Values, Identity, and Israel Advocacy

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What do we care about—or pretend to care about—when we try to sway hearts and minds through political action? The question of values and value trade-offs in International Relations is understudied. By examining Diaspora-based Israel advocacy (the set of political and educational activities at the school, campus, community and formal political levels designed to increase support by Diaspora Jews, their co-citizens, and their governments for Israel), this paper interrogates the idea of “Jewish values,” and theorizes about how actors negotiate among sentiment, aspiration, and values. The evidence suggests that Jews are more likely to invoke “Jewish values” when engaging in in-group critique, whereas Israel advocates are more likely to draw on universal values to defend Israeli goals and actions to others. The essay identifies five value clusters that appear to structure Israel advocacy activities: nationalism and sovereignty, democracy, science, history, and peace, identifies some potential value conflicts that may result, and raises questions about the strategic use of values in social mobilization.

Introduction

The role of values in political mobilization is a crucial yet understudied component of international politics. Constructivist scholars have stressed the role of ideas in shaping outcomes, pointing to norms residing at the international, societal, and interest group levels (March and Olsen 1998; Sending 2002; Muller 2004). But they have spent less time theorizing about how values—and value trade-offs—operate in the realm of foreign policy, particularly among interest groups. Acting in accordance with one’s values helps maintain personal identity, and hence a sense of ontological security, where routines of action and relationships serve to maintain psychological well-being (Mitzen 2006; Lupovici 2008; Steele 2008).

But as discursive currency in garnering public sympathy for policy pressure, values are also used instrumentally. By turning a lens on the case of “Israel advocacy,” this article assesses how ethnic groups combine particularist and universal values to promote support for certain foreign policies. The evidence from the Israel advocacy case suggests that parochial values are more likely to be used in the service of in-group critique, whereas mainstream Israel advocates are more likely to draw on universal values to make their case. In doing so, the article encourages a more self-conscious focus on the affective motivations and strategic use of values, by expanding on the emotions-based turn in IR (Crawford 2000;

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Mercer 2006; Ross 2006; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Fierke and Fattah 2009)—particularly the dynamics of intergroup sensitivity and shaming, and the literature on decision making and value trade-offs (Festinger 1957; Keeney and Raiffa 1993; Baron 2000; Bain, Kashima, and Haslam 2006). Doing so can also help connect with debates surrounding the identity-action constitutive chain introduced by constructivists (Wendt 1999); how personal and communal values shape, and are informed by, the dominant view of what is appropriate within global politics, how the national interest is conceived (Krasner 1978; McCabe 1999); how values-based loyalty can redefine the group (Tessman 1998), how religion shapes international affairs (Abrams 2001; Dionne, Elshtain, and Drogosz 2004; Thomas 2005; Fox and Sandler 2006; Banchoff 2008; Hurd 2008), how advocacy can strengthen personal identity (Teske 1997), and the relationship between advocacy and discourse, teaching and learning, and talking and listening (Muller 2004).

The case of Israel advocacy helps shed new light on these debates. I define Israel advocacy as the collection of political and educational activities at the school, campus, community, and formal political levels designed to increase the support by Diaspora Jews, their co-citizens, and their governments for Israel, including support for most of Israel’s policies, and an opposition to outright critique of those policies. Israeli advocacy is a useful case since it raises important questions about how individuals conceptualize their affinities to particular ideas and groups. This is not least because Israel advocacy takes place in the Diaspora, and mostly by Jews who are citizens of those states yet emotionally and cognitively attached, in varying degrees, to Israel. Jewish Israel advocates are guided by both universal and particular values, as most Diaspora populations are.

The burgeoning subfield of Diaspora studies (Sheffer 2003) has worked to illuminate these dynamics, including situating the multiple loyalties question within constructivism (Ogden 2008), the space between the identity concerns of constructivism and the domestic-politics focus of liberalism (Shain and Barth 2003), the role of homelands in the “identity sustenance” of Diaspora populations (Shain 2002:280), the relationship between self-perception and scholarly assessment regarding the uniqueness of any given Diaspora population (Sheffer 2005), and the question of transnational politics in International Relations theory (Hagel and Peretz 2005; Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

Focusing on Diaspora advocacy also gives the idea of imagined community (Anderson 1983) a more complex, spatial aspect. Diaspora advocacy is meant to connect with the ethical compass of one’s co-citizens and to an overall sense of how the target audience feels the global world should be ordered. But views on what is strategically viable also flow from the collective values of the activists. This tension helps flesh out the ethnic mobilization questions with which Diaspora...
Theorists have been concerned. But whereas Diaspora theorists have thus far examined the values question only fleetingly, this paper attempts a more in-depth probe of the issue of values in ethnic mobilization.4

The role of values is especially relevant when thinking about the so-called legacy of liberalism among American Jews (Cohen and Liebman 1997). The old saw that American Jews earn like Episcopalians but vote like Puerto Ricans cuts to the heart of the question of the relationship between identity and material concerns in guiding political action, as expressed through values. The largest population of Jews outside of Israel resides in the United States. Focusing on the American Jewish aspect of Israel advocacy also helps connect these arguments to the burning policy issue of the Israel lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt’s 2007 provocative book on the topic dominated the United States–Israel relations conversation for a time, and the ongoing three billion dollars in annual aid flowing from the United States to Israel keeps the issue a morally and strategically pressing one.5

In the pages that follow, I will first grapple with the theoretical issues that the study of values and political action present. I will then outline the nature of Israel advocacy in North America (with an emphasis on the United States, the locus of the most powerful and well-developed Israel advocacy activities), in light of five “value clusters.” These values in part reflect the “postmaterialist” turn that Ronald Inglehart (1977) has identified as defining contemporary post-Industrial societies. Once individual survival has been assured, individuals are more attuned to abstract notions of democracy and justice. The notion of political advocacy reflects these concerns. Finally, I will discuss how Israel advocates negotiate among potentially conflicting values and spatial attachments.

**Prescription and Experience in Conceptualizing Values**

While the particular content of values is not necessarily universal, everyone possesses views on what is important materially, esthetically, emotionally and morally. Dismayed by the dearth of scholarly attention on values while the social face of America was undergoing radical changes in the 1960s, Milton Rokeach sought to disentangle the concept of values from attitudes. He defined values as hav[ing] to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence. He continues, “to say that a person ‘has a value’ is to say that he has an enduring belief that a particular mode of conduct or that a particular end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence (Rokeach 1968-69: 550; emphasis original).” Rokeach adds that the collection of a person’s rank-ordered values constitutes one’s value system. In many cases, he acknowledges, there will be some conflict among two or more values (552–553). The resulting dissonance often leads to a change in values or attitudes. (This assertion is not to be assumed outright, however, as I allude to below.)

How many significant values do individuals hold? One values-oriented researcher claims that “the number of peoples’ values is significantly small,” making the study of values “easy for scientific research and cross-cultural observation to handle” (Kanavou 2006:282). Rokeach gets quite specific, suggesting that the number of “terminal values” (those relating to desirable lifeway end states) held by a person is around “a dozen and a half” (552). The world values survey, the largest project of its kind, organizes societal values into two main axes

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4 See, for instance, Shain and Barth’s (2003:450) claim that Diaspora mobilization serves to promote the values of pluralism and democracy in their home societies.

5 For an argument that the Israel lobby is a much less powerful determinant of US foreign policy than Mearsheimer and Walt maintain, see Jonathan Rhynhold, “Is the Pro-Israel Lobby a Block on Reaching a Comprehensive Peace Settlement in the Middle East?” *Israel Policy Forum* 25, 1 (Summer 2010): 29–49.
(traditional vs. secular-rational, and survival vs. self-expression). Values may
derive from formal collective affiliation (such as in the case of religious doctrine)
or from the vast array of ideational inputs circulating across our states and socie-
ties. One’s collection of values is generally, therefore, a combination of particu-
larist and more universal inputs. It is the intersection between sentiment and
aspiration that helps us uncover the strategic use of values in advocacy work. As
we will see, even though the content of parochial versus more global value sets
may overlap, whether one is critiquing or supporting the dominant expression of
the in-group will determine whether one draws more on parochial or universal
values.

While individuals may reject particular communitarian commitments in favor
of a cosmopolitan view of value creation (Heater 2004), we also know that
humans are motivated to maintain the integrity of the group for psychological
reasons related to stress and insecurity (Janis 1972). This suggests that once they
are associated with a particular group, individuals may be more inclined to adopt
the group’s values as a way of maintaining group cohesion and their own place
within it. Accounting for value expectation also helps us understand and predict
the effects of specific political and discursive acts, particularly in the case of in-
group criticism. Finally, identifying value expectations helps us understand
instances when group members withhold criticism out of fear of being shunned.7

Whence Values?

Values are intrinsically tied up with group identity. In addition to geographic
locales and organized religions, we can identify many sources of collective identi-
fication, including one’s family (Pratt, Norris, Hubblethwaite, and Arnold 2008),
ethno-cultural community, spatial identity—including urban space (Baeck 2004),
or “mega-region” (Florida 2007), the state itself, supra-state region, hemisphere,
or “linguistic sphere” (Vucetic 2008). But identifying this range of identity
groupings raises the question of how much choice people actually have in culti-
vating a set of values. Part of the answer lies in how much individuals consciously
identify with their groups.

Yet even ascriptive identities can entail a set of phenomenological identity-
markers. Social identity theory introduced the idea that our association in a min-
imally descriptive group category—arbitrarily dividing members into groups in a
controlled laboratory setting—will elicit in-group bias and out-group discrimina-
tion (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986). But critics (Huddy 2001) have argued
that we need to account further for personal choice in identity formation. Still
others posit that human-nature beliefs help determine values (Bain et al. 2006).
If values are even partly a function of choice, then they become a mode of per-
sonal expression, as is any discursive act or esthetic choice.

However, given that acting according to values implies that one is acting
according to what one thinks is “proper” or “right” (Kanavou 2006:282), there
is also a fundamentally social aspect to values. Advocacy groups are naturally
attuned to which beliefs are mainstream and which are counter-cultural. Many of
Israel’s advocates are alarmed by the strength of rhetorical opposition of late to
Israel and its policies, including the boycotts of Israeli academics enacted by the
British academics’ union and more recently the Ontario branch of CUPE. The
“size doesn’t matter” campaign launched by the Canadian Federation of Jewish

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7 Feldman (1988) supports this view of values giving rise to preferences, though Chong (1996) has argued that
in some cases, communal values can serve interests.
Students in 2010 as a response to Israel Apartheid Week across university campuses is one example of a rearguard action. In a campus climate where uncritical support for Israel is becoming farther from the mainstream, Israel advocacy is seeking to tap into popular instincts. This particular campaign capitalizes on highly sexual imagery, using a tone and feel that is decidedly mainstream to make the case for Israel.8

Drawing on the tension between a view of the in-group’s values and the perceived values of the target audience, the next section will investigate the idea of “Jewish values.” As we will see, the notion of Jewish values operates counterintuitively in the case of Israel advocacy. The invoking of Jewish values more often occurs by those Jews (both Diaspora Jews and Israelis) who are seeking to critique the mainstream practice of Israel advocacy. Conversely, Israel advocates tend to draw on more universal values when trying to make their case. This dynamic is most visible in the use of the “peace” value, which serves to connect with Jewish values while paradoxically advancing a case for Israeli hawkishness.

### Jewish Values: The In-Group Critique

While it is difficult to ascertain whether there is such a thing as specifically “Jewish” (rather than Western or Judeo-Christian or simply universally humanistic) values, people often speak and write of Jewish values without problematizing the term. This section seeks to interrogate the idea further. As celebrity rabbi and founder of the Jewish Values Network, Shmuley Boteach has declared that “Slowly but surely, Jewish values are sculpting and molding the mainstream culture.” Boteach identifies 18 “Jewish values,” ranging from “the belief in the brotherhood of mankind” to “peace is superior to war” to “law is ineffective unless it is immutable” to “men and women are different but equal.”9 One study of Jewish adolescents in Britain uses the term “Jewish values” to refer to religious practices such as not going out on Friday nights (Sinclair and Milner 2005, 106). Twentieth-century theologians such as Louis Jacobs and Rabbi Joseph Telushkin outline such so-called values as “study of the Torah,” “trust in God,” “humility,” “compassion,” and “peace” (Jacobs 1960:86, 108, 135, 155); as well as such injunctions to “enter a mourner’s home with silence,” (193) “pray for someone else today,” (139) “not everything that is thought should be said,” (219) and “don’t snap at your spouse” (Telushkin 2000:349). Within a more secular perspective, Andrew R. Heinze has discussed the role of Jewish values in the formation of psychoanalytic thought, arguing that “The very definition of ‘Jewish’ has been unstable since ancient times. And yet, Jewish values exist as a real, identifiable, and consequential force in the history of Western civilization....” (Heinze 2004:2). Part of the core of twentieth-century Jewish values, according to Heinze, is a commitment to rationalism, which challenged Protestant transcendentalism. Yet a significant part of Jewish values, he also claims, arises from the experience of Jews as immigrants and “outsiders.” Also writing about the origins of psychoanalysis, Stephen Frosh (2008) argues that that discipline was intimately tied up with Freud’s Jewish identity.

These approaches suggest that values need to be cognitively instilled (otherwise, why write an adult-geared book on the topic?). This approach also implies that there are clusters of “value custodians”—the ethical elite, if you will—who mediate and transmit what are presumed to be the defining values of that group to the group’s members. The history of psychoanalysis discussion also raises

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questions about the relationship of values to material interests, and the degree to which values are mutable according to social understandings of relative position.

There are at least two problems with this approach. How can we understand the role values play in political action if some individuals prescribe particular values for others to live by, rather than all members of that group necessarily holding those values in the first place? And what about the values held by members of a particular group who identify with that group culturally, but reject (or are simply unfamiliar with) many of its doctrinal teachings? Israel was founded on a peculiarly nonreligious definition of what it means to be a Jew, as Gershom Gorenberg (2008) has shown, citing the Zionist justification for existing as a Jewish state within the modern tradition of ethno-nationalism. Ultimately, the explanatory relevance of Jewish values hinges on the ability to determine that a critical mass of Jews consciously holds particular beliefs about the world (whether textually and doctrinally linked or otherwise). It does not appear that adequate research has yet been done to assess this, yet many still claim that, empirically, there is such a thing as Jewish values.\(^\text{10}\)

Here, I suggest that the most salient aspect of the idea of Jewish values is in its rhetorical use. In the case of Israel advocacy, we find a counterintuitive dynamic at play. Jewish values seem to be invoked most often not to defend Israeli policies, but rather when Israeli or other Jewish voices are attempting to critique mainstream Israeli government policy or mainstream Israel advocacy activity. For example, Israeli writer and peace activist David Grossman, whose son died fighting in the 2006 Lebanon War, criticized what he saw as Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s reluctance to advance the peace process. As Grossman declared at a Tel Aviv peace rally, ‘‘...for many years, the State of Israel has been squandering not only the lives of its children but also the miracle it experienced – the great and rare opportunity...to create an enlightened, decent, democratic state that would conduct itself according to Jewish and universal values (in Goldberg 2008:42).’’ Or Donniel Hartman, president of the religiously guided but liberal-leaning Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem: ‘‘The Jewish community is not in need of an Israel advocacy campaign of facts and figures alone, but also of a new Jewish narrative based on Jewish ideas and values for engaging Israel in a way that will help integrate Israel into a modern Jewish identity.’’\(^\text{11}\) Two years in, J Street’s founder Jeremy Ben-Ami described the organization as ‘‘seek[ing] to inject new voices into foreign policy discussion, express support for Israel in accordance with Jewish values and promote a more open debate about Israel in the American Jewish community. In particular, J Street seeks to ‘expand what it means to be pro-Israel.’’\(^\text{12}\) Or Israeli philosopher and public intellectual Yeshayahu Leibowitz, writing soon after the 1967 war: ‘‘Out of concern for the Jewish people and the state we have no choice but to withdraw from the territories and their population of one and a half million Arabs (Leibowitz 1968 in Goldman, Ed. 1992:226). Or Jews for a Just Peace, a Vancouver-based group devoted to a ‘‘fair and just solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict,’’ in the wake of a 2007 Israeli decision to impose electricity and fuel sanctions on Gaza: ‘‘As Jews, we call upon Jewish leaders to speak out unequivocally against this offense against Jewish values on the eve of Yom Kippur.’’\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{10}\) A Google search reveals 412,000 entries for ‘‘Jewish values,’’ 975,000 for ‘‘Christian values,’’ and 117,000 entries for ‘‘Chinese values.’’ This isn’t to say that Jewish values are more deeply ingrained in their respective populations, only that they are the subject of speaking and writing far above what the world Jewish population figures would suggest.


\(^{13}\) http://www.jewsforajustpeace.com (communique issued September 20, 2007).
Psychologists have pointed to the tendency for “high identifiers,” when experiencing normative conflict, to engage in dissent in an effort to change the norms of the group rather than leave it altogether (Packer 2008). Others have found that individuals view in-group criticism as more legitimate than criticism emanating from other groups (Hornsey, Oppes, and Svensson 2002). When groups are engaged in intergroup conflict, however, the group might be more sensitive to criticism (ibid, 305). This helps explain why in-group critics in an ethnic-conflict context would be more likely to couch their opinions in the language of their group’s values. The literature on “shaming” and “reflexive discourse,” whereby political actors attempt to get others to change their behavior by appealing to their projected identity (Steele 2007) helps explain this as well. Finally, the case of Israel advocacy raises questions about collective guilt and shame as group emotions (Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004). The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, however, poses a less stark moral conundrum for most, given the way that Israel couches many of its actions in the language of “security.” The case of Israel advocacy thus extends the work of those who have analyzed how morally culpable societies “come to terms with the past” (Adorno 1977; Elster 1998), into a realm where the notion of right and wrong, victim and victimizer is much less clear.

Values and Israel Advocacy

The above discussion demonstrates that the deliberate invocation of Jewish values in Israel advocacy is most pronounced when Jews are attempting to critique what they see as an uncritical, mainstream stance supporting Israeli intransigence. Conversely, Israel advocates tend to couch their arguments in language that is more universal so as to effectively connect with the target audience. As we will see, Israel advocates try to show that their policy goals accord with the interests and values of the target state’s population.

Consider how AIPAC, the most prominent and mainstream Israel lobby group, attempts to deliver its message. AIPAC’s Web site emphasizes the importance of strengthening “the vital US-Israel relationship.” And although one anonymous Jewish senior State Department official in the George H.W. Bush administration stated that “we act in America’s interest, but through a prism” (quoted in Goldberg 1996, 232), a former head of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations has said that “leading American Jews really feel very deeply that American interests and Israeli interests are one and the same” (in Mearsheimer and Walt 2007:148). American Jewish Committee representative David Harris has declared that “I believe I am expressing the highest democratic and aspirational values of the United States when I express my support for Israel.”

The remainder of this section highlights five clusters of values that appear to structure Israel advocacy: nationalism and sovereignty, democracy, science, history, and peace. Each of these values is meant to connect with some degree of universalism. Though as we will see, the use of “peace” is both the most universal, and, paradoxically, the most deeply tied to supporting Israeli hawkishness. I will discuss the use of each value in Israel advocacy and suggest possible value trade-offs facing political activists.

Nationalism and Sovereignty

The sine qua non of Zionism, and hence Israel advocacy, is the idea of Jewish statehood. For Zionists and Israel advocates Jewish nationalism represented a

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crucial break from anti-Semitism and religious passivity. Through the State of Israel, Jews were able to join the family of nation-states. One need only picture the sense of heightened anticipation followed by collective elation that Jews around the world experienced as they listened to the famous (though ill-fated) November 1947 United Nations vote on the partition of Palestine to realize that modern Zionism self-consciously bound the Jewish people and created a joint sense of rehabilitative collective destiny never before experienced in the modern period.

But the fact of Israeli sovereignty exists in stark relief with Palestinian statelessness. It was many decades before Zionists, and Israel advocates among them, acknowledged Palestinian national existence, never mind the Palestinian right to an independent state. (Past-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famously observed that there was "no such thing" as a Palestinian people.) Most American Jews (and indeed most Israelis) favor a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Even vocal Israel advocate Alan Dershowitz writes in *The Case for Israel* (2003a:2) that "a two-state solution to the Israeli and Palestinian claims is both inevitable and desirable." Nevertheless, mainstream Israel advocacy does not tend to actively promote this outcome. Israel's 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was followed by thousands of Hamas rocket attacks into Israel and Israelis have come to fundamentally distrust Palestinian intentions.

A commitment to Jewish nationalism and sovereignty also precludes the idea of a binational state—a single state for Jews and Palestinians that would encompass all of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (Ghanem 2009). The form of nationalism that Israel advocates promote is intrinsically an ethnically particularistic one, arguing that the Jewish nation is entitled to state of its own. Israel advocates often draw on the fact that Israel is surrounded by 21 Arab states, coupled with the fact that Palestinian citizens of Israel do enjoy formal rights of equality—though in practice, there are various discrepancies, as will be discussed below. As the Jewish Federations of North America Web site states, "No one suggests that Arabs are not entitled to a nation [sic] (and they have not one, but twenty-one) of their own or Swedes or Germans....To suggest that Zionism, the nationalist movement of the Jewish people, is the only form of nationalism that is illegitimate is pure bigotry." Israel advocates focus on what they term a campaign of "delegitimation" of Israel. Among their targets are protest actions such

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**16** But even then, most discussions of future Palestinian statehood among Israel advocates refer to that future entity as demilitarized. Aside from the handful of states that have decided—either for identity reasons or due to security umbrellas—to do without formal or extensive militaries, the idea of a state without the means to defend itself is little heard of in modern international affairs. The Palestinian Authority has rejected the idea of a demilitarized state, with one official stating that "a Palestinian state that does not have a strong security force won't be able to survive for one day." Yet other research suggests that a Palestinian military is inevitable, and in fact currently exists in nascent form (Luft 2001).

**17** Some of Israel’s critics deny the ethnic component of what it means to be Jewish, trying to undermine the Jewish claim to a state based on the fact that Judaism is (also) a religion.

**18** Though some transnational Jewish organizations specifically fund Palestinian citizen initiatives within Israel in part to shore up what they see as a more liberal and viable multi-ethnic Jewish democracy. See Haklai (2008).

as the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions Campaign that have accompanied calls of Israel being an apartheid state (Guttman 2010).

Yet Israel advocates may be faced with a value conflict around the immigrant experience in their own societies of North American and Western Europe. Israel advocates champion the idea of Israel being a Jewish state, while celebrating their own right to live as Jews within their multicultural societies, without any consideration for ethno-national demographic balance. In more symbolic terms, some Israeli voices have recently been raising the value tension around the demographic problem in the context of Israel’s national anthem, Hatikvah, which talks of a “Jewish soul” (Benmark 2008). But, as is often the case with criticism within Israel versus within the Diaspora, Diaspora critics lag far behind. It is to this problem of democracy and its meaning that we now turn.

Democracy

Along with sovereignty and nationalism is the prominence of the observation in IR that democracies almost never go to war with each other (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Owen 1994). The belief in the so-called “democratic peace” has long shaped American foreign policy. Then-US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake spearheaded a program of democratic “enlargement” in the mid-1990s, and the Bush Administration touted “democracy promotion” as an American ideal (Monten 2005; Fukuyama and McFaul 2007/08; Burnell 2008). Democracy promotion has taken a new form with the Obama Administration, with the president stating in his June 4, 2009 Cairo Speech that “No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other. That does not lessen my commitment, however, to governments that reflect the will of the people.”20

Israel advocates often stress that Israel is “the only democracy in the Middle East.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has used the democratic peace argument to try to demonstrate that Israel is more peace-loving than its authoritarian Arab neighbors (Netanyahu 2000:259–277). Dershowitz similarly emphasizes Israel’s being a democracy in a region dominated by nondemocracies, saying “it may be useful to look at the Middle East’s only democracy as ‘the Jew’ among nations.” (Dershowitz 2003a:222). And consider the talking points that the World Union for Jewish Students presents for campus advocates: “Israel is a Western democracy in the middle of the Middle East. It stands for freedom, equal rights for all, it is a civilized country whose opera, ballet, and world-class universities ensure that Israeli culture is very advanced.”21 Or those from the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Boston: “Israel is a modern democracy and America’s ally in the Middle East. All Israeli citizens—Christians, Muslims, and Jews—have freedom of religion and the right to vote. Ten Arabs and 18 women are in Israel’s parliament, and both men and women have access to education, modern healthcare and good jobs.”22 Or the “Israel Education” wing of Hillel Vancouver: “Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people and an oasis of democracy, pluralism and equality.”23 The Canada–Israel Committee compares the Israeli and Canadian political systems by stating that “The essential characteristic of the two systems...is that they share an overriding loyalty to and respect for democracy.”24 Drawing on the liberal aspects of Israeli society, Israel

advocates on campus sometimes partner with gay-rights awareness groups to argue that Israel treats its gays better than do Israel’s neighbors.

While the status of Israel’s Palestinian Arab citizens has been roundly criticized by Middle East observers, and indeed Israel’s own 2003 Or Commission found that Israel’s Arab citizens are systematically mistreated, Israel advocates emphasize the superior treatment accorded Arab citizens by Israel compared to how Arab regimes treat their own populations.25 They also routinely refer to the mass expulsion of Jews from Arab countries to Israel following Israel’s establishment in 1948 (Dershowitz 2003b). Finally, Israel advocates—both supporters of Israeli policies as well as Zionist critics of the West Bank settlements—point to the demographic problem awaiting an Israel that does not ultimately cede the occupied territories. Known as the “triangle dilemma,” the logic dictates that Israel must choose two of three fundamental values: remain a democracy, remain a Jewish State, or retain the post-1967 borders of Greater Israel.26 With the differential birthrates of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, there promises to be a majority Arab population between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River by 2020.

The idea of a Jewish state is seen by some to present a challenge to the idea of liberal democracy—specifically, whether a state can justifiably define itself on the basis of religion, or even a single ethnic group. Israel advocates tend to dismiss this criticism as an unfair (and often anti-Semitic) attempt to deprive Jews of sovereign expression when many other national groups have historically achieved statehood.

History

Both with the Judeo–Christian claim to Jewish sovereignty arising out of the Bible and centuries of anti-Semitism culminating in the Holocaust, Israel advocates routinely draw on historical claims to support the right of Jews to a state in the Middle East. The Jewish Federations Web site declares that “the Jewish people have maintained ties to their historic homeland for more than 3,700 years” and that Israel’s “international ‘birth certificate’ was validated” not only by the “Balfour Declaration” and the “United Nations partition resolution of 1947,” but also “the promise of the Bible.”27 There are tricky ethical implications stemming from the use of the Bible as justification for modern national practices in the Israeli–Palestinian sphere, but the strong Judeo–Christian premise upon which much of Western politics and society rests makes the Bible a natural source of talking points for Israel advocates.

Yet the Israeli relationship with the past is not necessarily a simple one. As Yael Zerubavel (1995) has shown, Israel’s nation-builders discarded the weak and vulnerable Exilic Jewish prototype in favor of a “new Jew” more tied to physical pursuits and state-building, a new corporeal figure echoing Zionist philosopher Max Nordau’s call in his call for the Jews to reinvent themselves into a “Jewry of muscle” through a pioneering ethos centered on returning to the Land of Israel (Bi- ale 1997). This underscores the idea that collective renewal has both push and pull manifestations regarding escaping European anti-Semitism.

25 An example is the Israeli Bedouin Ishmael Khaldi tours with Hasbara Fellowships. As the website states, “Israel is constantly attacked for being racist towards non-Jews. Ishmael proves that this is far from the truth as he describes the many advantages minorities in Israel enjoy compared to the surrounding countries in the Middle East” http://www.hasbarafellowships.org/index.php?page=recommended-speakers#Ishmael%20Khaldi (Accessed June 15, 2011).
A historical perspective can lead to value tension when confronting the contemporary Israeli–Palestinian conflict, particularly when history is viewed as centering on the advocate’s given “protagonist.” For Israel advocates, the question is: “whose history?” Proponents of the two-state solution are more likely to deal with this tension by acknowledging the dual historical narratives, which are partly a mirror image of one another. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the Zionist celebration of 1948 (celebrated annually as Yom Ha’atzma’ut, or Independence Day), which is mirrored by the Palestinian commemoration of al-Nakba (“the catastrophe”), the displacement, dispersal and in some cases, deportations and massacres, that accompanied Israel’s founding (Sa’di 2002). In Israel, a loose collection of academics called the “new historians” have dedicated portions of their careers to unearthing previously silenced episodes in Israeli history, particularly revolving around Israel’s role in contributing to the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem. (Morris 1988; Morris 2007; Shlaim 2000; Pappe 2007).

Ultimately, Israel advocates prize the temporal aspect of history (the “we were here first” idea) coupled with the “missed opportunities” view of historical analysis. First stated by Abba Eban and repeated many times since, this view asserts that the Palestinian leadership has “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” As Neil Caplan (2009) shows in his highly balanced history of the conflict, both sides have suffered from missed opportunities and so the charge is ultimately not fruitful for future diplomatic efforts. But the phrase exists powerfully in Israel advocacy lore, and advocates use it to their advantage.

Science

In line with an attachment to the value of history as an intended objective criterion to justify Israel’s position is a focus on science. The idea of scientific progress is often used by Israel advocates to highlight Israel’s contribution to the region over time. The blogger “Fiery Spirited Zionist” writes that “[a]lthough constantly under the gun, Israel still manages to be a world class nation in the realms of science, technology and medicine, its innovations making for a better world…I think the only innovation having come from the Arabs recently is the invention of the suicide bomber.” And a Web site devoted to countering the boycott-Israel movement lists a dozen and a half Israeli scientific inventions and achievements, ranging from a satiety-feeling drug for weight loss to an “environmentally friendly technology for cleaning oil spills.” Israel’s many universities and technical institutes garner widespread support among Diaspora activists and community organizers, with “Friends of” philanthropic affiliates located all over the world for Israeli universities. At a speech marking Israel’s 60th anniversary, then-US Vice President Dick Cheney stated, “Israel has become a nation of world-class enterprises, great universities and medical centers, technological advancement, scholarly brilliance, and cultural beauty.”

Underscoring Israel’s global contributions is a Zionist history that relied on technology for state-building. The country’s founding narrative emphasizes the pioneering spirit along with the Zionist ability to “make the desert bloom” through various technology-reliant inventions such as drip irrigation (a narrative

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which also serves to obscure the history of Palestinian Arab settlement and land development). Israelis and Diaspora Jews have long touted the Jewish National Fund as a paragon of environmental stewardship, a badge reflecting a respect for scientific knowledge about ecology. Recent “revisionist” accounts, however, cast doubt on this version. Some claim that the JNF has uprooted thousands of fruit and olive trees in what were Palestinian-tended orchards in order to replace them with less useful pines (Nathan 2005:135).

In addition to the clash between Israeli and Palestinian narratives of pioneering and development is a value conflict between political rhetoric and fair-mindedness. Despite using names like “Honest Reporting” for their media-watch organizations, Israel advocacy is fundamentally about argument in the service of a prior cause. One rhetorical device Israel advocates frequently use is to attempt to expose hypocrisy and double standards. For instance, David Harris, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, recently wrote, “When Israel takes action to defend itself, pro-Palestinian forces around the world are ready to mobilize at a moment’s notice with emergency sessions, self-righteous indignation, heated resolutions, angry protests, boycotts, letter-writing campaigns, and over-the-top ads. Yet, these very same forces are AWOL if Israel is not involved.” He continues, “If this isn’t a case of rank hypocrisy and transparent double standards, then what is?” Or Dershowitz (2003a:161), discussing Israel’s West Bank presence: “I have strongly opposed the occupation of Palestinian population centers since 1967, but Israel’s actions have been far more justified militarily, legally, and morally than other longer occupations that have not been the object of nearly as much condemnation.” Here, there is an intrinsic value conflict between obscuring the debate over moral and strategic questions by examining the record of the critic.

As a document titled “Tenured or Tenuous: Defining the Role of Faculty in Supporting Israel on Campus” issued by the Israel on Campus Coalition states, “[f]or educators and the professionals who work on campus, the greatest challenge is not training students to respond to Israel’s critics, but educating them about the history and politics of the Middle East so they can become independent thinkers who love and understand Israel, warts and all.” This directive must sound odd to historians and political scientists who view their mission as getting students to understand the objects of study, rather than, necessarily, to “love” them.

It is for this reason that Israel advocates see their role partly as educators. One Israeli author argues that “education is the best form of advocacy” while citing other Israelis who decry the current form of hasbara. One of these voices is Larry Derfner, who writes in the Jerusalem Post that “I think the best way to win friends for Israel among the undecided out there is to lay off the propaganda and bullshit and talk like one reasonable, balanced, intelligent adult to another,” which means that “we should admit frankly that while the Arabs owe us plenty of apologies, we owe the Arabs, certainly the Palestinians, some apologies of our own” (Derfner 2006). This sort of Israeli voice is questioning not only the moral dilemmas inherent in advocacy but whether it is of strategic value.

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In sum, the value trade-offs in focusing on science relate both to the pioneering narrative of Israeli state-building where the Palestinian presence was rendered mostly invisible in Zionist lore ("a land without people for a people with a land," in the words of Zionist publicist Israel Zangwill), and rhetoric in the service of Israel couched in the language of objectivity. Israel advocates feel that they are engaging in a rearguard action. With public opinion turning against the Jewish state, their selective focus on anti-Israel media and on actions that buttress the case for Israel is simply evening out the score and bringing a dose of "objectivity" to what they see as a biased discourse.

Peace

With the court of public opinion focusing on what many see as Israel’s ability to end the conflict by ending the occupation, it is no surprise that Israel advocates emphasize Israel’s desire for peace. Israel advocates declare the desire of Israelis simply to "live in peace," struggling for recognition from within a sea of enemies, only two of whom (Egypt in 1982 and Jordan in 1994) have officially signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. The university campus-based Israel awareness committee in one Canadian city sported shirts at Israel’s annual Independence Day event emblazoned with a peace sign below the words "Israel wants." Indeed, from the early 1990s, when the "land-for-peace" strategy entered the political mainstream, critics of the Oslo formula called for "peace for peace," a formula that helped to define the "Clean Break" strategy drafted in 1996 by a group of American intellectuals, many of whom later held senior positions in the Bush Administration.34 Israel advocates tend to emphasize 60 years of Arab-Israeli wars which they see as largely initiated by the Arab states with the aim of annihilating Israel, capped by decades of Palestinian terrorism, now spearheaded by Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with the threat from Iran. The Israeli narrative of "waiting by the phone" for the Arabs to make peace, underscored by the trope of "milchemet ayn breirah" (war of "no choice") underscores this theme of "peace," as does the ubiquity of the term shalom in historical and contemporary Jewish life (Sucharov 2005:46–49), and the related concept of sheket ("quiet") that has been pointed to as a recurring motif in Israel’s desire for both physical and identity-related security (Lupovici 2008).35 Golda Meir famously said in 1969 that "When peace comes we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons."36

There is another aspect flowing from the idea of peace that cuts to a fundamental value held by Israel advocates, and that is the idea of recognition. From a psychological standpoint, recognition is one of the fundamental needs for psychic security. Political philosopher Charles Taylor (1997:99) describes it as "a vital human need," arguing that "My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others" (103). Calling for peace implies a status quo where one’s identity (and more fundamentally one’s right to exist) does not have to be constantly defended. Since 1948, Israel has struggled to gain recognition from its Arab neighbors. Peace talks as recently as 2007—those following from the Annapolis summit—controversially hinged on Israeli Prime Minister Ehud

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35 There is not much evidence within Jewish history that pacifism has ever been a dominant value. Some recent Jewish voices have issued a call for pacifism (Howard 2007: 17–22) or "pacifoidism," a self-described orientation of being committed to pacifism unless Israel’s existence is threatened (Axelrad 2007: 215–219), but Judaic tradition includes detailed laws and norms surrounding the conduct of war (Rofe 1985).
Olmert’s insistence that the Palestinian Authority recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” prior to meeting. Curiously, however, sometimes the opposite of peace can bring about a sense of ontological security, as Mitzen (2006:362–363) has argued. There, routinized relations of competitiveness and enmity can in fact lead to a sense of psychological security. But peace is the easiest way of assuring mutual recognition (and ontological routinization) and is also a value that is much more easily “sold” in the marketplace of ideas.

The status-quo implication of the peace value (meaning that Israel advocates often pair a call for “peace” with a reluctance to urge painful territorial concessions) suggests that conflict is inevitable until the Palestinians’ own desire for statehood is addressed. In their gradual acceptance of a two-state solution, this is something that many Israel advocates have come to recognize. Palestinians, of course, are struggling to attain the same recognition that Israelis have sought to obtain. Still, there are many others who see the possible establishment of a Palestinian state as a fundamental threat to Israel, particularly given the political strength of Hamas. This feeling has only been compounded since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.

**Conclusions: The Problem of Value Trade-Offs**

Thinking about the values that animate Israel advocacy raises the issue of value conflicts and value trade-offs. Thought systems such as religious orthodoxy significantly curtail the degree to which one is permitted to trade off values, the code of religious adherence being already concerned with having laid out a total system of morals, values, and ethics along with a complicated set of prescribed and proscribed behavior. And while there are many political activities across the globe that are informed by religion, there is a wide array of options for political behavior, particularly in the globalized age of shifting identities, and in the secularized era of modern nationalism.

The psychological theory of cognitive dissonance can shed some light here. As Leon Festinger (1957) has presented it, individuals who hold conflicting beliefs or whose beliefs clash with a given behavior will experience a sense of psychological discomfort. To cope with the dissonance, people will either change their behavior, change the belief, or attempt to rationalize the disconnect. Though Dershowitz told me that he experiences absolutely “no value conflicts” in his Israel advocacy work (interview with author, 2008), Israel advocacy regularly faces challenges from competing values. The most obvious of these are the notion of human rights (particularly when daily Palestinian freedoms are being curtailed due to Israeli occupation policies); justice (for Palestinian national aspirations as well as any desire to rectify the Palestinian refugee problem); cosmopolitanism (when the national rights of one group are sometimes promoted at the expense of those of another); environmentalism (in those cases where “national security” considerations, such as house demolitions, to name one IDF practice, are seen to trump ecological ones) and the diplomatic notion of fair-mindedness, whereby each side may be lauded or criticized based on its behavior at any given time.

Sometimes the collective experience of cognitive dissonance can play a pivotal role in bringing about foreign policy change. Israel’s conduct in the 1982 Lebanon War and the first Intifada is one set of factors that has been argued to have led Israel to pursue the 1993 Oslo agreement (Sucharov 2005). There, Israel became painfully aware that its behavior clashed with its identity as a “defensive

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38 These practices are encoded in the Shulhan Arukh, the sixteenth century compilation of laws by Joseph Karo.
warrior’’ fighting only wars of “no alternative” guided by “purity of arms.” Yet Israel advocacy presents a different sort of case. Advocacy is fundamentally about rhetoric in the service of a prior goal. We must be able to imagine a point where such a political actor might experience a cognitive and emotional clash between her actions and her beliefs. But we can also surmise that advocacy presents a tougher case. Political advocates have conditioned themselves to bat away conflicting arguments (and hence beliefs) in the service of their cause. A related problem is that of individual versus group action. Most of the literature on value trade-offs is prescriptive in nature and, operating within the tradition of decision analysis, refers to the problem of individual choice (Keeney and Raiffa 1993; Baron 2000). But political advocacy is essentially a communal act, insofar as the actor is engaging in discourse on behalf of a group.

Perhaps Israel advocates are guided more by the imperative to maintain group cohesion and ethno-national identity than they are by any particular set of value clusters pertaining to the specific case of Israel. If so, then the potential value-dyad trade-offs facing Israel activists are more disparate—meaning identity-maintenance versus justice (rather than peace versus justice, etc.). More research remains to be done on this important and understudied question.

Finally, as the Jewish community in North America continues to become more entrenched, putting more years between the trauma of the Holocaust followed by postwar institutionalized anti-Semitism, and today’s relatively comfortable ethno-national existence within the multiethnic projects of the United States and Canada, we can expect to see a value shift with regard to support for Israel. In a widely cited study, Steven M. Cohen and Ari Y. Kelman (2007) have documented the generational distancing that is taking place among young American Jews toward Israel, a trend that has been manifest over the past generation. Similarly, a 1989 American Jewish Committee survey found that 73% of American Jews felt that “caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew,” while by 2005, only 57% agreed with that statement (Cohen and Wertheimer 2006:34). This is a trend that Chaim I. Waxman (1999:221–222), quoting from Herbert Gans, likens to the idea of “symbolic ethnicity,” whereby individuals consciously choose when and how to identify with the symbolic trappings of their culture. This trend in some ways parallels the “post-materialist” value shift that Ronald F. Inglehart (1971, 2008) has identified globally.

This dynamic has recently been scrutinized by Peter Beinart in the New York Review of Books. Documenting a series of value conflicts between young American liberals and the messaging of mainstream Diaspora Israel advocacy, Beinart (2010) writes, “For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism’s door, and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism instead.” Israeli geographer David Newman recently echoed these sentiments in the Jerusalem Post. “When the Diaspora spokesmen lobby their governments and media in an almost blind defense of Israel, they are often doing more damage than benefit” (Newman 2010). As the social and physical security of American Jews is now assured, and the existence of the State of Israel is a fact rather than a question—the current so-called “delegitimation” campaign notwithstanding, we can expect younger American Jews to put more emphasis on values such as justice for both Israelis and Palestinians until a negotiated settlement is reached.

References


Values, Identity, and Israel Advocacy


