher percentage of kosher households in Israel, where following the laws of kashrut is both common and easier to accomplish.

All in all, these intercontinental comparisons reveal a remarkable amount of consistency when viewing the significant differences that prevail in constitutional arrangements, social and cultural patterns and contextual environments in the three geographical areas considered. One possible explanation is that the nature of Judaism and Jewishness and the options they offer have important common threads related to long-term Jewish history and culture. Differences of style, not discussed in depth here, may of course add significantly to the relatively homogeneous picture depicted by these data.

**Figure 57. Observance of selected Jewish religious rituals: Europe, 2018, the US, 2013, and Israel, 2015 (%)**



Sources: Europe relates to 12 countries in the 2018 FRA dataset. US: Pew Research Center, 2013; Israel: Pew Research Center, 2015.

## 12 / Overview and conclusions

In this report we explored the characteristics and transformations of Jewish identity in Europe. Our chosen focus of investigation was the Jewish populations of twelve European Union Member States in 2018, which, together, comprised 78% of the Jewish population of Europe and 96% of the Jewish population of the EU at the time. The database we worked with included over 16,300 respondents who participated in the 2018 FRA survey of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the EU. Unlike many other existing analyses that focus on one aspect of Jewishness, for example, the intensity of religious ritual observance or the preference for a given religious stream of Judaism, in this study we stressed the multi-dimensional, multifaceted, intertwined nature of Jewish feelings, beliefs and behaviours among the Jewish public.

### Delimiting the subject matter

The study of Jewish identity has often been constrained within a limited set of assumptions and measurements which have tended to reflect more the assumptions of the investigators than the real and complex practical and symbolic world within which Jews live their lives. In this report we identified three principal Jewish identification axes and presented the findings for each separately, as well as in association with each other. These three axes are:

- **What** is the definition of Judaism, or the portal of entry of one's own perception of being Jewish?
- **Why** is Jewish identity important to a person and what are the main concerns that inform this identity?
- **How** is one's personal Jewishness expressed through a mode of presenting oneself and associating with one's peers?

Our purpose here was to explore and clarify each of these threads separately and to elucidate the many interconnections that exist between them. Judaism and Jewish identity comprise a complex cluster of opportunities and choices. Some of these – like monotheism and the belief in one supreme creating and protecting power – are embedded in a history and cultural tradition going back thousands of years. Others – such as supporting Israel as a Jewish sovereign state – have existed only since the mid-twentieth century. Yet, plausibly, under different momentary circumstances for different people, these diverse options play an important role in the self-definition of individual Jews, in their immediate and most relevant environment, and their relations with the broader non-Jewish world. In many debates, inside and outside the organised Jewish community, the perception of Jewishness is often reduced to a simple linear relation based on the expressed intensity regarding one particular variable. Such an approach – frequently found not only in private and public discourse but also, unfortunately, in past research – does not do justice to the complexity of Jewish feelings and experiences. In the preceding pages we made an effort, at times unprecedented, to present the picture in all its complexity and multidimensionality.

An additional goal was to help Jewish communities understand themselves on the assumption that such information can be used in communal planning and policy development. We thus reviewed the composition of the Jewish population surveyed in terms of their current Jewish attitudinal and behavioural modes, their earlier personal background, and the processes of change that have shaped their current situation over their lifetime.

## Representativeness of the survey

Any set of findings runs a certain risk of inaccuracy. The main culprit may be the unrepresentativeness of the sample. Such a risk exists in any survey, but particular care must be exercised with studies undertaken via the internet on convenience samples, like the present one. There might be doubts that the survey focused exclusively or mainly on the more closely-knit and communally affiliated segments of the Jewish population. In particular, there might be doubts regarding the reliability of the FRA survey in portraying the configuration and levels of Jewish identity, namely lifetime shifts in religiosity. If, in fact, there were massive withdrawals from Jewish identity, and many more did not take part in the survey, this would leave the current sample as manifestly not representative of the community in the past and present.

However, we believe that we have demonstrated that a lot of marginal Jews beyond the boundaries of the organised community participated in the survey, and we specified that in the chapter on channels of response. We should recall that the 2018 FRA survey was about antisemitism, not about Jewish identity. We believe that, given the widely diffused interest in, and growing concern about antisemitism, every possible type of Jew was interested in the topic and participated, including the most alienated and distant. A key proof is the presence of an ambiguous category of the 'Nones' – the weakest of all in terms of Jewish identification, who do not identify with any of the possible range of options to manifest their Jewishness. Who are they if not Jews peripheral to both Jewish family and community life? No definition of Judaism and Jewishness may be satisfactory to them, and their participation in the life of a Jewish community may be scarce or nil, and yet they participated in the survey.

Thus, we relate to the present sample as a *hybrid*. The state of Jewish identity documented by the sample reflects (a) the identity of those who belong to an organised Jewish community in a broad sense (members of organisations,

affiliates and subscribers to various Jewish newspapers and other forms of media); and (b) the identity of those who are not part of the organised Jewish community but are aware of its existence or keep some kind of communication with people who belong to the Jewish community network.

## Defining and measuring Jewishness: boundaries and main aspects

In spite of its limitations, the present survey was able to capture the great variability of Jewish identities – hence the use of the plural 'identities' rather than the singular 'identity' in the title of this report – extending from a solid core to a remote periphery. In this report the cut-off point of 'who is a Jew?' was perhaps a little beyond the limits typically set by rabbinic law. However, two things became clear. One is the enormous gaps that commonly exist between the most and the least Jewishly observant, motivated, knowledgeable and active members of the Jewish collective, as reflected among our respondents. The other is that even among the least present and visible fringes of the Jewish population, there may remain quite significant residues of a Jewish identity. It is plausible to think that among some who were on the verge of literally disappearing from the Jewish scene, the renewal of antisemitic, anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli pressures from the surrounding society may have strengthened their interest and motivation in belonging to a Jewish community – whatever its symbolic and practical meaning – as a matter of solidarity, or out of curiosity, or fear.

Regarding the main aspects of Jewish identity, each of the three main axes delineated above – the *what*, the *why* and the *how*? – can be represented through different measurable variables. These, in turn, tend to offer nearly infinite options and nuances. Sometimes, however, focusing on the many trees are an obstacle to perceiving the nature of the whole forest. One of the conclusions of this study is that after detailing the numerous principal patterns of questioning and response that

seem appropriate to describe the Jewish experience, it is also possible to summarise the main categories. Thus, regarding the question of *what* is the definition of Judaism in the eyes of our respondents, we offered the following options: Religion, Parentage, Culture, Heritage, Upbringing, Ethnicity or 'Something else'. Our analysis and triangulations (see Appendix B) with the various data at our disposal would suggest a simpler three-fold typology: Judaism as *Religion*, as *Peoplehood*, or as *Memory-Culture*. Likewise, in the matter of *why* the most essential aspects of Jewish identity strongly matter personally, the options offered were (in descending order of response): Remembering the Holocaust, Combating antisemitism, Feeling part of the Jewish People, Celebrating the Jewish festivals with the family, Supporting Israel, Cultivating Jewish culture, Believing in God and Donating to charity. Here too the same three-fold typology appears to efficiently capture the essentials: Jewish identity as *Religion*, *Peoplehood*, or *Memory-Culture*. Finally, regarding the *how*, or the mode of expressing personal Jewishness, the options offered were: Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive, Just Jewish, 'None of these' and Mixed (meaning partly Jewish). The three-fold typology here can be boiled down to the *Observant*, the *Modern* and the *Marginal* (see Appendix B). In one way or another, each of these types seems to express some form of interest or at least concern with things Jewish. Each can be very meaningful in one way or another, at a given point in time, or in response to a certain emerging situation. What should not be forgotten is that in one circumstance or another, all types, regardless of intensity and proximity to the core Jewish community, can be identified from the outside as Jewish and be, or become, the victims of prejudice and hatred. In their broadest manifestations, antisemitism and anti-Jewish hostility do not distinguish between the political stances, or the ideological preferences of Jews. It is true, though, that there is a tendency on the political Left today to concede acceptance in return for repudiation of Israel/Zionism, and that on the political Right, support for Israel sometimes goes along with unabashed anti-Jewish hostility.

## Complementarity and contradictions

The mutual relations (or triangulations) between the principal aspects of the *What*, the *Why* and the *How* of Jewish identity – demonstrated in this report mostly for the first time in research literature (see also Appendix B) – provide very useful indications of an overall assessment of the structure and meaning of Jewish identities in Europe, their strength, complementarity and possible contradictions. These indications can be summarised as follows: religion can be perceived (a) as a basic definition of what Judaism means; (b) as one of the fundamental aspects of personal Jewish identification; and (c) as a mode of expression of personal Jewishness in one's daily life. As might be expected – but never previously tested empirically – there is a strong correlation between these three aspects and therefore it is not surprising to find that respondents who are religiously strong in their personal life tend to be more Jewishly focused in their definition of Judaism and regarding many of the main aspects of Jewish identity as well. By contrast, those less religiously involved in their personal life are often less interested in other main aspects of Jewish identity as well. The picture is more complex for those who are less focused on religion – and they are the majority. We find that most often those who are focused on the perceived importance of Jewish peoplehood and Jewish memory-culture as *essential aspects of their personal Jewish identity* hold quite stable perceptions of *what Judaism is* for them. Likewise, those who display what we have defined as modern or even marginal *modes of expression of their own Jewishness*, still continue to hold fairly high levels of interest toward and involvement with the fundamentals of Jewish identity. In turn, we find significant stability in the relationship between different *definitions of what Judaism is* and the *essential aspects of Jewish identity*. Stated in another way, many people who present themselves differently – and often frankly disagree – in terms of religious observance, or who adhere to different and apparently distant concepts about the ultimate meaning of Judaism, share similar perceptions concerning the importance of the principal aspects of Jewish identity.

## Jewish religion versus Jewish ancestry: an ‘unproblematic duality’

European Jews tend to say that being Jewish is primarily about ancestry or culture. Yet, this understanding needs to be qualified. We have shown that, in Europe – as well as in the US and in Israel – Jews define themselves without difficulty in terms of their common ancestry and religion without perceiving these definitions as inherently contradictory. In some places the emphasis is on ancestry (e.g. Eastern Europe), in others it is on religion (e.g. the UK or France), but both definitions are acceptable even in places where one is clearly preferred. The difference in emphasis stems from the particular history of the societies in which Jews live. The multi-ethnic and, in places, significantly secularised cultures of Eastern Europe apply the language of ethnicity and ancestry to Jews, while cultures which developed a strong unitarian national civic ethos, such as France, tend to regard Jews only as followers of a religion. Jews living in each place followed – or were compelled to follow – these local traditions, yet nowhere did they lose sight of the other elements of their Jewishness, be they ancestry or religion, that might have been less understood or accepted in the surrounding cultures. This duality of Jewish self-definition is well-known, but it has not been as clearly articulated until now as we have done here.

The observed duality is not of purely academic or analytical interest. It is significant to understand this for anyone concerned with defining and labelling Jews correctly in data-gathering enterprises, such as national censuses, that underlie the provision of services to different communities and the monitoring of social and economic outcomes. Further, correctly capturing who Jews are is essential for policy development. One example of the successful accommodation

of the ‘religion-ancestry’ duality of Jews can be found in the extension of the application of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour and national origin, to discrimination rooted in antisemitism.<sup>35</sup> Another example of an attempt to accommodate the duality is the continuous and vigorous debate around how to define Jews in the census and administrative datasets that took place in the United Kingdom in preparation for the 2021 Census. While defining Jews both as a religious group and an ethnic group was recommended by experts in Jewish social statistics prior to the 2001 Census, this recommendation was not followed by the Office for National Statistics.<sup>36</sup> Jews were explicitly defined, both in 2001 and the following two decennial censuses, as a religious group, not least because, having failed to include the duality when the religion question was first introduced in 2001, Jewish social science experts recommended retaining the same approach utilised in 2001 in the interests of data consistency over time. Ultimately, this was not detrimental to the capacity of the census to count Jews in that particular context, as the vast majority of British Jews regarded the religion question as a meaningful and appropriate way for them to identify themselves as Jews.

## Being religious, being Jewish

One of the great bones of contention in the past and today is whether a person can be a ‘good’ or a ‘normative’ Jew outside the premises of religious belief and ritual behaviour. In the assessment of Jewish identity in this report, we made a maximal effort to escape from a simplistic concept of linearity. The conventional approach would be one of measuring Jewishness along a gradient from most to least religiously observant. We actually paid considerable attention to religiosity, namely rituals and beliefs, and we often found that religiosity is positively

35 Executive Order 13899 of December 2019 (Combating Anti-Semitism). Federal Register: Combating Anti-Semitism. For critique of the debates taking place around the order see: Staetsky, Daniel. ‘Jewishness: Written in the Body’, *Times of Israel*, December 26, 2019.

36 Kosmin, B. 1999. *Ethnic and religious question in 2001 UK census of population: policy recommendations*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.



associated with more intense perceptions of other aspects of Jewishness. In particular, we found that the more religiously observant sectors of the Jewish population do not shun their relationship with the national components of Jewish identity, unlike attitudes frequently observed in the State of Israel or even in the US. We also found interesting discrepancies between the various perceptive fields of being Jewish. About half of European Jews perceive Judaism as their religion but do not find it very important to believe in God. At the same time, those who believe in God commonly perceive Judaism as their religion, but many who believe in God only selectively perform the rituals that supposedly express the sacred nature of Jewish belief.



**We found that the more religiously observant sectors of the Jewish population do not shun their relationship with the national components of Jewish identity, unlike attitudes frequently observed in the State of Israel or even in the US**

The ‘substitution hypothesis’ – i.e. that the place of lesser religious belief and practice is taken by other non-religious avenues of intellectual and concrete participation in Jewish life – was not really confirmed in our study. However, one of the striking conclusions of this study is that a robust Jewish identity can be maintained outside of a religious observance outlook. One check we carried out consistently throughout this report was to measure the frequency of belief and participation among the more marginal sectors of the Jewish collective, epitomised in this case by those who are out-married.

In community discourse, assimilation – of which out-marriage is a principal indicator – is sometimes equated with the total loss of such Jews to the Jewish community, or, in more pejorative language found in some parts of the community, to a ‘silent Holocaust’. Notwithstanding the

inappropriate and unacceptable association of Jewish cultural and identificational erosion with the physical destruction of Jewish communities, the statistical indicators largely correspond with the simplified perceptions, albeit not entirely so. It is important to recognise that over 20% of those Jews who affirm Judaism as their religion are out-married, as are 20% of those who believe in God, 36% of those who believe it is very important to remember the Holocaust and combat antisemitism, 17% of those who fast on Yom Kippur and 25% of those who attend a Passover Seder. Clearly, Jewish community and institutional arrangements are such that, if those same persons cannot be hosted and welcomed by their more traditional communities of origin, they will find hospitality and welcome elsewhere. Only 1% of those who present themselves as Haredi are out-married, as against 14% of those who declare themselves Traditional, 45% of those who chose the Reform/Progressive option, and 72% for whom no definition fits. Along the continuum between all and nothing, Jews are able to find many nuances or niches that can better accommodate them. Although we have not studied this directly here, it is clearly apparent that those who are in-married are more likely than those who are out-married to pass on their Jewishness to the next generation. This will affect not only the numbers but also the structure of the future Jewish community. That said, how the out-married are engaged or included – bearing in mind a proportion of them clearly continue to find meaning in their Jewishness in a variety of ways – will also have a bearing on the evolution of European Jewry, its organisational frameworks and population size.

## **Secularisation and desecularisation**

The study sheds new light on the mutual balance of two processes: secularisation (understood as both switching to lesser religiosity and a disassociation from the organised community), and desecularisation (the strengthening of religiosity combined with new joiners from outside the Jewish community). The question is whether the two opposing trends offset each other at the

level of the total Jewish population, or whether one of them prevails. We found that the effects of these processes are present across all possible different modes of expression of personal Jewishness, but the different modes have switchers/joiners on quite different scales.

Regarding the whole of European Jewry, or at least the twelve countries included in this study:

1. Today's Jewish communities display significant compositional continuity: about two-thirds of Jews today belong to the same mode with which they identified during their childhood. The central feature of the European Jewish community today is its compositional stability. Ideologically, most people declare that, in terms of their personal religiosity, they are currently positioned where they were in their childhood;
2. Yet, re-shuffling and new arrivals take place too, and they are not insignificant: one third comes from different modes, both more or less traditionally observant;
3. The new (non-Jewish) arrivals are less significant in proportional terms compared to the switchers (born Jews who changed their behaviour or self-perception, or both, to less/more traditionally observant), though the exact numerical relationship between these two groups depends on the mode of expression of personal Jewishness.
4. It is worth noting that this study did not include Jews in Russia or Ukraine – former communist countries with sizeable Jewish populations – where there is often much talk from community leaders and activists about desecularisation being a very important and real phenomenon (i.e. people rediscovering their Jewishness). We cannot comment on it here because these countries were outside the scope of our investigation.

Questions such as 'What wins in the experience of contemporary Jewish populations – secularisation

or desecularisation?' or 'Do communities, as a whole, become more or less religious over time?' could begin to be answered with the data we have at hand, albeit not completely. The first question could only be fully answered if the trajectories of those who left the Jewish community entirely and are no longer reachable by surveys were known to us. The second question could be better answered by examining repeated snapshots of communal composition, i.e. directly following the attitudinal and behavioural changes undertaken by the same persons over their lifetime, alongside indices of demographic behaviour (i.e. births and deaths). Still, we can tell quite a bit about the composition of today's community and how this came about for the benefit of community policy makers and social scientists alike.

The balance of our data unequivocally points to accrued lifetime religiosity especially among the younger people – at least as far as those covered in our survey are concerned. This is visible both in terms of Jewish beliefs and practices. In noting this we do not forget that past communities included people who are no longer part of today's communities because they (i) died or emigrated (demographic departures); or (ii) drifted away from the Jewish community to the point of becoming unreachable through the FRA survey (identificational departures). Their absence precludes a fuller understanding of the past composition of the Jewish community and, in addition, precludes a fuller understanding of their lifetime journeys. We can understand the make-up of today's community, i.e. the journeys of today's members, but not the journeys of former members. The individual profiles, when aggregated by age groups (hence shared years of birth) and ideological groupings, tell a revealing story about the transformational character of the Jewish community experience. Different sub-groups tell entirely different stories persuasively, which indicates that it is still easy to discern the dynamics and patterns of life despite the unavoidable limits of survey research. This is the main strength of the dataset at our disposal.



## The dual loyalty of Jews: putting this issue to bed

We now have a very sound crop of findings that goes a long way towards demystifying and de-sensationalising the old *canard* of ‘dual loyalty’ – namely, that Jews feel a stronger allegiance to the State of Israel than to their countries of residence. Accusations of dual loyalty, alongside perceptions of Jews as foreigners, arise from time to time. They are directed at Jews and serve as an expression of existential anxieties in the majority populations. These anxieties are known to intensify during times of economic crises and deterioration of security, and more recently, crises in public health. Such phenomena have emerged prominently in various European contexts since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Jews are sensitive to such accusations, yet they perceive them as less threatening compared, for example, to denial of the Holocaust. Direct data on the Jewish response to the ‘dual loyalty’ claim do not exist, but the 2018 FRA survey indicated that 47% of Jews said that they regarded viewing Jews in Europe as a group with very different interests from the rest of the population in their countries as definitely antisemitic; 57% of Jews responded similarly regarding the claim that Jews are not really capable of integrating into the societies of their countries of residence. By way of comparison, 80% of Jews regard the claim that the Holocaust is a myth or an exaggeration as definitely antisemitic.<sup>37</sup> So, to summarise, Jews today are less sensitive to claims of their foreignness than to the denial or minimisation of the Holocaust. Still, does the ‘dual loyalty’ claim have any validity?

Our findings show that Jews are attached to their countries very much in accordance with the patterns of their countries’ total populations, which are varied in themselves. We found that ethnic and religious minorities, including Jews but not limited to them, may be a little less attached to their countries of residence, but mostly, the difference between them and the

general population is moderate. Additionally, we found that the patterns of attachment to one’s country are similar across all major modes of expression of personal Jewishness. We further found that the attachment to one’s country and the attachment to Israel are non-contradictory for Jews, and therefore should be understood as non-contradictory for the purposes of general discourse. At the same time, it is undeniable that Israel represents a permanent concern in the minds of many Jews and a relevant component in the whole complex of their religious, national and cultural identity. This does not mean that they have to agree with everything that happens in Israel or that is enacted by Israel’s government. Likewise, in general, Jews have looked with hope at the European Union project which offered an opportunity to identify with a geopolitical framework that is additional to, and not substitutive of the primary national frame of reference. The evidence is that, over time, European Jews have increasingly integrated and become less segregated within the societies of their respective countries.

In the chapter on the structural aspects of the fundamentals of Jewish identity, we saw that in recent years, Israel – often associated with Jewish peoplehood – has become more central in the minds of European Jews. This does not mean that they necessarily support the policies of this or that Israeli government in greater proportions, although it should be noted that the nature of those policies does affect Israel’s international standing and the degree of emotional proximity of the Jewish diaspora to the Jewish State. Nor does this mean that European Jews hold any lesser allegiance to their respective countries; rather, it most likely signals a sense of stress and enhanced solidarity within a Jewish camp that perceives an increase in the frequency and aggression of antisemitic incidents and hostility on the part of the wider non-Jewish society. The feeling of this external pressure seems to have caused a distinct need or desire to return to the camaraderie found within the

37 FRA. 2018. *Experiences*, cit.

community on the part of many who, over time, had drifted to its periphery, or had even dropped out of the recognisable Jewish collective.

It is especially important that the European public, European politicians, Jewish leaders and Jewish communities understand well the non-exceptional nature of Jewish political attachments. Europe is diverse and is diversifying further under the impact of international migration. It is not unusual for ethnic minorities and immigrants to have more than one centre of attachment and a somewhat reduced attachment to the country in which they live when compared to the locally born majority populations. Indeed, this is entirely natural. Yet it is a mistake to perceive such attachments as inherently competing. Indeed, in the eyes of the members of minority groups, they may not be. And at least as long as peace prevails between the European countries where minorities live and the other countries close to their hearts, 'dual loyalty' is not a problem to be feared but a complexity more appropriately understood as a normal situation of 'multiple attachments'.

## Country variation

The common denominator of the countries studied in this report is that they all belonged to the European Union at the time the data were gathered. However, significant variation was found in Jewish identification patterns across the twelve countries observed here. These differences concerned the intensity of personal participation and the depth of Jewish community integration in the framework of general society more than the understanding of what the values of Judaism are and the perception of their relevance to the individual and the community. All in all, considering the different aspects reviewed here, distinct differences can be seen between Jewish communities located at the four cardinal points of the North, South, East and West of the continental space delimited here. Jews in Scandinavia and in the former communist countries appeared to be less involved in the fabric of Jewish religious and cultural life than Jews in Western-Central Europe and in the southern Mediterranean countries.

A further insight comes from the analysis of Jewish integration and segregation based on the combined patterns of attachment to Judaism and to the respective countries of residence. Four main types can be described in this respect. One is the 'enclave' (or self-isolated) type of communities, where a significant proportion of all Jews are either relatively recent immigrants, such as in Germany, Austria and Spain, or have chosen to self-segregate, such as the strictly Orthodox population in Antwerp, who, in turn, affect the total profile of the Jewish population of Belgium. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Jews in Hungary and Poland find themselves in a more uncertain (and perhaps frustrating) position of being in the process of positively rediscovering and re-evaluating their Jewish identity, two or three generations after the Shoah, one generation after the collapse of communism, and in contemporary national contexts that have evolved in rather nationalistic, even xenophobic directions. Jewish communities that can be defined as part of the 'mainstream' include the two largest and vibrant ones in France and the UK, but also the smaller and more assimilated ones of the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. In these countries Jewish life not only flourishes but also enjoys the formal support and recognition of local and national democratic institutions. Finally, Italy – possibly due to the unique depth of its Jewish cultural patrimony – constitutes a sort of 'natural reserve', at the same time highly integrated and assimilated, protected and cultivated, but also constantly on alert. These observations should caution us against making straightforward generalisations about the situation of Jews in Europe, and in general, about the contemporary Jewish experience.

## Emerging models of Jewish identity in Europe

Our concluding remarks must return to the title of this report: Jewish *identities* in the plural and not 'identity' in the singular. The relevance, complexity and multiformity of attachments to Judaism and of the manifestation of personal and collective Jewishness clearly emerge

from this study. Yet, there is no chaos in Jewish perceptions, rather a clear distinction between the main options available, and those freely chosen.<sup>38</sup>

### The traditional/Jewish religion option

This type includes people who largely, if not almost exclusively, adhere to a self-contained complex of Jewish beliefs, norms and values, and who consistently perform Jewish traditional ritual practices. These mostly *religiously observant* people are very cohesively integrated in an exclusive Jewish community of reference and belong to Jewish social networks which emphasise religious leadership and enforce negative sanction in cases of deviance from the norm.

### The national/Jewish peoplehood option

This type includes those who maintain a cohesive community of reference through strictly or predominantly Jewish association networks, with an emphasis on common Jewish ancestry or ethnicity, and a strong focus on Israel. In-group communication includes a predominant amount of non-specifically Jewish cultural content, whilst continuing to affiliate with Jewish organisations and to associate exclusively or mainly with other Jews. It may also include many Jews whose main attachment to Judaism is through membership of a religious congregation where, as in the case of some contemporary non-orthodox religious congregations, the sense of community is preserved, but the unique element of Jewish traditional, or in broader terms, cultural *exclusiveness* is not.

### The modern/Jewish culture option

This type includes those for whom attachment to Judaism may persist independently of a clearly recognisable personal Jewish behaviour or associative involvement in a Jewish community. Memory, curiosity, notions of one's own Jewish historical past, tradition and culture, knowledge of a Jewish language, interest in Jewish scholarship, or even a sense of ancestral *nostalgia*, may be factors in such a form of less continuous,

but nonetheless sincere belonging. Thus defined, culture provides a more ambiguous, less binding criterion for Jewish identification, typical of those who are not affiliated to the web of Jewish organisations and does not create an exclusively Jewish bond in the face of the rest of society.

### The marginal/assimilation option

This type of identification includes people of Jewish origin whose cultural outlook and frame of reference are basically non-Jewish, but who nevertheless belong within the formal definitional framework adopted (namely by rabbinical authorities) to delineate the Jewish population. Sometimes, a declining intensity of Jewish identification tends to be replaced by an increasing identification with other, non-Jewish religious, ethnic, communal or cultural forms of identity – until the last remnants of Jewish identification become so marginal that they may simply fade away. This type may have its counterpart among those non-Jews – Evangelist or Messianic Christians – who, for a variety of reasons, keep some links with Jews and Judaism.

These diverse options do not really stand in opposition to one another, with the possible exception of the last one. Even in the latter case we found that something residually Jewish is left at the end of the long process of distancing or becoming alienated from the main core of the Jewish collective. Evidently, these broad categories should not be perceived as fixed and static, but rather as poles of reference within a highly dynamic process of personal choices. The changing personal positioning and repositioning within the broader set of existing options is part of the ongoing Jewish experience.

## Policy options: Fragmentation and conflict versus unity?

Our study indicated that among Jews in Europe today, strong religiosity is a minority lifestyle. At the same time, seen in sectorial terms, the

38 See also: DellaPergola, S. 1999. *World Jewry Beyond 2000: The Demographic Prospects*. Oxford: Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, The Third Frank Green Lecture, Occasional Papers, 2.

Jews of Europe lack a clear numerical majority or hegemony, in terms of Jewish identity and lifestyle. In the chapters dedicated to the modes of expression of personal Jewishness, we chose to present the denominational split in the form of pie charts. For each country, and for Jews in Europe as a whole, the pie charts looked like broken plates, with five or six numerically significant pieces. We also documented the state of denominations in respondents' childhoods, only to discover that the childhood pie of denominational identities was split similarly. This is simultaneously a well-known and largely ignored reality. The existence and contents of the different denominational streams, or modes, are well-known; the political, religious and cultural fragmentation of Jews is also known, yet the two 'knowns' are rarely put together. They teach an important lesson. Jewish communities are fragmented within themselves and this fragmentation may bring conflict, although this is far from inevitable.

Anyone who travels through Jewish communities in Europe or elsewhere throughout the Diaspora and holds conversations with Jewish leaders and regular members will quickly spot the existence of political divisions and rivalries. How much support should be lent to this or that policy implemented by the government of Israel or by the national government? Which political parties are 'good for Jews' and on what grounds can such a question be answered? How is antisemitism to be defined? We have shown that while the memory of the Holocaust and the task of combating antisemitism are seen as equally important across different modes of expression of personal Jewishness, this is much less the case for issues of religious belief, ritual observance and support for Israel. At least since the end of the Second World War, compared to other religious and ethnic groups, the Jewish Diaspora managed to keep internal divisions to a minimum: internal

political conflicts were ever present but extreme ruptures were unusual. Whether the strong shared awareness of common ancestry or the permanent state of political vulnerability associated with minority status, or both, played a role, remains an open question.

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the existence of fragmentation within the Jewish collective. Certain political developments and dynamics are incomprehensible without such an acknowledgement. When, for example, in an attempt to shape an adequate response to the threat of antisemitism, national governments receive more than one response from Jewish communities, they ought to remember that they, in fact, may have been hearing from the multiple (and competing) voices within the Jewish collective – each with its own wavelength. It has been shown previously that the extent to which criticism of Israel is seen as antisemitic differs across different groups of Jews, with religiously observant Jews being more inclined to see criticism of Israel as an aspect of antisemitism.<sup>39</sup> In this study, we have shown that more religious Jews (the Orthodox and the Traditional probably more than the Haredi) are those most attached to Israel. Is it, then, really surprising to hear different views on the issue of whether or not criticism of Israel is antisemitic? Similar or sharper divisions in Jewish opinion are expected on matters such as circumcision, the prohibition of traditional slaughter of animals, and the like. The best advice one can issue to national policy makers is to consider the multiplicity of Jewish voices, and to try to understand them.

The ultimate challenge of this study of Jewish identities among European Jews is to communicate the idea that European Jewry is strong – and perhaps unexpectedly strengthening – owing to recently developing social and geopolitical circumstances. The

39 Staetsky, L. D. 2019. 'Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? What do British and French Jews think about the link between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among non-Jews?' In: *Unity and diversity in contemporary antisemitism: The Bristol-Sheffield Hallam Colloquium on Contemporary Antisemitism*, eds. Campbell, J. and L. Klaff, Boston: Academic Studies Press; DellaPergola, S. 2020. *Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism*. Berlin: De Gruyter, and Jerusalem: SICSA, ACTA, 40, 2.

resilience of the Jewish community is significantly due to its internal diversity. The simultaneous existence of different internal threads offers the Jewish population multiple tools to cope with the difficulties of a somewhat unpredictable and unstable European environment. The necessary precondition to succeed in the struggle for continuity is that those different threads should continue to maintain a relevant dialogue with one another.

## A final comment

The Jews arrived in Europe on the wings of history from many corners, and, over a long timespan, were present in locales all over the continent at one point or another. There is no Jew anywhere in Europe whose ancestors did not once live in a different place in Europe or did not arrive from an area in the Middle East or North Africa, extending to the shores of the eastern and southern Mediterranean. But in the long run, whether accepted or rejected, Jews have always constituted an integral and unavoidable part of European society. Jews created their own – sometimes segregated – communities, and at the same time were present – and sometimes led – during all junctures of European intellectual creation and change. Figures such as Rashi and the Rambam, Joseph Caro and Moses Isserles, the Gaon of Vilna and the Ba'al Shem Tov, Leon of Modena and Salamon Rossi, Baruch Spinoza and Moses Mendelsohn, Benjamin Disraeli and Léon Blum, Karl Marx and Leon Trotsky, the Rothschild family and Adolphe Crémieux, the Baron Hirsch and Theodor Herzl, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein not only demonstrated exceptional distinction and influence in so many different fields, but also represented an extraordinary array of different personal Jewish identities, just as we find in today's Europe.

Looking again at our analytic framework of the *What?*, the *Why?*, and the *How?*, what do we find? Based on our whole European sample, the *What?* – the definition of the meaning of Judaism – attracted the following higher

response among those who gave multiple answers: Parentage (68%) followed by Culture (64%), with Religion (35%) first among those who gave one single answer. Regarding the *Why?* – the essential aspects of Jewish identity – Remembering the Holocaust came first (78%), followed by Combating antisemitism (73%). And regarding the *How?* – the preferred mode of personal Jewishness – Just Jewish (38%) was followed by Traditional (24%). These results outline the profile of a group for the vast majority of whom Jewish identity is deeply rooted in memory, comprises a diffused respect for religion, and at the same time is solidly built on a modern and secularised approach to daily life. Being a Jew in Europe is, first of all, being proud of being associated with a particular spiritual patrimony and being an integral part of their local environment. A significant and visible minority of European Jews chooses to put greater emphasis on the role of Judaism in their personal life and social relations, while another minority reveals a very weak connection with their Jewish background and sometimes appears to be on their way out of the collective.

If we can imagine a competition between the religious option and the ethno-national option of being a Jew, the data we have presented indicate a higher resilience of religion, even if this is currently not the option preferred by a majority of the Jewish community. Expressing one's own Jewish identity through observance of Jewish rituals appears to be on the increase among the younger age cohorts, but it also seems that engagement in Jewish life through secular means is increasingly unlikely as we work down the age bands. More than signs of growth or decay, these are signs of transformation. In this respect, one may recall the metaphor of the 'boiling pot of soup' theory – i.e. as soup boils, it evaporates, leaving a thicker and richer soup at the bottom of the pot. It might well be that, similarly, some younger people are 'evaporating' (assimilating or losing connection – and hence, they are less likely than older people to be in the sample), but those who are left behind have richer Jewish identities. But that does not detract from the fact that the soup is still boiling away.

This seems to be the main thrust of this study of European Jewry in relation to its potential future on the continent. But Jews do not live in a vacuum. The crucial burden of what lies in the future stands on Europe's geopolitical shoulders, and on those of the individual countries in which Jews live. In a situation of stability characterised by a tolerance for difference and a respect for pluralism, Jews in Europe – despite all their internal diversities –

will continue their existence as loyal citizens who contribute their bit to a better life on the continent, as they have done consistently throughout the past two thousand years. The alternative scenario would be highly disruptive and, without needing to mention periodic negative occurrences in the past, would lead to a decline in the two thousand year-long presence of Jews in Europe.<sup>40</sup>

40 On the occasion of its Fifth Working Group Meeting on combating antisemitism, the European Commission announced that by the end of 2021, it will adopt its first ever *Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life in the EU*. With the forthcoming EU strategy, the Commission will aim to: i) prevent and combat all forms of contemporary antisemitism; ii) protect and foster Jewish life; and iii) ensure remembrance of the victims of the Shoah, as well as education about antisemitism, Jewish life and the Holocaust as a defining moment of post-Second World War Europe and the founding of the European Union. Its plans can be found here.

## / Appendices

### Appendix A

The 2018 FRA survey of the perceptions of antisemitism among Jews obtained valid answers from 16,395 respondents in twelve countries in the EU. The total core Jewish population of those countries was estimated at 1,041,200, so that the ratio of respondents to population was 1.6%, or one for every 62–63 European Jews. If the Jewish population definition

is expanded to include all those with at least one Jewish parent – whether or not currently Jewish – the population estimate was 1,280,500 and the ratio of respondents to population was 1.3%, or one for every 77. Countries where the sample/population ratio was particularly high included Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. The lowest ratio was in France.

**Table A1. Sample size in the 2018 FRA survey of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism in twelve countries of the European Union**

Country	Sample size	Core Jewish population (CJP)	Population with Jewish parents (PJP)	% ratio sample/population	
				CJP	PJP
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>16,395</b>	<b>1,041,200</b>	<b>1,280,500</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.3</b>
Austria	526	10,000	14,000	5.3	3.8
Belgium	785	29,100	35,000	2.7	2.2
Denmark	592	6,400	7,500	9.1	7.9
France	3,869	450,000	550,000	0.9	0.7
Germany	1,233	118,000	150,000	1.0	0.8
Hungary	590	47,300	75,000	1.2	0.8
Italy	682	27,400	34,000	2.5	2.0
Netherlands	1,202	29,800	43,000	4.0	2.8
Poland	422	4,500	7,000	9.4	6.0
Spain	570	11,700	15,000	4.9	3.8
Sweden	1,193	15,000	20,000	8.0	6.0
United Kingdom	4,731	292,000	330,000	1.6	1.4

Note: Not including data collected in Latvia. Source: FRA 2018 survey. Jewish population estimates: DellaPergola, S. 2019. World Jewish Population 2019. *American Jewish Year Book 2019*, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin, 263–353. Cham: Springer.



**Table A2. Main characteristics of respondents, 2018 (%)**

	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Netherlands	Poland	Spain	Sweden	UK
<b>Gender</b>												
Male	50	48	49	48	47	46	48	50	53	48	48	48
Female	50	52	51	52	53	54	52	50	47	52	52	52
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Age</b>												
16–39 years	41	44	34	34	32	35	29	34	44	33	34	35
40–59 years	32	27	31	32	26	24	30	34	37	31	31	30
60 plus	27	29	36	35	42	41	41	32	19	36	35	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Education</b>												
Higher education	71	59	75	78	78	83	62	71	79	73	78	68
No higher education	29	41	25	22	22	17	38	29	21	27	22	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Country of birth</b>												
Born in country	60	65	55	76	48	98	86	81	91	41	68	79
Born abroad	40	35	45	24	52	2	14	19	9	59	32	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

## Appendix B

### Triangulations

We have discussed the configuration of each of the three principal fields of Jewish identification outlined in this analysis – the *What?* – or the definitional field of one’s own Jewishness; the *Why?* – or one’s feeling about the substantive components of one’s own Jewishness; and the *How?* – or the visible modes of expression of one’s own Jewishness. To scrutinise the intersections between these three fields more closely, we now pitch them against each other. We look first at the detailed relationships, in order to be able to help distil some broader conclusions. Readers who may find the treatment in this chapter somewhat too dense will find its main substance directly in the conclusions of the report. What we do here is deal with six intriguing questions everybody asks all the


time, but which have never before been answered in typical social research.

*1. Do Jews with different intensities of personal religiosity understand Judaism in the same or in different ways?*

Let us first consider the relationship between the various *definitions of Judaism* (the *What* is my Jewishness?) and the different *modes of expression of one’s own Jewishness* (the *How* am I Jewish?) (Figure B1 and Table B1). Expressed more simply, do people belonging to different Jewish religious streams/denominations (described on the bottom axis of Figure B1) understand the basis of their own Jewishness (as measured on



**Figure B1. Definition of Judaism (multiple answers allowed), by mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (%)**



the vertical axis) differently from one another? The data are presented first for all definitions together and then separately for each of three major groups of definitions that can be plausibly derived from the data: *Religion*, *Peoplehood*, and *Memory-Culture*.

With few exceptions, the ranking of preference for the various definitions is quite constant across the various modes of expression of personal Jewishness. As expected, defining Judaism as a religion is highly dominant among the Haredi,

**Table B1. Definition of Judaism, by mode of expression of one's own Jewishness, 2018 (%)**

Definition of Judaism	Mode of expression of Jewishness							Total sample
	Haredi	Orthodox	Traditional	Reform/Progressive	Just Jewish	None of these	Mixed: both Jewish and another religion	
Religion	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>83</b>	66	37	19	22	58
Parentage	66	63	70	67	<b>70</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>68</b>
Culture	47	55	74	<b>73</b>	64	44	47	64
Heritage	49	55	65	65	58	46	41	59
Upbringing	58	55	66	53	44	25	19	50
Ethnicity	39	41	42	43	42	30	34	41
Other	3	4	3	7	6	14	15	6

Note: highest value in each column in **bold**.

Orthodox, and Traditional types, but is not excluded from the less religiously observant modes. Definitions of Judaism as culture, parentage and heritage are more popular among the less religiously observant modes. The latter, however, do not shun religion as an overarching defining concept of Judaism. Thus, in terms of self-definition, the difference between the more and the less religiously observant modes concerns emphasis rather than actual preference. Jewish culture is the definition with the highest rating among the Reform/Progressive. Parentage (and, at a lower level, ethnicity) is remarkably stable across all types of modes of expression of Jewishness. Parentage is also the most frequent among the more marginal Jewish types (Just Jewish, None, and Mixed). Very few among these groups indicate Jewish religion as a relevant definitional domain. The upbringing definition, too, is conspicuously low among them. Ethnicity is the least popular definition among all modes with the exception of the Nones and Mixed. Some of the Nones and Mixed choose a definition other than the main ones specified beforehand, meaning they find it difficult to recognise themselves within the main definitional criteria of what Judaism is.

## 2. Do Jews with different intensities of personal religiosity feel the same or different emotions toward the main aspects of Jewish identity?

We now turn to the relationship between the *essential aspects of Jewish identity* (the *Why am I Jewish?*) and the *modes of expression of one's own Jewishness* (the *How am I Jewish?*) (Figure B2 and Table B2). Do people belonging to different Jewish religious streams/denominations feel differently about different main aspects of Jewish identity? Here too, all main aspects are first represented together and then split into the three main groupings: *Religion*, *Peoplehood* and *Memory-Culture*. The Haredi and Orthodox, as a rule, attach great importance to all main aspects. They have the highest proportions attributing great importance to ritual, social and Israel-related content (believing in God – nearly 100%; feeling part of the Jewish People and celebrating Jewish festivals with the family – around 90%; donating to charity – 70–80%; and supporting Israel – over 50% of the Haredim and about 70% of the Orthodox). It is particularly noteworthy that the Haredi mode, as well as the Orthodox one with slightly lower frequencies,

**Figure B2. Main aspects of personal Jewish identity (multiple answers allowed), by mode of expression of personal Jewishness, 2018 (% 'very important')**



do not only stress the more religious aspects of Jewish identity, but also the broader feeling of Jewish peoplehood. With respect to the main aspects centred on memorialisation, antisemitism

and Jewish culture, the proportion of the Haredi and Orthodox groups considering these to be 'very important' is not significantly different from the less religiously observant groups. The less

**Table B2. Main aspects of personal Jewish identity, by mode of expression of one's own Jewishness, 2018 (% 'very important')**

Main aspects of Jewish identity	Mode of expression of Jewishness							Total sample
	Haredi	Orthodox	Traditional	Reform/Progressive	Just Jewish	None of these	Mixed: both Jewish and another religion	
Remembering the Holocaust	75	74	<b>84</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>78</b>
Combating antisemitism	65	69	79	74	72	61	74	73
Feeling part of the Jewish people	90	<b>87</b>	83	68	56	29	39	66
Sharing Jewish festivals with family	91	86	78	53	33	16	17	52
Supporting Israel	52	68	69	47	43	26	40	51
Jewish culture	34	38	46	50	40	29	38	42
Believing in God	<b>98</b>	78	43	25	16	16	33	33
Donating to charity	80	61	40	28	20	14	19	32
Average score	73	70	65	53	45	32	42	53

Note: highest value in each column in **bold**.

observant modes are different: they are low, and certainly much lower than the Haredi and Orthodox on religion and peoplehood, but as high as the Haredi and Orthodox on the memory-culture type.


Thus, greater personal religious observance goes with a stronger emphasis on several different aspects of Jewish identity, not only on the religious ones. While the less observant take a strong interest in memorialisation, combating antisemitism and Jewish culture, the more observant are strong both on all of those, and also on many other aspects related to faith, ritual, charity, family and Israel. Remembering the Holocaust, combating antisemitism and supporting Israel are highest among those in the Traditional mode. Those in the Reform/Progressive mode stress Jewish culture more than others. In all instances, the weakest perceptions of the importance of specific Jewish identity aspects appear among those of the None mode. Interestingly, persons who define themselves as Nones generally display a lower salience of Jewish identity aspects than those who define themselves as Mixed, i.e. partly Jewish.

The bottom line of Table B2 provides an average of the scores of the previous rows, and (reading from left to right) clearly confirms the expected ranking of types – here in terms of their higher or lower frequency of very important contents essential to own Jewish identity.

### 3. Does the preferred definition of Judaism affect the mode of personal expression of Jewishness?

The answer is absolutely not, with a few exceptions. Figure B3 and Table B3 show the distribution of *modes of expression of one's Jewishness* (the *How am I Jewish?*) within each *definition of Judaism* (the *What is my Jewishness?*). This is the symmetric reading of Figure B1 and Table B1. The data are presented for all modes together, followed by a split between three major groups: more religiously *Observant* (Haredi and Orthodox), *Modern* (Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish), and *Marginal* (None and Mixed). The Traditional mode is shown in both the Observant and Modern boxes to reflect the fact that it commonly straddles both.

**Figure B3. Mode of expression of personal Jewishness, by definition of Judaism (multiple answers allowed), 2018 (%)**



The amount of variation of modes of expression across the different definitions of Judaism is relatively minor, which means that each type of definition of Judaism attracts in its domain quite a heterogeneous constituency from the point of

view of the manifested level of Jewish religiosity. It is true that, as expected, the Haredi and Orthodox are somewhat more prone to interpret Judaism as a religion. Those who define their Judaism through the prism of Religion include a relatively

**Table B3. Mode of expression of one's own Jewishness, by definition of Judaism, 2018 (%)**

Mode of expression	Definition of Judaism							Total sample
	Religion	Parentage	Culture	Heritage	Upbringing	Ethnicity	Other	
% choosing mode of expression within each chosen definition								
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Haredi	8	4	3	4	5	4	2	5
Orthodox	13	8	7	8	9	8	5	8
Traditional	<b>34</b>	25	27	26	32	24	13	24
Reform/ Progressive	17	15	17	16	16	15	17	15
Just Jewish	24	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>
None of these	2	6	4	5	3	4	14	6
Mixed: both Jewish and another religion	2	4	4	3	2	4	13	5

Note: highest value in each column in **bold**.


higher proportion of religiously observant people: about 20% are comprised in the range between Haredi and Orthodox. However, because of the relatively small share of the more religiously observant among the total Jewish population, those who see Judaism as a religion tend to be predominantly Jews who are moderately religiously observant, or not observant at all. Variation across the other definitional options is quite minor, with Just Jewish showing up as the dominant mode in all cases. Among those who chose the weakest 'Other' option to define their Judaism, 27% pertain to the None or Mixed modes, thus confirming their marginality versus the Jewish conceptual mainstream.

#### 4. Do belief in God and observance of Jewish law necessarily capture the same thing?

Yes, to some extent, but not completely. Figure B4 and Table B4 show the distribution of *modes of expression of one's Jewishness* (*How am I Jewish?*) for each of *the main aspects designated as very important* (*Why am I Jewish?*). This is the symmetric reading of Figure B2. Again, the modes of expression are presented altogether and then separately for each of the

three major groups: *Observant*, *Modern* and *Marginal*. Not unexpectedly, we find that the Haredi and Orthodox modes are relatively more present among those who think believing in God is very important for their Jewish identity. Persons in the Traditional mode are more visible among those who attribute importance to celebrating Jewish festivals with the family, while the Reform/ Progressive are relatively more visible among those interested in Jewish culture. The Just Jewish, None and Mixed are more visible in remembering the Holocaust, combating antisemitism and Jewish culture. The somewhat higher visibility of the Mixed among those believing in God makes one wonder from what ideological angle they do that: do we perhaps observe a residual of another, non-Jewish (maybe Christian) religious attachment? Here it is important to note that the shares of the various modes of expression of Jewishness in stressing a particular aspect of Jewish identity are fairly stable. To demonstrate this, it is true that proportionally more of the Haredi and Orthodox believe in God, but among all believers in God, those who are Traditional are more numerous than those who are Orthodox, and those who are Just Jewish are more numerous than those who are Haredi.

**Figure B4. Mode of expression of one's own Jewishness, by main aspects very important to personal Jewish identity (multiple answers allowed), 2018 (%)**



**Table B4. Mode of expression of one's own Jewishness, by main aspects very important to personal Jewish identity, 2018 (%)**

Mode of expression	Main aspects of Jewish identity								
% choosing mode of expression within each Jewish identity contents	Remembering the Holocaust	Combating antisemitism	Feeling part of the Jewish People	Sharing Jewish festivals with family	Supporting Israel	Jewish culture	Believing in God	Donating to charity	Total sample
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Haredi	4	4	6	8	5	4	13	11	5
Orthodox	8	8	11	13	11	7	19	16	8
Traditional	26	26	30	36	32	26	31	30	24
Reform/Progressive	15	15	15	15	14	18	11	13	15
Just Jewish	37	37	32	24	32	36	18	24	38
None of these	5	5	3	2	3	4	3	3	6
Mixed: both Jewish and another religion	5	5	3	2	4	5	5	3	5

Note: highest value in each column in **bold**.

5. Do Jews who define Judaism differently have different sensitivities vis-à-vis the main aspects of Jewish identity?


Overall, the answer is strikingly negative. Figure B5 and Table B5 present the relationship between the definitional field (*What is my Jewishness?*) and the main aspects of Jewish identity (*Why am I Jewish?*). The percentages indicate what proportion designate a *given Jewish aspect* as *very important* in their Jewish identity among those who have chosen each of the *given definitions of Judaism*. To make reading the data easier, all the Jewish identity aspects are initially represented together, and then appear separately in the three sub-groups, respectively stressing *Religion*, *Peoplehood* and *Memory-Culture*. The differences in the frequencies of perceptions of what Jewishness essentially means to respondents are remarkably small across the different definitions of Judaism. People with different concepts of Judaism feel the significance of main Jewish identity aspects in similar ways. Or, in other words, the ranking of the various Jewish identity main aspects

(running, in order: remembering the Holocaust; combating antisemitism; Jewish peoplehood; Jewish festivals; supporting Israel; Jewish culture; believing in God and donating to charity) is nearly the same among people who prefer different definitions of what Judaism means to them. Overall, the percentages are slightly higher among those who define Judaism primarily as a Religion, and this is mostly felt in the higher salience of celebrating Jewish festivals with the family, believing in God and donating to charity, but also feeling part of the Jewish people and supporting Israel. The highest salience of combating antisemitism along with interest in Jewish culture naturally appear among those choosing the definitional domain of Judaism as culture. Remembering the Holocaust is slightly higher among people mentioning upbringing as the main Jewish definitional domain.

Remarkably, the correspondence between the definition of Judaism and the main aspects of Jewish identity is not always complete or consistent. For example, of those who affirm that Judaism is a religion, only about 50% think it is



**Figure B5. Main aspects of personal Jewish identity (multiple answers allowed), by definition of Judaism (multiple answers allowed), 2018 % 'very important'**



**Table B5. Main aspects of personal Jewish identity, by definition of Judaism, 2018 (% 'very important')**

Main aspects of Jewish identity	Definition of Judaism						Total sample
	Religion	Parentage	Culture	Heritage	Upbringing	Ethnicity	
Remembering the Holocaust	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>78</b>
Combating antisemitism	74	73	75	74	74	72	73
Feeling part of the Jewish people	78	67	70	68	72	70	66
Sharing Jewish festivals with family	71	52	56	56	63	53	52
Supporting Israel	60	51	53	52	55	53	51
Jewish culture	44	41	48	45	45	43	42
Believing in God	49	31	30	30	35	31	33
Donating to charity	42	31	32	32	35	32	32
Average score	62	53	55	55	57	54	53

Note: highest value in each column in **bold**.

very important to believe in God as part of their Jewish identity. On the other hand, of those who think believing in God is a very important component of their Jewish identity, about 85% define Judaism as a religion (see Figure B6).


The bottom line of Table B5 provides an average score of the previous rows. Those designating Religion as a defining domain somewhat more often than others designate the selected Jewish contents as very important to their own Jewish identity.

#### 6. Do Jews who rate certain main aspects of Jewish identity highly define Judaism differently?

Again, the answer is mostly negative. In Figure B6 and Table B6 the relationship already seen in Figure B5 and Table B5 is examined the other way around, i.e. the percentages indicate how many designate a given main aspect of Jewish identity as very important in their Jewish identity (the *Why* am I Jewish?) among those who have chosen a given definition of Judaism (the *What*

is my Jewishness?). All definitions of Judaism are first represented together and then split for better visibility into the three sub-groups of *Religion*, *Peoplehood* and *Memory-Culture*. The differences across definitions are relatively small, i.e. people with different concepts of what Judaism essentially is feel the significance of its main aspects with similar frequencies. Or, in other words, the ranking of different Jewish identity aspects is quite similar among people who define Judaism differently. Religion is clearly the preferred definition among those who particularly stress celebrating Jewish festivals with the family, believing in God and donating to charity. Religion is also fairly highly placed with regard to feeling part of the Jewish people and supporting Israel. In turn, parentage is consistently a frequent choice, though somewhat less among those who stress believing in God. Ethnicity follows a similar pattern but at much lower frequencies. Remembering the Holocaust is higher among people mentioning Parentage and Culture as the main Jewish definitional domains. The highest interest for Jewish culture (quite obviously) appears among those choosing the definition of Judaism as culture.

**Figure B6. Definition of Judaism (multiple answers allowed), by main aspects very important to personal Jewish identity (multiple answers allowed), 2018 (%)**



Appendix C

In this Appendix, the weighted data used throughout this report are compared with unweighted data. The variables used for weighting, obtained from independent sources, were sex, age and community affiliation. Compositional weights refer to adjusting the original data to the Jewish population

characteristics known from independent sources. Country weights refer to adjusting the data according to Jewish population size known from other sources (see Appendix A). It is remarkable how small the influence of data weighting is on the total distributions, both with compositional weights and with country size weights.

Figure C1. Definitions of Judaism (% unweighted vs. weighted; multiple answers allowed)








Figure C2. Main aspects of Jewish identity (% 'very important' unweighted vs. weighted)



**Figure C3. Modes of expression of Jewishness (% unweighted vs. weighted)****Figure C4. Frequency of observance of selected Jewish religious rituals (% unweighted vs. weighted)**

**Figure C5. Frequency of attachment to selected geographical frameworks (% unweighted vs. weighted)**



## JPR European Jewish Demography Unit

Chair: Prof. Sergio DellaPergola

Director: Dr. Daniel Staetsky

### Reports

1. L.D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, *Why European Jewish Demography? A foundation paper*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, July 2019, 29 pp.
2. L.D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, *Jews in Austria: Demographic and Identificational Portrait*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, April 2020, 61 pp.
3. L.D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, *Juden und Jüdinnen in Österreich: Ein demografisches und soziales Porträt*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, April 2020, 68 pp.
4. S. DellaPergola and L.D. Staetsky, *Jews in Europe at the Turn of the Millennium: Population Trends and Estimates*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, October 2020, 84 pp.
5. L.D. Staetsky and A. Paltiel, *COVID-19 mortality and the Jews: a global overview of the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic, March to May 2020*, with a Preface by S. DellaPergola. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research JPR, European Jewish Demography Unit, December 2020, 36 pp.
6. S. DellaPergola and L.D. Staetsky, *The Jewish Identities of European Jews: What, Why, and How*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, December 2021, 108 pp.
7. L.D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, *Jews in Belgium: Demographic and Identificational Portrait*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, European Jewish Demography Unit, forthcoming.

### Other recent JPR publications on Jewish Europe

- K. Kahn-Harris, *Social research on European Jewish populations: The state of the field*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, December 2020, 54 pp. See also [www.jpr.org.uk/archive](http://www.jpr.org.uk/archive)
- J. Boyd, *Young Jewish Europeans: perceptions and experiences of antisemitism*, with a preface by European Commissioner for Justice Věra Jourová, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Brussels: European Commission, July 2019, 38 pp.
- D. Graham, *European Jewish identity: mosaic or monolith?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, April 2018, 49 pp.
- L. D. Staetsky, *Are Jews leaving Europe?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, January 2017, 26 pp.
- L. Dencik and K. Marosi, *Different antisemitisms: perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Sweden and across Europe*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, March 2017, 32 pp.
- S. DellaPergola and L.D. Staetsky, *From old and new directions: Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Italy*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, February 2015, 56 pp.

## **Institute for Jewish Policy Research**

© Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, now known or hereinafter invented, including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing of the publisher.

## **Published by Institute for Jewish Policy Research**

6 Greenland Place, London NW1 0AP

**tel** +44 (0)20 7424 9265

**email** [jpr@jpr.org.uk](mailto:jpr@jpr.org.uk)

**website** [www.jpr.org.uk](http://www.jpr.org.uk)