jpr / report No. 5 1997
The attachment of British Jews to Israel
For all who want to influence the future relationship between British Jews and Israel, an understanding of where that relationship now stands and where trends suggest it might be going is essential.
Overall it was found that 43 per cent of the sample felt a strong attachment to Israel. Yet, if current trends prevail, attachment to Zionism and to the Jewish state could become the concern of only a minority with a mostly Traditional or Orthodox religious outlook.
Barry Kosmin, Antony Lerman and Jacqueline Goldberg
Summary of findings
The findings in this report are based on a 1995 postal survey of a sample of 2,194 British Jews.
- Overall it was found that 43 per cent of the sample felt a strong attachment to Israel, 38 per cent were moderately attached, 16 per cent expressed no special attachment, while 3 per cent had negative feelings towards Israel.
British versus Jewish group identity
- When respondents selected one of the following ways of self-identification, 18 per cent replied that they felt 'more British than Jewish', 54 per cent that they felt 'equally British and Jewish' and 26 per cent that they felt 'more Jewish than British'. Only 2 per cent were unsure.
- When these group identifications were analyzed according to age group, the percentage of those identifying themselves as more Jewish was highest among the youngest respondents and decreased with age. There was a concomitant increase with age in feeling equally British and Jewish.
- There is a significant relationship between feeling strongly attached to Israel and self-identification as primarily Jewish. In fact 73 per cent of those who identified themselves as feeling more Jewish express a strong attachment to Israel while very few of those who feel more British (12 per cent) have an equivalent attachment.
- When examining the role of youth movement participation in the creation of group identities among British Jews, exposure to Zionism in youth is not particularly significant in forming pro-Israel opinions in later life. The experience is no more influential than other forms of adolescent Jewish socialization and memberships.
General ties to Israel
- Although group identity is a logical predictor, other factors such as demography and ideology play an important role in determining attitudes towards Israel.
- Statistically significant differences are found by sex (women are more strongly attached than men), age (older age groups are more strongly attached than the young) and region.
- The findings also demonstrated a strikingly clear pattern of strengthening attachment to Israel as the degree of commitment to traditional Judaism rises.
- Twenty-two per cent of the sample had never visited Israel while a further 12 per cent had not been since 1985. The remaining 66 per cent of the sample had therefore visited Israel at least once in the previous ten years with many making multiple visits. Almost 7 out of 10 (69 per cent) British Jews said they have close friends or family in Israel, a sign of increased social connections as compared with earlier surveys.
The age factor
- A significantly higher percentage of the over 50s felt strongly attached to Israel than under 50s.
- Between 45 and 60 per cent of each age group which have friends or relatives in Israel were strongly attached, with a slight tendency for more of the older respondents to express this attitude. However, while 34 per cent of those aged between 70 and 79 who do not have friends in Israel are strongly attached, very few of the 18-49 year olds who lack tangible social ties with Israelis have this kind of emotional attachment.
- In the older age groups, large proportions of those who have visited Israel are strongly attached, but this declines somewhat in the younger age groups. In contrast, while 34 per cent of the oldest group who have never visited Israel are still strongly attached, only 3 per cent of the 18-29 year olds without personal experience of Israel feel the same.
- The findings point to the significance of experiencing Israel for younger people. The young have a psychological and emotional deficit that has to be compensated for by visiting Israel.
- An essential feature of classic Zionist ideology is the belief that only in the sovereign Jewish state is there a secure long-term future for Jews. While 61 per cent of the total sample rejected this classic view there was a significant difference by age group: the 18 to 39 year olds overwhelmingly reject this view while the older age groups were less inclined to disagree. Furthermore, the stronger an individual's attachment to Israel, the more likely she or he is to agree with the above statement.
- When examining attitudes towards aliya (immigration to Israel) in comparison with the 1978 Redbridge study, 34 per cent of the JPR sample had thought about living in Israel compared with only 17 per cent of the Redbridge sample. Clearly more people had also given aliya a try, but the fact that the percentage of those who say they are actually making preparations to go is so similar in both surveys suggests that there remains a big gap between thought and action.
- Given the overall degree of attachment expressed in the survey, only 12 per cent of those who made a choice between Israeli causes, UK Jewish causes, overseas aid for the poor and general British charities chose Israel as their first priority charitable cause. When this is analyzed further by age group, there is a marked generational decline which does not reflect the finding that 85 per cent of younger Jews give to charity.
The religious factor
- There is a highly significant relationship between religious outlook and attachment to Israel: over the past 10 years the average number of visits for the Secular, Just Jewish and Progressive groupings is approximately 2, for the Traditional 4, and for the Strictly Orthodox just over 8 visits.
- Closeness towards Israel among the Orthodox does not imply support for the Oslo peace process nor for the principle of land for peace.
- Examining attitudes towards aliya showed that traditionalist religious-based attachment to Israel extends to considerations about aliya: only 5 per cent of the Strictly Orthodox have never considered going on aliya.
Key variables influencing attachment to Israel
- A multiple regression analysis showed that religious outlook and group identity were the key explanatory variables for individuals' levels of attachment to Israel. It is crucial to note that these characteristics are acquired, not fixed, and so are theoretically open to change and influence.
1/ Introduction
Israel is widely regarded by Diaspora communal leaders and many ordinary
Jews as being of crucial importance to Jewish life. It is seen as a focus
of consensus in the Jewish community, the central aim of fundraising activity,
as well as a force for cohesion and enhancement of the status and security
of British and other Diaspora Jews.
However, the extent to which this pivotal institutional role can be taken
for granted in the lives of ordinary Jews has not been determined. Given
the emphasis placed on Israel's role in maintaining and strengthening Jewish
identity, it is critical to delineate this relationship of the Jewish public
towards Israel not only for all of the many organizations involved in activities
related to Israel, but also for the issue of Jewish continuity. For all
who want to influence the future relationship between British Jews and Israel,
an understanding of where that relationship now stands and where trends
suggest it might be going is essential.
The report on the Redbridge Jewish community in 1978 observed that 'The
place of Israel within the framework of the life and ideas of British Jews
has never been investigated in any real depth. Considering the apparently
tremendous emotional and practical investment of Jews in Israel and the
long years since the Zionist "capture" of the community's institutions
in the 1940s, this situation is quite surprising'.(1) The JPR Survey of theSocial
and Political Attitudes of British Jews begins to address this problem and
the results presented in this report provide some of the answers to the
critical questions which arise. We hope the findings will stimulate debate
within the community and will help to develop informed policies on Israel-Diaspora
relations. Since the JPR survey was the first of its kind, there is no comprehensive
earlier survey data with which comparisons can be made, but it is still
necessary to set the JPR data in their historical context: how did relations
between British Jews and Israel develop and how did things stand in the
years prior to the JPR survey?
Historical context
It is easy to forget that Zionism and the possibility of a sovereign Jewish state were once deeply divisive issues in Jewish life in this country. The transition from Zionism as a minority interest to Israel as a point of consensus for the British Jewish community was not easy, certainly not in the years prior to the establishment of the state. As one of the historians of British Zionism, Gideon Shimoni, wrote: 'Zionism raised issues more divisive and enduring than any other in the post-emancipation experience of Anglo-Jewry. Thus . . . the leadership echelons of Anglo-Jewry engaged in a chronic ideological controversy about the Zionist idea itself.'(2) The early supporters of Zionism were a small and rather secular group. Many in the main religious organizations were opposed to Herzl's political Zionism because it envisaged the creation of a Jewish state without any divine intervention, and was therefore against fundamental religious tenets. 'Before the First World War Zionism could claim-on the E[nglish] Z[ionist] F[ederation]'s own figures-the support of fewer than six per cent of the Jewish population of Great Britain.'(3) Nevertheless, the small group of Jewish Zionists, supported by some prominent Gentile Zionists and led by Chaim Weizmann, eventually secured the issuing of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, even though this was bitterly opposed by many in the Anglo-Jewish establishment. Despite their fierce opposition to political Zionism, many in the establishment were prepared, especially after the Balfour Declaration, to give pragmatic support to Jewish settlement activity in Palestine. But they refused to accept the idea of a Jewish state and continued to fight against this notion right up to the end. The Declaration did not signal a sudden and rapid rise in the fortunes of British Zionism. If anything, it entered a period of decline and failed, at that time, to become a mass movement. But the organized Zionists, who were increasing in number, began a kind of long march through the Anglo-Jewish institutions, finally capturing the Board of Deputies of British Jews in 1939 and installing Professor Selig Brodetsky, a popular and deeply committed Zionist, as president. Events in the 1930s conspired to shift matters the Zionists' way: the Palestinian Arab riots, the increasingly negative approach of the British government as expressed in the 1929 Passfield White Paper and the 1939 White Paper; the rise of Nazism; and the perceived inadequate response to British fascism-all made Jews more responsive to the Zionist message. 'The cumulative effect of the "Zionization" of the Board of Deputies (and the energetic activities of the World Jewish Congress) was to generate an overwhelmingly Zionist consensus among the Jews of Britain for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.'(4) Zionism thereby achieved a dramatic ascendancy in the Jewish community. By the time the state was established in 1948, Zionism had indeed become a mass movement among British Jews and arguably the most powerful single force within Anglo-Jewry. In time, practically all the individuals and organizations-secular and religious-that had opposed Zionism and the idea of a Jewish state were won over. Organizations like British WIZO, Mizrachi, Emunah, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), all the Zionist youth organisations and the Zionist political groups, became absolutely central to Jewish life, exercising educational, cultural and organizational influence. The Zionist Federation in effect became the most dynamic and powerful force in the organized life of British Jews. As Chaim Bermant put it, the Zionists saw themselves as 'the ginger group of Jewish life . . . alert against anything that might threaten the continuity of Jewish existence'.(5) After the establishment of the state, the Joint Palestine Appeal became the main fundraising body for Israel, changing its name to the Joint Israel Appeal in 1974. Many other fundraising bodies for Israel were established, including those raising money for Israeli universities. Moreover, in many organizations not directly concerned with Israel, the dominant lay and professional personnel were very often motivated by their Zionism. Practically speaking, Zionism and support for Israel became all-pervasive. But in the ultimate success of organized British Zionism were sown the seeds of its decline. As Israel became more established and its needs were increasingly defined in terms of immigration and financial support, the ideological and political structures of Zionism in the Diaspora diminished in importance, rapidly becoming shadows of their former selves, though they continued to exist. With relatively few British Jews ready to turn their Zionist commitment into active aliya, it was the fundraising side which came to absorb the prodigious energies of key communal figures. By the 1970s, the JIA had established itself as the pre-eminent and most powerful single organization in the community. This was reflected in, among other things, the funds it raised. Israel had certainly become a focus of consensus, a strong unifying factor, and 'a means of Jewish identification for those who [lack] religious belief (6) for what was always an argumentative and fractious community. Jewish anti-Zionism-at times able to deploy powerful and persuasive arguments before 1945-had practically ceased to exist. But since the 1967 Six-Day War and more specifically with the coming to power of Likud Party governments after 1997, a number of developments have clearly had an impact on the relationship between British Jews and Israel. The 1982 Lebanon War and the Israeli government's response to the Intifada (1987-92) brought to the surface differences over Israeli government policy, marking the beginning of a public and continuing airing of contrary views within the community. The opening of negotiations with the Palestinians and the other results of the peace process were widely welcomed in Britain but they also caused confusion. Yasser Arafat, implicitly and sometimes explicitly likened to Hitler in Israel fundraising material suddenly became a partner for peace. The JIA and many other organizations had spent years using a demonized image of Arafat to galvanize support for Israel. At a stroke, this tool ceased to be available. Some expected the beginning of negotiations with the Palestinians to bring an end to differences over Israeli government policy, but the opposite happened, with those British Jews who opposed the actions of the Rabin government choosing to take their opposition onto the streets outside the Israeli embassy. After 1989, the collapse of the Soviet bloc-which had orchestrated, together with the Arab states, the worldwide anti-Zionism campaign-coupled with the peace process led to the end of Israel's isolation in the international community. The embattled, vulnerable state no longer seemed embattled and vulnerable. At the same time Israel's economic prospects were being transformed. Growing self-sufficiency increasingly threw into doubt the need for Diaspora Jewish fundraising. In the last few years this fact surfaced in statements by some Israeli leaders, most memorably by the former Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin, who explicitly told a 1994 WIZO gathering that Israel no longer needed charity from Diaspora Jews. The character of the state evolved, both in terms of national ideals and ethnic make-up. The socialist-Zionist ethos, epitomized by the kibbutz movement and looked on favourably and benignly by many Jews in the West who were not in the least socialist, has been eclipsed as Israel has become a more normal consumerist society. The huge influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union after 1979, which followed a period in which the earlier Sephardi immigration produced a new ethnic balance (1948-67), resulted in the country becoming increasingly less Western and Central European in outlook. Since 1967 messianic religious Zionism and the ultra-orthodox elements have become increasingly prominent in the state. Orthodox religious parties, especially since the 1996 general election, are seen to have a growing influence on government and, through government acquiescence in their demands, on the lives of ordinary Israelis. Finally, in recent years in Israel some intellectuals have spoken of 'post-Zionism'. They argue that Israel has moved into a phase beyond Zionism, since the aims of Zionism have been achieved. The implications of this are that Zionism would cease to be the country's unifying national ideology. All of these developments must, at the very least, make the relationship between British Jews and Israel more complicated. Some of them already have. The JPR Survey of the Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews came at a critical moment in Israel-Diaspora relations. The survey was conducted in the summer of 1995. At the time of its planning Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat had already shaken hands on the lawn outside the White House. This event in itself promoted widespread interest in British Jews' feelings about particular recommendations of the Oslo Agreement. On the other hand, the fieldwork was completed well before the assassination of Rabin in November 1995. Responses to survey questions on Israel will therefore have been influenced by the former event but remain unaffected by the latter. In effect the findings reported here reflect how the community felt during the early optimistic stages of the Peace Process.
The survey data
The questionnaire included a number of items concerning Israel and the answers give an indication of the relationship between respondents and Israel. Although the results of the survey are interesting in themselves, they would become much more interesting if they could be compared with the answers to similar questions asked at an earlier point in time-in order to measure trends and change. Unfortunately, because the JPR survey was the first of its kind there is very little that its results can be compared with as far as the British Jewish population is concerned. The survey replicated some questions from a major ongoing general survey of the British population-the British Social Attitudes survey-and some comparisons can be made with that. But these questions do not relate to Jewish issues, and certainly not to the question of British Jews' relations with Israel. However, as we shall see later, there are a few fascinating points of comparison that can be made with two earlier surveys of Jewish populations in the UK: the 1968 Edgware survey and the 1978 Redbridge study. Where appropriate, comparisons have also been drawn with data collected in the same months as the JPR survey for the American Jewish Committee's (AJC) Public-Opinion Survey (1995) on attitudes toward Israel and the peace process. These findings are based on 2,194 self-completed questionnaires obtained through a postal survey of British Jews between July and October 1995. The methodology was designed to generate a random sample of self-identifying Jews using three sampling strategies.
- The first strategy was implemented in areas of high Jewish population density-where the Jewish population constitutes more than 15 per cent of the general population-and involved sending questionnaires to approximately every thirtieth household, anticipating that a given proportion would reach Jewish households.
- In areas of low Jewish population density-less than 15 per cent of the general population-households were randomly targeted based on a selection of some 400 distinctive Jewish names on the electoral register.
- The third strategy was designed to compensate for the fact that the second strategy would tend to overlook intermarried Jewish women: a snowball sample was implemented in the low Jewish population density areas and aimed at intermarried Jewish women. Respondents found by adverts in newspapers and by personal contact were invited to suggest others in the same situation and all were sent a questionnaire.
The overall response rate was approximately 60 per cent which compares well
with other questionnaire-based surveys. This represents the largest and
most representative sample yet obtained of the British Jewish community
and it was the first nationwide survey of its kind not based on synagogue
or organizational lists.
There are, however, problems which arise because the Jewish population cannot
be easily reached in its entirety, and whilst the sample was representative
in most ways, it had to be weighted for age and sex on the basis of the
known demographic profile of the British Jewish population published by
the Board of Deputies of British Jews' Community Research Unit.(7) The analyses
presented in this report therefore reflect findings from the weighted sample.
Statistical tests
Various techniques have been used to analyze the data in this study in order
to determine their statistical significance. If a finding is statistically
significant then it is unlikely that it is a chance occurrence. In other
words, as the statistical significance of a finding rises, it becomes more
improbable that it is due to chance. For example, if a finding that suggests
a discrepancy between respondents with different religious outlooks on a
particular issue concerning Israel has a 'p' value of 0.05, then there is
only a 5 per cent (or 5 in 100) likelihood that it is a chance occurrence.
If the 'p' value is 0.0001, the likelihood of it being a chance occurrence
is 0.01 per cent (or 1 in 10,000). Such a finding has a very high statistical
significance. Another indication of statistical significance is an F value.
As the F value rises, so does its statistical significance.
The following symbols have been used in this report to indicate the degree
of statistical significance of findings: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**),
p<0.001 (***). Further details of the techniques employed to analyze
the data are available on request.(8) Section 6 develops the analyses further
and is provided for those readers who are interested in more technical explanations.
When examining the percentages tabulated in this report it is important
to take into account what is known as the confidence level which is based
on the size of the sample. Calculations show that we can be 95 per cent
certain that the true sample proportion is within 2 to 3 per cent in either
direction of the figure we report. For example, if we report that 43 per
cent of the sample felt a strong attachment to Israel, we can be 95 per
cent confident that the true proportion is between 40 and 46 per cent of
the sample.
General degree of attachment to Israel
A general overview of British Jews' present attachment to Israel is supplied
by respondents' answers to the question 'Can you say whether you have any
special feelings of attachment (or otherwise) towards Israel?'.
Four choices were given: strong attachment, moderate attachment, no special
attachment and negative feelings. Figure 1 shows that overall, 43 per cent
felt a strong attachment and 38 per cent felt a moderate attachment to Israel.
Thus while over 80 per cent of respondents expressed special feelings of
attachment to Israel, only 3 per cent expressed negative feelings. US figures
on a similar survey question revealed that 67 per cent felt either 'very
close' or 'fairly close' to Israel, while 6 per cent reported themselves
to be 'very distant' (AJC, 1995).
Figure 1: Attachment to Israel
British Jews are a well educated population with an above average interest
in world affairs and a tendency to read the broadsheets rather than the
tabloid press. In this context, another interesting indicator of a general
feeling of solidarity with Israel was the finding that a majority of the
sample felt that there was a consistent pattern of unfairness or bias in
the media representation of news about Israel: 15 per cent felt that the
media was 'always' biased, 39 per cent thought it was 'often' biased and
an additional 36 per cent thought it was 'sometimes' biased. In contrast
only 9 per cent felt that the British media was 'rarely or never' biased.
These initial findings of the respondents' feelings of loyalty and attachment
to Israel seem fairly positive. This report is concerned with examining
the picture in more depth in order to discover trends and to understand
the forces which produce such attitudes. Three key explanatory variables
are utilized: identity, age and religious outlook. These are each presented
in separate sections of the report.
1 Barry Kosmin and Caren Levy, Jewish Identity in an Anglo-Jewish Community (London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews 1983), p. 25.
2 Gideon Shimoni, 'From Anti-Zionism to Non-Zionism in Anglo-Jewry 1917-1937', The Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28(1), 1986, 19^18, p. 19.
3 Joseph Finklestone, 'Zionism and British Jews' in The Jewish Year Book (London: Vallentine Mitchel, 1997), p. xxii.
4 Gideon Shimoni, Jews and Zionism (Cape Town: Oxford University Press 1980), p. 154.
5 Chaim Bermant, Troubled Eden: An Anatomy of British Jewry (London: Vallentine Mitchell 1969), p. 118.
6 Stephen Brook. The Club: The Jews of Modern Britain (London: Constable 1989).
7 Stephen Haberman and Marlena Schmool, 'Estimates of the British Jewish Population 1984-1988' Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Vol. 158(3), 1995, pp. 547-62,
8 The techniques used include Chi-square analyses (X²) and Analyses of Variance (ANOVA). The report will generally indicate the outcome of such analyses without referring to the specific methods used. One final technique used is the post hoc Scheffe analysis which is helpful for discovering the relative statistical differences between different subsets of data or, in this case, groups of people. It is used. for example, to find out whether Traditional Jews are closer to the Strictly Orthodox in their expressed attachment to Israel or to the Progressive Jews.
2/ British versus Jewish group Identity
The State of Israel is the creation of the Zionist movement which regards itself as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. Zionism thus defines Jews as a nation or people and not just as a religious group. It is logical therefore to expect individual Jews' feelings and attitudes towards Israel to vary according to their own self-identity: how far they perceive themselves primarily as 'Englishmen of the Jewish faith' or primarily as 'Jewish ethnics'. As part of the study respondents were asked directly, 'Would you say you feel more British than Jewish or vice versa?' in order to discover the range of identifications. Figure 2 shows that 18 per cent replied that they felt 'more British than Jewish', 54 per cent that they felt 'equally British and Jewish' and 26 per cent that they felt 'more Jewish than British'. Only 2 per cent were unsure.
These replies reflect the European Jewish
historical experience and have strong ideological
implications. At first sight they suggest a
population that should be moderately pro-Zionist.
In fact the overall pattern of attachment to Israel
reflects this prediction. If we assume historical
events have affected perceptions of Jewish self-
identity, then we need to investigate differences
between older and younger British Jews. When
the distinction drawn by respondents between
feeling more British, more Jewish, or equally
British and Jewish was analyzed further according
to age group an interesting pattern was revealed
as illustrated in Figure 3. While the percentage
feeling more British remained fairly constant
across all age groups, the percentage of those
identifying themselves as more Jewish was highest
among the youngest respondents and decreased
with age. There was a concomitant increase in
feeling equally British and Jewish as age rose.
This finding was statistically significant (***).
However, it is important to note that Figure 3 is a
cross-sectional viewpoint, a snapshot. Therefore
we cannot preclude the possibility of an age
rather than cohort effect so that an individual in
their twenties will be likely over time to develop
progressively equal feelings of being both British
and Jewish. Nevertheless, when the graph is set
in a historical or cohort context, then those in their
sixties or older would have been at least ten years
old at the end of the Second World War; we
believe this experience undoubtedly played a role
in forming both British and Jewish identities.
The relationship between the British vs. Jewish
identity issue and the level of attachment to Israel
becomes clear when the two variables are cross-
tabulated in Table 1 (***). This table shows the
percentage of respondents with strong,
moderate, weak and negative attachment to Israel
who identify themselves as feeling more British,
more Jewish or equally British and Jewish. The
table shows that while only 5 per cent of those
who feel strongly attached to Israel identify
themselves as more British, this rises to 21 per
cent of those with a moderate attachment, 43 per
cent of those with no special attachment and 44
per cent of those with a negative attitude.
Interestingly, 19 per cent of those who express a
negative attitude and 7 per cent of those with no
special attachment towards Israel identify
themselves as feeling more Jewish, thereby
revealing a separation of Jewish identity and
attachment to the Jewish state. This group, which
accounts for 2 per cent of the total sample,
equates with the extreme ultra-Orthodox position
of religious anti-Zionism.
This relationship between attachment and group
preference is illustrated in a different way in
Figure 4 which shows the degree of attachment
to Israel according to the various group identities
(***). The histogram clearly reveals that the
majority of those who identify themselves as
feeling more Jewish (73 per cent) express a
strong attachment to Israel while very few of
those who feel more British (12 per cent) have an
equivalent attachment. Those who identify
themselves as equally British and Jewish clearly
lie between the other two identity positions. This
produces the clear linear relationship that we
originally predicted based on the ideological roots
of such opinions. Thus we can observe that
attitudes towards Israel among contemporary
British Jews are materially influenced by ideology
and group identity.
Youth movements
However, the Zionist movement has operated a
number of youth movements in Britain for most of
this century, and one-third of the sample had been
members at some time. These movements
operate a system of informal education about
Israel and often attract teenage membership so
they should be more reflective of respondents'
autonomous attitudes and peer influences than of
formal education in childhood. Therefore, the
sample was divided into three groups: those who
had attended one of five Zionist youth movements
(Habonim Dror, FZY, Hanoar-Hatzioni, Hashomer-
Hatzair and B'nei Akiva), those who had attended
only other non-Zionist youth groups under Jewish
auspices (e.g. local youth clubs, sports and
uniformed groups) and finally those who had
attended no Jewish youth groups. The three
groups were roughly equivalent in size.
We might expect the category associated with
'Zionist youth movement' to match the 'more
Jewish' group, the 'non-Zionist youth groups'
category to match the equally Jewish and British
category, and for the 'no Jewish youth group'
category to match the primarily British identifying
category. In fact we found that Zionist youth
movement membership was no more highly
correlated with Jewish group identity than non-
Zionist youth group (Table 2). However, having no Jewish youth group connections was associated
with more British attachment, i.e. assimilated
attitudes.
Table 2 shows that the pattern of youth group
memberships follows the same binary model as
regards their correlation with degree of
attachment to Israel. Non-members, as we might
expect given their pattern of group identity, are
less enthusiastic about Israel than those who
were members of a youth group.
Our finding is that exposure to Zionism in youth is
not particularly significant in forming pro-Israel
opinions in later life, or rather the experience is no
more influential than other forms of adolescent
Jewish socialization and memberships. Of course,
these data could be interpreted to mean that
Zionism is a consensus opinion among the
mainstream of British Jews. It also has to be
remembered that a small minority who went on
permanent aliya to Israel are therefore out of the
sample population.
The formative influences in the creation of group
identities among British Jews are relevant areas
of inquiry. Whether people feel more Jewish or
British could be due to a number of causes
beyond those already mentioned. Some might #12; suggest that formal Jewish education is a factor.
Undoubtedly it has some influence but the fact
that most adults fall into one category
—supplementary education in synagogue
classes—makes analysis superficial. In addition,
Jewish education is largely a childhood
experience and reflects parental more than
student aspirations.
3/ General ties to Israel
The demographic pattern of attachment to
Israel
Somewhat surprisingly, statistically significant
differences are found by sex, age and region.
Women are more strongly attached than men. In
fact this gendered pattern of 'Jewish loyalty' is a
common pattern in Jewish sociology. In a
previous JPR report on unmarried young Jews
(No. 4, June 1997), we discovered that young
women were more likely to have visited Israel.
The age pattern seems to contradict the earlier findings on group identity. We discover that
overall, the young are less attached than the old.
However, we can also observe that there is
slightly more polarization among the young.
The regional differences probably reflect the age
pattern of the inhabitants more than real cultural
differences between the various regions of
Britain, though we would expect areas of low
Jewish density to attract more assimilated Jews.
The findings concerning synagogue membership
and religious (self-identified) outlook strongly
confirm each other. They demonstrate a strikingly
clear pattern of strengthening attachment to Israel
as the degree of commitment to traditional
Judaism rises. These findings illustrate that
demography and ideology play an important role in
determining attitudes towards Israel. The
remainder of this report will focus on how these
two factors play out across a range of tangible
forms of attachment to Israel.
Visits to Israel
However, when we look again at those who have
visited Israel we see a slightly different picture
(Figure 5).
Respondents were asked how many visits they
had made to Israel in the past ten years. Figure 5
shows that while 22 per cent had never visited
Israel, a further 12 per cent of the sample had not
been to Israel since 1985. Thus 66 per cent of the
sample had visited Israel at least once in the ten
years prior to participating in the survey. The
significance of this figure is open to interpretation.
Should this level of visiting be placed in the
context of international tourism, seen in terms of
solidarity or viewed in some other way? Obviously
variables such as discretionary income and leisure
patterns of this population need to be factored
into the equation before a judgement can be
made.
Relatives and friends in Israel
9 Non-Orthodox synagogue—Masorti, Reform and Liberal.
10 Ernest Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey: Demographic Results', The
Jewish Journal of Sociology. Vol. X, No. 1, 1968, pp. 83-100.
11 Stanley Waterman and Barry A Kosmin, British Jewry in the Eighties
(London: Board of Deputies of British Jews 1986).
Although group identity is a logical predictor, other
factors also come into play when differentiating
between groups of people according to their
attitudes in this area. Table 3 shows the weighted
percentages of degrees of attachment to Israel by
sex, age, region, synagogue membership and
religious outlook in order to give an overview of
patterns of attachment.
The majority of respondents, 78 per cent, have visited Israel at least once. For comparison, in the ;
United States 37 per cent of Jews have visited
Israel but of course greater distance, expense and other factors play a part in reducing ease of :
access (AJC, 1995). This question has been asked
in two previous surveys of Jews in Britain: that of Jews in Edgware in 1968 (10) and Jews in :
Redbridge in 1978. The figure for Edgware was 16 i
per cent having visited Israel and for Redbridge 26
per cent, so there is clear evidence of increased
travel to Israel over the past few decades. 
In 1972 the number of British born Jews living in
Israel (olim) numbered 5,500.(11) In the 1978
Redbridge Survey when a question was asked
about relatives living in Israel, almost three-
quarters of the sample had no relatives living
there. By 1983 the number of British-born Jews
living in Israel had risen to 13,350 which was
equal to 4 per cent of British Jewry at that time.
Between 1989 and 1993 a further 2,500 British
Jews went on aliya. Given this increase in
emigration, and as we have previously seen in
tourism, we should expect increased social
connections with Israel now as compared with
1978. In fact this is borne out by our data. The
rates of both tourism and aliya are higher in the
UK than in the US; in 1995 almost 7 out of 10 (69
per cent) British Jews said they have close friends
or family in Israel as compared with 40 per cent of
American Jews (AJC, 1995).
4/ The age factor
Degree of attachment to Israel by gender
and age group
The variables of attachment, visits and close
friends or relatives in Israel were examined by sex
and by age group. As we saw earlier, women are
more strongly attached to Israel than men (***)
and there was a slightly higher percentage of over
50s (49 per cent) who felt strongly attached than
under 50s (38 per cent). Again this difference was
statistically significant (**). However, when the
number of visits by respondents was broken
down by age, the average number of visits for
each age group was found to be similar. In
addition, there was no significant difference when
looked at by sex. And finally, among those who
say they have close friends or relatives in Israel,
again there was no significant difference across
the age ranges, although the youngest
respondents—those in the 18-29 age group—
tended to have more connections with Israel than
respondents aged over 30. This finding is
surprising given that there is a greater opportunity
for older respondents to have friends in Israel due
to greater exposure over the years, and also to
have more relatives in Israel as a result of their
offspring having made aliya.
Tangible ties to Israel and age effects However, the bottom line shows something very
different: 29 per cent of the oldest group have no
family or friends in Israel, yet are still strongly attached. This rate declines sharply as we move
to the younger age groups, so that only 8 per cent
of 18-29 year olds who have no friends in Israel
are strongly attached. Thus, though more than
one-third of these 70-79 year olds have no friends
or relatives in Israel, they still feel strongly
attached—evidence of a connection with Israel
based on ideology and emotion rather than
experience. But very few of the 18-29, or even 18-
. 49 year olds who lack tangible social ties with
Israelis have this kind of emotional attachment.
When it comes to visiting Israel we see a very
similar pattern in Figure 7. This shows the
percentage of those who have or have not visited
Israel who expressed a strong attachment
according to their age group. The top line
represents the percentage of respondents who
have visited Israel and are strongly attached; the bottom line represents those who have never
visited Israel yet also have a strong attachment.
Again, in the older age groups, large proportions
of those who have visited Israel are strongly
attached, but this declines somewhat in the
younger age groups: 45 to 50 per cent of the 18
to 49 year olds who have visited Israel are
strongly attached.
But again the bottom line shows something very
different: 34 per cent of the oldest group who
have not visited Israel are still strongly attached.
This declines very sharply as we move to the
younger age groups, so that only 3 per cent of 18-
29 year olds who have not visited Israel are
strongly attached.
Returning to the bottom line we see even more
dramatically that a substantial proportion of older
people who have never been to Israel feel
strongly attached. In contrast only a tiny
proportion of younger people without personal
experience of Israel have this level of attachment.
The difference between the proportions of older
people who have or have not visited and are
strongly attached is relatively narrow; but there is
a huge gap between the proportions of younger
people who have or have not visited and express
strong attachment—which points very strongly to
the significance of experiencing Israel for younger
people. It is interesting to note that despite the
clear link between visiting and attachment for the
young, the proportion who have visited Israel and
are attached—45 per cent—is not that much
higher than the proportion of older people who
have never been yet are attached. This is surely a
stark indicator of the powerful role of ideology,
emotion, sentiment and psychology among the
older generations and the equivalent role of
experience and physical contact for the young.
It would appear then that, after all, the more
visceral attachment to Israel upon which the
relationship between British Jews and Israel has
always been based, is very much age-related and
in apparent decline. For young people to develop a
close attachment to Israel, they need to see the
land and meet the people—but even then, that
experience only outpaces the attachment of the
older generation who have not been there by a
relatively small margin. In that sense, the young
have a psychological and emotional deficit that
has to be compensated for by the physical
connection. An Israel experience just stops the
cracks from widening; it does not reverse the
trend of growing distance between young Jews
and Israel. Moreover these data also reveal that
compared with the wider consensus on Israel
among older respondents, there is a greater
polarization of opinion among the young.
The Jewish future in Israel
As might be expected, level of attachment to
Israel is positively correlated with the belief that
'the only long-term future for Jews is in Israel'
(***). In other words, the stronger an individual's
attachment to Israel, the more likely she or he is
to agree with the above statement. Of those who
feel strongly attached, only a minority, 46 per
cent, disagree that the only long-term future for
Jews is in Israel.
Attitudes towards aliya in 1978 and 1995
The overall trends serve to complicate the picture
further (Table 4). Whatever people's ultimate
opinion about the long-term viability of the Jewish
Diaspora, on the personal level Israel has entered into the equation as a place to live. In the 1995
JPR survey, much higher percentages had
thought about living in Israel than in 1978—33.5 to
16.6 per cent—or say they may go one day in the
future—21.9 to 9.3 per cent; while a much
reduced proportion have never thought about it—
46.6 to 71.2 per cent. As a result more have been
on aliya and returned—5.7 to 1.3 per cent. But as
for those making preparations or going soon, the
figures are remarkably similar for both years—1.8
in 1995 and 1.5 per cent in 1978.
What accounts for these differences? International migration reflects both push and pull
factors. On the one hand, the higher percentages
in the JPR survey could reflect increasing
awareness of and engagement with Israel during
this time: Israel has loomed larger in people's lives
in a positive way. Many more have been there and
are now in a position to develop a realistic
appreciation of the country. On the other hand, it
could also reflect something quite different: it may
tell us more about attitudes to Britain than it does
about attitudes to Israel since the period between
the surveys experienced two recessions, growing
unemployment, the lowering of public
expectations of increasing standards of living. In
short, it probably reflects dissatisfaction with life
in Britain as much as it does a positive
appreciation of the possibilities of living in Israel.
Clearly more people have given aliya a try but the
fact that the percentage of those who say they
are actually making preparations to go is so similar
in both surveys suggests that there remains a big
gap between thought and action.
Giving to Israel charities
Support for Israel charities may be regarded as a
good indicator of practical attachment to Israel.
But as Figure 9 shows, only 12 per cent (less than
one in eight) of those who answered say that their
highest charitable cause is an Israeli one. This is
not as high as one might have expected from the
overall pattern of degree of attachment expressed
in the survey and the attention given to Israel by
the organized Jewish community.
The data on highest charitable priority does not
tell us the proportion of all respondents who
donate to Israel related charities. However, from
another question we know this to be 26 per cent.
This rate can be compared with the 1978
Redbridge survey when 87 per cent of
respondents said that they gave to an Israeli
charity, or with a 1980 estimate which put the
figure at between 40 and 70 per cent of the
Jewish population contributing to Israel.
Undoubtedly, British Jews are increasingly less
inclined to support Israel-oriented charities.
Moreover, if we turn again to analyze the pattern
by age group, we see a marked generational
decline. In Figure 10 each line represents one of
the four priority charitable causes and the mark on
each line shows the percentage of each age
group saying that they prioritized that cause. The
Israeli causes line shows that approximately 15 to
20 per cent of those 50 years old and over have
an Israeli cause as their highest charitable choice,
but only 10 per cent or less of 18 to 49 year olds
say their highest charitable cause is an Israel one.
This is not explained by lack of philanthropy in this
age group since 85 per cent of younger Jews give
to charities.
It is also interesting to note that both Israel and
UK Jewish causes decline as priority choices
across the generations, while the choice of
general British charities and overseas aid for the
poor becomes increasingly favoured.
Whereas these figures indicate the percentage of
the Jewish population prioritizing Israel causes,
they tell us nothing about the total amount raised
in the community for Israel, nor do they say
anything about the proportion of total giving which
goes to Israel-oriented charities. A report
produced in the early 1980s, which was the
subject of much controversy, showed that about
60 per cent of charitable moneys was going to Israel.(12) The proportions must have changed since
then, and almost certainly more stays in the UK
than before. Yet it seems highly unlikely that the
total amount raised for Israel causes, as compared
with local Jewish causes, is as low as the 12 per
cent figure of those who choose Israel as their
highest charitable cause suggests. Of course, the
proportion of communal money going to various
causes is not a matter of democratic decision—
after all it is private money—but these data
suggest that if it was, a much greater proportion
of the total would stay at home and much less
would go to Israel.
Support for the Joint Israel Appeal (JIA)
12 Bernard Garbacz and Associates, Trust; The Social Virtues and the
Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton 1984)
Without a time series for the relationship of
British Jews to Israel, we have to use age cohort
as a surrogate variable. This approach assumes
that variations between people of different ages
or sex reflect not only their life experiences but
also the continuation into the present of the ideas
and opinions they formed at critical historical
junctures. We can therefore assume that there
are specific historical experiences which influence
opinions and determine attitudes and thus are
unique to specific generations of people.
A deeper analysis poses further questions as to
the processes which produce these patterns.
Figure 6 looks at the various age groups which
expressed a strong attachment to Israel according
to whether they have close friends in Israel or not:
the top line represents those who have friends
and relatives in Israel and the bottom line, those
who do not. In the oldest two age groups, a large
proportion (60 per cent) of those with friends and
relatives in Israel are strongly attached and this
declines among the younger age groups: between
45 and 50 per cent of those who have friends in
Israel are strongly attached. There is a difference
but it is a relatively gentle slope. 
An essential feature of classic Zionist ideology is
the belief that only in a sovereign Jewish state is
there a secure long-term future for Jews.
Therefore some important conclusions can be
drawn about the state of more ideologically-based
attachment to Israel from the responses to the
following statement: the only long-term future for
Jews is in Israel. Respondents could tick one of
five boxes: strongly agree, agree, unsure,
disagree and strongly disagree. Of the total
sample, 61 per cent rejected the classic Zionist
view. Figure 8 looks at the respondents by age,
aggregating the 'strongly agree' / 'agree' and the
'strongly disagree' / 'disagree' responses while
omitting the 'unsures'. Figure 8 shows that there
is a significant difference between the age groups
on this issue (***): 18 to 39 year olds
overwhelmingly reject this view. The older age
groups, particularly the 80 plus group, were less
inclined to disagree.
Even allowing for differences in sampling and
methodology, when we compare attitudes in the
1978 Redbridge study and in the 1995 JPR
survey, we can observe a fascinating change in
attitudes over 17 years.
As we discussed earlier, for many British Jews in
the past the most potent token of their solidarity
with Israel was charitable donations, particularly to
the JIA. In order to appraise the current position
on charitable giving, the questionnaire asked
people: 'Irrespective of what you did in the past
year, do you feel you have a greater responsibility
to support some types of charity than others?
Which of the following, if any, do you feel should
be given the highest priority: general British charities, overseas aid for the poor, Jewish causes
in Britain, Israeli causes?'
Looking specifically at support for the JIA—the
largest Israel-oriented charity—the data reveal that
only 13 per cent of the sample claim to support it.
Figure 11 breaks down this support by age,
showing that there is a clear variation (**). The
highest level of support for the JIA comes from
50-59 year olds, 21 per cent of whom support the
JIA, but only 10 per cent of 18-29 year olds
support the JIA. This could perhaps be explained
by JIA's historical methods of fundraising through
synagogues. 
5/ The religious factor
The relationship between religious outlook
and attachment to Israel
We have already noted in Table 3 that a strong
degree of attachment to Israel is much more
common among those who declare themselves to
be Traditional or Strictly Orthodox than those with
a more liberal outlook. Figure 12 shows that 86
per cent of the Orthodox are strongly attached,
declining evenly to 19 per cent for the Secular.
There is a highly significant relationship (***)
between religious outlook and attachment to Israel,
each religious outlook group from the Secular to
Strictly Orthodox expressing progressively and
significantly stronger attachments to Israel. Thus
Strictly Orthodox Jews, as shown by Figure 12, are
four times as likely to express strong attachment to
Israel than Jews who declare themselves as Just
Jewish. These findings are reflected in the signifi-
cant relationship between synagogue membership
and attachment (***). In particular, the unaffiliated
expressed a more moderate or weaker attachment
to Israel than those affiliated to synagogues.
Visits to Israel
The actual number of visits paid by respondents
to Israel over the past ten years is an indication of
the intensity of the tie. This line again follows a
clear slope: the average number of visits for the
Secular, Just Jewish and Progressive groupings
over the past ten years is approximately 2; for the
Traditional 4; and for the Strictly Orthodox—a little
over 8 visits.
Friends and relatives in Israel
Israeli charitable causes
These findings are reflected in the figures
representing support for the JIA. We have already
seen that only 13 per cent of the total sample
support the JIA, but analysis of these supporters
by religious outlook shows that there is a strong
connection with religious outlook (***). Two-thirds
of those who support the JIA fall into the
Traditional or Strictly Orthodox categories.
The peace process
Clearly, the religious significance of the territories
dictates Orthodox opinions. Overall, Traditional
Jews are less inclined to agree with the land for
peace principle than Progressive, Just Jewish and
Secular Jews. Whilst 69 per cent of the sample as
a whole agreed that Israel should give up some
territory in exchange for credible guarantees of
peace, 55 per cent of the Strictly Orthodox and 24
per cent of Traditional Jews were opposed.
Respondents were also asked whether they
supported the then Israeli Labour government's
peace policy—whilst over 56 per cent of the total
sample said yes. Orthodox Jews were four times
as likely to be against the policy than anyone else.
The Jewish future and Israel
Aliya by religious outlook
Looking then at those who have visited Israel by
religious outlook, Figure 13 shows a similar linear pattern although the differential declines less
steeply, since clearly even 60 per cent of Jews
who regard themselves as Secular have visited
Israel at least once.
Looking at those with friends and relatives in
Israel by religious outlook, Figure 14 shows a very
high percentage of the Orthodox with friends and
relatives in Israel and much smaller percentages
of the Secular, Just Jewish and Progressive being
in a similar position. This demonstrates a highly
significant relationship between religious outlook
and having friends and relatives in Israel (***).
Turning now to the priority of charitable causes, a
slightly different pattern emerges. When the
choice of Israeli charities was examined according
to re igious outlook, the results showed that it is
Traditional Jews who are most likely to name
Israeli causes as their first priority (19 per cent),
and they are more likely to do so than the Strictly
Orthodox (13 per cent). Yet again these two
groups are ahead of the Progressive group (8 per
cent), the Just Jewish (10 per cent) and the
Secular Jews (5 per cent) in prioritizing Israeli
causes. However, Israeli causes are much less of
a priority than UK Jewish charities: 60 per cent of
the Traditional and 80 per cent of the Strictly
Orthodox give UK Jewish charities as their highest
priority. The Strictly Orthodox position here could
firstly reflect anti-Zionism and secondly be caused
by a perceived need to look after their own.
Religious ideology impinges on attitudes towards
the Middle East settlement. Religious Zionism is
particularly concerned with the actual boundaries
of Israel and the biblical case for Jewish
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Looking at
the responses to the question: 'Do you feel that
Israel should give up some territory in exchange
for credible guarantees of peace?', according to
religious outlook (Figure 15), we can see that
closeness to Israel among the Orthodox does not
imply support for the Oslo peace process or for
the principle of land for peace.
The responses to the question of the only long-
term future for Jews being in Israel were also
analyzed further in terms of religious outlook. A
strongly significant relationship was found for
agreement (along a scale of strongly agreeing to strongly disagreeing) by religious outlook (***).
The results showed that respondents who
declared themselves to be Secular, Just Jewish or
Progressive in their religious outlook were
significantly more in disagreement or were
uncertain about their attitude towards the
statement than those with a Traditional outlook,
while the Strictly Orthodox group were further
along the scale towards being in agreement.
Until 1967 Socialist Zionism was dominant among
the British Zionist youth movements which
encouraged aliya. Those who went on aliya were
largely motivated to cultivate the land and to
pioneer the collective agricultural settlements.
Kibbutzim such as Kfar Hanassi and Kfar Blum
were founded by British olim; the religious
Kibbutz, Lavi, also had a large British contingent.
The swing of the political pendulum to the right
altered this pattern. In recent decades, aliya from
the West has largely been religiously motivated
and composed of Orthodox Jews who settle in
Jerusalem and urban centres. Our results clearly
reflect this trend. Figures 16 and 17 show that
traditionalist religious-based attachment to Israel
extends into considerations about aliya. It is highly
significant that only 5 per cent of the Strictly
Orthodox have never considered going on aliya.
6/ Statistical explanations of strength of attachment to Israel
All the previous tables attempted to show the
relationship of some key demographic or
attitudinal characteristics (i.e. independent
variables such as age and group identity) to the Israel attachments of our sample (i.e. dependent
variables such as degree of attachment and
charitable priorities). However, each of these
tables treated the relationships in aggregate
categories. Moreover, the results only showed the
relationships of two or three independent
variables to the dependent variables at a time,
with no simultaneous control for any additional
variables which might have an effect (i.e.
interactions).
We now try to calculate the relative influence of any
one factor in predicting any individual British Jew's
attachment to Israel. Fortunately, complicated and
lengthy statistical analyses can be accomplished
easily with computers. The methods we have
chosen to use are called Multiple Regression analyses.(13) Our aim is to calculate the real
significance of all the variables we have discussed
and then place them in order of importance for
explaining the range of responses known as the
variance in the continuum of attachment to Israel
from negative to very strong. It also calculates the
combined explanatory power of all the inputs in
explaining the degree of variance. This is known
as the adjusted R².
Altogether nine variables were utilized in the
calculations: the respondent's age, sex and region
(London vs. elsewhere), their group identity,
religious outlook, religious upbringing, number of
visits to Israel in the last ten years, as well as
whether or not they have close friends and
relatives in Israel and whether or not they had
been members of a Jewish youth group (including
Zionist groups).(14) The dependent variable, i.e. the
factor we are seeking to explain, is the degree of
attachment to Israel.
The results can be seen in Table 5 which shows
that five of the nine variables selected were highly
significant (***). Four variables—sex, region,
religious upbringing and youth club membership
—were not significant at all. The five significant
variables were positively related to attachment to
Israel: e.g. older age groups are associated with
stronger attachment. Altogether, in aggregate, the
Obviously some individual attributes are closely
inter-linked and the regression analyses
underlined these relationships. A stepwise
regression showed that either of the variables of
religious outlook and group identity alone could
explain approximately 20 per cent of the variance.
The two variables in combination can explain 25.6
per cent or a quarter of all the variance. This
indicates they have great predictive value since
the other three significant variables add only 8.2
per cent of explanatory power. The cumulative
explanatory powers of each of the variables can
be seen in Table 6 (the variables of sex, region,
Jewish youth group membership and religious
upbringing were not entered into the equation).
These results, show that the sample's religious
outlook and group self identity along the
continuum from Secular to Strictly Orthodox and
from British to Jewish are the key to
understanding much about their degree of
attachment to Israel. This means that self-
perception is crucial and is the foundation for a
significant proportion of the emotion and
behaviour which we currently observe in relation to Israel. However, we must remember that the
religious outlook and group identity of adult British
Jews is neither a given nor necessarily a permanent
individual attribute. It is associated with the wider
social and political context within which these attitudes operate. In addition, unlike demographic
attributes such as sex or age cohort, acquired
characteristics such as attitudes and opinions are
open to change in a number of possible
directions.
13 This is the procedure required for a mixture of dichotomous and
continuous variables.
14 Full documentation of the procedure and the regression coefficients
is available upon request.
7/ Conclusion
Recent developments and trends
The data in the JPR survey suggest that marked changes have taken place
in the nature of the relationship between British Jews and Israel in recent
years. To summarize the changes and highlight the trends, Table 7 indicates
the direction in which matters look as if they are going, unless something
changes or something is done to bring about change in the interim. In other
words, these are probable trends, they are not inevitable.
Table 7: Israel
Those who are closest to Israel are far more likely to be Orthodox by synagogue
affiliation or by religious outlook. It is the Traditional and Orthodox
who are more likely to have friends in Israel, to visit more often, to have
thought about aliya, and to consider going on aliya in the future. They
are more likely to support Israel causes than other kinds of Jews, and they
adopt a more hawkish approach to the peace process, being far less likely
to want to give land for peace than other kinds of Jews. This suggests a
narrowing, in religious terms, of the base of attachment to Israel in the
British community. Although we do not have definitive social survey data
from the past on this, the thrust of the evidence in the Redbridge survey
indicates a much more broadly-based attachment to Israel in 1978. We would
argue that this is borne out by experience and accounts of the history of
British Jewry during this period.
Younger Jews are more polarized on Israel but in the aggregate they are
less likely to give to an Israel charity, and more likely to disagree with
the view that 'the only long-term future for Jews is in Israel'. Their attachment
to Israel is much more dependent on actual experience of the country and
its people - having friends and relatives there, and making visits - than
the attachment of older people.
What seems to be happening then is a radical shift from a period of community-wide
consensus concerning attachment to Israel, which was probably as secular
in character as it was religious, and which grew out of ideological and
emotional feelings, to a more narrowly-based attachment linked to religiosity
on the one hand and to experience on the other. It is after all the national-religious
trend in Israel which has been ideologically and politically dominant in
the last two decades, despite the advances in the peace process. As stated
above, the socialist-Zionist ethos is in eclipse. If anything challenges
the national-religious camp it is Israel's secularism and consumerism, and
that hardly offers itself as a point of positive identification for liberal
or secular Diaspora Jews. Whether one agrees with their point of view or
not, it is the national religious camp which has conveyed a more certain,
more coherent view of what Israel is, and is to be, in the future. Whereas
Israel once appealed to radicals and later to all denominations in the community,
as time passes it looks as if increasingly it will appeal more to Traditional
and Orthodox Jews than to others.
This pattern applies to the new episodic connections between British Jews
and Israel that have arisen in recent years. Many British Jews have invested
in vacation and retirement properties in Israel. Business travel and business
links have developed. Teenage trips to Israel have become almost a rite
of passage for young British Jews. Yet as any casual observer of airline
travellers to Israel can observe, the Orthodox are over-represented. While
Secular and Progressive Jewish teenagers who visit Israel tend to spend
a few weeks of their summer vacation there, Orthodox youngsters are more
likely to spend a year at a religious yeshiva or seminary.
Israel has been a powerful mobilizing force in British Jewry, especially
at times of crisis, such as the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. That
force has been employed, with phenomenal success, for fundraising. For years
it was taken for granted that Israel was the primary focus of communal fundraising,
in terms both of priority, and of the amount of money raised. It is probably
still the case that a high proportion of charitable funds from Jews go to
support Israel in one form or another. However, the JPR survey clearly shows
that that must come from a shrinking group among whom are a number of elderly
people and individuals with large foundations who give substantial donations.
Not only is the proportion of the Jewish population supporting Israel relatively
small-26 per cent-but younger people are showing even less interest. Israel
used to be the primary focus of communal fundraising, but there is now declining
support for Israel-oriented charities.
Zionism in the Diaspora was never simply an ideological machine for producing
olim-immigrants. It became a cultural and educational force-one only has
to look at the role of the Zionist Federation in establishing Jewish day
schools. Through the creation of that Zionist space within British Jewry,
Israel came to be an essential component and a medium of expression of Jewish
ethnic identity. But as elements of Israeli culture became part of the fabric
of Jewish life, Zionism as an ideology began to lose its resonance. It was
simply unnecessary to have to buy into all the theory which made up the
Zionist idea in order to have a close relationship with the reality of Israel.
JPR survey data show that most Jews in Britain see themselves as firmly
rooted in British society and not as a Diaspora waiting to return. They
do not see the only long-term future for Jews in Israel, and if they are
contemplating aliya, they are most likely to be Traditional or Orthodox
Jews, but even then only a very small minority say they are actively making
preparations to go. Zionism was once seen as the most widely-held communal
ideology, but in the future it looks as if Zionism will become increasingly
irrelevant, or the tool of one communal faction. An erosion of the centre
and the end of consensus politics is not just a British Jewish phenomenon
but a global trend as religious fundamentalism and local nationalisms grow.
Other JPR survey data have indicated that British Jews are becoming more
like an ethnic community, but that the components of that ethnicity are
becoming more broadly based and complex. As we noted, a rise in Jewish group
identity among the young has not translated into increased Zionist feeling.
Israel is part of Jewish ethnicity, but by no means as important to it as
is generally assumed. Certainly, to call Israel the 'central focus of Anglo-Jewish
identity' (15) is not justified by the JPR data. Some talk of Zionism Mark
II, or of a renewal of Zionism, and it is not mere coincidence that they
do so in this anniversary year. But this flies in the face of reality. The
trend for Zionism is towards ideological irrelevance; and for Israel to
be very much present in, but diffused throughout, the increasingly complex
mosaic that makes up contemporary Jewish identity.
Zionism and Israel have ideological meaning for post-1967 religious Zionists
who saw in the Six-Day War the beginning of the fulfilment of the messianic
hope. But most Jews-indicative of polarization in the Jewish world-are far
removed from that. Israel has certainly been a unifying factor for British
Jews. Even when arguing over the policies of the Israeli government, Jews
overwhelmingly cherish the existence of the state. Of course it was far
easier to express solidarity with Israel and for it to be a source of unity
when its existence was under threat.
With eyes now focused on the issues that were always held in abeyance-the
future of Jerusalem, Israel's final borders, the possible creation of a
Palestinian state, the status of Palestinian refugees, the very nature of
the Jewish state-disagreements between Jews have become much sharper. The
JPR survey data reflect this in the division over such issues as land for
peace between Orthodox Jews and some Traditional Jews on the one hand, and
the rest of the Traditional, Progressive, Just Jewish and Secular Jews on
the other. The survey data relate to the situation in late 1995 and we can
be assured that the Rabin assassination and the election of the Netanyahu
government mean that today, far from being a source of cohesion and consensus,
in some respects Israel is becoming a source of communal division.
Implications for policy development
Such developments and trends must have an impact on the centrality of Israel
in Jewish life. Diaspora Jews do not see themselves as living in exile.
They have freely chosen to live where they are, and if they want to do that
Jewishly in any sense they are increasingly giving priority to problems
internal to their communities and related to the maintenance of Jewish distinctiveness.
They can see that the state of Israel and the Israeli population are managing
quite nicely without their perpetual concern. Thus fewer feel the need to
give charitable support to Israel. Many see no relevance in Zionism. Those
that are actively attached to Israel are drawn more and more from one sector
of the community. And the incipient struggle over the crucial issues facing
Israel's future, including the power of the Orthodox religious parties to
determine who is a Jew, is likely to make Israel less a focus of consensus
and more a source of division and alienation for liberally minded Jews.
In this light-and if Israel is integrated more into the Middle East-can
Israel's centrality hold for all Jews?
If these trends prevail, and if nothing happens or is done in the interim
to change them, we could be seeing a turning of the circle in British Jewry's
attachment to Zionism, and to the idea and the reality of the Jewish state:
it began as the concern of a mostly secular minority, grew to embrace the
entire community, and could be in the process of returning to be the concern
of a minority, although now a minority with a mostly Traditional or Orthodox
religious outlook.
This situation can be viewed as a natural process and a product of the success
of the Zionist project. Israel has grown up, it does not require the support
of Diaspora Jews as it once did since it is no longer under immediate threat.
If there is to be a relationship with British Jews, why shouldn't it be
based on practical and personal connections-visits, friends and so on-or
on some kind of religious imperative? And meanwhile, British Jews turn increasingly
to the problems of their own community or the world. This may be the normal
position and those whose primary concern is Israel may simply have to adjust
to this new reality.
On the other hand, this new situation could be seen as a huge problem, a
major crisis given the role that Israel once played in fostering contemporary
Jewish identity and in keeping Jews broadly united around a central issue.
Given the link between experience of Israel and attachment to Israel among
younger Jews, it suggests that enormous resources would need to be poured
into giving young Jews that experience, only to prevent any further erosion
of attachment to Israel.
The challenge for policy makers is therefore considerable: to let matters
take their course, the implications of which may well be as outlined in
the summary Table 7; or to gear up Israel-oriented charities and organizations
to prevent further erosion, the implications of which could be the taking
of even more money out of British Jewry for Israel-oriented activity.
The onus could also fall on Israel to take the initiative. Since ideology
plays such an important role in Diaspora Jews' attachment, Israelis have
to decide if it is in their interests to modify their policies and how they
present them in order to appeal to a wider spectrum of Diaspora Jews. They
could also consider the way in which the intermediary role played by the
media in portraying Israel's government and society impacts upon the attitudes
and feelings of many Diaspora Jews.
As the twentieth century ends, time and historical processes seem to accelerate.
So even as we commemorate the triumphs of Zionism, the centennial of the
First Zionist Congress in 1897 and approach the jubilee celebrations of
the establishment of the state, paradoxically one thing is clear: the attachment
of British Jews to Israel can no longer be taken for granted.
15 Joseph Finklestone, 'Zionism and british Jews' in The Jewish Year Book (London: Vallentine Mitchel 1997), pp. ix-xxx
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Report authors
Professor
Barry Kosmin
Antony Lerman
Jacqueline
Goldberg
Acknowledgments
JPR is grateful to Stephen Miller and Marlena Schmool for their advice and
helpful comments on the text, and to Larry Rubin for carrying out literature
searches.