jpr
/ report No.
3 1999
Jews of the 'new South Africa': Highlights
of the 1998 national survey of South African Jews
'South African Jews, with their high level of general
education and exposure to Western culture, combined with a relatively high
level of religious observance and education, are an interesting community
in which to test out how Jewish beliefs and values are operationalized
in the social world. We can now see how this cultural inheritance plays
out in the particularly intriguing realm of contemporary South African
society.'
Barry A. Kosmin, Jacqueline Goldberg,
Milton Shain and Shirley Bruk
Summary of key points
Demographic characteristics
A nationally representative sample of 1,000 adult respondents was interviewed
for the survey, of whom there were 464 men and 536 women with a median age
of 45. Eighty-seven per cent were born in South Africa; 94 per cent were
South African citizens. Geographically, 650 lived in Johannesburg, 250 lived
in Cape Town, 50 in Pretoria and the remaining 50 in Durban.
The general profile shows a population group that is well educated, with
35 per cent having achieved a minimum of a university degree. Half the economically
active population are in professional and managerial occupations. On the
basis of its occupational and educational patterns the South African Jewish
population is shown to be an important and valuable human capital asset
for the development of a new democratic society and a healthy economy.
Identity
The majority of the respondents in the survey feel strongly about their
Jewishness, with 49 per cent feeling 'extremely conscious of being Jewish',
and 41 per cent feeling 'quite strongly Jewish'. Overall, personal and psychological
ties to Jewish life were rated more important markers of Jewish identity
than externalities such as religion and culture. Moreover, there is a general
trend towards a strengthening of Jewish identity that is taking place side
by side with the political changes in South Africa.
Jewish education
Ninety-four per cent of the adult male respondents and 77 per cent of
the female respondents have received some form of Jewish education. A majority
of Jewish children currently attend Jewish day schools at both the primary
and secondary levels.
Religious belief and observance
South African Jewry is by and large more Orthodox in its religious outlook
and behaviour than comparative samples in Britain and the United States,
with 36 per cent subscribing to the belief that the Torah is the actual
word of God (compared to 15 per cent in the UK and 13 per cent in the US).
In terms of religious outlook,
61 per cent describe themselves as 'traditional', 14 per cent are strictly
Orthodox, 7 per cent are Reform/Progressive and 12 per cent 'Just Jewish'.
Religiosity is high: 39 per cent of the respondents attend synagogue each
week and
91 per cent fast on Yom Kippur. As adults, a majority also tend to keep
the same (Orthodox) affiliation with which they were raised.
Israel and Zionism
In keeping with a century-old trend in South Africa, Israel continues
to be a point of Jewish communal consensus, a focus of fundraising activity
and a force for cohesion. Overall, South African Jews are Zionist, with
54 per cent feeling a strong attachment and 33 per cent a moderate attachment
to Israel. A considerable 79 per cent have visited Israel at least once
(as compared to 37 per cent of American Jews).
Exposure to the media
The majority of respondents have daily access to television, with 95
per cent watching at least some programming every day; 88 per cent listen
to some radio daily.
Perceptions of current media bias-important in a country with a recent
history of media censorship under the apartheid regime-varies from subject
to subject. There is considerable concern that news about the Arab-Israeli
conflict and about Israel tends to be negatively biased. In addition respondents
felt there was a media bias against police behaviour, South African government
policy and the personal lives of South African MPs. Significantly, they
regarded as comparatively insignificant any media bias against Jews in general
and Jewish businessmen in particular. This points to a certain fair-mindedness-and
lack of 'paranoia'-on the part of South Africa's Jewish population.
Moral issues
Respondents were asked to rate the degree to which certain practices
were or were not justified. In the 'justified' column came 'using a firearm
in self-defence', and 'the death penalty', whereas a vast majority deemed
'never justified' 'buying something you knew was stolen'.
Perceptions of antisemitism
South African Jews tend to believe that antisemitism is more of a problem
elsewhere than it is in their home country. Yet 34 per cent believe there
has been an increase in antisemitism in South Africa over the last five
years. This perception is based on personal experience, with 60 per cent
reporting hearing derogatory remarks about Jews generally, or specifically
(29 per cent). The pattern suggests that antisemitism largely falls within
the realm of unpleasant discourse in South Africa and is of minor importance
in political terms.
Affirmative action
Despite the policy of affirmative action in the new South Africa, only
a minority of the sample-18 per cent-was in favour of giving preferential
treatment in housing and jobs, as compared to a considerable 77 per cent
who are against such laws. By comparison, 62 per cent support laws against
incitement or inter-group ill will.
Neighbours
Despite the legacy of residential segregation by race, 84 per cent of
the respondents stated that having neighbours from other races was acceptable.
The groups now considered least desirable were right- and left-wing extremists,
members of minority cults and people with a criminal record.
Attitudes towards the New South Africa
While about a third of the sample were positive about the benefits that
have been gained for the people of South Africa as a whole, only 1 in 6
feel that they have benefited personally. In the main, personal safety ranks
high on the list of concerns, with an overwhelming 90 per cent rating South
Africa 'poor' or 'very poor' on this issue.
Cultural identity
Despite emerging from a country that for more than 50 years stressed
cultural difference and institutionalised racial segregation, a majority
of the population (54 per cent) positively identify themselves as South
Africans. Seven per cent of the sample say that they feel 'more South African
than Jewish', while 47 per cent now consider themselves 'equally South African
and Jewish'. Forty five per cent said they feel 'more Jewish than South
African'.
Quality of life
Only one in eight respondents (13 per cent) agreed with the optimistic
statement, 'The quality of my life in South Africa will improve over the
next five years', whereas a resounding 65 per cent disagreed, implying that
they believe the quality of life in South Africa in fact will deteriorate
over the next five years. At the same time,
59 per cent of the respondents believe that people are less willing to
help each other than they were five years ago.
Special responsibilities
Against the backdrop of the recent abolition of the apartheid system
of legalised discrimination,
42 per cent of the sample believe that Jews have a special responsibility,
as Jews, to help those who suffer discrimination. Similarly, given the clear
biblical injunction on Jews to give charity,
41 per cent agree that Jews have a special responsibility to give charity
and 58 per cent believe they have the same responsibility as others.
Government spending
A clear consensus emerges regarding increased government spending on
domestic priorities. Ninety six per cent of the respondents want more spending
on police and law enforcement,
88 per cent on education, 88 per cent on health, 81 per cent on old age
pensions, 50 per cent on the environment, and 33 per cent on culture and
the arts. By comparison, only 13 per cent want more spending on the military
and defence. A majority of 86 per cent regards HIV/AIDS as 'the most serious
social/health issue in South Africa'.
Migration and emigration
When asked about their own personal emigration plans, the vast majority
of Jews do not seriously contemplate leaving the country. Only 12 per cent
of the total sample say they are very likely to leave over the next five
years. Half of these likely emigrants cite fears of crime and 'personal
safety' as the prime reason for this decision.
The future
The responses to the issues addressed in the report point to a cohesive
community existing within what is perceived to be a turbulent social and
political climate.
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, South African Jewry remains religiously
and communally vibrant, highly skilled and well qualified to assist in the
development of a democratic South Africa.
1/
Introduction
Early Jewish contacts with Africa
Jews have been associated with Africa since their enslavement by the
Pharaohs of ancient Egypt. Indeed their very origins have been attributed
to this period in captivity and to the biblical Exodus from Egypt. After
the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem (586 BCE), a number of
Jewish survivors took refuge in the military outpost at Elaphantine. Following
the conquests of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE, the city
of Alexandria became a centre of Jewish learning. Under the Romans, Philo
(first century CE) was one of the most influential Jewish philosophers associated
with the city. Jewish settlement spread westward under the Romans, despite
periodic oppression. After the Arab conquest of North Africa in the seventh
century, Jewish life and culture flourished. Jews were prominent in newly
founded Arab cities such as Fostat (Eqypt) and Kairouan (Tunisia). Isaac
Israeli (d.950) in Kairouan, and Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) in Fostat,
were eminent Jewish scholars in North Africa.
Other than Ethiopia, where the Beta Israel (Falashas) lived, the history
of sub-Saharan Jewry is linked to the history of European colonization.
Jewish navigators were involved in the early Portuguese voyages of exploration
and Jewish merchants in Holland were connected to the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) which pioneered settlement to the Cape of Good Hope. However, non-Protestants,
including Jews, were denied the right to settle during the rule of the DEIC
(1652 to 1795). This practice was abrogated under the relatively enlightened
Batavian administration (1803-06) and maintained thereafter by their administrative
heirs, the British, in 1806.
Jews in South Africa
A handful of Jews, mainly of English, Dutch and German origin, availed
themselves of the new circumstances. In 1841 they founded 'The Society of
the Jewish Community of Cape Town', forerunner of the Cape Town Hebrew Congregation.
Their numbers were consolidated by the influx of Eastern European Jews,
mainly from Lithuania, following the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s
and gold two decades later. Some of the newcomers made their way to Rhodesia
(present day Zimbabwe and Zambia). Mass immigration of Jews to South Africa
was virtually curtailed with the introduction of a Quota Act in 1930. (1)
The Eastern European newcomers readily adopted the Anglo-Jewish style,
rapidly discarding their distinctive garb and mores. They did not, however,
dilute their Jewish identity and indeed helped to establish a wide range
of communal institutions and organizations designed specifically to safeguard
that identity. Most importantly, the Eastern European Jews brought with
them a Zionist fervour which continues to mark the South African Jewish
community to this day. In 1898 the South African Zionist Federation (SAZF)
was founded, co-ordinating all Zionist work in the country, and in 1912,
the Jewish Board of Deputies for Transvaal and Natal (founded in 1903) and
the Jewish Board of Deputies for Cape Colony (founded in 1904) were merged
into the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, hereafter referred to as
the Board. As the official voice of the community, the Board understood
its mandate as representing the Jewish community to the authorities solely
on matters Jewish.
Both Anglo-German and Eastern European Jews had great respect for Britain,
its liberal institutions and its reputation for fair play. This showed in
the Jewish community's support for British-orientated political parties,
first the Unionists and later the United Party. The latter's attractiveness
was enhanced by Jan Smuts' association with the Zionist movement and, most
importantly, by the serious manifestations of antisemitism from right-wing
Afrikaners in the 1930s and 1940s. (2) Antisemitism prompted the governing
United Party to introduce the 1937 Aliens Act, curtailing German Jewish
immigration. Jews were left with a profound sense of vulnerability and fear
of Afrikaner hegemony in South Africa. Their fears were exacerbated when
right-wing pro-Nazi Afrikaners, including the Greyshirts and other fascist-like
organizations, opposed South Africa's entry into the Second World War. Jewish
identification with the English-speaking population was thus reinforced.
Concern reached its zenith when the National Party, with its blatantly anti-Jewish
record, came to power in 1948. (3)
The 'Jewish problem' disappeared rapidly from the public agenda as the
National Party government concentrated its energies on institutionalizing
apartheid. The new government's recognition of Israel and Prime Minister
D. F. Malan's visit to the Jewish state in 1953 further alleviated Jewish
anxiety. Jews showed consistent upward mobility with the proportion of administrative
and professional workers in the labour force increasing from 12 per cent
in 1936 to 40 per cent in 1960. (4) By 1961, virtually the entire Jewish
population was urbanised, with the overwhelming majority in the metropolitan
areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Pretoria. At its zenith in
1970, the community numbered 118,200, or 0.6 per cent of the country's total
population of 21.4 million, and3.1 per cent of the 3.7 million white population.
(5) Fifty-six per cent of all Jews had matriculated in comparison with 23
per cent of the total white population and 10 per cent of all Jews held
university degrees compared with 4 per cent of the total white population.
Jews were disproportionately represented in the commercial and financial
sectors (94 per cent of Jewish males were concentrated in the four sectors
of manufacturing, commerce, finance, and services) and employed almost exclusively
in the private sector, with 28 per cent of economically active Jews being
employers.
Numbed by the Holocaust, buoyed by the emergence of the Jewish state
and reassured by the National Party's new attitude, Jews for the most part
ignored the unfolding of apartheid in the 1950s. There were, however, a
number of radical left-wing Jews who were prepared to confront the state
directly. Other bodies, most notably the Union of Jewish Women, helped alleviate
some of the misery caused by apartheid through charitable projects and self-help
schemes. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 some Jews emigrated;
others supported liberal initiatives. But the majority of Jews were satisfied
simply to voice their opposition to the evils of apartheid through the ballot
box. Accusations of dual loyalty after Israel's support for the African
bloc at the United Nations in 1962, as well as public accusations associating
Jews with liberalism and communism, both terms of opprobrium at the time,
may well have contributed to Jewish communal quiescence during this period.
Unprecedented co-operation between Pretoria and Jerusalem from the 1970s
intensified the dilemmas.
In the wake of the Soweto uprising in 1976, many Jews moved into the
white laager; in the 1977 elections more than one in four Jews supported
the ruling party. The move to the right continued through the 1980s as the
National Party shifted to the centre of the political spectrum. It was against
this background that two new organizations, Jews for Justice and Jews for
Social Justice, were founded in 1985, in Cape Town and Johannesburg respectively.
Both organizations sought to enlighten Jews about South African realities,
to build bridges to black community organizations, and to participate actively
in changing South African society. Their members, largely of a younger generation,
rejected a bystander role and argued forcefully for a direct and explicitly
Jewish involvement in the unfolding political process.
With the National Party regime losing ideological coherence, amidst massive
repression and resistance, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies increasingly
condemned apartheid. South African Jews by and large welcomed the momentous
changes inaugurated by President De Klerk on 2 February 1990, which in effect
ended the apartheid era. The Jewish people stood fully behind the negotiation
process, culminating in South Africa's first democratic election in 1994.
Applauding President De Klerk did not, of course, mean unequivocal Jewish
confidence in the future. In addition to apprehensions they shared with
many other white South Africans, they had particular concerns: the freedom
to practice a full Jewish life as individuals and as a collectivity, the
right to pursue Zionist activities, and the continuation of relations between
South Africa and Israel.
Jews and the 'New South Africa'
According to the 1991 Census there were 59,000 Jews in South Africa,
that is approximately half the number enumerated a decade earlier. However,
the figure was misleading because, for the first time, the census described
the question on religion as optional. As a result one-fifth of all whites
did not answer the question. The size of the Jewish population could therefore
only be estimated. According to Allie A Dubb, an estimate based on a range
of variables, was between 92,000 and 106,000-less than 2 per cent of the
total white population and 0.5 per cent of the total population. The size
of the community had thus remained fairly constant, despite the emigration
of an estimated 40,000 Jews since 1970. There had been some immigration
from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 1970s, some re-immigration, and
an estimated influx of 6,000 Israelis.
The composition and structure of the community had changed significantly
because emigration occurred largely among middle-aged couples and their
children, with immigrants and returning émigrés having a different
profile. Examination of the age distribution suggests that, compared with
1980, the proportion of school-age children and their parents had decreased;
the proportion of those aged 60-70 decreased; and those over 70 increased.
Migration within South Africa continued. It was estimated that Johannesburg
had 60,000 Jews and Cape Town 21,000. Eighty per cent of South African Jews
were affiliated with a religious body. About four-fifths belonged to Orthodox
congregations and one fifth to Progressive organizations.
Confronting the Challenges
Although funds, skilled professional personnel and committed lay leadership
have become scarce-related to the emigration of young people and the ageing
of the community-South African Jewry continues to manifest a vibrant communal
life. This is exemplified in the two major organizations: The Board and
the SAZF. The Board deals essentially with domestic matters and the SAZF
with Israel-related activities. In 1987 the two premier fundraising bodies-the
United Communal Fund (UCF) and the Israel United Appeal (IUA)-had merged.
This single entity known as the IUA-UCF has unified the community and ensured
that the two funds do not compete with each other for contributions. The
IUA-UCF also enlists the help of the rabbinate and lay leaders of synagogues.
The major beneficiary of the UCF is Israel. Other recipients include the
Board, the Jewish day school movement, the Union of Orthodox Synagogues,
the Union of Progressive Judaism and the Union of Jewish Women. Congregations
and other bodies raise their own funds among members and with fundraising
drives. In 1992 it was decided to establish a Joint Communal Co-ordinating
Committee from the Board and SAZF to ensure communal unity, loyalty and
discipline. The initiative was stillborn. However, in October 1998 the Board,
the SAZF and the IUA-UCF established a joint commission to create a single
administration for the three groups. Under the new plan, each organization
would continue to follow its own agenda and maintain its own identity.
Financial rationalization, security, and the need to establish sound
relations with the wider population has dominated the Jewish communal agenda.
Among the priorities of the Board are monitoring acts of antisemitism and
safeguarding the rights of Jews as South African citizens. In pursuit of
these objectives the Board has maintained contact with government and public
officials and informed opinion makers, the press, and politicians on issues
relevant to the Jewish community. The Jewish community is enormously concerned
with rising crime levels. Safety and security has become a major focus of
communal endeavour. Caring for the elderly has also become a major problem,
especially as emigration broke up extended families and many of the elderly
were left to survive on their own resources.
South Africa's relationship with Israel under the ANC-led government
has come under close scrutiny by the SAZF. It appears that the government
does not wish to turn the Middle East into an arena of contention and conflict
among South Africans. Certainly it is aware of the centrality of Israel
for South African Jewry and the positive feelings of many others towards
Israel. At the same time, in the new South Africa, Middle Eastern foreign
policy is clearly going to be even-handed, based on the substantial sympathy
that existed for the Palestinians among the black majority.
The Union of Orthodox Synagogues (UOS) is the umbrella body for Orthodox
synagogues throughout South Africa. The UOS appoints and maintains the office
of the Chief Rabbi, the Johannesburg Beth Din, and the Cape Beth Din. Recently
there has been a tremendous growth in the Ba'al Teshuva (religious revival)
movement and a number of shtieblach have been established mainly in and
around Johannesburg. The Lubavitch Hassidic movement has also made inroads
into the community, especially in Johannesburg. The South African Union
for Progressive Judaism is the co-ordinating body for Reform congregations
which comprises approximately 12 per cent of the population.
The South African Board of Jewish Education (SABJE) controls a large
Jewish day school system. Despite the number of Jewish pupils in day schools
declining in recent years, these schools still enrol 7,443 children, or
approximately 75 per cent of all Jewish children. The schools are concentrated
in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The sole exception in Port Elizabeth survives
only because the majority of its pupils are not Jewish. The schools range
from tiny splinter institutions like the Yeshiva Maharsha to large day schools
like King David High School in Johannesburg. In ideology they range from
the strictly Orthodox (e.g. Yeshivas Toras Emes) to modern/centrist orthodox (Yeshivah College) to national-traditional (King David Schools and the United
Herzlia Schools). The SABJE also involves itself with Jewish children in
state schools. The Progressive movement maintains a network of supplementary
and religious classes at temples affiliated with it. A perennial cloud over
the Jewish day school horizon is funding. In April 1998 a government White
Paper effectively cut off state funding for private schools beginning in
April 1999. At the tertiary level university students are able to take undergraduate
and postgraduate courses in Jewish studies at the University of South Africa
and the University of Cape Town.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
A Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC), charged with investigating crimes
committed under apartheid, was established in 1995. (6) Under its provisions,
individuals who applied for amnesty would not be brought to trial if they
made a full disclosure of their actions since 1960. Gesher, a social action
group based in Johannesburg, was the first Jewish organization to make a
submission to the TRC, in January 1997.
A major oral submission was made to the TRC in November 1997 by Chief
Rabbi Cyril Harris. He identified substantial anti-apartheid activism on
the part of Jews but confessed on behalf of the community 'a collective
failure to protest against apartheid'.
The TRCs first published report contained a full section on the role
of the 'faith communities' under apartheid. Among the findings it was noted
that 'Religious communities in general, as a rule, failed adequately to
support dissident ministers, priests, imams, rabbis and lay persons who
found themselves in confrontation with the state.' (7) 'While members of
the Jewish community made their greatest contributions to South African
human rights as individuals, some organizations also played a role. During
the last years of apartheid, Jews for Justice and Jews for Social Justice
were important voices of protest.' (8)
Jews are largely part of the white minority and are fully protected under
the constitution by a Bill of Rights which enshrines religious and cultural
freedom. Antisemitic incidents in the 'new South Africa' have been largely
confined to far right and Islamist groups. Given the ANC's opposition to
racism, the climate for opposing antisemitism in South Africa publicly is
more favourable than in the past. Nonetheless, the Jewish population continues
to decline. According to the preliminary results of the 1996 census, there
were 55,734 white Jews; 10,449 black Jews; 1,058 coloured Jews and 359 Indian
Jews. Initially it was thought that the Black Jews belonged to the Lemba
group in the Northern Province, but this was not the case because further
analysis showed that the 'black Jews' were distributed throughout the country
and not restricted to the Lemba tribal area. Further analysis is necessary.
(There are an estimated 40,000 Lemba in all of southern Africa who claim
their origins from an ancient Jewish tribe in Sana'a, Yemen.)
David Saks, research officer at the Jewish Board of Deputies, adjusted
the white Jewish population total of the Census upward, based on several
factors. For one thing, the question on 'religion' in the census was optional,
and 'Judaism' was excluded from the options, so that respondents had to
write in 'Judaism' if they wished to indicate their religion. Also, approximately
17 per cent of the total population did not indicate any religion. Allowing
for a similar proportion of Jews doing the same, and adjusting the figures
accordingly, he arrived at a 'White' Jewish population of 65,023. In addition,
Saks noted that Census figures were widely considered to be too low, and
that a total South African population of 43 million was more realistic.
If this were the case, the white Jewish population should be further adjusted
upward by about 7 per cent, resulting in a final total of 70,000. By comparing
known Jewish white birth, death and marriage ratios with the known birth,
death and marriage ratios of the general white population it may be possible
that the Jewish population is between 75,000 and 80,000.
2/
Social Profile of the Respondents
Demographic characteristics
A total of 1,000 adult (18 years and over) respondents were interviewed
for this survey of whom there were 464 men and 536 women. Table 1 shows
the breakdown of the sample according to age. The median age of respondents
was 45 years. The nationally representative nature of the sample is discussed
in Appendix A.
Table 1: Age distribution of survey respondents

In terms of their current marital status, 55 per cent of the respondents
were married, while 9 per cent were divorced and 1 per cent were separated
at the time of the survey. A further 9 per cent were widowed and 2 per cent
were unmarried but living with a partner. Nearly one in four respondents
or 24 per cent were single, i.e. had never married and were not living with
a partner.
Educational achievements
The sample was very well educated by South African standards. Only 7
per cent of respondents had failed to matriculate indicating a very high
level of education. Table 2 tabulates the highest educational attainments
of respondents who had matriculated showing that overall 35 per cent had
attained a minimum of a university degree, including 41 per cent of men.
The table also shows the percentage of men and women at each level of educational
achievement. A clear male advantage is shown at the highest levels of tertiary
education with twice as many men as women holding Honours degrees and above.
Table 2: Highest educational attainments of matriculators

Employment and occupation
In total 68 per cent of the sample were in paid employment at the time
of the survey. Of these, 75 per cent were working full-time and 25 per cent
part-time. Furthermore, of those who were in paid employment, 42 per cent
were self-employed.
The breakdown of those who were not in paid employment revealed that
36 per cent were full-time housewives/househusbands or mothers/fathers.
About one in four were students and one- third were retired with only 5
per cent being unemployed and seeking work.
The occupations themselves were distributed across 7 job-type categories
as shown in Figure 1. The pattern of occupations reflect the high levels
of educational achievement of the Jewish population with half in professional
and managerial occupations and only 2 per cent in manual and unskilled jobs.
Figure 1: Occupation categories of respondents

Languages spoken
Not surprisingly this was a multi-lingual sample with a variety of languages
being spoken fluently. The vast majority of 98 per cent spoke English fluently,
while just over half of the respondents (53 per cent) also spoke Afrikaans
fluently. In addition, 13 per cent spoke Hebrew, 9 per cent spoke Yiddish,
3 per cent spoke French, 4 per cent spoke another European language and
2 per cent spoke an African language such as Zulu or Xhosa.
Birthplace
This pattern of language proficiency is largely explained in terms of
the birthplaces of the respondents. While 87 per cent of the sample were
born in South Africa, the remaining respondents were born in other Sub-Saharan
African countries (3 per cent), the UK (3 per cent), Germany (1 per cent),
Eastern Europe (2 per cent) and Israel (2 per cent).
When respondents were asked about the birthplace of their parents the
trend was clearly different with about 50 per cent of their mothers and
fathers being born in South Africa and around 25 per cent coming from Eastern
European countries.
Citizenship
In terms of citizenship, 94 per cent of respondents were South African
citizens. The remainder were citizens of the UK, other European countries,
Canada, the US and Israel. Given the common perception of the large numbers
of Israelis living in South Africa it was perhaps surprising to find that
only 1.4 per cent of respondents were Israeli citizens.
Geographical residence
The respondents were sampled according to the strategy laid out in Appendix
A in order to ensure a nationally representative sample. Of the 1,000 respondents,
650 lived in Johannesburg, 250 lived in Cape Town, 50 in Pretoria and the
remaining 50 in Durban.
Housing tenure
This is a population with a high degree of home ownership. Only 17 per
cent of respondents were living in rented accommodation at the time of the
survey. The majority, 67 per cent, were living in a residence that was owned
by the respondent or their spouse with the remaining 16 per cent living
in a residence owned by another household member.
Household composition
In addition to details about the individual respondents, some basic demographic
information was also collected about the households. Table 3 shows a breakdown
of the sizes of the households including the individuals being interviewed.
Nearly 20 per cent of respondents live alone while nearly 17 per cent live
in households of five or more persons. The most common sizes of households
consist of two and four individuals with a mean average household size of
2.94 persons.
Table 3: Size of respondents' households

The population was overwhelmingly composed of nuclear families. In terms
of the relationship of other household members to the respondent, the majority
fell into the following categories: husband/wife of respondent, child, father/mother
and brother/sister.
The survey reveals South African Jews as a high status, property owning,
urban community. Their social class profile is very much that of an elite
even within the white population. They are very much a unique population
in the African context and this is epitomised by the fact that 29 per cent
of Jewish women are university graduates. The occupational and educational
patterns reveal the South African Jewish population to be an important and
valuable human capital asset for the development of a new democratic society
and prosperous economy.
3/ Jewish Identity and Religiosity
Jewishness
Origin/parents
All 1,000 survey respondents were Jewish and the vast majority of 970
were born Jewish. The remaining 30 respondents were converts to Judaism-including
10 patrilineal Jews.
Personal sense of Jewishness
Respondents were questioned about their personal sense of
Jewishness,
and how important being Jewish was to them. This question was not concerned
with their levels of religious observance. The majority of respondents felt
strongly about their Jewishness with 49 per cent feeling 'extremely conscious
of being Jewish and it is very important to me' and 41 per cent feeling
'quite strongly Jewish, but I am equally conscious of other aspects of my
life'. Only 9 per cent indicated that they were aware of being Jewish, but
do not think about it very often. Out of 1,000 respondents, only 1 respondent,
or 0.1 per cent, answered 'although I was born Jewish, I do not think of
myself as being Jewish in any way' while 0.5 per cent were not able to choose
one of the above categories.
The concept of Jewishness is a complex one, not easily encapsulated by
answers to one question. The questionnaire highlighted several different
aspects of Jewish life and asked how important they were to the respondents.
Table 4 represents the percentages of responses for each item starting with
the aspect of Jewish life rated as the most important one by the majority
of the sample, namely feeling Jewish 'inside'. Overall, externalities such
as religion and culture were not regarded as important as intangible personal
and psychological ties.
Table 4: Percentages of opinions as to the importance of aspects of
Jewish life

Identity
Jewishness and Jewish identity are not static concepts. They are open
to change over time and under differing circumstances. Respondents were
asked whether their Jewish identity had changed or remained the same in
recent years, and this finding is represented in Figure 2. The general trend
was for an overall increase in Jewish identity. It is interesting to note
that this strengthening of Jewish identity has occurred simultaneously with
the political change in South Africa.
Figure 2: Changes in Jewish identity

Jewish friendship networks
In the 'Jewish attitudes, practice and belief' section of the survey
the respondents were asked what proportion of their close friends was Jewish.
Table 5 shows that over half of the sample responded that 'all or nearly
all' of their close friends were Jewish while only 8 per cent in total responded
that 'less than half' or 'none or very few' of their friends were Jewish.
Table 5: Comparison of SA and UK Jewish friendship patterns by (percentage)

The intensity of South African Jewish friendship networks and the concomitant
high level of social segregation is evident in the comparison with British
Jews who have wider friendship networks. (9)
Intermarriage
Intermarriage with persons of other faiths is always an issue that is
of interest to small religious minorities. Table 6 compares the percentage
of current married persons who were intermarried (or living as married)
in the South African survey with those in equivalent surveys in the UK and
the US. (10) It is clear that the rates of intermarriage in South Africa
are much lower than either of these two countries. Obviously this pattern
is linked to the above finding that most South African Jews mix in mainly
Jewish social networks.
Table 6: Comparison of in-married and out-married percentages in South
Africa, the UK and the US (percentage)

Jewish education
Experience of formal Jewish education
The issue of Jewish education was addressed in a range of questions.
Judaism encourages lifelong religious education and just over one in three
(38 per cent) respondents had been involved in furthering their Jewish education
as an adult in the form of informal Jewish education. In fact at the time
of the survey 9 per cent of the sample were or had been a Jewish education
lecturer or teacher. Looking back then to the respondents' youth, overall
83 per cent indicated that they had received some kind of Jewish education.
However, there are gender differences with almost universal male uptake
of Jewish education in comparison with only three-quarters of women. The
form that this education took was then examined in more detail in terms
of the type of education and the number of years attended. The form of Jewish
education attended by the greatest proportion of the sample was part-time
classes in synagogue (Cheder); 56 per cent of respondents had attended Cheder,
some for 3 months and others for 10 years or more.
Table 7 shows the percentage of male and female respondents who experienced
a range of different types of Jewish education for a minimum of 3 months.
Multiple answers were accepted. Men and women emerge as fairly evenly matched
for experiences of Jewish education, however men were more likely to have
attended Cheder or have received formal lessons from a family member.
Table 7: Male and female experience of Jewish
education (percentage)

The impact of their Jewish education can be measured by respondents'
attitudes towards Jewish education and perceptions of the role it might
play. Table 8 shows the strength of agreement or disagreement about a number
of Jewish education related statements.
Table 8: Attitudes towards Jewish education (percentage)

Table 8 shows that respondents are in agreement that it is important
that all Jewish children attend some form of formal Jewish education, but
they are divided on the idea that Jewish education may insulate children
from the realities of the wider world. It is interesting to note that 42
per cent of the sample were either in disagreement or unsure as to whether
the years spent in Jewish education have a cumulative effect with regard
to strengthening the commitment to a Jewish life in adulthood. This statement
on the utility of maximum possible exposure reflects a key argument behind
communal funding of Jewish education for children and young people.
Schooling of respondents' children
With these attitudes in mind we can now assess information about the
contemporary pattern of schooling in the Jewish population. This was collected
by asking about the respondent's oldest child from Grade 1/ Sub A (up to
and including age 20). Table 9 tabulates all the types of schools attended
by these children so far.
Table 9: Types of schooling attended by current students

The majority of South African Jewish youngsters attend Jewish day schools.
The choice of school is a religious, educational and financial decision
for parents. However, the overall pattern of schooling is of importance
for inter-group relations because the various types of schooling have differing
proportions of students from the non-white populations. The identification
benefits of Jewish day school for students have to be offset against the
lack of personal contact with non-Jews. Hence the division among parents
on the issue of the insulation of Jewish children in day schools which was
found in the final item of the previous table.
Experience of Jewish youth groups
Having addressed the younger generations' formal education, we now return
to consider the adult respondents' own earlier experiences of informal Jewish
education. The majority of respondents (71 per cent) had been members of
a Jewish club or youth movement when they were in their teens. Table 10
shows the membership pattern which reflects the Zionist orientation of the
Jewish community and the historic strength of socialist Zionism.
Table 10: Frequencies and percentages of attendance at Jewish/Zionist
youth clubs or movements

Eighteen per cent of respondents had been members of the South African
Union of Jewish students (SAUJS) and 15 per cent had participated in an
Israel group trip during their school going years.
Religious outlook and behaviour
Origin of the Bible/Torah
Table 11 compares the beliefs of the South African sample regarding the
nature of the Torah to those of UK and US samples. The South African population
emerges as being much more Orthodox and traditional in its theological outlook
on this issue.
Table 11: Comparison of feelings towards the Torah (percentage)

Religious outlook
Table 12 tabulates the replies to the question 'In terms of Jewish religious
practice, which of the following best describes your position?' from both
the South African and the JPR 1995 UK surveys.
Table 12: Religious outlook groups (percentage)

It can be seen that the distribution of the samples across the religious
outlook categories are quite different, with the South African sample being
much more to the 'right' than British Jews. Mirroring the pattern of theological
belief, South Africa has twice as many 'Traditional' Jews but about half
as many Just Jewish and Progressive Jews than the UK. The South African
sample emerged as having only a quarter of the proportion of secular Jews
compared with the UK.
Kashrut
The keeping of kashrut (Jewish food taboos) is an indicator of adherence
to normative Judaism. Table 13 shows the kinds of meat bought by respondents
for their homes.
Table 13: Kinds of meat bought for the home

Table 13 shows that 40 per cent of the sample will only buy meat for
the house that comes from a kosher butcher. Further questioning revealed
that 95 per cent of these individuals then separate meat from milk products
as regards cooking and serving and so on, i.e. 38 per cent of the overall
sample. This proportion equates with UK figures of 36 per cent, with the
US at 15 per cent emerging as being half as likely to observe the same practice.
A further subset of 15 per cent of the whole South African sample will eat
out only in kosher restaurants.
Religious observance
The many facets of religious observance including synagogue attendance
and participation in the various practices and rituals were addressed during
the interview. We already know from Table 12 earlier that 6 per cent of
the sample regard themselves as 'non-practising (i.e. 'secular', 12 per
cent as 'Just Jewish', 7 per cent as 'Reform/Progressive', 61 per cent as
'Traditional (not strictly Orthodox' and 14 per cent as 'Strictly Orthodox'.
Table 14 shows the percentage of respondents observing a range of personal
religious practices. These levels of religious practice exceed those of
the Jewish populations of all other countries including Israel.
Ninety-three per cent of respondents said that they attend a Seder meal
at Passover either at home or elsewhere. Of those remaining, 4 per cent
attended most years, 2 per cent some years and only 1 per cent never attend
a Seder meal. Another key ritual is the lighting of Sabbath candles in the
home on a Friday night. Exactly three-quarters of the sample responded that
candles are lit in their homes every Friday night, with 16 per cent saying
'sometimes' and 9 per cent replying 'never'.
Table 14: Percentage of respondents observing different personal religious
practices

Synagogue affiliation and attendance
Patterns of synagogue affiliation and attendance and how they change
are of importance to life within the South African Jewish community. The
interview focused on both present and past synagogue belonging and attendance.
In the year prior to participating in this research only 9 per cent of the
sample had not attended a synagogue service, with a further 11 per cent
going once or twice. Thirty-one per cent indicated that they had been on
a few occasions such as for festivals or Yahrzeit, (11) 10 per cent went
once a month, and 39 per cent went to synagogue most Sabbaths or more. In
comparison with the UK Jewish community, the South African community is
much more likely to attend synagogue regularly. The UK survey found that
more than a quarter (28 per cent) of all respondents had not attended synagogue
in the year prior to the survey.
Moving on to compare parental and current respondent affiliation, the
intergenerational shift appears to be very slight. Table 15 shows the past
and current affiliation patterns of the sample in addition to their current
synagogue attendance. It shows that the biggest shift in percentage terms
is towards non-affiliation rather than between synagogue types.
Table 15: Past and present synagogue affiliation (percentage)

Israel/Zionism
Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, and its
creation the state of Israel, are widely regarded by Diaspora communal leaders
and many ordinary Jews as being of crucial importance to Jewish life. For
most of this century it has been seen as a focus of consensus in the Jewish
community, the central aim of fundraising activity, as well as a force for
cohesion. The survey included a number of items concerning Israel and the
answers give an indication of the current relationship between respondents
and Israel.
Attachment to Israel
A general overview of South African Jews' present attachment to Israel
is supplied by respondents' answers to the question 'Can you say whether
you have any special feelings of attachment (or otherwise) towards Israel?'
Four choices were given: strong attachment, moderate attachment, no special
attachment and negative feelings. Figure 3 shows that overall, 54 per cent
felt a strong attachment and 33 per cent a moderate attachment to Israel.
Thus while 87 per cent expressed special feelings of attachment to Israel,
just under 1 per cent expressed negative feelings. Figures from the 1995
UK survey found that 80 per cent of respondents felt a strong or moderate
attachment to Israel, while US figures on a similar survey question in 1990
revealed that 69 per cent had a moderate or strong attachment.
Figure 3: Attachment to Israel

Another interesting indicator of a general feeling of solidarity with
Israel was the finding that a majority of the sample felt that there was
a consistent pattern of unfairness or bias in the media representation of
news about Israel: 12 per cent felt that the media was 'always' biased,
34 per cent though it was 'often' biased and an additional 37 per cent thought
it was 'sometimes' biased. In contrast, only 13 per cent felt that the South
African media was 'rarely or never' biased. This pattern of responses is
strikingly similar to that among Jews in the UK.
Visits
The majority of respondents, 79 per cent, have visited Israel at least
once. For comparison, in the UK 78 per cent of Jews have visited Israel
and in the United States, 37 per cent of Jews have visited Israel at least
once. Surprisingly perhaps, South African Jews are as likely to have visited
Israel as UK Jews despite the disparities in the distance between these
countries and Israel, and twice as likely as American Jews.
Respondents were also asked how many visits they had made to Israel in
the past ten years. Figure 4 shows that while 21 per cent had never visited
Israel, a further 20 per cent of the sample had not been to Israel since
1998. Thus 59 per cent of the sample had visited Israel at least once in
the ten years prior to participating in the survey.
Figure 4: Number of visits to Israel in the past 10 years

The significance of these figures is open to interpretation. Should this
level of visiting be placed in the context of international tourism, seen
in terms of solidarity or viewed in some other way such as emigration planning?
Obviously variables such as discretionary income and the leisure patterns
of this population need to be factored into the equation before a judgement
can be made.
Friends and relatives in Israel
Given recent increases in emigration from South Africa and, as we have
already seen, high levels of tourism, we should expect increasing social
connections with Israel. In fact over 8 out of 10 (83 per cent) South African
Jews said they have close friends or family in Israel.
Taken in aggregate the survey evidence on Jewish identity and religiosity
shows that overall levels of Jewish identity are high and even increasing.
There is a particularly strong sense of Jewish solidarity and active community
involvement within this population. In terms of international comparisons,
South African Jews are more Orthodox in belief and observance than British
Jews, and more Zionistic than American Jews. South African Jews, with their
high level of general education and exposure to Western culture, combined
with a relatively high level of religious observance and education, are
an interesting community in which to test out how Jewish beliefs and values
are operationalized in the social world. We can now see how this cultural
inheritance plays out in the particularly intriguing realm of contemporary
South African society.
4/
Social and Political Attitudes
Exposure to the media
It is appropriate to consider the media preferences of the respondents
as this is a major form of communication for both information and opinion.
The survey examined the respondents' television viewing patterns and their
preferences for secular and Jewish newspapers to determine which types of
media and communications reach and influence this population.
The majority of respondents have daily access to television, with 95
per cent of the sample watching at least some programming every day. Likewise,
88 per cent of respondents also listen daily to some radio. Table 16 shows
this sample's access to different forms of media.
Table 16: Respondents' use of the media

In addition to the terrestrial television channels, 73 per cent subscribe
to M-Net, 19 per cent to DStv, 1 per cent to Astrasat, with 4 per cent having
access to Shalom TV.
The choice of daily newspaper, which is specific to city of residence,
also reflects and influences political outlook in South Africa. The choice
was well distributed across the spectrum of broadsheets. The most popular
daily newspaper was The Star (47 per cent). Others that were regularly read
were Business Day (12 per cent), the Cape Argus (15 per cent), the Cape
Times (14 per cent) and the Citizen (12 per cent). The Sunday Times was
the most popular of the Sunday papers with a regular readership of 67 per
cent of this sample. The Sunday Independent was read regularly (at least
twice a month) by 11 per cent of the sample.
The statistics on the reading of the Jewish press are particularly relevant
for communication within the community. The majority of respondents (77
per cent) have read at least one Jewish newspaper or publication regularly,
the most popular of which were the Jewish Times (25 per cent read regularly
or occasionally), the South African Jewish Report (24 per cent) and the
Jewish Tradition (15 per cent).
Media bias
The previous section has shown that the majority of the sample have regular
access to the radio and both visual and printed media. Perceptions of media
bias have particular relevance in South Africa, a country with a recent
history of government media censorship under the apartheid regime. Respondents
were asked in reference to the South African media as a whole (i.e. press,
TV and radio) whether they believed the media is ever negatively biased
in the way they present a range of events. Table 17 shows how often respondents
sense bias in the handling of different topics. It is clear that the representation
of issues concerning Israel are particularly likely to be perceived as biased.
The fact that this sample considered the least sinned against group were
Jewish businessmen is a very important finding both for what it says about
contemporary South African society and the fair-mindedness and lack of 'paranoia'
of this population.
Table 17: Percentage believing there is media bias

General social attitudes
Importance of religion in South Africa
Bearing in mind the current social climate within South Africa, it was
interesting to address perceptions of the future importance of religion
among a population whose own average level of religiosity was increasing.
When asked to think of the country as a whole, 42 per cent believed that
religion will become more important to people while a further 38 per cent
believed that religion will remain of equal importance as present. Only
18 per cent believed that it will become less important with 2 per cent
of respondents professing not to know or not to be able to answer.
Moral issues
Attitudes towards moral issues are subjective and though they usually
correlate closely with religious beliefs they can also be influenced by
individuals' personal experiences or circumstances at the time. Respondents
were questioned on a range of personal and social practices and complex
issues of conscience, where personal judgement and religious principle tend
to overshadow the legal dimension. They were asked to rate these practices
on a scale of 1 to 10, whereby the closer they were to 1 the more they thought
the practice was never justified and the closer they were to 10 the more
they thought it was always justified. Table 18 tabulates the mean average
of scores on these questions in descending order i.e. the practices at the
top of the table were believed to be more acceptable than those at the bottom
of the table.
Table 18: Personal and social practices

The scores on these questions provide an interesting insight into the
day-to-day lives of individuals living in a sometimes volatile environment
where it is more acceptable to use a firearm in self-defence or uphold the
death penalty than to keep money that has been found or to buy goods that
are known to be stolen.
Family roles
With changing economic, social and political climates come changes in
gender roles both within and beyond the family. Traditional male and female
roles have changed dramatically in recent years across the western world
and attitudes as we approach the twenty-first century are more liberal than
ever before. Table 19 shows the patterns of agreement and disagreement to
a range of statements on traditional and more liberal family roles. In the
contemporary South African context, responses to these questions reveal
the economic pressures to go out to work on both spouses within a family
unit as well as the general agreement that work plays an important role
for women.
Table 19: Percentage agreeing and disagreeing with different family
roles

N.B. * denotes a statistical difference between the responses
of men and women
When these items were analysed further by gender it was interesting to
note that responses to the two items concerned with family finances were
significant (as denoted in Table 19). Women tended to agree more strongly
with the statement 'It is difficult to manage a home and family and have
a job but these days women often have to work to supplement the family income'
than men, but disagree more strongly with the statement that 'A man's job
is to earn the money, a woman's job is to look after the home and family'.
Sexual mores
Along similar lines to the section addressing particular social and moral
practices, the survey also looked at attitudes towards particular types
of sexual relationships as shown in Table 20. Thus, this sample of South
African Jews believe that adultery is more wrong than homosexuality, and
the general liberal outlook of this population in South African terms is
shown by the fact that 47 per cent believe that inter-racial relationships
are not wrong at all.
Table 20: Attitudes towards sexual relationships in different circumstances-percentage
('Don't know' responses excluded from table)

Prejudice
Racial prejudice
Attitudes of the general population towards the prevalence of racism
are pertinent in South Africa in general, and particularly so within the
Jewish community where one might believe there would be a heightened awareness
of such issues. When asked 'Do you think there is more racial prejudice
in South Africa now than there was 5 years ago, less or about the same amount?'
the sample was split. A plurality of 42 per cent believed that there was
more racial prejudice now than the period prior to the change of government
in 1994, with 29 and 28 per cent respectively believing that there was less
and no change in the level of prejudice.
Antisemitism
Some of these attitudes may be placed in context when we find that in
their opinion, 44 per cent of respondents believe that antisemitism is different
from other types of racism. In fact very few Jews believe that antisemitism
has decreased in the past 5 years (8 per cent), while 34 per cent believe
there has been an increase and 55 per cent believe that it has remained
about the same (3 per cent did not answer).
Yet when antisemitism in South Africa is then examined in the context
of antisemitism across the world, respondents tend to believe that it is
more of a problem elsewhere than it is in their home country as illustrated
in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Antisemitism in South Africa and the world

Personal experience of antisemitism
Table 21 tabulates the experiences of the respondents of different forms
of antisemitism during the past 5 years. These range from hearing someone
else making derogatory remarks about Jews in general to personally being
refused employment on these grounds. The pattern suggests that antisemitism
largely falls within the realms of discourse in South Africa but that it
is not important in practical terms, i.e. it is at the level of unpleasantness
rather than being threatening. Over a third of the sample have had no personal
experience of antisemitism in five years.
Table 21: Experiences of antisemitism (respondents may have experienced
more than one form of antisemitism)

Anti-Zionism
South African Jews' strong emotional ties to Israel mean that they are
particularly sensitive to the issue of anti-Zionism. We have already seen
that they regard the media as heavily biased against Israel. They also believe
that in terms of anti-Zionism, there has been a distinct shift towards a
perceived increase in negative attitudes over recent years as illustrated
in Figure 6. The ANC's ties in exile to Libya and the PLO are obviously
a factor in this perception, as is the fact that the previous government
tended to take a pro-Israel stance on the Middle East question.
Figure 6: Anti-Zionist feelings over the past 5 years

Affirmative action, gender equality and hate incitement laws
Affirmative action-giving preference to the disadvantaged races in jobs
and housing for example-is increasingly prevalent in the New South Africa.
When asked about their views regarding the laws which encourage affirmative
action only 18 per cent were in favour or supported them. In fact the majority,
77 per cent, were against such laws with the remaining 5 per cent being
unsure or declining to answer. However, when considering laws which prevent
gender inequity (i.e. laws preventing sexual discrimination) this sample
was split down the middle with 51 per cent supporting such laws and 49 per
cent opposing them. When this question was examined in more depth according
to gender there was the surprising finding that marginally more men than
women supported such a law (54 and 48 per cent respectively); however this
difference was not statistically significant.
As regards laws against people who incite or promote ill-feeling between
groups, by displaying posters or writing racist signs in public places for
example, there was more of a general consensus with 62 per cent supporting
such laws. However, a significant proportion of 35 per cent were still in
opposition to laws preventing the incitement of racial hatred, presumably
mostly on civil liberties grounds.
Neighbours
A classic social science method of assessing how comfortable individuals
are with certain groups of people is to ask how they would feel about having
this type of person or persons as next-door neighbours. This question is
particularly fascinating in the South African context because under Apartheid's
Group Areas Act there was legal enforcement of racial segregation. Table
22 shows how happy or unhappy respondents felt about having a range of different
groups of people as neighbours today, with those they felt happiest about
at the top of the table.
Table 22: Attitudes towards different types of neighbours (percentage)

The table demonstrates the largely liberal and tolerant outlook of this
population. Their feelings are placed in perspective when it is realised
that more people are unhappy even with fellow Jews as neighbours as compared
with Christians. Other races are now acceptable as neighbours by the vast
majority of the Jewish population. Given the Jewish historical experience,
it is not surprising that 80 per cent of the population would not want to
live next door to right-wing extremists.
Attitudes towards South Africa
Benefits from the 'new South Africa'
There have been substantial changes in South Africa since the new government
came to power in 1994, some of which may be perceived positively and others
negatively. This sample overwhelmingly judged the change as negative in
its impact as shown in Table 23. So while about a third of the sample were
positive about the benefits that have been gained for the people of South
Africa as a whole, only 1 in 6 feel that they have benefited personally.
There is an even clearer belief that the new political situation has not
been of benefit to the Jewish community as a whole.
Table 23: Benefits from the New South Africa (percentage)

Crime and personal security
With social, political and economic changes have also come increases
in crime and concerns about personal security. It has already been noted
that on average, respondents believe that it is often justified to use a
firearm in self-defence, a reflection of the growing concerns about personal
safety.
This was confirmed when respondents were asked to rate South Africa in
terms of personal safety. An overwhelming majority, 90 per cent of the sample,
rated South Africa as either 'poor' or 'very poor' on this issue. Further
concerns were highlighted when questioning those who were fairly or very
likely to leave South Africa to live in a different country during the next
five years. Of these 267 individuals, 121 cited 'personal safety concerns'
as their most important reason for leaving. A further 90 cited such concerns
as their second or third most important reason.
Law and order
Given the growing concern about crime, perceptions of the purpose of
criminal sanctions and appropriate punishments are important. The survey
briefly addressed sentencing and law and order, eliciting views on what
the main aim of imprisonment should be when someone is sentenced by a court.
This is clearly a divisive issue. The sample was split across all four categories
as follows: 25 per cent believe the main aim of imprisonment is to re-educate
the prisoner; 28 per cent believe it is to make those who have done wrong
pay for it; 27 per cent believe it is to protect other citizens; and the
remaining 14 per cent think it is to act as a deterrent to others (1 per
cent was unsure).
A more consensual topic was the application of the death penalty for
different situations, between which there appeared to be very little to
choose. Eighty per cent were in favour of the death penalty for murder in
the course of a terrorist act, 81 per cent supported it for murder of a
police officer and 79 per cent were in favour of the death penalty for other
murders.
Cultural identity
Group identification is a particularly pertinent issue given the political
and social changes in South Africa's recent history. It is interesting to
see how this population perceives itself in the context of the country and
the alignment of different groups of people living within it. They were
asked 'Would you describe yourself more as an English speaking South African,
a white South African, or both equally?' The smallest proportion, 9 per
cent, identified themselves as 'more white South African', 57 per cent as
'equally English speaking and white', and 32 per cent as 'more English speaking
South African'. Two per cent were unsure.
Respondents were then asked directly 'Would you say you feel more South
African than Jewish, more Jewish than South African, or both equally?' in
order to discover the range of identifications within this population. Figure
7 shows that only 7 per cent replied that they felt 'more South African
than Jewish', 47 per cent that they felt 'equally South African and Jewish'
and 45 per cent that they felt 'more Jewish than South African'. Only 1
per cent was unsure.
Figure 7: South African vs. Jewish group identity

There is obviously a sizeable segment of this population that does not
regard itself as primarily South African (if it ever did) when offered this
choice alongside language, race and ethnicity. This lack of national identity
is probably unexceptional amongst a population subject for over 50 years
to a political climate that stressed cultural difference and institutionalized
racial and linguistic segregation.
Quality of life
One way of measuring the levels of optimism in this population in South
Africa was to ask how much respondents agreed or disagreed with this statement:
'The quality of my life in South Africa will improve over the next five
years'. Given the results reported so far it was not unexpected to find
that just one in eight respondents (13 per cent) agreed with this optimistic
statement while a further 19 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed. However,
a resounding 65 per cent disagreed with the statement, the implication being
that they believe that the quality of life in South Africa will in fact
deteriorate over the next five years.
The accompanying finding that 59 per cent of respondents believe that
people are less willing to help each other than they used to be 5 years
ago may be implicated in these views on the current and future trends in
the quality of life.
Social Responsibility
Attitudes towards charitable giving
The Hebrew term tzedakah is often translated into English merely as charity.
However, this is an inadequate definition for it also means righteousness
and social justice. There is a clear religious obligation on Jews to pursue
these goals in the world. The Jewish population of South Africa, with its
high degree of religiosity, should be well aware of this fact.
Given the clear biblical injunction on Jews to give to charity, the survey
asked respondents whether they thought Jews had a special responsibility
to give to charity because they were Jews or whether they had the same responsibilities
as others. The sample was roughly divided into two halves on this question.
Forty-one per cent agreed that Jews had a special responsibility to give
and 58 per cent believed that they had the same responsibility as others
(1 per cent didn't know). Presumably most of the latter group believed that
Christians were also obligated to be charitable because of their acceptance
of the Hebrew Bible.
Given these perceptions of charitable giving, respondents were also asked:
'Irrespective of what you did in the past year, do you feel you have a greater
responsibility to support some types of charity than others?' Respondents
were asked to choose between general South African charities, aid for the
poor in other countries (i.e. outside SA), Jewish causes in South Africa
and Israeli causes and to nominate both their first and second charitable
priorities as shown in Table 24. Clearly this population believes in the
old adage 'charity begins at home' since their first choice is their own
community followed by other South Africans.
Table 24: First and second charitable priorities (percentage)

Patterns of charitable giving
Why some people in society are more charitable than others and how one
motivates larger numbers of donors are questions of interest to social scientists
as well as to charities. We would expect both the propensity to give and
the size of gifts to be higher among South African Jews than among the general
population because of a combination of factors including wide exposure to
religious education and comparatively higher levels of socio-economic status,
educational qualifications and income.
This survey addressed financial contributions to charitable causes. Respondents
were questioned about both household and personal financial contributions
to Jewish and non-Jewish causes or charities in the year prior to participating
in the survey. In terms of donations to Jewish causes, 75 per cent of respondents
had personally made a financial contribution to these while an additional
12 per cent were part of a household within which donations had been made.
A lower proportion of respondents, 61 per cent, had personally made a contribution
to non-Jewish causes with an additional 10 per cent being within a household
making such a contribution. Thus the actual pattern of charitable giving
correlates well with the pattern of priorities discussed above.
Special responsibility on discrimination
Given the views of this population regarding prejudice and the recent
abolition of the apartheid system of legalised discrimination, it is interesting
to note that 42 per cent of the sample believe that Jews have a special
responsibility, because they are Jews, to help people who suffer discrimination.
The remaining 57 per cent believe that Jews have the same responsibility
as others (1 per cent was unsure). Jews were often regarded as the most
liberal element among the dominant white population. Their level of liberalism
however needs to be seen in an international perspective. The above finding
is even more pertinent when compared with UK figures whereby a higher proportion
of British Jews (54 per cent) believed that Jews have a special responsibility
to help others suffering discrimination.
HIV/AIDS
The HIV and AIDS pandemic is a health issue for communities and countries
across the world but it is particularly serious in Africa. The fears associated
with the disease results in some sufferers being exposed to discrimination.
Attitudes towards HIV and AIDS are often formed in the context of communities
and their values, and the survey addressed a range of such issues. Respondents
were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements
which reflected the views some people have about HIV and AIDS as shown in
Table 25. These attitudes reveal a mix of educated liberalism together with
more traditional Jewish views. Even among this well-educated population
there is an element of placing the moral blame on sufferers.
Wealth tax
Nation building and social equity in South Africa may well require going
beyond the redistribution of income. The introduction of a wealth tax would
be one measure that would predominantly affect the wealthier inhabitants
of South Africa, such as members of the Jewish community. The sample was
divided on the issue of a wealth tax on assets and property owned. Twenty
per cent agreed with the introduction of such a wealth tax, 14 per cent
neither agreed nor disagreed and 63 per cent disagreed, while 3 per cent
were unsure or didn't answer.
Table 25: Attitudes towards HIV and AIDS (percentage)

Government spending
One way of gauging the importance of certain services to individuals
is to ask whether there should be more or less government spending in those
areas, on the understanding that if increased spending is proposed there
might have to be tax increases to pay for it. Table 26 shows the attitudes
of respondents towards government spending on a range of services. There
is a clear consensus regarding increased spending priorities on policing
and law enforcement, education, health and old age pensions, which reflect
the contemporary concerns of the Jewish population. Interestingly these
concerns largely align with the spending priorities of the current government.
Table 26: Government spending on service (percentage)

This table reflects a theoretical willingness to increase rates of taxation
for spending on key services. This is particularly interesting given that
70 per cent of respondents think the amount of tax their household has to
pay is too high at present.
Political outlook
Political party support in 1994 and 1998
This survey took place in 1998, four years after the 1994 general election
but before the recent 1999 elections. Respondents were questioned on their
voting patterns in the 1994 elections and their current political party
preference as shown in Table 27.
Table 27: Support for political parties by eligible voters

The Jewish vote in 1994 was unique amongst the white population. Over
half the Jews voted for the Democratic party, which gained less than 2 per
cent of the vote nationally. Roughly one in nine voted for the African National
Congress and one in three for the former governing National Party.
The party preference figures for 1998 reveal the political realignment
and uncertainty that occurred during the period of South Africa's first
multiracial parliament. There was a general decline in support for the National
Party and of white support for the ANC. Our survey seemed to presage the
emergence of the Democratic Party as the official opposition which took
place at the second free General Election in 1999. Assuming the undecided
spread their votes in the same was as those with a preference, we can assume
that the Democratic Party led by Tony Leon received over 80 per cent of
the Jewish vote.
The overwhelming Jewish support for the Democratic Party reflects the
good fit between its political policies and approach and the opinions and
attitudes presented in these findings. The clearest manifestation of this
is the negative attitude towards affirmative action which is regarded by
the DP as merely an inversion of the apartheid mentality and a re-racialization
of South African society.
Migration
Internal migration plans
Respondents' migration plans are clearly important for a community that
is planning for the future; migration being concerned with not only emigration
but also movements within South Africa. A high rate of residential migration
has always been a feature of South African Jewry. There has been a drift
away from the small centres of the Platteland and more recently the provincial
centres towards the two major cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town.
However, a plateau has now been reached and less than 3 per cent of the
sample intend to move within South Africa in the foreseeable future. Any
further movement is likely to be towards Cape Town and away from Durban.
The Jewish future in Israel
An essential feature of classic Zionist ideology is the belief that only
in a sovereign Jewish state is there a secure long-term future for Jews.
Therefore in a Jewish community where emigration is a serious concern there
is a real opportunity to measure Zionist commitment in action. Important
conclusions can be drawn about the state of more ideologically-based attachment
to Israel from the responses to the following statement: the only long-term
future for Jews is in Israel. Respondents could tick one of five boxes:
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly
disagree. Of the total sample, only 8 per cent strongly agreed but 46 per
cent rejected the classic Zionist view.
Attitudes towards aliyah
Whatever people's ultimate opinion about the long-term viability of the
Jewish Diaspora, on the personal level Israel has entered into the equation
as a place to live for a majority. In this 1998 South African survey, 8
per cent of the sample have lived there while 40 per cent have thought about
going to live in Israel in the past.
Table 28: Attitudes towards aliyah (emigration to Israel)

Return migrants
Information was sought about respondents' migratory patterns between
January 1975 and the time of completing the survey. A total of 130 respondents,
or 13 per cent of the sample, replied that they had left South Africa with
the intention of settling in another country between 1975 and 1998 when
the respondents were once again residing in South Africa. Emigration was
particularly high during the years of 1979, 1985 and 1987, with half of
the leavers going before 1985.
Of the 130 individuals who left South Africa during this period, 39 per
cent went alone, 22 per cent went only with their spouse, a further 22 per
cent went with their children and their spouse, 8 per cent with their parents
and 8 per cent with other family members. The most popular countries for
the returnees were Israel (35 per cent), the US (22 per cent), the UK (17
per cent) and Australia (13 per cent). However, one in four respondents
who left to live in one country were not living in that same country before
returning to South Africa.
As respondents to this survey, all individuals who left during this period
returned to South Africa at some point prior to mid-1998. Thirty per cent
of the leavers had returned after the political changes following the 1994
elections, with 9 per cent returning in 1996.
Emigration plans
Emigration and talk of emigration is a feature of contemporary white
South African society. Yet when asked directly about their own personal
emigration plans, it appears that the vast majority of Jews do not seriously
contemplate leaving the country. Only around 12 per cent of the total sample
are very likely to leave over the next five years. This figure too has to
be offset against the 13 per cent of returnees who were emigrants in the
past. Nevertheless, it appears there will be a constant stream of farewell
parties for the foreseeable future which will inevitably lower communal
morale. However the impact of overseas migration will vary across cities
since proportionately more people appear to be planning to emigrate from
the smaller centres of Durban (24 per cent) and Pretoria (16 per cent) than
from Johannesburg (12 per cent) and Cape Town (10 per cent).
Respondents were questioned on the likelihood of them staying or leaving
South Africa in the next 5 years and the responses are shown in Table 29.
Table 29: Respondents' emigration plans

Destinations of potential emigrants
Responses to questions by respondents who were either 'fairly' or 'very
likely' to leave South Africa in the next five years were examined further
in terms of the countries they would most like to move to. Four countries
emerged as being the most popular. Thirty-three per cent favoured Australia,
27 per cent favoured Israel, 20 per cent were most likely to move to the
US and 13 per cent to the UK. We have noted that only one in four potential
emigrants was seriously considering a future in Israel.
Reasons for leaving South Africa
The 27 per cent of respondents who said that they were either fairly
or very likely to leave South Africa to live elsewhere in the next five
years were questioned further on their reasons for leaving. One reason emerged
as the primary concern for 52 per cent-personal safety concerns. Other respondents'
impetuses were to be with family (15 per cent), worries about the future
of South Africa (15 per cent) and the education of their children (9 per
cent).
The future of South African Jewry
The response patterns to the issues addressed in the report so far point
to a cohesive community existing within what is perceived to be a turbulent
social and political climate. Nation building, as already discussed, goes
beyond the internal redistribution of power and wealth. It requires the
availability of human capital as a foundation. The same may be said for
the Jewish community and its infrastructure, and as such respondents' opinions
were solicited on the future of Jewish life in South Africa as shown in
Table 30.
Table 30: Attitudes towards the future of South African Jewry (percentage)

Obviously the findings on the previous emigration questions colour people's
expectations of the future. Table 30 suggests that respondents believe themselves
to be part of an ageing community, one within which most younger Jews do
not feel themselves to have a future. Interestingly, attitudes towards the
perceptions of Jews under the age of 30 years were consistent across each
age group including the target group itself.
There is a need to see the present rather pessimistic view of the future
of South African Jewry in historical perspective. A question mark has hung
over the future of the community ever since the National Party won the 1948
General Election and introduced apartheid. This led over the past 30 to
40 years to a slow erosion of the population base because of the emigration
of young Jews and was particularly noticeable among the liberally minded
and well qualified professionals whose qualifications meant that they were
welcome in other countries.
5/
Concluding remarks
South African Jewry remains vibrant, highly skilled and well qualified
to assist in the development of a democratic South Africa. The vast majority
of Jews do not wish to emigrate; they are deeply rooted in the country of
their birth. However, crime and fears for personal safety remain a source
of concern. The new government under President Thabo Mbeki has committed
itself to tackling the unacceptable crime rate. Success in this regard will
do much to ensure confidence among all South Africans, including Jews.
In the event of instability and a major demographic shift, all aspects
of Jewish life will be affected: institutional memberships, synagogue life,
welfare needs and services, schooling, funding-to say nothing of general
morale. The emigration of philanthropists and benefactors is already being
felt in a community heavily dependent on self-funding. Of course, emigration
also affects the quality of leadership, and at this time of social transformation,
the need for wise and sensitive guidance is acute. To date this has been
manifest and there is good cause for optimism, both insofar as the Jews
of South Africa are concerned and the country as a whole.
6/
Further Analysis Postscript
This report contains the highlights of the survey findings but it provides
only a glimpse of the fascinating and wide range of topics and issues that
the national survey covered. As such it is only the start of the process
of analysing this large and rich data set. Appendix B shows there were actually
over 100 questions posed to 1,000 persons. In fact hundreds of variables
can be created from the answers which means there are hundreds of thousands
of pieces of information potentially available. Many topics which were dealt
with only perfunctorily in this report can be considered in much greater
depth by drawing on additional answers to associated questions. For instance,
there is much more that could be said about gender issues, demographics,
migration, the media, health, Jewish education, religious practice and Jewish
identity than we had room for here.
The data presented here were mainly in the form of aggregate data-the
overall national scores. There is the possibility of producing comparative
breakdowns of groupings within the overall population. Mining of the data
alongside segmenting the population will tell interesting and important
stories. How and in what ways do Johannesburg and Cape Town Jews differ?
Where do men and women, Reform and Orthodox, or young and old agree and
disagree? What were the social profiles of Jewish ANC or NP voters in 1994?
This data also provides important material for the crucial practical task
of planning the future of South African Jewry in terms of education, welfare
and religious services. The Kaplan Centre is committed to producing a series
of further reports along these lines.
7/
Appendices
Appendix A. Methodology of the 1998 National Survey of South African
Jews
The objective of the survey was to complete 1,000 face-to-face interviews
with a nationally representative sample of adult South African Jews. The
questionnaire content was designed to replicate as far as possible the postal
JPR 1995 Survey of the Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews.
The questionnaire also drew on other contemporary national surveys of Jewish
populations as well as items from the British Social Attitudes Survey in
order to enhance the comparative international context. The full range of
topics covered can be seen in Appendix B. The questionnaire consisted of
100 questions and the average length of an interview was between 40-60 minutes.
1 Fieldwork
The fieldwork was carried out between June and October 1998. For a survey
of this nature, evening or night-time interviewing is essential. A sizeable
sector of interviewers in Johannesburg were reluctant to work at night because
of fears relating to the levels of crime and violence. As a result the data
collection took longer to complete than originally anticipated. In addition
the questionnaire was quite long and often necessitated making appointments
to interview.
2 Research approach and methodology
a. Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban
Communal lists were available for these cities. The lists were given
to Decision Surveys International (DSI) in alphabetical order and comprised
names, addresses and, in most cases, telephone numbers.(12)
To ensure that all suburbs were proportionately represented within each
of the three cities, the suburbs were colour-coded on the full list and
the number per suburb grouping were counted.(13)
Using Pretoria as an example, it was checked whether the list of 50 'originals'
drawn comprised the correct proportion per suburb grouping and the list
was corrected where necessary. Thus if the list of 50 'originals' drawn
by the nth number method yielded 6 interviews in an area which the total
suburb grouping count reflected as requiring 8 interviews, the sample was
adjusted accordingly. However, such adjustments were only necessary in a
few instances. Overall, the approach ensured that the sample would yield
a representative spread area-wise within the three cities (Cape Town, Durban
and Pretoria).
Since it was not always possible to obtain interviews with the original
household drawn, the interviewers were also provided with 3 substitute names
for each original name. So for example, if in Pretoria the first name on
the list of 50 originals drawn was 'Mr and Mrs G Cohen from Sunnyside',
the interviewers were provided with the first 3 names from the correct suburb
grouping following G Cohen on the Pretoria communal list i.e. from the grouping
'Sunnyside, Brooklyn, Muckleneuk, Menlo Park'.
Substitution only occurred after at least 3 attempts were made to obtain
the required respondent from the 'original' household. More specifically
the interviewers telephoned a household from the 'original' list and then
applied the 'last birthday' method to determine which person in the household
should be interviewed. Following this the interviewer attempted to set up
an appointment to conduct a personal interview with the selected respondent.
If this interview could not be conducted, interviewers did not substitute
it for someone else in the household as this could have skewed the sample.
Instead they tried the first substitute household and applied the 'last
birthday' approach and so on.
b. Johannesburg
The lack of communal lists in Johannesburg necessitated a review of information
on proportionate distribution of Jewish people in various suburbs. DSI were
obliged to use the 1991 census data as a starting point. The data was submitted
to the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and they adjusted it in accordance
with their current suburb proportion estimates. These new proportions were
used to structure the Johannesburg sample i.e. based on these proportions
the number of interviews to be done per suburb and per suburb grouping was
calculated.
Grids were used to draw the sample. If, for example, a suburb required
15 interviews the map of that suburb was divided into 15 grid-blocks and
a starting point was found within each block. Using starting point no. 1
as an example: The household at the starting point was approached. A 'contact
questionnaire' was used to establish if anyone in the household considers
himself/herself to be Jewish and, if so, the 'last birthday' method was
applied to identify the selected respondent. If there were no Jewish household
members, interviewers tried to get a lead as to where the nearest Jewish
person lived and/or the interviewer moved on to find a household comprising
a Jewish person(s). The first household in which they found a Jewish person
would become the 'original' household for starting point no. 1. The 'last
birthday' method was then used to select the respondent. If for some reason
the selected respondent could not be interviewed, interviewers would move
on to find a substitute household comprising Jewish person(s) and would
reapply the birthday method to select a respondent. Once again-as was the
case for other cities-substitution only occurred after at least 3 attempts
to obtain an interview with the selected respondent from the original household
had been made.
c. Substitution during the survey
It should be noted that interviewers were instructed to put maximum effort
into obtaining the respondents from 'original' households. They only moved
to substitute households if it was essential to do so as follows:
- When there were 'refusals'.
- When there was no reply from the selected 'original' household after
at least 3 calls made at suitable times.
- When the respondent selected via the last birthday method from the
original household was unavailable during the interviewing period (e.g.
on leave, holiday, seriously ill, in hospital); permanently mentally or
physically disabled to the extent that they could not be interviewed; theoretically
in the relevant city at the time and fit to be interviewed but could not
be contacted or interviewed despite at least 3 attempts to contact or interview
the individual at appointed times.
In the survey as a whole, a high percentage of 'originals' was obtained,
that is:
- 77.5 per cent of the interviews were with the selected respondents
from the original households.
- 22.5 per cent of the interviews were with respondents from substitute
households.
The reasons for the substitutions were:
- 6.3 per cent: refusals
- 2.5 per cent: selected household could not be contacted after at least
3 attempts
- 5.5 per cent: selected respondent unavailable during interviewing period
- 0.6 per cent: selected respondent permanently mentally or physically
disabled to the extent that they could not be interviewed
- 1.8 per cent: selected respondent could not be contacted/interviewed
despite at least 3 attempts at appointed times
- 5.8 per cent: instructed by office to substitute (14)
3 Sample size and composition
Decisions relating to sample size and composition were based on the study
objectives, the estimated number and distribution of Jewish people in various
cities/areas throughout South Africa and budgetary issues. Unfortunately,
there was no up-to-date information on the number and distribution of Jewish
people. It was therefore necessary to work with adjusted 1991 census data
to decide on which cities to include in the survey and the proportion of
interviews per city and the distribution of interviews in Johannesburg since
no communal lists were available there. (15)



In total, 1,000 individual face-to-face interviews were conducted with
Jewish males and females aged 18 years and older in Johannesburg, Pretoria,
Cape Town and Durban. In the absence of precise up-to-date information,
the extent to which the age and sex ratios in the sample being obtained
reflected the current total Jewish population is unknown.
Although JPR had opted for using the 'last birthday' method without controlling
the male:female ratio, DSI was concerned that an imbalance could occur.
The gender ratio was monitored throughout the survey and it was found necessary
to boost the male proportion towards the end of the survey. Similarly it
was also necessary to boost the younger age groups towards the end of the
survey (as mentioned previously).
Suburbs for Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban
There were lists to work from in these three cities. Table 34 shows the
area proportions per suburb grouping based on analysis of the lists and
alongside that the proportions actually obtained in this survey.

The 1996 National Census data
The most recent national census data, which included a voluntary question
on religion, became available at the end of 1998 once the survey had already
been completed. Although it was received in time for weighting the survey
data if necessary, this did not seem to be necessary or wise. The new census
data is still controversial because of problems of coverage and coding.
However, some comparative census information on the Jewish population is
used for the relative proportions for the cities included in the survey
and the sex and age ratios as shown in Table 35. The census results appeared
largely to validate the geographical distribution and sex ratios of the
sample. However, they suggested that the survey may have oversampled the
middle aged at the expense of the elderly population. Yet, given the concern
of the sponsors about the future of Jews in the New South Africa, this may
not be regarded as a serious deficiency.

Appendix B. Question Guide

Notes
1 G. Saron and L. Hotz (eds.), The Jews in South Africa:
A History (Cape Town, Oxford University Press 1955).
2 G. Shimoni Jews and Zionism: The South African
Experience 1910-1967 (Cape Town, Oxford University Press 1980).
3 M. Shain The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa
(Charlottesville and London, The University Press of Virginia 1994, and
Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).
4 A. Arkin The Contribution of South African Jewry to Contemporary
South African Economic Life Jewish Affairs, 1995, 40, 1.
5 A. A. Dubb The Jewish Population of South Africa:
1991 Sociodemographic Survey (Cape Town, Kaplan Centre, UCT 1994).
6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa
Report, Volume 4, 1998.
7 Ibid. 91.
8 Ibid. 64.
9 Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmool and Antony Lerman, 'Social
and political attitudes of British Jews: some key findings of the JPR survey',
JPR Report no. 1, February 1996.
10 Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg,
Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar and Jeffrey Scheckner, Highlights of the CJF
1990 National Jewish Population Survey (New York, Council of Jewish
Federations 1991).
11 Annual remembrance service for close family member.
12 The names were either those of individuals e.g. Mr R
Levy, Mrs Z Jacobs) or couples (e.g. Mr and Mrs R Stein). The count covered
the listings and was not a population count i.e. Mr and Mrs R Stein was
counted as one name. The Pretoria lists excluded phone numbers and our interviewers
were required to look up the numbers in the directory.
13 To yield numbers that could be worked with, the suburbs
were grouped together if they were close to one another or in the same area.
At times the grouping spanned a relatively large geographical area because
of the suburbs being rather isolated and comprising a small number of Jewish
people e.g. the 'Sarnia Queensborough, Cowies Hill, Westville, Berea North,
Pinetown, Kloof, Hillcrest' grouping in the Durban sample.
14 Throughout the survey the proportions of males
and females and those within different age groups were monitored. Towards
the end of the survey it was necessary to boost the proportion of males
and younger age groups in order to ensure that there would be adequate numbers
in each cell for the purpose of data analysis. Adjustment totalled 5.8 per
cent.
15 Details of the 1991 adjusted data showing proportions
of Jewish people per city were given to JPR together with initial sample
recommendations per city. JPR made final decisions as to the sample composition.
16 The census results show a sizeable sector of the Jewish
population as being black. Interestingly they are geographically dispersed
and they do not reside in Vendaland, the Lemba tribal area, so they cannot
belong to this tribe which considers itself Jewish. Given this discrepancy,
the comparative data shown above uses the census data only for white Jews.
Report
authors
in association with the

The Kaplan Centre was established
in 1980 under the terms of a gift to the University of Cape Town, South
Africa by the Kaplan Kushlick Foundation and is named in honour of the parents
of Mendel and Robert Kaplan. The Centre, the only one of its kind in South
Africa, is engaged in both research and teaching and functions as a co-ordinating
unit in the university and is incorporated in the Department of Hebrew and
Jewish Studies.
Professor Barry A. Kosmin is
Director of Research at JPR. He was founding Director of the North American
Jewish Data Bank at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He
has directed a large number of studies of Jewish populations worldwide,
including the the US 1990 National Jewish Population Survey.
Dr Jacqueline Goldberg is Research
Fellow at JPR. She is co-author of three reports based on the 1995 JPR Survey
of Anglo-Jews examining the attitudes of young unmarried Jews, attachment
to Israel and patterns of charitable giving. She is currently involved in
JPR's Long-term Planning for British Jewry programme of research. Jacqueline
is also a consultant with Z/Yen Ltd, a risk/reward management consultancy.
Professor Milton Shain is Professor
of Modern Jewish History and Director of the Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre
for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town. Among his
books are 'The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa', published by the
University Press of Virginia in 1994 and 'Antisemitism', published by Bowerdean,
London in 1998.
Shirley Bruk is Senior Research
Executive and Branch Manager at Decision Surveys International Ltd in Cape
Town, South Africa who carried out the fieldwork and sampling for this project.
Shirley specialises in both quantitative and qualitative market research
and was previously Research Manager at J. Walter Thompson and Research Director
at McCann Erickson.
Acknowledgements JPR is grateful
to |