Immigration from the United Kingdom to Israel

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The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based independent research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in Britain and across Europe by conducting research and developing policy in partnership with those best placed to influence Jewish life.

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Introduction

**Immigration to Israel: the phenomenon and its meaning**

Immigration to Israel, by Jews and people of Jewish ancestry (known in Hebrew as *aliyah* – literally, ‘ascending’), has played a key role in the formation of Israel’s population, economy, culture and society. In the context of Zionist thought, the act of ‘making *aliyah*’ is seen as an expression of a desire, individual and collective, to put an end to the forced dispersion of Jews from the land of Israel in ancient times. However, in reality, like other migration movements, *aliyah* is motivated by a complex set of factors. Some of these are ideological or spiritual in nature, but others have to do with the various socio-economic and political contexts in the countries that have housed the Jewish diaspora. One of the ways to conceptualise and understand *aliyah* is to present it as a net outcome of several key ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

‘Push’ factors are forces that encourage migration from the Jewish diaspora. Two of the chief ‘push’ factors that have influenced *aliyah* are socio-economic conditions in the source countries, such as the state of the economy and its political situation, and the existence and intensity of anti-Jewish sentiment in these countries, often linked to the vagaries of economic and political life. Past waves of immigration to Israel were significantly driven by the development of socio-economic crises (especially in the case of immigration from the Soviet Union) and the political and social intensification of anti-Jewish attitudes and behaviours (notably in the case of the immigration of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa).

‘Pull’ factors include aspects of Israel that make it an attractive immigration option – for example, the fact that Israel positions itself politically as an immigration country for Jews and people of Jewish ancestry, that it offers an immigrant absorption programme and access to citizenship, and the frequent existence of family and friendship ties in Israel. Zionism itself is probably a special case of a pull factor, insofar as it drives immigrants towards Israel, and it has certainly been the focus of a range of social and educational efforts in the diaspora over many years.

In essence, different ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors have played different roles in the course of the history of immigration to Israel, and they have played different roles in different Jewish diaspora communities. For example, *aliyah* from Western Europe and North America, both centres of relative economic prosperity and political stability in the second half of the twentieth century, has typically been perceived by researchers and the Israeli public alike as more ideologically or spiritually driven than *aliyah* from the countries of Eastern Europe. A recent survey of motivations for *aliyah* among immigrants to Israel from North America, France and Argentina showed that while ‘pull’ factors, such as a religious connection to Israel, were mentioned as the principal factor behind their decision to immigrate by over 90 per cent of immigrants from North America and France, only 41 per cent of immigrants from Argentina mentioned these factors as primary; the remaining 59 per cent identified ‘push’ factors, such as a lack of personal and economic security, as the principal factor (Amit 2012).

While some researchers of *aliyah*, both inside and outside Israel, have tended to emphasise the uniqueness of immigration to Israel, others have drawn parallels with other migration movements. Amongst the latter, immigration to Israel has often been conceptualised as a ‘diaspora migration’, i.e. a return to the ethnic and spiritual centre of a widely scattered ethnic group that shares a collective memory of that centre and the process of dispersal, as well as a sense of a common fate and a desire to preserve its cultural heritage (Shuval and Leshem 1998). Comparisons commonly drawn include the repatriation of the ethnic German and Greek diasporas. In all three cases, the desire for a return to roots is seen as a motivating factor for migrants, and the receiving countries (i.e. Israel, Germany and Greece) set up legal provisions and policies to allow those with some sort of familial connection or ancestry to immigrate. Thus, neither the ethos of *aliyah* nor its related administrative frameworks are strictly unique. However, compared to other examples of repatriation, *aliyah* is quite unusual in the extent of the impact it has exercised on the size and structure of the Israeli population.
The role of immigration in shaping the dynamics of Israel’s population is evident from an examination of the basic indicators of Israel’s population growth. On 15 May 1948, the first day of the State of Israel’s establishment, the Jewish population of Israel amounted to 650,000 people. By the end of 2011, it had reached 5,908,000, i.e. eight times the initial figure. Migration was responsible for 42 per cent of the total growth in this population. Throughout the period between 1948 and 2011, the Jewish population grew at an average rate of 3.5 per cent per annum, as a combined result of natural increase (with a positive balance of births and deaths) and migration. At the same time, the Muslim population of Israel grew at an average rate of 4.2 per cent per annum, almost exclusively as a result of natural increase; the Druze population grew at a rate of 3.5 per cent per annum, exclusively as a result of natural increase; and the Christian population grew at a rate of 2.3 per cent per annum, as a result of both natural increase and migration (Statistical Abstract of Israel 63, 2012).

It is easy to see that in the absence of immigration, (i) the size of the Jewish population of Israel would have been smaller that it currently is; and (ii) the numerical relationship between the Jewish and Muslim populations in Israel would have been dramatically different from the one currently observed. Indeed, a leading Israeli demographer concluded that, without any Jewish immigration between 1947 and 1972, the Jewish population of Israel in 1972 would have been just 902,000, rather than the 2,694,000 it was in reality (Friedlander 1975). On this basis, the proportion of Jews in the total population of Israel in 1972 would have been about 72 per cent, instead of the 89 per cent it was in reality. This analysis has never been updated to the most recent times, but one can be certain that without immigration, Jews would have possessed a much less confident majority in Israel by the end of the twentieth century than they did in reality.

Such a volume of immigration has understandably had a lasting impact on the composition of the Israeli population. For a long time, the Israeli Jewish population contained a very high proportion of people who were foreign-born, even when compared to other major migration-receiving countries. The proportion of the foreign-born population in Israel in the mid-1990s was around 37 per cent, although it has declined since then towards a relatively low level from an historical perspective: by 2011, 27 per cent of Jews were foreign-born. By way of comparison, the proportion of foreign-born in the population of Canada was just below 20 per cent in 2006 (Statistics Canada 2008), and in the United States it was around 13 per cent in 2010 (US Census Bureau 2012). Australia, however, showed the same proportion as Israel in mid-2010 – about 27 per cent – although unlike Israel where it was a historical low, the Australian figure constituted an unprecedentedly high level in the history of that country (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012).

Aims and objectives of this report
All of this provides the necessary context for an examination of the specific case of British Jewish immigration to Israel. This report does not delve into the causes and determinants of immigration of British Jews to Israel; at this stage, there is insufficient empirical evidence to support any strong statements to this effect. Instead, it aims at a thorough description of the phenomenon of immigration from the United Kingdom to Israel: its volume and characteristics, as well as its impact, both on the Israeli population and on the British Jewish population.

More specifically, it aims to:
1 present trends, levels and basic socio-demographic characteristics of British immigration to Israel;
2 compare British immigrants to Israel with other immigrant groups, both from English speaking countries and non-English speaking countries;
3 compare British immigrants to Israel with the British Jewish population in the UK;
4 assess the potential impact of immigration to Israel on the prospects of numerical change in the British Jewish population.

To tackle the first three objectives, we use data on immigration to Israel routinely collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel (CBS-Israel). In Israel, in contrast to many countries of the world, immigration (aliyah) is an official status, which is given to people who declare their intention to

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1 Among the elderly, the foreign-born still constitute a majority: the foreign-born population currently amounts to over 65 per cent among Jews aged sixty years and over (Statistical Abstract of Israel 63, 2012).
become immigrants (‘olim’) on entry to Israel, or after a certain period of stay there. To deal with the fourth objective, we use numerous data sources, including data collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the various statistical authorities of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

**How many?**

From 15 May 1948 to the end of 2011, Israel received 32,594 immigrants who indicated the United Kingdom as their country of birth. British immigrants constituted 1 per cent of the total immigration to Israel between 1948 and the end of 2011. The peak of British immigration to Israel was in the 1960s-1980s, with 6,000-7,000 immigrants arriving in each decade. About one-third of all British immigrants came to Israel over the past twenty years or so (i.e. since 1990), and 14 per cent came since 2000. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of British immigrants to Israel by decade of arrival.

The population census conducted in Israel in 2008 found 21,050 people born in the United Kingdom. This group constituted 1 per cent of the total foreign-born population in Israel. This number is different from the total number of UK-born immigrants who have arrived in Israel since 1948 (32,594) in that it is the net outcome of three factors: immigration from the UK to Israel, return migration of some immigrants and mortality of immigrants in Israel.

Among immigrants to Israel from English-speaking countries, the number of immigrants from the UK is second highest. Since the establishment of the State of Israel to the end of 2011, immigrants born in the US constituted 3 per cent of total immigration (96,754 in number). Over the same period, immigrants from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa combined constituted about 1 per cent of all immigrants to Israel (35,221 in number); in comparison, France ‘gave’ Israel 51,933 immigrants, 1.7 per cent of all immigrants to Israel.

Figure 2 shows the annual numbers of immigrants from the UK to Israel from 1948, with the total number of immigrants to Israel from all source countries in the background. In this figure, two types of immigrants from the UK are shown: UK-born immigrants, and those for whom the UK was the last country of residence (who may or may not have been born in the UK). CBS-Israel routinely publishes immigrants’ country of birth and country of residence, a practice which allows the exploration of the migration patterns of Jews. Because the UK Jewish community in the second half of the twentieth century is predominantly locally born, the two types of data are very similar.

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The late 1960s to the mid-1980s were times with the largest annual number of immigrants from the UK, when an average of 1,000 immigrants arrived each year. The annual number of immigrants then declined to a low of 300 per year in 2002, a level last seen in the mid-1960s. Since 2004, it has increased to an average of about 500 immigrants per year, last seen in the mid-1980s. It is interesting to note that the two peaks of immigration from the UK to Israel (1960s-1980s and the late 2000s) occurred at times when overall immigration to Israel was at its lowest levels.

The rate of immigration per 1,000 persons in the Jewish population of selected countries is shown in Figure 3, for the UK, other English-speaking countries and France, for the 2000s. Assuming that the UK Jewish population remained stable at around 290,000 persons
during the 1990s and 2000s,\(^3\) the annual rate of immigration from the UK to Israel was in the range of 1-2 per 1,000 people in the Jewish population of the UK. The rate of immigration to Israel from the UK was lower than in France, where about 4 people per 1,000 Jewish people per year moved to Israel, and slightly lower than in South Africa. The UK rate of immigration to Israel was the second highest among English-speaking countries.

\(^3\) This is a reasonable assumption, as can be concluded from the existing estimates of the population size of British Jews, collated by Graham (2011).
The demographic profile of the immigrants

Age and sex composition

British immigration to Israel is relatively young. In the 2000s, the median age of British immigrants to Israel was in the range of twenty-five to twenty-eight years, similar to the median age of American and French immigrants to Israel during the same period, and, in most years, four or five years younger than the median age of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union.

As the figure below shows, the most significant age group among British immigrants to Israel is young adults: immigrants aged twenty to thirty-four years constitute about 40 per cent of all immigrants and are responsible for the visible peak in the centre of the age distribution shown in Figure 4. These people may come to Israel single or as part of a young family. Indeed, children under ten years-old constitute 20 per cent of all British migrants. People aged between fifty-five and sixty-nine years constitute 10 per cent of British immigrants; this much smaller peak is likely to represent migration among the retired and/or widowed.

In that respect, it is worth noting that a majority (55–60 per cent) of all British migrants aged fifteen years and over are married, a slightly higher proportion than among American and French immigrants, where married immigrants constitute 50–53 per cent of the total (Immigration to Israel, 2007-2010, Publication No. 1483, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012).

More women than men make aliya. Overall, among British immigrants, females formed the majority during the 2000s: there were 109 females per 100 males, a relationship similar to that observed among American immigrants to Israel. This gender composition of British immigrants is more balanced than among French and Russian immigrants, where there are 118 females per 100 males.

In short, British Jewish immigration to Israel constitutes a case of ‘family migration’ which is different from ‘labour migration’. Labour migration is characterised by a particular age structure – young adults, and an absence of children and the elderly – with a very dominant position of a particular sex (depending on the nature of migration, it can be males or females). In the case of British Jewish immigration to Israel, both sexes are represented in proportions

![Figure 4: Age profile of British immigrants to Israel, 2000s (%)](image)

Note: average for years 2002-2006.

resembling the total British Jewish population in the UK, and both children and the elderly are commonly found.

It is common practice in demographic research to compare selected characteristics of migrants, both to the characteristics of the societies they join (destination countries, in this case Israel) and the characteristics of the societies they leave (source countries or communities, in this case the UK Jewish community). These comparisons allow an evaluation of the impact that migration has, both on the destination country and the source countries: whether, for example, migration makes the populations younger or older, or more or less educated, etc.

Exploring the issues of age and gender, British Jewish immigrants to Israel are younger than Israeli Jews, whose median age in the 2000s was around thirty-one years, and have a higher proportion of females. Among British Jewish immigrants the proportion of females (109 females per 100 males) is higher than among Israeli Jews (104 females per 100 males).

On the other hand, the gender composition of British immigrants to Israel closely resembles the composition of the British Jewish population in the Census (107 females per 100 males, an average of Census 2001 and 2011 figures), but the age profile of immigrants is very different. Immigrants to Israel are significantly younger than the British Jewish population, with its median age of forty-two years, an average of Census 2001 and 2011 figures (Graham et al. 2007, Graham 2013).

In short, immigration to Israel from Britain makes the British Jewish community older, and the Israeli population younger, with an increasing proportion of females. The immigration of females of reproductive age may also mean a loss of reproductive power (e.g. potential children) by the source community – i.e. Britain – and the acquisition of such power by the destination community – i.e. Israel.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{4} Waterman and Kosmin (1986) explicitly suggested this, also mentioning that the fertility of immigrants from Western countries increases after immigration to Israel. In our view, this assessment may or may not be correct. At a population level, childbearing is linked to marriage and partner availability for this purpose. Part of the immigration dynamics may involve establishing partnerships that may not have been feasible before immigration. Thus, children born in Israel may not have been born if their mothers had remained in the UK. This is also true in relation to partnerships established in the UK when children are born in Israel: if the tendency of immigrants is to increase their childbearing in a more pro-birth Israeli environment, it is possible (although by no means certain) that their fertility would be lower if they remained in Britain. It is because of these multiple uncertainties that we prefer not to relate to the potential population losses and gains but to real ones – those incurred by the movement of immigrants themselves.
The socio-economic profile of the immigrants

Educational profile

About one third of British immigrants to Israel in the 2000s had sixteen or more years of education, a level equivalent to holding an academic degree (Level 4/5 qualifications). This proportion is higher than among all immigrants to Israel, where it is about one quarter.

It is clear that educational levels differ according to the particular age group, a finding also typically observed in Census and large population surveys: the youngest age group (aged fifteen to twenty-four years in this case) has a relatively small proportion of people with academic degrees simply because this age group is still involved in the educational process. The oldest age groups (aged sixty-five and upwards) represent the generation where participation in higher education was less common than it is for younger generations. As Figure 5 below shows, British immigrants to Israel have a higher educational level than other immigrants to Israel across all age groups, and the gap is especially large for people in prime working ages (aged twenty-five to forty-four years).

Looking at the populations as a whole (see Figure 6), there is no difference between the educational attainment levels of British immigrants to Israel and those of the British Jewish population in general as reported in the 2001 UK Census. However, there are differences between specific age bands: British immigrants to Israel appear to be slightly less educated than the British Jewish population in the younger age groups (aged fifteen to twenty-four, and twenty-five to forty-four years). Indeed, in the higher of these two bands (twenty-five to forty-four years), there is a difference of five percentage points: 45 per cent of British immigrants and 50 per cent of British Jews in the 2001 Census have sixteen or more years of education. This relationship reverses at older ages: among forty-five to sixty-four year-olds, 55 per cent of British immigrants to Israel, but only 33 per cent of British Jews in the 2001 Census, have sixteen or more years of education. The picture suggests a curious selectivity of British Jewish immigration to Israel: of the somewhat less educated among people of prime working age and of the somewhat more educated at older ages. However, both groups are significantly more

Figure 5: Percentage of people with sixteen and more years of education among British immigrants to Israel and all immigrants to Israel, 2000s

Note: average for years 2009-2010. For immigrants from the UK as last country of residence.

educated than Israeli Jews, with 36 per cent having sixteen or more years of education, compared to 19 per cent among the latter.

**Occupational profile**
The majority of British immigrants to Israel (around 70 per cent) held scientific, academic and other professional occupations prior to immigration. About one quarter had worked in managerial and clerical occupations, sales and services in the UK, and a small minority (5 per cent) was occupied in agriculture or industry as skilled or unskilled workers. 10 per cent of British immigrants had worked in medical occupations (physicians, dentists, nurses and paramedics) and 5 per cent had worked as engineers and architects (Figure 7).

The comparison with all immigrants to Israel shows that, in the 2000s, British immigrants were somewhat more skilled than the immigrant population as a whole. The proportion of people with scientific, academic and other professional occupations, as well as the proportion of people with managerial, clerical and related occupations, is higher among British immigrants (85 per cent) than among all immigrants to Israel (73 per cent). The proportion of people with occupations in agriculture and industry as skilled and unskilled workers is lower among British immigrants (5 per cent) than among all immigrants to Israel (17 per cent). In this regard, the occupational profile of British immigrants to Israel in the 2000s resembled the profile of the immigrants from the United States during the same period.5

**Place of residence in Israel**
A significant proportion of British immigrants to Israel in the 2000s (around 45 per cent) settled in the Jerusalem district upon their arrival in Israel, and a similar proportion settled in the Central and Tel Aviv districts combined. About 5 per cent of

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5 The difference in the systems of occupational classification between the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and the UK Census makes it impossible to compare the occupation profiles of British immigrants to Israel with the occupational profiles of British Jews.
British immigrants moved to Judea and Samaria, and even smaller proportions settled in the Northern (3 per cent), Southern (4 per cent) and Haifa districts (4 per cent).6

The distribution of British immigrants across districts, with the dominance of Jerusalem, Central and Tel Aviv districts, is largely similar to the distribution of the immigrants from the United States and France. The most significant difference between British and American immigrants is the proportion of those settling in the district of Judea and Samaria (18 per cent among immigrants from the United States, compared to 5 per cent from Britain). The most significant difference between British and French immigrants is the proportion of those settling in the Jerusalem district (25 per cent among immigrants from France, compared to 44 per cent from Britain) and in the Southern district (about 20 per cent among immigrants from France, compared to just 4 per cent from Britain).

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6 The districts shown are named and classified as recorded in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics population accounting system. Jerusalem district includes the natural regions of the Judean Mountains and Judean foothills. Central district comprises the following sub-districts: Sharon, Petah Tikva, Ramla and Rehovot. Tel Aviv district includes the natural regions of Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan and Holon. Haifa district comprises the sub-districts of Haifa and Hadera. Southern district comprises the sub-districts of Ashkelon and Beer Sheva. Northern district comprises the sub-districts of Zefat, Kinneret, Yizre’el, Akko and Golan. The district of Judea and Samaria is not sub-divided into sub-districts; the twelve localities with populations of 5,000 people or above in this district are Ariel, Alfe Menashe, Bet El, Betar Illit, Efrata, Givat Zeev, Kokhav Yaqov, Maale Adumim, Modiin Illit, Oranit, Qarne Shomeron, and Qiryat Arba. A full list of localities included in this district can be viewed at the CBS-Israel site: www.cbs.gov.il/ishuvim/ishuvim_print.htm
Figure 8: British immigrants to Israel, by first district of residence in Israel, 2000s (%)

Note: average for years 2006-2010, for immigrants from the UK as last country of residence.

Growth prospects of the Jewish population in Britain

Migration is a component of population change. Together with births and deaths, migration shapes the size, structure and composition of populations. Naturally, immigration to Israel reduces the population size of British Jews, but just how influential is it? To answer this question comprehensively, the data on the number of British Jewish immigrants in Israel need to be considered from three complementary angles:

1. how the annual number of immigrants to Israel compares to other components of population change among British Jews, namely births and deaths;
2. the extent of return migration of British Jews from Israel, i.e. how many immigrate to Israel and, after a period of time, return to the UK;
3. how migration to and from other countries adds to or subtracts from the British Jewish population.

Concerning the first of these – how immigration to Israel compares to other components of British Jewish population change – Table 1 below shows the numbers of births and deaths for British Jews from 2001 to 2010, the annual numbers of immigrants to Israel, and the population balance with and without immigration to Israel. We use the term ‘natural balance’ in relation to the balance of births and deaths, without taking immigration into account.

The balance of births and deaths in the Jewish community in the UK was negative from 2001 to 2004, i.e. deaths outnumbered births during this period (see column 4). From 2005 onwards the balance became increasingly positive: the number of births is greater than the number of deaths for all years between 2005 and 2010. It is clear that immigration to Israel contributed substantially to the negative balance between 2001 and 2003, accounting for up to 30 per cent of it. For example, in 2001, the Jewish population in the UK decreased by 740 people as a result of natural balance (more deaths than births), but 308 people also left for Israel, so the total loss constituted 1048 people (see column 6).

Remarkably, during the time of positive natural balance (2005-2010), the annual number of immigrants to Israel was greater than the balance of births and deaths. If natural balance and immigration to Israel were the only components of change in the size of the British Jewish population then the British Jewish population would have declined in size between 2001 and 2011. They are not, of course, both because of migration to and from other parts of the world, and return migration from Israel.

Concerning the second issue highlighted above – British Jews who left for Israel but came back (i.e. ‘return migration’) – Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data demonstrate that, on average, 80 British-born people returned to the UK per annum in the 2000s. Return migration for each year is shown in column 7 of Table 1. Adjustments made on the basis of migration balance, taking into account migrants returning to Britain are shown in column 8.

In sum, as immigration to Israel outweighs return migration, the population balance

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7 Estimates of numbers of births and deaths among Jews in the UK originate from the Board of Deputies of British Jews. These are based on the reports collected from the practitioners of circumcision (with an adjustment made for female births) and from the Jewish burial societies, respectively. Board of Deputies records are affected by a degree of undercount. From the single age distributions of British Jews in the 2001 Census and in the 2011 Census it could be concluded that, in 2001, the true number of births among people self-identifying as Jews was in a range 2,800–3,000. This indicates the presence of approximately 10 per cent undercount of births. Staetsky (2011) proposed that the undercount of deaths in the Board of Deputies records is likely to be in a range of 10-20 per cent. We avoid correcting Board of Deputies records here and maintain that, as undercounts of births and deaths offset each other in their impact on the population, the natural balance figures (the difference between births and deaths) may be more reliable than their separate components.
of British Jews remains negative or nil after adjusting for return migration. If this is the case, a conclusion that points to a numerical decline of the British Jewish population between 2001 and 2010 appears to hold good. However, does it hold true in light of the UK Census estimates of the numbers of Jews in Britain?

The 2001 UK Census found 259,927 Jews by religion in England and Wales, and the 2011 UK Census found 263,346 Jews. Taken at their face value, these numbers indicate a population increase of 1.3 per cent. However, because the question from which these data are derived was voluntary (in contrast to all the other Census questions, which are compulsory), the reality of such an increase is by no means certain. Because Jews could opt out of answering the question on religion, both of these figures certainly constitute an undercount. In particular, between the 2001 and 2011 figures, there may have been a decrease in the undercount of Jews, especially in the strictly Orthodox sector of the British Jewish population. A simple adjustment to take this factor into account for both the 2001 and 2011 counts (Graham, Boyd and Vulkan 2012) indicates that the British Jewish population of England and Wales grew at a slightly lower rate of 0.8 per cent: from 281,642 (adjusted figure for 2001) to 283,773 (adjusted figure for 2011).

Future work by JPR will comprehensively address the scope of the undercount in the 2011 Census. In the meantime, JPR has preferred to relate to the observed change in the population size of British Jews as ‘stable’. Ultimately, however, at this stage the question of the precise nature of the numerical development of British Jewish population between 2001 and 2011 remains open.

However, as the third issue highlighted above indicates, immigration to, and return migration

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Table 1: Selected components of change in the British Jewish population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1)</th>
<th>Births (2)</th>
<th>Deaths (3)</th>
<th>Natural Balance (4)</th>
<th>Migrants to Israel (5)</th>
<th>Balance with migration to Israel (6)</th>
<th>Migrants returning from Israel (7)</th>
<th>Balance with migration to Israel and return migration (8)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>3469</td>
<td>-740</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>-1048</td>
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<td>-849</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2748</td>
<td>3498</td>
<td>-750</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>-1014</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>-837</td>
</tr>
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<td>3424</td>
<td>-776</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>-1106</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-1034</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>3098</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>-385</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-348</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3062</td>
<td>277</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>325</td>
<td>594</td>
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<td>435</td>
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<td>632</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Immigrants from the UK as last country of residence.

*An average of years 2005-2007 imputed for 2008-2010 as the actual data for these years are not yet available.

from Israel are not the only migration flows for British Jews. To some extent at least, other migration flows may compensate for population losses caused by the interplay of births, deaths and immigration patterns of British Jews to Israel. Unfortunately, a full assessment of the role of migration in influencing the British Jewish population is not currently possible.8

However, while information on population flows of British Jews into and out of countries other than Israel is not available, information on population stocks (e.g. the number of people of a particular origin at a point in time) is available for selected countries where their national census asks questions both on country of birth and religion. Table 2 collates the existing figures on population stocks of British-born Jews in Australia and Canada, alongside Israel (Panel A), and population stocks of Jews born in Australia, Canada and Israel in the UK Census (Panel B).

Two principal observations can be gleaned from these figures:

1. Looking at Panel A, the stock of British-born Jews in Israel goes up steadily from period to period: from 2,790 in the 1960s, to 13,352 in the 1980s, and to 21,050 in the 2000s. Such an increase in the size of the population stock is an unambiguous indication that aliyah flows are larger than the flows of returning migration. Thus, Israel clearly receives more British-born Jewish migrants from the UK than it gives back to the UK. A much smaller and substantially less steady rise in the population stocks of British-born Jews is seen in Canada between the 1960s and 2000s. In Australia, a decrease in the number of British-born Jews is observed between the 1960s and 2000s. This indicates that Canada receives more British-born Jewish migrants than it gives back to the UK by means

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8 Estimates of long-term migration generated by the Office for National Statistics rely on the International Passenger Survey (IPS), which does not include a question on religion. Nevertheless, there is a clear and long-standing hypothesis arguing that out-migration of Jews from the UK plays an important role in numerical change in this population (see Waterman and Kosmin, 1986).
of return migration, but the same cannot be said with certainty about Australia.

2 Still looking at Panel A, since the 1980s the number of British-born Jews found in Israel is larger than in Australia and Canada. Hence, when compared to other potential destination countries for British Jewish out-migration, Israel is certainly a leading destination.

3 Looking at the row of data relating to the year 2001 across Panels A and B, one can assess the scope of the Jewish population exchange between the UK on the one hand, and Canada, Australia and Israel, on the other. It is clear that in 2001 the number of British-born Jews found in Australia, Canada and Israel, separately and combined, is larger than the number of Jews born in these countries, separately and combined, found in the UK. This demonstrates that in population exchanges with Australia, Canada and Israel, the British Jewish community is more of a ‘sending’ than a ‘receiving’ community, i.e. migration of Jews from the UK towards these countries contributes to the numerical decline of the British Jewish population in the UK.9

Regrettably, we do not possess data of flows or stocks of British Jews in countries other than those presented in Table 2 which might potentially attract British Jewish migrants. The United States and continental Europe may be especially important in this context. Unfortunately, neither the United States nor major countries of Jewish settlement in Europe ask a religion question in their national censuses.10

Future releases of the 2011 UK Census data on the number of Jews born in Australia, Canada and Israel, as well as in the USA, will allow us to update and refine the observations presented above in due course. Specifically, it will allow us to understand whether population stocks of Australian, Canadian and Israeli-born Jews in the UK have increased, diminished or stayed the same. A comprehensive assessment of the role of migration in the numerical change of the British Jewish population will have to wait until additional information on the stocks of British-born Jews in countries other than those presented here is available.

9 This supports the hypothesis presented by Waterman and Kosmin in the mid-1980s (see Waterman and Kosmin, 1986).

10 The 2001 UK Census found 5,991 Jews born in the USA (Graham, Schmool and Waterman 2007 p. 66), but the latest (and only) figure for British-born Jews in the USA is 19,457 British-born Jews who speak Yiddish in 1970 (Waterman and Kosmin 1986, p. 18).
Summary and conclusions

To summarise the findings presented in this report:

• Since the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 up until the end of 2011, Israel received 32,594 immigrants born in the United Kingdom, 1 per cent of all immigrants to Israel.

• Among the immigrants to Israel from English-speaking countries, the number of immigrants from the United Kingdom is the second highest, after the United States.

• Since the 1990s, every year one to two people per 1,000 people in the British Jewish population immigrated to Israel.

• In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, during the 2000s immigrants appear to be selective in relation to the Jewish population living in the United Kingdom.
  
  a. First, British immigrants to Israel during the 2000s are significantly younger than British Jews living in the UK, with a median age in the range of twenty-five to twenty-eight years, in contrast to a median age of forty-two years among the latter.

  b. Second, among the younger immigrants (under forty-five), the proportion of people with the highest educational qualifications (Level 4/5) is lower than among British Jews living in the UK, and it is higher among the older immigrants.

• Immigration to Israel is a significant contributor to British Jewish population change. During the early 2000s, when the number of deaths in this population was higher than the number of births, immigration to Israel exacerbated the Jewish population decline in the UK. During the late 2000s, when the number of deaths of British Jews in the UK was lower than the number of births, aliyah could have prevented population growth from happening in the UK.

• In the population exchange between the United Kingdom and Israel, Israel is so far ‘winning’: in the 2000s around 19,000 British-born Jews permanently lived in Israel and up to 15,000 Israeli Jews permanently lived in the United Kingdom (see Table 2).

This report presents a detailed statistical picture of immigration to Israel from the United Kingdom. What it does not provide, however, are explanations of the motivations behind aliyah. Aliyah from the United Kingdom proceeded in a wave-like manner with peaks in the 1950s, 1970s, early 1990s and late 2000s. What forces are responsible for these waves? The early 1950s immigration wave can probably be explained by the proximity to the establishment of the State of Israel; committed Zionists were able to act on their convictions for the first time. There was also a post-1967 immigration wave which could be observed in the United Kingdom as well as in other Western countries, which is commonly understood as an expression of patriotic feelings in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

The reasons behind the more recent peaks of aliyah are less clear. There are a number of ‘candidate’ factors for the increase in the number of immigrants during the 2000s. For example, data gathered by the Community Security Trust in the UK indicate increases in antisemitic incidents in this period, and surveys conducted by JPR provide additional evidence for significant levels of worry and apprehension among British Jews in relation to a perceived increase in antisemitism. Findings from the Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project point in the same direction: in Britain the proportion of people expressing unfavourable views of Jews was 7 per cent in 2005 and 9 per cent in 2008 (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008). There are, however, other factors with a potential influence, such as the relative economic situation in the United Kingdom and Israel, as well as the policy of encouraging aliyah through the educational activities of various Zionist organisations. Our current state of knowledge does not allow us to distinguish between the separate influences of these factors.

Migration, in general, is the least predictable component of population change. In contrast to births and deaths, it is not shaped significantly by biological factors, and the motivations behind it are not well understood. Policy-making depends crucially on understanding motivation, but to
achieve this, further research work is required. This might include:

- a short survey of those who register as prospective immigrants with the Jewish Agency, specifically investigating their motivations and reasons at a pre-aliyah stage;
- evaluation studies to understand more about the specific impact of educational programmes which encourage or facilitate aliya (e.g. young people should be asked about their aliya intentions before and after specific activities, such as Israel summer tours and gap year programmes);
- a short survey of those who have immigrated to Israel from Britain and settled there, as well as of those who have done this and subsequently returned, to understand their experiences and motivations.

The commissioning of such studies would greatly enhance the capacity of decision-makers to allocate resources in an informed manner.

How do the data presented here square with the existing empirical data on intentions to make aliya? It is very difficult to match declared intentions to actual behaviour. First, intentions may change over time. Second, acting on intentions is influenced by practical considerations and by circumstances that may not be taken into account when declarations are made. Third, measuring intentions in an attempt to predict behaviour requires careful specification of a timeframe for a particular expected behaviour.

The JPR Israel Survey conducted in January-February 2010 asked British Jewish respondents how likely they were to live in Israel in the future, and 22 per cent of the sample answered that it was a very likely or fairly likely scenario. Interestingly, a similar proportion of British Jews in JPR’s survey of social attitudes, which was conducted in 1995, stated that they were considering going to live in Israel ‘maybe one day in the future’. In this case aliya appears to be a likely scenario for about 66,000 British Jews. Just how realistic or otherwise is this figure? The truth is that the questions asked did not specify the timeframe for aliya. So the stated intentions to move to Israel may have related to the next year, or to a lifelong plan of the respondents which could come to fruition many years or even decades later.\footnote{In a very similar manner, when answering a question on fertility intentions, people may state that they intend to have, perhaps, three children. Realisation of this intention is a long-term, rather than a next year, development.}

About 32,600 Jews born in the UK made aliya in the sixty-three years following the establishment of the State of Israel. Is it reasonable to expect that nearly twice as many (circa 66,000) will do so in the next sixty years or so? For obvious reasons, one cannot answer this question in a satisfactory way. 32,600 British Jews have made aliya under a particular combination of pull and push factors. We may have some knowledge of these factors but we certainly do not possess any idea about their interaction and relative strength. Moreover, the actual combinations of push and pull factors may change during a sixty year span. We cannot know how the economic situations in the UK and Israel will compare in such a long term, how the political situation in the UK, Europe and Israel will change and, for example, the place of antisemitism in the UK and in European politics.

While political developments are difficult to project, seeds of given demographic situations are sown long in advance and, therefore, the demographic future is easier to foresee. The proportion of the strictly Orthodox Jewish population in the UK has been on the rise for some time, and due to persistent differences in fertility between this population and non-Orthodox Jews, there will be a further increase in the proportion of the former (Graham, 2013). The findings of the Israel Survey tell us that religious Jews are more likely to make aliya than non-religious Jews (Graham and Boyd 2010, p. 18). It is therefore reasonable to expect that the number of immigrants to Israel will increase in accordance with the rise in the proportion of religious Jews in the UK. The ultimate outcome will depend, however, on the impact of other factors that may offset the impact of this demographic change.
Intentions of aliyah are nearly impossible to match to actual aliyah behaviour even under a more detailed timeframe specification. The JPR survey of social attitudes conducted in 1995 also asked whether people were making preparations for aliyah or were going to make aliyah soon, a question that implies a greater immediacy of the act of aliyah, although still without relating it to a specific timeframe. About 2 per cent answered positively to this question, translating into a national figure of approximately 5,500 people. CBS-Israel data tell us that the timespan required for the immigration of this number from the UK is about twelve years (1995-2007).

Further, a JPR survey of Jewish students conducted in February-March 2011 found that 8 per cent of undergraduates in the sample stated that moving to Israel was their most preferred path in the year or two after completing their university course (Graham and Boyd 2011). Assuming a similar level of intentions in the total population of Jewish students, estimated at 6,500-8,500 at that time, one would expect approximately 260-340 people from this group to make aliyah annually in the next two years. Further, assuming that about 30 per cent of Jews in the appropriate birth cohort ages would not have gone to university and that there was a similar level of intentions among them would give us an additional 110-150 people who might make aliyah annually in the next two years. So, in total, one would expect 370-490 people to make aliyah annually in this age group. However, CBS-Israel data tell us that about ninety people aged twenty to twenty-four made aliyah annually from the United Kingdom in the years 2008-2010 (i.e. 20-24 per cent of the expected figure above). Thus, the gap between intentions and actual behaviour is clear. Furthermore, one ought to take into account the fact that the JPR Student Survey may have attracted the most Jewishly involved youth, and, therefore, that the aliyah intention rate of 8 per cent is not applicable to the general population of British Jews of student age.

The chief conclusion from an examination of the intentions of aliyah data is that any attempts to map it onto the actual aliyah behaviour are extremely complex. Intentions of aliyah data may have an independent value: the periodic questioning of the Jewish population about aliyah intentions may provide information on trends in such intentions (i.e. changes in public mood in relation to aliyah). Trends in aliyah behaviour, on the other hand, can and should be studied using the actual records of aliyah which are maintained by the Israeli statistical authority.

\[12\] All calculations are based on Graham and Boyd (2011), pp. 64-65 and p. 57.
Reflections on the data

1. Why are aliya rates from Britain so low?
One of the most striking findings emerging from these data is that an average of just one or two British Jews per 1,000 made aliya each year during the 2000s. This might indicate that the Jewish population does not feel attached to Israel. However, data from JPR’s 2010 survey of the attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel clearly demonstrate that this is not the case – 72 per cent self-identify as Zionists, 82 per cent maintain that Israel plays an important or central role in their Jewish identities, and 90 per cent regard Israel as the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people. The connection of British Jews to Israel is clear and robust. An alternative explanation may be that a low aliya rate is indicative of a secure Jewish community that feels settled and at home in Britain. This view is supported by data gathered by JPR in the same survey, which showed that even at times of high tension in the UK, when events in Israel create a difficult or even hostile climate for Jews, over 70 per cent feel comfortable in Britain. Additional research on Jewish life in Europe, conducted by JPR in 2012 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), is liable to further enhance this view. This is striking because it appears to be at odds with the argument commonly conveyed in parts of the Israeli and American Jewish media that Europe is becoming an increasingly inimical environment for Jews. While this perspective is certainly worthy of consideration, in the particular case of Britain it is challenged by these data. At the very least, the vast majority of Jews who live in the UK do not seem to feel that antipathy with sufficient strength to motivate them to emigrate from the country.

2. Why are aliya rates from Britain so high?
Nonetheless, contrasted with data from other comparable countries, British Jews are making aliya in disproportionately high numbers. The American Jewish population is close to twenty times the size of the British Jewish population, but only three times as many American Jews have made aliya as British Jews since 1948. The total number of olim (migrants to Israel) from four other centres of the English-speaking Jewish diaspora – Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand – is almost exactly equivalent to the number of olim from Britain, even though the combined Jewish population of these four countries today is approximately twice that of the UK. Clearly, something must be prompting these higher rates of aliya from Britain. One can hypothesise that it may be due to Britain’s geographical proximity to Israel, or that aliya drives further aliya (for example, for reasons of family unification), or that Jewish education in Britain places a greater emphasis on Israel and aliya than is the case in other comparable countries, or that antisemitism is a greater factor in Britain than elsewhere. However, the empirical data to assess any of these theories, or to assert alternative ones, do not exist. More work has to be carried out if we are to understand the phenomenon in greater depth.

3. Is aliya from Britain a good thing?
In many Jewish communal circles, this is almost a heretical question, and one that is rarely, if ever, asked. Behind the closed doors of Jewish homes, some individuals may struggle with the decision of their friends or relatives to make aliya, feeling sadness about them leaving and perhaps fearing for their safety. Others may wonder about how the emigration of passionate and committed Jews might affect the strength and vibrancy of Jewish life in Britain. But in British Jewish communal terms, aliya is commonly both encouraged and celebrated. Nevertheless, when researching migration in general, it is standard practice to analyse its impact on both the source country and the destination country. Until now, we have not been able to make any assessment of the impact of aliya on the British Jewish community, but these data allow us to begin that process. They show that, whilst the effect is small, when Jews from Britain migrate to Israel the mean age of the British Jewish population rises, and the total number of Jewish women of reproductive age in Britain declines. These changes, in turn, contribute to major trends seen in global Jewish demography, namely, that the Jewish population of Israel has been growing since 1948, and the Jewish population of the Diaspora has been declining. The projections in
this regard are clear – barring a major unforeseen development, these two contrasting trends will continue. Whether or not this is a good thing depends heavily on one’s ideological persuasion, but we should be in no doubt – the shape of the Jewish world, and British Jewry’s part in it, is changing, and *aliyah* from Britain constitutes a small, but not insignificant part of the overall story.

4. How might British olim affect the Israeli political balance?

Among the most intriguing data in this report are those showing where immigrants from Britain first settle in Israel. It is particularly striking that just five per cent settle in “Judea and Samaria”, the region often referred to as the West Bank, particularly when contrasted with the equivalent figure for immigrants from the United States, which stands at 18 per cent. This may indicate that immigrants from Britain are less likely than immigrants from the United States to hold right-wing political views, and/or that they are simply in a higher socio-economic bracket than American Jewish immigrants, as housing in this area tends to be cheaper than in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It is unclear which of these theories is correct. We can hypothesise about the political attitudes of British *olim* and debate the impact of their *aliyah* on Israeli politics, but new empirical data would need to be generated to develop a robust thesis.

5. Are *aliyah* rates from Britain likely to decline or increase over time?

Data from the 2011 UK Census indicate that the Jewish population of Britain may have stabilised following several decades of decline. The primary reason for this is that population growth in the *haredi* (strictly Orthodox) sector appears to be offsetting population decline among Jews in other parts of the community. Looking at these trends alone and projecting forward, we would expect the Jewish population of Britain to grow over time. However, given that data from JPR’s 2010 survey of the attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel demonstrate that religious Jews are more likely to make *aliyah* than secular Jews, we might equally expect *aliyah* rates from Britain to increase simply as a result of this demographic shift. At present, the UK is a “sending” country – it sends more immigrants to Israel than it receives from Israel. If this pattern not only continues but is enhanced further, it will be extremely important to understand the reasons why. As noted in the introduction to this report, *aliyah* is driven by both push and pull factors. If, indeed, we see an increase in the migration of Jews from Britain to Israel in future years, we should not instantly assume that this is driven by a reaction to antisemitism or anti-Israel sentiment, or by the success of Zionist education. Once again, the importance of gathering credible data on this issue is essential to any reliable assessment of it.
References


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