jpr / report           No. 1 1996

Social and political attitudes of British Jews: 
some key findings of the JPR survey

This study presents the first results of a survey of the
largest and most representative sample yet obtained of
British Jews. It encompasses the whole community-
including the substantial proportion who are assimilated,
outmarried or uninvolved.
Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmool and Antony Lerman

Introduction

Assumptions about the attitudes and opinions of British Jews influence policy formation on key issues affecting Jewish life. Yet until now, on most issues - from internal communal problems, to social and political matters - there has been no reliable information on Jewish attitudes. Policy planning has suffered as a result. To fill this crucial information gap, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (formerly the Institute of Jewish Affairs) commissioned a survey of social and political attitudes of British Jews, the first of its kind. The aim was to produce a profile of the community defined in the broadest possible terms. Uniquely, the survey focuses on the interface between Jewish identity and the social and political attitudes of Jews.

This report summarizes and analyses some key findings. A comprehensive report exploring the complexities of attitudes and behaviour revealed in the data, including a considerable amount of qualitative material, will be published later in 1996. Over the next two years, JPR will publish a series of in-depth analyses of specific topics which will include policy proposals.

The findings are based on 2,180 self-completion questionnaires obtained from a postal survey of British Jews between July and October 1995. This represents the largest and most representative sample yet obtained of the British Jewish community using methods designed to generate a random sample of self-identifying Jews. The sample is not drawn from community lists.

About the survey

British Jewry is not good at strategic planning or the formation of policy. In part this is due to the organizational structure of the community, to the arbitrary way in which communal agencies take decisions and interact with one another. These problems are increasingly recognized by communal leaders and have led to some initiatives to develop more rational and better co-ordinated planning structures. But there remains a second critical factor which inhibits constructive change: the paucity of research data about the community and the consequential lack of understanding of its social, political and religious dynamics.

Conclusions drawn from experience of the Second World War still sometimes dominate communal thinking, even though most British Jews are members of new generations whose views have not been shaped directly by these experiences. The community has witnessed increasing secularization and assimilation, demographic shrinkage and ageing, the erosion of traditional values and beliefs. In Britain there have been massive changes in social and political norms, family life-styles and inter-ethnic relations. Internationally, the momentous political changes since 1989 have also affected the circumstances of Jewish life. How the community adapts to these developments is a key issue for communal leaders, policy-makers and planners. So far, despite much lip-service being paid to the need to respond to change, the results have been haphazard.

The JPR survey provides new data on key aspects of Jewish attitudes and beliefs, including:

• political orientation and social values covering, among other things, the environment, social welfare, the economy, personal/sexual morality, law and order, Europe.

• attitudes to antisemitism and racism

• how Jews see their future in a pluralist and open society

• the dimensions and consequences of outmarriage

• singles and the search for a partner

• the priorities of young people and those on the margins of the organized community

• Jewish identity

• the practice of Jewish ritual

• religious polarization

• attitudes to Israel and the Middle East peace process

• patterns of charitable giving

• leisure activities

This is the first UK survey that has sought seriously to relate Jewish characteristics to more general social values, and that also encompasses the whole community - including the substantial proportion who are assimilated, outmarried or distanced from the community.

The data should provide communal leaders and professionals with an opportunity to assess needs and identify communal priorities on the basis of hard facts. It shoud encourage new thinking, promote the rational use of resources and help establish an ethos of creative planning informed by research and scholarship.

JPR intends to follow up presentation of the data with conclusions and policy recommendations. Leaders and professionals will need positive encouragement to make use of these materials and JPR will embark on a programme of activity to ensure that this happens.

Integral to this programme will be a conference to discuss the implications of the survey, which will be held after the full report appears. JPR will also use the experience gained from undertaking the survey in its wider European data-gathering and policy work.

The proposal for the survey was conceived and formulated by JPR in its former role as the Institute of Jewish Affairs. Dr Stephen Miller, Dean of Social Sciences at City University, and Marlena Schmool, Director of the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies, were commissioned to conduct the survey under the overall direction of Antony Lerman, JPR Executive Director. Lionel Gordon, Chairman of the Jewish Chronicle, acted as advisor for the project.

The survey was funded by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Jewish Care, the Jewish Chronicle, Jewish Continuity, the Joint Israel Appeal, the Joseph E. Levy Foundation, the Lord Ashdown Charitable Settlement, Mr David M. Cohen, Mr Michael Phillips, Mr Felix Posen and Mr Fred Worms.

This report combines analysis and interpretation of the data undertaken by Stephen Miller and Marlena Schmool, with additional interpretation, selection and editing by Antony Lerman.

Summary of key points

1 On party political preferences the key comparison is between Jews and the general population in the same social and occupational groups. This reveals that British Jews fall consistently to the left of those in equivalent occupations. For example, Jewish doctors and health professionals are far less likely to vote Conservative than non-Jewish colleagues in the same professions. The same is true for business people and managers.

2 Respondents are significantly more radical on environmental issues than the general population. Older Jews tend to express concern about the environment through 'green' consumer behaviour; younger Jews by supporting 'green' political action. Despite Judiasm's emphasis on responsibility to protect the natural environment, strict Orthodox or Traditional Jews are less likely to exhibit environmentally-friendly behaviour than Progressive or Secular Jews.

3 On Europe, a substantial majority of Jews favour continued membership of the Union, but membership is not seen as a safeguard against antisemitism. This view stands opposed to the view of the representative body of British Jewry, the Board of Deputies, which looks to EU institutions to play a central role in combating antisemitism.

4 British Jews tend to be tough-minded in their attitudes to social welfare and support for the unemployed, but they are far more liberal then the general population, on crime and punishment and sexual conduct; and more radical in their attitudes to authority and social norms.

5 Even where Jews have similar attitudes to the general population, their views tend to be far more divergent. For example, on questions of educational policy, attitudes to censorship and ethical issues Jews are more likely to fall at the two extremes of the attitude scale (strongly agree and strongly disagree) and less likely to have intermediate views.

6 More British Jews feel that racism in general has worsened in the last five years than feel that antisemism has worsened. Close to one-third say there was more antisemitism, but almost two-fifths say there was more racism.

7 While 42 per cent of the respondents report a strong attachment to Israel, many of the indicators show a distancing from institutionalized, practical support for Israel, and from traditional ideological attitudes.

8 Sixty per cent of respondents favour the Israeli government's approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process (compared to 68 per cent of American Jews), and 69 per cent agree that Israel should give up some territory in exchange for peace. Sixty-two per cent would give up most of the West Bank in order to achieve peace, compared with 8 per cent of American Jews. (The American data is from August 1995; the JPR data is from July to October 1995.)

9 The survey provides clear evidence of communal divisions between Secular and Progressive Jews on the one hand and more Orthodox Jews on the other - not only on matters of religious dogma, but also on perceptions of the moral and social character of the Jewish community. Orthodox Jews tend to see the community as being distinguished by its high moral standards (for example, in relation to sexual behaviour, racial tolerance and ethical business practices), while Secular and Progressive respondents regard Jews as similar to the rest of society in these respects. These divisions are also underpinned by distinct differences in the general political and social attitudes of the two groups, resulting in two very diverse sub-populations within the community as a whole.

10 Jews vary widely in the strength of their religious beliefs, ritual practice and ethnic identity. But unlike other religious groups, in the Jewish community levels of ritual observance are far more closely related to ethnic identity than to strength of belief. For most Jews, religious observance is a means of identifying with the Jewish community, rather than an expression of religious faith. The failure to construe observance as a religiously prescribed act leaves the way open for many Jews, particularly the young, to redefine the core elements of 'ethnic observance' so as to exclude conventional requirements like Jewish marriage and affiliation to a synagogue.

11 The results throw much light on the crisis of Jewish continuity. The survey data suggest that the rate at which Jewish men are marrying non-Jewish women in the crucial younger age-groups (less than 40) is 44 per cent. This is not far short of the 52 per cent intermarriage rate of US Jews, which, when it was announced in 1990, caused widespread shock throughout the community and fuelled debate on the Jewish future. Overall, more than half of the adult Jewish population has, at some time, had a steady relationship with a non-Jew.

12 Many of those who have married non-Jews are actively involved in Jewish life and strongly identify as Jews: 55 per cent rate themselves 'extremely conscious of being Jewish' or 'quite strongly conscious', compared with 84 per cent of single and Jewishly-married respondents.

13 1 in 3 British Jews between the ages of 20 and 49 are not living with a partner, and 1 in 5 of this age group - equivalent to approximately 25,000 people - are either seeking a partner or are positively disposed towards meeting someone. However, only half those seeking a partner care whether their future partner is Jewish.

14 1 in 3 Jews choose not to associate formally with a synagogue. Moreover, while some Jews have moved out of formal association with their parents' synagogue and joined less religiously Orthodox synagogues, a much larger proportion of those who have moved have simply not affiliated. The JPR survey reveals for the first time the scale of this development and the fact that it has been happening over some decades. Many Jews appear to be leapfrogging the religious institutions which claim to act as bulwarks against erosion. JPR survey data therefore show clearly a developing gulf between members and non-members.

15 The social and religious dynamics of the family emerge very clearly as the major determinants of Jewish life choices. Jewish education appears to play very little part in determining whether an individual maintains his or her Jewish identity, once religious background is allowed for.

16 Despite the emphasis placed on moral standards by traditional Jewish teaching, Jews do not appear to have developed unusually demanding or censorious moral standards in comparison with the rest of society. A clear tendency towards liberalism on matters of personal/sexual morality can be discerned among a majority of respondents. The strict approach of the very Orthodox to these matters, which reflects the strong prohibitions in Orthodox Jewish teaching, would be recast by some as representing intolerant or even unethical behaviour.

17 The data clearly disprove the common assumption that intermarried, or uninvolved, or Secular Jews display negative attitudes towards Jewishness and the Jewish community. The uninvolved express strong support for Jewish survival, 60 per cent feel influenced by their Jewish background, nearly always positively, they have relatively positive attitudes to Israel and 17 per cent of them express a desire to become more involved.

18 The data show a growing sector of British Jews who feel firmly and securely rooted in British society, have no sense of living in dispersion or 'exile', do not see the Bible as the actual word of God, do not believe that Jews are more moral and tolerant and less racist than others, do not believe that Jews behave in such a way as to cause hostility towards themselves, and do not feel an imperative to find a Jewish partner.

1/Politics

Historically, Jews have been associated with left- wing politics. But in recent years it has been assumed that Jews have become more right- wing, reflecting rising affluence, concern with security and family values, commitment to enterprise and perceived left-wing bias against Israel.

Voting Intentions

• In fact the political preferences of British Jews do fall significantly to the right of the general population. Voting intentions were almost evenly split between the two main parties. This compares with a 57:29 per cent split for the population as a whole. 

Figure 1: percentage support for three main parties in July 1995 
(don't knows excluded)

Tory                  Labour               Lib-Dem

• The tilt to the right is not surprising given the proportion of British Jews in middle class, professional occupations. The key comparison is therefore between Jews and the general population in the same social and occupational groups. This reveals that British Jews fall consistently to the left of those in equivalent occupations. For example, Jewish doctors and health professionals are far less likely to vote Conservative than non-Jewish colleagues in the same professions. The same is true for business people and managers.

Views on specific issues 

• Jews resemble the general population in wanting to spend more on health, education, old age pensions and law enforcement, and less on defence and the arts. However, Jews are more firm in their opposition to defence spending and less so in their desire to cut arts spending (see Figure 2). 

• On unemployment, Jews are ambivalent about increased spending, whereas the population as a whole favours increased spending. 

• On Europe, the majority of Jews favour continued membership of the Union (63 per cent for, 19 per cent against). But membership is not seen as a safeguard against antisemitism (16 per cent thought it was, 41 per cent thought it was not), a view which contrasts strongly with the policy of the Board of Deputies, the representative body of British Jewry, which looks to EU institutions to play a central role in combating antisemitism.

• While Jews are more tough- minded on social welfare and support for the unemployed, they are far more liberal on crime and punishment and sexual conduct; and more radical in their attitudes to authority and social norms. Jews therefore emerge as far less authoritarian than others on standardised scales which combine items of the kind in Table 1.

• On their attitudes to sexual conduct, only Strictly Orthodox Jews equal or exceed the average level of conservatism to be found in the general population. Other Jews, including many who attend synagogue regularly and practice many (but not all) religious precepts, are relatively tolerant of those sexual practices that are prohibited in Jewish law. For example, the percentage who regard homosexuality as 'always wrong' or 'mostly wrong' falls significantly below the BSA average (see Figure 3). 

• The difference in support for the Tory party between religious and secular Jews (54 per cent against 22 per cent) is larger than the difference between religious and non-religious Protestants (50 per cent against 33 per cent). In other words, religious differences are more clearly related to political differences among Jews than among Protestants. This may be because a Jew needs to be more radical to declare him- or herself secular than does a Protestant.

Jews are more liberal than non-Jews on a wide range of issues, but they are more tough-minded on questions of social welfare. The latter appears to drive their voting intentions which are to the right of the general population. However, if Jews are compared with non-Jews of equivalent socio- economic status, they emerge as more left-wing. 

2/Prejudice, Racism and Antisemitism

Combating antisemitism is often regarded as one of the main priorities of the organized community. Yet until now, there has been no evidence on what Jews think about the seriousness of racism and antisemitism, or on how their own attitudes to prejudice and other minority groups compare with other people in Britain. 

• The majority of respondents feel that levels of antisemitism and racial prejudice have not changed much in the past five years. But of those who have sensed a change, most say there has been an increase. The perception of an increase is slightly more common in the case of racial prejudice than in the case of antisemitism.

• Jews appear to have a heightened awareness of racism since they are more likely to perceive an increase in prejudice than the general population. This may of course reflect direct experience.

• The 37 per cent who experienced antisemitism over the last ten years tend to be high-identity or Orthodox Jewish men who feel Jewish rather than British and who are more at ease in Jewish company. 

• When asked to assess their own racial prejudice Jews are markedly more likely to say hat they are to some extent prejudiced than s the general population. 

• When asked if certain 'groups behave in a way what causes hostility towards them', the overall response was not very different from the response to a similar question put to a sample 3f the general population in September 1993. A greater proportion of the general population ;hose Gypsies and Pakistanis than did Jews. 3ut a greater proportion of Jews chose West Indians and Arabs. 

• Jews were about as likely to say that Jews themselves caused hostility as that Pakistanis did (21 per cent as against 23 per cent). 

• Support for a law against incitement to racial hatred is practically unanimous although there is less support for the law against racial discrimination. Nevertheless, Jews support this law more than the general population does. 

Overall, Jews have a heightened sensitivity to racism and prejudice. They are more ready to recognize prejudice in themselves and more likely to sense an increase in society at large. However, the proportion of respondents sensing an increase in antisemitism undermines the assumption that there is widespread fear of a dangerous wave of antisemitic activity.

3/Moral Issues

Judaism places overriding emphasis on the moral and social responsibility of mankind, including its obligations to individuals, society and the natural environment. Whether this responsibility manifests itself in actual behaviour or attitudes, and whether it has found its way into the ethnic culture and personal identity of Jews, has been, until now, purely a matter of conjecture. The JPR survey data provide an opportunity to examine these questions for the first time. 

• On the basis of their ratings of 'justification' for different actions, Jews resemble other sections of society in being relatively strict on questions of 'legal morality' (for example, buying stolen goods, falsely claiming state benefits) and again, like others, less meticulous on choices related to 'self-interest morality' (lying, minor cheating, unfairness).* 

• On more complex issues of conscience, where personal judgement and religious principle overshadow the legal dimension—for example, on euthanasia, abortion, homosexuality and adultery—Jews are considerably more liberal than the population at large. 

• Attitudes to moral issues do not necessarily predict behaviour. But judgements as to whether a given precept is 'fully relevant personally' may give some indication of likely behaviour. When asked about the relevance of certain of the Ten Commandments, some 70 per cent judged the 'self-interest' command- ments (not bearing false witness, not coveting thy neighbour's goods, honouring parents) to be 'fully relevant personally'. This proportion is 8 per cent lower than that found in the general population, although the comparison is confounded by a substantial fifteen year time lag between the two surveys. However, the difference is in the wrong direction to support the idea that Jewish religious teaching has had a specific impact on the moral conduct of Jews. 

• As is the case in the general population, moral 'strictness' increases with age. The age effects vary, however, according to the type of moral issue. Strictness in relation to both legal and 'self-interest' morality increases steadily with age. But attitudes to abortion, homosexuality and similar personal/sexual issues do not change much until the 50s and beyond. This may be taken to suggest that the more liberal sexual attitudes adopted by the young will be more enduring (likely to travel with these cohorts as they age), while the more liberal attitudes to self-interested or illegal conduct are more likely to be transitory life-cycle effects.**

Moral attitudes and religious belief 

• Predictably, moral attitudes are related to religious variables. But for the JPR sample of Jews, the relationships are somewhat muted. They are strongest in the area of personal/ sexual morality, where strictness of approach is directly related to religious denomination and to levels of observance. 

• With regard to general standards of moral behaviour (both 'legal' and 'self-interest'), only the Strictly Orthodox espouse significantly stricter attitudes than other Jews. The position of Traditional (Orthodox) Jews is, if anything, less strict than that of Progressive Jews, but the variations are small. 

• In these areas of general moral behaviour, the main predictor of strict attitudes is the respondent's age, which accounts for about 10 per cent of the variation in attitudes. Religiosity then accounts for only a further 2-3 per cent of the variation. 

There is no evidence from the data analysed so far that Jews as a whole have developed unusually demanding or censorious moral standards in comparison with the rest of British society. A clear tendency towards liberalism on matters of personal/sexual morality can be discerned in the sample as a whole, which parallels other evidence of liberal attitudes in the survey data. The strict approach of the very Orthodox to these matters, which reflects the strong prohibition against alternative sexual practices and lifestyles inherent in Orthodox Jewish teaching, will not be regarded by some as evidence of high moral standards.

*The 'legal' and 'self-interest' typology is from D. Phiilips and S. Harding, 'The Structure of Moral values' in M. Abrams, D. Gerard and N. Timms (eds), Values and Social chnage in Britain (London: macmillan 1985), pp. 93-108.
** See Phillips and Harding.

4/The Environment

One of the aims of the survey was to find out what Jews think about general social and political issues and whether there is any relation between those views and the respondent's Jewishness. Mankind's responsibility for the natural world is clearly stated in Judaism, but there is no theological consensus as to what this means in relation to current environmental issues. 

• When Jews are compared with the general population in terms of their tendency to act in an environmentally-friendly manner—using a 12-point scale of 'green' consumer behaviour— Jewish respondents are more likely than others to have high scores. 

• Jewish respondents are also more widely dispersed in their consumer practices: a higher proportion of Jews are very 'green' consumers and, at the other extreme, a higher proportion report no environmentally friendly practices whatsoever.

• Jews who demonstrate green consumer behaviour are more likely to be young, female, left-of-centre politically with high levels of ethical concern. Despite the emphasis Judaism places on responsibility to protect the environment, there was a negative relationship between affiliation to Orthodox or Traditional Judaism and green consumer practices. In other words, more observant Jews were less likely to exhibit environmentally friendly behaviour than Progressive or Secular Jews.

• The survey also found that Jews were substantially more likely to take political action in favour of the environment than the population at large. Again, left-wing political preference was strongly associated with green policies as was self-identification with Progressive or Secular Judaism. However, being female and showing heightened ethical concern were not associated with green political leanings, while being young was. 

• Although Jews are more prone than others to take environmentally friendly action, their general attitudes and values in this area closely resemble those of the general population. For example, 58 per cent agree that 'human beings should respect nature because it was created by God', while only 28 per cent say that 'people worry too much about human progress harming the environment'—the corresponding percentages in the British Social Attitudes study were 60 per cent and 32 per cent. 

Concern for the environment is strong in the Jewish population and it is associated with a tendency towards radical thinking, both politically and religiously. There is, in addition, a distinction between those who express their 'greenness' through consumer behaviour and those who engage in green politics. The former tend to be older, female and apparently motivated by ethical concerns; the latter are younger and seem to be more pragmatic in their approach.* The tendency towards polarisation of attitudes on environmental questions has been found in several areas and may reflect a general feature of the psychology of the Jewish population.

*These concepts are from Sharon Witherspoon, 'The Greening of Britain: Romance and Rationality' in R. Jowell et al. (eds), British Social Attitutes: the 11th report (London: SCPR 1994), pp. 107-39.

5/Support for Israel

British Jews have supported Israel through charitable giving, political involvement in Zionist organizations and by emigrating to Israel. That support has been seen as a key component of Jewish identity. But Israel has become far stronger, peace moves have altered the image of the country as embattled and British Jews have become more entrenched in British society. Changes have therefore taken place. Some see a new significance for Zionism, others see increasing divergence between Israel and Jews living in other countries. 

• Forty-two per-cent of respondents expressed a strong and 38 per cent a moderate attachment to Israel. 

• A proportion (2 per cent) of the variation in attachment to Israel can be explained by whether or not respondents had been members of a youth group, and a further 1.5 per cent of the variation is explained by age. Experience of some form of Jewish education or attending university explained only very small amounts of the variation (0.4 per cent and 0.2 per cent respectively). 

• Seventy-seven per cent had visited Israel at some time, but for 37 per cent, the visit was over ten years ago. On the other hand, 22 per cent had been five times or more in the past ten years. Sixty-seven per cent have close friends or relatives living in Israel.

Charitable giving

• Only a quarter of respondents give to Israel- linked charities, and one in eight feel that they should give the highest priority to Israeli causes. Most (60 per cent) who give to Israeli charities were 50 years old or older. A far smaller proportion of Jews under 50 (21 per cent) named an Israeli charity than those over 50 (32 per cent), and this is not explained by lack of giving in this age group since 85 per cent give to charities.

• There is a strong link between religious self- identity and giving to Israeli causes, with Traditional Jews five times more likely to give to Israel than Secular Jews, and the Strictly Orthodox four times more likely. 

Attachment to Israel/attachment to Jewish life in Britain 

• Strength of attachment to Israel varies markedly with level of Jewish identity. In the most Jewishly identified group, 76 per cent express a very strong attachment compared to 14 per cent in the least identified group. The less Jewishly identified are, predictably, less likely to have visited Israel, and less interested in Middle East affairs. 

• Level of attachment is positively related to the belief that 'the only long-term future for the Jews is in Israel'. Overall, 61 per cent of respondents reject that view but in the strongly attached sub-group only 45 per cent reject it. 

• The less attached a respondent is to Israel, the more likely they are to feel that Jews have a long-term future in the Diaspora.

• Age explains 4 per cent of the variation in whether respondents see a future for Jews outside Israel, and in this case experience of higher education explains a further 1 per cent. However, having had some Jewish education or having attended a Jewish youth club do not explain any of the variation.

Most Jews in Britain see themselves as firmly rooted in British society and not as a Diaspora waiting to return. Nonetheless, Jews— especially those over 50—show strong evidence of personal and emotional attachment to Israel. At the same time, the patterns of attachment and charitable giving of younger respondents suggest a distancing from practical support for Israel overtime. In these circumstances, it seems likely that levels of giving to Israel will fall, and this fall will be compounded by the fact of a shrinking community. However, if charitable preferences of the younger respondents change with age, the decline in support will be less acute.

6/Israel and the Middle East Peace Process

Jews are sharply divided over the Israeli government's policy on Arab-Israeli peace. Public demonstrations against that policy have taken place in Jewish communities outside Israel—a marked departure from the previous consensus against such open objections to Israeli government policy. The assassination of the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, showed the extreme degree of ideological and religious tension which surrounds the issue. Since the data from the survey was gathered before the assassination, it could be seen as reflecting the more normal set of British Jewish attitudes to the peace process. 

• The Israeli government's approach to the peace process was favoured by 59 per cent of respondents and only 9 per cent said they were against it. 

• Sixty-nine per cent of the sample agreed that Israel should give up some territory in exchange for credible guarantees of peace. Within this group, 62 per cent would give up most of the occupied West Bank, 42 per cent would give up the Golan Heights and 16 per cent would give up East Jerusalem. 

• Approximately one-third of this group, who overall were prepared to cede land, were undecided about the fate of each named area. 

• As regards the fate of Jewish settlements on the West Bank while peace negotiations were taking place with the Palestinians, of those who felt familiar with the details, 49 per cent would freeze existing and new development, but allow existing settlements to stay; 32 per cent would freeze all development and gradually remove existing settlements; 14 per cent would not permit new settlements, but would allow existing ones to expand; and 5 per cent would allow the establishment of new settlements. 

Overall, British Jews emerge as very supportive of the Israeli government's peace policy, although with clear reservations and uncertainties about specific aspects. In the light of developments elsewhere, it seems reasonable to assume that support would have increased further as a result of the Rabin assassination. JPR data can be loosely compared with an American Jewish Committee survey of Jewish attitudes to the peace process conducted in August 1995. American Jews are more supportive of the Israeli government's peace policy but less ready to cede territory on the West Bank and Golan Heights, and more ready to compromise over the status of Jerusalem. The most striking difference is the much higher level of 'don't knows' in the JPR sample—approximately 30 per cent. In the AJC poll, those answering 'not sure' to these questions were never more than 7 per cent.

7/Jewish Identity

There is a widespread view that Jews today are Jews by choice because of the freedom afforded them in modern society. This has led to the existence of a variety of forms of Jewishness rather than one classical model to which most self-identifying Jews adhere. Moreover, British Jews have traditionally expressed their religious and communal identity by joining a synagogue. But since one Jew in three chooses not to do so, synagogue affiliation cannot be seen as an adequate way of assessing Jewish identity. 

• Respondents were asked to define themselves subjectively, in terms of their religious practice, as: Secular, Just Jewish, Progressive, Traditional and Strictly Orthodox. These self- defined categories are found to be closely related to different patterns of ritual observance: a move from one group to the next—for example, from Progressive to Traditional—is accompanied by a significant increase in the rate of observance of core rituals such as lighting Sabbath candles, attending a Passover Seder, and not travelling on the Sabbath. The percentage of respondents falling into each category is shown in the table below. 

• The correlation between the self-classification scale and ritual practice is much stronger than that between type of synagogue and ritual practice. Hence the scale is a more effective measure of religious observance. 

• Two other dimensions of Jewish identity— religious belief and ethnic attachment—are also correlated with the self-classification scale, but predictably the relationships are less strong. In particular, the level of belief or faith in God (which is relatively low for most respondents) does not vary greatly between the Secular, Just Jewish, Progressive and Traditional Jews. 

• However, the correlation between level of belief and type of synagogue is even weaker, showing that knowing what synagogue a person belongs to is not a good indicator of what that person believes. 

• Like other religious groups, Jews vary widely in the strength of their religious faith, ritual practice and group identity. But they differ from others in the sense that Jewish ritual practice is less clearly an expression of religious faith. In the Jewish community, levels of ritual observance are far more closely related to ethnic identity that to strength of belief. For most Jews therefore, religious observance is a means of identifying with the Jewish community rather than an expression of religious faith. 

• The failure to construe observance as a religiously prescribed act leaves the way open for many Jews, particularly the young, to redefine the core elements of 'ethnic observance' so as to exclude conventional requirements like Jewish marriage and affiliation to a synagogue. 

• Jewish identity may also be expressed by participation in Jewish social or communal activities—readership of a Jewish newspaper, visiting Israel, spending leisure time on Jewish activities and with Jews, and organizational involvement. Using this more practical measure, there was still a large gap between Traditional and Secular Jews. There is therefore little evidence to support the idea that Secular Jews are expressing a strong alternative Jewish identity through involvement in non- religious Jewish activities. 

On all measures of identity and participation there is a considerable difference between, on the one hand, the Traditional and Strictly Orthodox and, on the other. Secular Jews. This suggests that, no matter how strongly Jewish the latter may feel, there is a substantial divide between them and Traditional Jews, let alone between them and the Strictly Orthodox.

8/Uninvolved Jews

A key factor in the demographic decline of the Jewish community is the substantial number of Jews who acknowledge their Jewish origin, but take virtually no part in religious or communal life. The sampling methods used in the JPR survey have made it possible, for the first time, to identify a substantial sample of people on the periphery of the community and to examine their attitudes, patterns of involvement and perceptions of Jewish life. 

More than 750 respondents—36 per cent of the sample—do not belong to a synagogue, but many of them are actively involved in Jewish life in other ways. The number who qualify as uninvolved Jews depends upon the definition of non-involvement. Using a 'strong' definition, based on a lack of social, religious, organizational or cultural contact with Jews or Jewish events, produces a subset of 180 respondents (8 per cent of the sample) who qualify as uninvolved. 

• The majority of the uninvolved (62 per cent) are now, or have in the past, been married to non- Jews. But about a quarter of the total are single people who are out of touch with the community. Whether intermarried or not, uninvolved Jews tend to be:

Jewish background 

• Uninvolved Jews have a significantly less intense Jewish background than others, and the differences are quite marked on some measures (for example, youth club attendance). But, as Table 3 shows, the overlap between the Jewish experiences of involved and non-involved Jews (for example, in having had some kind of Jewish education and belonging to an Orthodox synagogue) emphasizes the unpredictability of Jewish life choices. 

• To evaluate the impact of background factors on adult involvement in a more precise way, an index of involvement was constructed based on twelve different measures. How the background factors impact on involvement can then be assessed. The analysis shows that only about 25 per cent of the variation in Jewish behaviour can be predicted from background factors and that by far the most important factor is parental religiosity. Once this is allowed for, the additional impact of Jewish education and Jewish youth activity is relatively insignificant.  

While uninvolved Jews manifest weak Jewish identities, they are not hostile to the organized community or to other Jews. It seems clear that they may be ready to slip off the continuum of Jewish involvement, but more by virtue of a process of passive assimilation than active rejection. However, their relatively positive attitudes to Israel, their support for Jewish survival, their recognition of their Jewish heritage and, for some at least (17 per cent), an expressed desire to become more involved suggest points of contact that could be explored.

9/Intermarriage

Intermarriage is seen as one of the main reasons for Jewish demographic decline. In the USA 52 per cent of Jews marrying in the period 1985-90 chose non-Jewish partners. In the UK over the past thirty years the proportion of young Jews of marriageable age who marry in a synagogue has fallen from two-thirds to approximately one-third. Despite the concern over intermarriage in Britain the factors underlying this critical statistic are hardly understood: to what extent are the missing two-thirds delaying marriage, cohabiting with Jews, marrying in a civil ceremony, or marrying or cohabiting with non-Jews? The JPR survey could not address all these questions, but the information on over 500 individuals who have a non-Jewish partner provides an unparalleled opportunity to investigate the attitudes and background of this group. New evidence on the rate of intermarriage and on the factors that predispose young Jews to find non-Jewish partners is provided. 

• Of those men who are married or living in a stable relationship, approximately 38 per cent have non-Jewish partners. The corresponding figure for women is more difficult to estimate at this stage of the analysis, but it is probably in the range of 20-25 per cent. Hence the overall rate of intermarriage across the entire age range is about 30 per cent. 

• The US figure of 52 per cent is based on marriages in the period 1985-90 and therefore tends to represent the marriage patterns of younger Jews. Although this group cannot be isolated with complete accuracy in the JPR sample, nonetheless, analysis of the data suggests that the intermarriage rate in young Jewish men (under 40 years old) is 44 per cent—not far short of the US figure.

• The significantly higher rate of intermarriage of Jewish men than of Jewish women has clear implications for communal marriage patterns. Either the rate of intermarriage of Jewish women will move towards that of men because of the unavailability of Jewish partners, or a higher proportion of Jewish women than men will remain unmarried, or Jewish women will be  less likely than men to remarry a Jew following divorce. Some combination of these effects is, of course, the most likely outcome.

• In addition to the 30 per cent of married respondents with non-Jewish partners, a further 8 per cent have had a steady relationship with a non-Jew at some time in the past. Among singles, about 60 per cent have had a steady relationship with a non-Jew. Overall, more than half the Jewish population has had a relationship with, or is married to, a non-Jew.

• The main predictors of outmarriage in the sample—that is, the factors (or variables) which appear to 'influence' the decision to marry a non-Jewish partner—are weak religious home life, university education and lack of Jewish youth club experience. Home background has by far the greatest influence, although even this is not large, and Jewish education is not a significant factor once parental religiosity is taken into account. Overall, these commonly cited educational, family and social factors explain less than 25 per cent of the variation in the marriage choices of young Jews. 

• Outmarriage is associated with less intense levels of Jewish identity, but many of those who have married non-Jews are actively involved in Jewish life and strongly identify as Jews: 55 per cent rate themselves 'extremely conscious of being Jewish' or 'quite strongly Jewish', compared with 84 per cent of single and Jewishly-married respondents. 

The intermarriage rate does not appear to be much lower than that in the United States. However, very many of those who have married non-Jews continue to regard themselves as strongly identifying Jews. With Jewish education playing such an insignificant role in predicting outmarriage, and family factors emerging as of some importance, it would appear that the issue requires more careful study. In particular, the observation that more than three-quarters of the variation in intermarriage behaviour cannot be predicted suggests that new types of investigation are called for, looking at, for example, personality characteristics, career factors and opportunistic variables.

10/Singles and the Search for a Partner

Since intermarriage is seen as a significant source of erosion of the community, much attention is now being paid to the circumstances in which singles find partners. The assumption is often made that one of the main factors leading Jews to marry non-Jews is the absence of opportunities for Jewish singles to meet other Jewish singles. A substantial proportion of the sample in the JPR survey fall into the category of Jews seeking partners, allowing for close analysis of their attitudes and behaviour. 

• On the basis of the JPR sample it is estimated that one-third of Jewish adults are not currently married or living with a partner. About half of these are single (never married) and the other half are separated, widowed or divorced.

• Those without partners are not restricted to the younger or older age groups. Even in the 'most married' 50-59 year age group, one person in five is without a partner.

• The desire for a partner is not greatly affected by age. Until their mid-sixties, well over half of those without a partner are actively seeking one or would 'feel OK' if they met someone. 

• The data lead to the conclusion that approximately 1 in 5 British Jews between the ages of 20 and 49 are either seeking partners or are positively disposed to meeting someone— that is approximately 25,000 people. 

The desire for a Jewish partner

• Just over half of those seeking a partner express a clear preference for a Jewish partner. The other half rate Jewishness as being 'of minor importance' or as 'not at all important'. The exact breakdown is (in percentages): 
  
  Very important 31 
  Important 26 
  Of minor importance 28 
  Not at all important 15 
  

• Women are more concerned about finding a Jewish partner than men; 64 per cent against 50 per cent feel it is important or very important. Single people are more concerned than separated or divorced people of matched age—55 per cent against 46 per cent. 

• The gender difference is particularly marked in the young and middle-aged. Of those under 50 years old, 62 per cent of women seeking a partner are concerned about Jewishness, compared with only 43 per cent of men. Allowing for the demographic imbalance between men and women, and for gender differences in the proportions seeking to marry or remarry, the data suggest that there are up to 50 per cent more women under 50 seeking to marry Jewish men than men wanting to marry Jewish women. However, the samples are too small to reach precise conclusions. 

Obstacles to finding a Jewish partner 

• Despite the substantial gender difference in the numbers seeking Jewish partners, the experience of 'difficulties meeting Jewish partners' is equally common in men and women. Just under 60 per cent report difficulties. 

• Most of these difficulties relate to actual or perceived incompatibility between the respondent and Jews of the opposite sex. Only about 25 per cent of respondents mentioned the inaccessibility of potential partners as an obstacle; usually this was a matter of geography rather than the availability of settings in which Jews could meet each other.

• Experiencing difficulty in finding a Jewish partner is found in all sections of the community, but not in equal measure. The figures show that older, highly academic, left-of- centre Jews have the greatest difficulty meeting suitable partners. As far as background is concerned, the children of parents with different levels of Jewish identity, and those from Progressive Jewish homes, are more likely to report difficulties than others. 

Relationships with non-Jews

• Fifty-six per cent of those currently seeking a partner (or who married within the past decade) have had a stable relationship with a non-Jew. Predictably, respondents who do not regard their partner's Jewishness as important are more likely to have had a relationship with a non-Jew. However, a substantial proportion of those who do regard it as important (62 per cent), or even 'very important' (16 per cent), have also had steady relationships with non- Jews. This suggests that while attitudes are thi major determinants of the choice of partner, opportunistic factors (such as the obstacles referred to above) may account for mixed partnerships among some of those who regard Jewishness as important.

• Detailed information on respondents' educational, social and religious background was used to examine the factors associated with choice of partner. Parental religiosity and type of synagogue were the main predictors of within-group relationships—both attitudes and behaviour. In addition, Jewish secondary schooling has a small, positive effect on attitude, but not on behaviour.

The relatively large number of Jews seeking partners suggests that their decisions could have a significant impact on Jewish continuity. However, assumptions about the factors influencing their choices clearly need to be revised. Factors external to the family account for very little of the variation in attitudes and behaviour once the home background is taken into account. This may change as more enlightened approaches to Jewish education and to youth programmes are developed, but it seems likely that the social and religious dynamics of the family will remain the major determinants of Jewish life choices.

11/The Changing pattern of Synagogue Affiliation 

What happens to synagogue affiliation is of fundamental importance to the character of Jewish life in Britain. Different approaches are on offer and each claims to act as a bulwark against erosion of the core Jewish population. The pattern of generational shift between denominations is a vital indicator of the prospects for continuity. 

Affiliation and attendance 

• As Table 4 below shows, over one-third of the sample do not belong to a synagogue. 

• The survey confirms findings from other surveys of the last 10 to 15 years that a higher proportion of British Jews are going to synagogue more often. Yet more than a quarter (28 per cent) of all respondents have not attended synagogue in the year prior to the survey. 

• For those 35 and under, non-attendance was also 28 per cent, but close to half were not members. In the age-group 35 to 50, the non- attendance was the same, but 38 per cent did not belong.

Synagogue affiliation: respondents and respondents' parents 

• For those whose parents were members of synagogues, 31 per cent were not members themselves, with younger people, not surprisingly, less likely to be members than older respondents. 

• Non-membership is most marked for respondents whose parents were members of Reform (56 per cent) and Liberal (59 per cent) synagogues. For those whose parents were Orthodox, non-membership is 27 per cent. 

• As for retention rates (excluding the Strictly Orthodox), half of those raised in families belonging to Orthodox synagogues remain members of such synagogues, compared with 31 per cent for Reform and 24 per cent for Liberal. 

• But the most marked development in synagogue affiliation is the shift from membership to non-membership, rather than from membership of one type of synagogue to another, with all synagogue groups (except the Hassidim) losing more people to the realms of non-membership than to other synagogues. Among mainstream Orthodox, 17 per cent had moved to Progressive synagogues, but 27 per cent were not members of any synagogue. Where there is movement from one synagogue to another, most is from more Orthodox to less Orthodox. 

'Stayers', 'changers' and 'leavers' 

• This point is reinforced when respondents who were born Jewish are divided into 'stayers' (who do not change from their parents' synagogue), 'changers' (who moved to a more progressive synagogue) and 'leavers' (who have no synagogue membership at all)—53, 15 and 31 per cent respectively. 

• 'Leavers' and 'changers' are younger, more likely to have been at university, and less likely to give to Jewish charities. The level of Jewish identity of 'leavers' is only just above that of the group with no synagogue background or current membership. 

• Table 5 shows the marked difference in attitudes between 'stayers' on the one hand and 'changers' and 'leavers' on the other. As the last line shows, the latter were more optimistic than the 'stayers' about non-orthodox Jews surviving as recognisably Jewish. This reflects the fact that historically, among British Jews, 'changers' have mainly moved from orthodoxy to non-orthodoxy.

• Although the 'changers' and 'leavers' are more hopeful about British Jewry's survival, their attitudes suggest a form of ethnic continuity, rather than the survival of a community defined by traditional religious norms. 

The main synagogue groups can take no comfort from these findings. Even allowing for membership decisions being made later in life, all are losing members and the evidence shows that Reform and Liberal are only picking up a relatively small percentage of people moving out of orthodoxy. Many Jews appear to be leapfrogging the religious institutions which claim to act as bulwarks against erosion. JPR survey data therefore show clearly a developing split between members and non-members. 

As for those on the move—for whatever reason—a majority envisage a non-orthodox Jewish presence in Britain into the next century. They are not especially inclined to achieve this by such traditional methods as working to prevent intermarriage, but rather want rabbis to welcome non-Jewish partners into the community. It is clear, therefore, that if they have a picture of what the British Jewish community should look like in 2050, for example, it is certain to be very different from that envisaged by the Orthodox, whose uncompromising interpretation of halacha (Jewish law), and of rules on 'who is a Jew', would prevent such people from being considered Jewish.

12/Charitable Giving

Attitudes to, and patterns of, charitable giving are t of communal importance. Giving to charity is a cardinal Jewish value which has been practised through the ages. This has resulted in a t perception that Jewish charitableness is highly  developed. Without charitable giving, the organized Jewish community—a voluntary association of institutions and individuals—could not function at its current level. Patterns of wealth ownership among Jews are changing and there is growing concern about the ability to support the community's institutions. 

• Respondents are evenly divided on whether Jews were more likely than others to give to charity. However, there is a strong difference in perception according to age: those aged 50 and over (62 per cent) are twice as likely to feel this way as those under 50 (29 per cent)

• Despite Judaism's stress on the importance of charitable giving, only 31 per cent agree that Jews, just because they are Jews, have a special responsibility to give to charity. Nevertheless, close to half the sub-sample asked agree that the Jewish community should not rely on the government to provide care for its old people; almost one-third feel it was the government's responsibility.

• In the year previous to the survey, under 2 per cent said that they had not given to any charity, compared with under 3 per cent of the general population—but this says nothing about levels of giving. 

• The Charities Aid Foundation's statistics show that covenants raise the most in monetary terms. Hence, the finding that 60 per cent of respondents had responded to a direct appeal (for example, by post or through a synagogue) by cheque, covenant or subscription, combined with the fact that 43 per cent said they used this method most often to give to charity, suggests that British Jews (compared with the 1991 BSA national sample) have a higher than average level of giving.

• Jews appear to have less difficulty than the British population as a whole in deciding which charities to support: 65 per cent of the JPR sample compared with 77 per cent of the BSA national sample agreed that it was difficult to choose which charities to give to.

• Three-quarters of respondents had donated to a charity supporting a British need. Medical charities were named by 49 per cent, 14 per cent named a charity connected with children, 9 per cent said they gave to charities like Oxfam (which works abroad), 9 per cent gave to animal charities, 2 per cent mentioned Amnesty International and 1 per cent named charities to do with refugees. 

Respondents may not have articulated the idea that Judaism obliges them especially to give to charity, but the evidence indicates that they have a higher level of giving than the population in general and that they look to themselves to support the community. Since the community will require increased resources in the future as the Jewish population continues to age and decrease in number, further analyses of this issue will need to concentrate on patterns of giving within specific sections of the community.

13/Jewish Perceptions of Jews and the Jewish Community

The image Jews have of themselves—both as individuals and as a community—may be an important determinant of participation in Jewish life, perhaps even of the prospects for Jewish survival. The JPR survey provides the first systematic evidence of communal self- perceptions and how these are related to religious differences in the community. 

• Based on the sample as a whole, respondents have a relatively balanced view of the characteristics of British Jews: they attribute some positive and some negative traits. For example, Jews see themselves as being more ostentatious, more paranoid and (slightly) more materialist than others; but they also see themselves as being more intelligent, more creative and less racially prejudiced. 

• However, the balance is disturbed if the sample is broken down by age or religious affiliation. Younger respondents (below 35) are more negative in their views than older respondents (over 60). And the variations are even greater among the different religious sub-groups. Secular and Progressive Jews have far more negative views about the characteristics of Jews in general than Traditional or Strictly Orthodox Jews. These differences may well reinforce or even underlie disputes over matters of religious dogma. 

• It might be thought that those who have married non-Jews would entertain more negative stereotypes, either as a contributory factor to their marriage decision or as a response to official communal reactions to intermarriage. In fact, respondents married to non-Jews had no less favourable views of Jews than those who had not married out. 

• In addition to judgements of personal traits, the Jewish community was viewed as more charitable, more concerned about the elderly, more family oriented, having higher standards of sexual morality, a lower propensity to divorce and a stronger sense of community. However, the community was seen as being less concerned about the environment and less supportive of women's rights.

• The more Orthodox respondents tend to have substantially more favourable views of the community than Secular and Progressive Jews. They see the positive attributes (for example, respect for others) as being more common and the negative attributes (for example, racial prejudice) as less common than do non- Orthodox Jews. 

• The only dimension on which there was not a variation between Orthodox and non-Orthodox assessments was 'support for women's rights' (not shown on graph), which was seen as 'more common in the rest of society' by all religious groups. However, the more judgmental statement 'I think women get a "raw deal" in Judaism' was rejected by the majority of Orthodox respondents (70 per cent), but only by a minority of the other groups of respondents (10-20 per cent). 

• Thus, although the respondents as a whole have relatively positive views about the individual and communal characteristics of Jews, there is quite a clear divide between the judgements of the Strictly Orthodox and the other respondents on some of the more ethically significant characteristics. If these variables are considered in conjunction with items relating to the social and ethnic identity of Jews, two distinct clusters of respondents can be identified (see below). 

• Not surprisingly, 90 per cent of Secular and Progressive Jews fall in Cluster 1, and 92 per cent of Strictly Orthodox Jews fall in Cluster 2. Traditional Jews are split 50:50 between the two clusters of attitudes. 

The encouraging evidence of positive disposition towards the community and other Jews may be seen to offer some hope for the maintenance of communal distinctiveness. But this is undermined by the mounting evidence of a communal divide, clearly highlighted by the two clusters. The polarization thus identified is not only apparent on matters of religious dogma but is closely associated with differences in other areas, specifically, the extent to which Jews are seen to have higher moral standards, and the extent to which Jewishness is seen as the most salient feature of personal identity.

Appendix 1: Newspaper Readership 

The table below gives the figures for the principal newspapers read by Jews, compared with the general population. 

Jewish newspapers

• Of those who are regular readers of Jewish newspapers (58 per cent of respondents), the great majority read the Jewish Chronicle and/or a northern paper, the Jewish Telegraph (17 per cent). Shalom, Jewish Tribune and New Moon are each read by between 5 and 10 per cent of regular readers. 

• Of occasional readers (13 per cent of the sample), 85 per cent read the Jewish Chronicle, 6 per cent read the Jewish Tribune and 9 per cent other publications.

• In addition, 29 per cent of the Jewish population do not read any Jewish paper.

Appendix 2: Key Background Data

Of the 2,180 people from throughout the United Kingdom who completed the questionnaire between July and October 1995: 

• 57 per cent are men and 43 per cent women 

• Ages range from 19 to 94 

• 72 per cent live in Greater London and the South East 

• 89 per cent have had some Jewish education, mainly part-time

:

Appendix 3: Note on Sampling Method

The sampling method was designed to ensure broad representation of the adult Jewish population. It covered the complete spectrum of self-identifying Jews, from those who are actively involved in the organized community through to those who have no functional link with Jews or Judaism save the recognition that they are, in some sense, Jewish. 

As a preliminary step in developing the sample, estimates were obtained of the Jewish population density (JPD) of every post-code semi- sector in the UK. These estimates were based on the frequency of distinctive Jewish names (DJNs) obtained from a computerised search of the electoral register. Three separate sampling strategies were then employed: 

1. In high density areas (JPD>15 per cent), questionnaires were sent to (approximately) every thirtieth household on the electoral register, irrespective of name, in anticipation that a given proportion would reach Jewish households. This was intended to produce a random sample of Jews living in such areas.

2. In low density areas (JPD<15 per cent), a random sample of addresses corresponding to distinctive jewish names was taken from the electoral register (1 in every 3.4 djns). this produces a random sample of jews to the extent that people with distinctive jewish names are representative of jews generally. 

3. Since the second sampling procedure could not be expected to reach intermarried Jewish women, a snowball sample of this group was developed in low density areas using newspaper adverts and other means. 

Further work is needed to determine the response rate, but it is estimated to be in the region of 60 per cent. Readership

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