The Sixth William Frankel
Lecture

Seminar grapples with EU-Israel-European Jewry nexus

Dr Ramin Jahanbegloo calls on Middle Eastern
intellectuals to put morality ahead of politics

From left: Professor Margaret Harris, Melvyn Carlowe OBE, Amobi Modu and Professor Stanley Waterman at JPR's Seventh Annual Seminar for the Jewish Voluntary Sector.

In what community leaders and policy experts are calling an indispensable blueprint for the future of British Jewry, JPR has produced seven far-reaching recommendations for the 2,000 organizations that make up the UK's Jewish Voluntary Sector (JVS). Entitled Long-term Planning for British Jewry: final report and recommendations*, the 90-page study, which was launched at JPR's Seventh Annual Seminar for the Jewish Voluntary Sector in December 2003, marks the capstone of a community-wide investment of more than £650,000 and represents the culmination of six years of work. It is the end result of 10 independent reports published by JPR between 1998 and 2003 - plus ongoing consultations with key experts, academics, institutions and fundraising bodies operating in the third sector.

The Long-term Planning Final Report touches on virtually every dimension of the UK Jewish community. It provides for the first time - in a single volume - the latest research-based evidence on the UK Jewish philanthropic sector, with its annual turnover of more than £500m.

Designed to help Jewish charities forge long-range plans to meet both internal and external challenges, the Final Report calls for reform in seven essential areas affecting structure, process and resources (see table).

Need for implementation

JPR Executive Director Professor Barry Kosmin emphasized that the Final Report presented urgent issues requiring action, 'especially given key changes in UK society: the Government's continued pullback from welfare provision, together with its clear message that the UK voluntary sector must be prepared to shoulder more and more of the burden of an ageing population'.

According to JPR Director of Research, Professor Stanley Waterman: 'The seven recommendations in the Final Report will make a real difference only if they are implemented. It is incumbent on the UK Jewish Voluntary Sector to move ahead and act on them while the data are current'.

* copies of the Final Report can be obtained from JPR at £7.50 each, or can be accessed on the website: www.jpr.org.uk

Seven Key Recommendations: Long-term Planning for British Jewry Final Report

1 Public relations and image
With special focus on the Jewish tradition of tzedakah (charity), the enormous amount of good work, communal spirit and excellent services of the Jewish Voluntary Sector needs to be more widely appreciated and effectively communicated as a foundation for future activity.

2 Collaboration and co-ordination
Jewish voluntary organizations should collaborate more closely and establish a mechanism for this purpose.

3 Community ties and networks
The Jewish community should maintain and nurture its stock of social associations.

4 Coverage and clients
Organizations need to enter into a debate and provide clear statements concerning their mission, ethos, targeted clientele and geographical coverage, as well as how their services can be delivered.

5 Financial resources
Financial support for the JVS has to be seen as a responsibility of the whole of the Jewish population and individuals should be expected to contribute in line with their means.

6 Human resources
The stock of community volunteers and paid workers should be developed and nurtured, particularly among younger people, early retirees and those with professional skills. Initiatives such as a Jewish volunteer bureau should be implemented.

7 Knowledge, research and development
Jewish voluntary organizations should plan their future strategies using research-based evidence. Research and data collection on the Jewish population and the JVS should be continually updated and refined.

Some key challenges

• Fundraising in a gloomy economic climate.
• Human resources - recruiting volunteers and appropriately paid staff, especially in Jewish schools, and maintaining a 'Jewish ethos' in residential homes.
• Service provision - in education and in long-term care for older people.
  There is rising consumer sophistication in both these areas. We may need to think about opening up these services to non-Jews for economic reasons. With increasing secularization and non-affiliation, it will also be difficult but essential to tackle the issues of providing provision for those who do not adhere to religious norms.
  
• How to involve users with high expectations. This can be done through consultations, advisory groups and market research. We must think of new ways of meeting needs, and alternatives to heavy investment in building and staff; for example, sheltered housing and respite care, which are intermediate level service

Professor Gerald Steinberg

Seminar grapples with EU-Israel-European Jewry nexus

'The way Europe deals with Israel is through myths and stereotypes. At best Israel is regarded as an extremist state, and at worst a serial violator of international law that has lost its right to exist.' With that stark assessment, Professor Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan University opened a recent seminar at JPR entitled, 'Strategies for Conflict Management: the EU, Israel and European Jewry.'

According to Steinberg, a professor of political studies and director of the Interdisciplinary Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation at Bar Ilan University, the European view of Israel did not emerge out of a vacuum. Instead, it is fed by a troubled history with Jews and a current obsession with Israel. Both themes are played out within European Union politics and the European media, and underlie the pro-Palestinian, and anti-Israeli role of widely influential international organizations, particularly NGOs (non-governmental organizations). 'Some NGOs regularly characterize Israel as a racist, apartheid state,' said Steinberg.

To help stem the negative tide of what Steinberg refers to as manifestations of the 'new antisemitism' in Europe, Steinberg recommended targeted and strategic research on the problem of what Professor Barry Kosmin called the 'triadic' relationship between the EU, Israel, and European Jewry. Such a study, Professor Steinberg said, could serve as a basis for a pro-active response by Jewish communities.

From the left: William Frankel CBE, The Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC and Lord Haskel

It is necessary, but rather surprising, to have to remind ourselves that for the first half of the last century it was Britain rather than the United States that dominated the Middle East. For forty years after the First World War the British had a love affair with the Arab rulers, if not with their people. However, British influence and power in the Middle East dropped dramatically after 1945 as part of the wider decline and fall of the British Empire. That influence collapsed after the 1956 Suez Crisis when Britain and France, in secret collusion with Israel, tried to destroy Gamal Abdul Nasser but were forced to withdraw by a hostile and uncompromising United States.

It is often forgotten that at that time unilateral military action against an Arab state so incensed Washington that they threatened economic sanctions against Britain at the United Nations. Now is a good moment to be reminded that Suez was the first time that Britain exercised its right of veto in the Security Council. But although the UN could be blocked, London was unable to stop the drain on our gold reserves, instigated by the Americans, and Eisenhower refused to help until the military action was suspended.

Why were the Americans so hostile? After all the British were only trying to bring about regime change against an Arab dictator, who had flouted his international obligations and was a threat to the security of his neighbours. In part it was because the Americans liked to think of themselves, at that time, as the natural friend of the Third World, and as the first nation to be decolonized from the British Empire. They were more interested in the Panama Canal than the Suez Canal and felt that they could afford to be high-minded.

In later years Eisenhower admitted that he had been wrong to force the British and French to withdraw. The result had been the collapse of British influence to the benefit of the Soviets, a triumph for Nasser and the destabilization of moderate Arab regimes. One consequence was the violent overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958, which led, in due course, to the rise of Saddam Hussein.

Suez and the eclipse of British power meant that the Americans had to fill the vacuum. They had every reason to do so. By that time the region had become the world's most important source of oil, literally the lubricant of the global economy. To the north of the Middle East was an aggressive Soviet Union determined to destroy the capitalist system and dominate the world. Countries such as Egypt, Iran, the Gulf States and Turkey were crucial to Moscow's ambitions. If their pro-Western governments could be overthrown and replaced by radical pro-Communist regimes the Soviet Union would have a stranglehold on Western oil supplies and be able to dictate its terms. The United States had alreadyreplaced Britain as the most important ally for Israel. Suez had been, in some ways, an aberration in British-Israeli relations. The two countries were not natural allies despite the Balfour Declaration. Britain had tried to be even-handed between Jews and Arabs during the Mandate and it still attached far more importance to its relations with Jordan, the Gulf States and the Saudis than to its relations with Tel Aviv.

The United States was far less equivocal. Its large, domestic Jewish population made relations with Israel a sensitive political issue in several pivotal states. Israel as a democratic, pro-western nation was a natural ally and republican America had less empathy with the feudal Arab monarchies than did the United Kingdom.strategic interests of the United States and the West as a whole. It no longer seemed to be of much importance to either Washington or London who ruled in the Middle East. In a wider sense it was claimed that the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War meant that it was 'the end of history'. That was always improbable. It would be more accurate to say that as one door closes another slams in your face. And so it has been with the Middle East. Although no longer part of a global battle for supremacy the fortunes of the region still have a major impact on both America and Europe.

One unresolved issue is, of course, the relationship of Israelis and Palestinians. Their future and the continuing occupation of the Golan Heights can still be the casus belli for a new regional war. Such a war would destabilize a region, which is Europe's back door. The Middle East is where Europe, Asia and Africa literally meet. Its stability and prosperity can never be a matter of indifference to us. But the world must always be reminded that even if Israel didn't exist, or if the Israelis and Palestinians could learn to love one another, the Middle East would still be a source of major tension and conflict. Israel is not responsible for the age-old rivalry between Iraq and Iran, nor the cause of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya and of the terrorism that he spawned for many years. The operatives of Al-Qaeda are not, for the most part, Palestinians dispossessed from their homeland but Saudis, Yemenis, Afghans and others with a multitude of other grievances.

Nor is Israel responsible for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. It is a matter of considerable regret that at a time when Latin America, Eastern Europe, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan and many other states have abandoned authoritarianism, hardly a single Arab state, apart from Lebanon, has democratic institutions or representative government. The only three other states in the region whose governments were elected by their people are those of Israel, Turkey and Iran. None are Arab and Iran is more pluralist than democratic with true power still with the ayatollahs.

These are now matters of history. The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat to the It may be impossible to divorce the rise in terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism entirely from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but few, even in the Arab world, would argue that Israel is the sole cause. The problems of the region are far more complex. The Americans and the British have many reasons to be concerned and involved in the Middle East.

Occasionally one hears a sort of conspiracy theory that it is all about oil. I believe that to be complete nonsense. Of course, during the Cold War, the control of Saudi, Iraqi and Gulf oil was a strategic issue that could have been fatal to Western interests. But that is no longer relevant. The Arab countries need to sell their oil in order to survive and prosper. Europe and the United States are their main markets. If they tried to refuse access to their oil for political reasons they would impoverish themselves while the rest of the world would use the increasing supplies of Russia, the Caspian and other regions in Africa, the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere. America does not need to control Iraq to have access to its oil. Indeed, it is not widely realized that much of Iraqi oil exports, allowed under the United Nations sanctions programme, found its way to American gas stations.

Iraq War 'unwise and unjustified'
The recent Iraq War has, of course, been a striking example of American and British official policy coming together and the special relationship acquiring a practical bond. For all that, I have to say that I believe that the war was unwise and unjustified. Like everyone else I was delighted to see Saddam Hussein toppled from power and the Iraq people freed from his yoke. I strongly supported the Gulf War and, as both Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary, worked closely with the Americans to enforce UN sanctions and the No Fly Zone on Iraq, which effectively prevented further Iraqi aggression. I also supported the American decision to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan who were providing sanctuary for Osama bin Laden. He and his terrorist organisation had declared war on the United States on 9/11 and those who gave him sanctuary deserved all that they got.

But Iraq was different. A decision to go to war is the most serious and most difficult decision that any President or Prime Minister will have to take. When that war is with a country that has not attacked you or your allies, we are in new territory. When it is, furthermore, a war waged without the express approval of the Security Council and with the world and, in the case of Britain, the nation deeply divided, thejustification has to be clear and consistent.

Tony Blair, in his address to Congress, declared that history would forgive him and President Bush, even if Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were never found in Iraq because of the undoubted bestiality of Saddam Hussein and his regime. We are challenged to admit that without the war Saddam would still be in power, able to terrorise both his own people and his neighbours. This attempt at moral blackmail will not do. The issue is not whether the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein. Of course it is. It would also be a better place without Robert Mugabe, Kim Jong II and a host of other despots, but there is no intention of the British or, so far, the American government to go to war to get rid of them.

Nor did Tony Blair call for an invasion of Iraq during the first five years of his prime ministership when Saddam was as evil as he was last year. What changed was George Bush's arrival in the White House and 9/11. Thereafter Blair recognized that, in order to retain the confidence of the new president, and to ensure British influence in Washington, he would have to support regime change and the new doctrine of pre-emptive wars. He knew that geopolitical arguments would be unlikely to convince the Labour Party or the British public of the need for war. But he also, rather shrewdly, concluded that a combination of an imminent threat of WMD in the hands of Saddam Hussein combined with a reminder of the human rights abuses of his regime would have the best prospect of swinging recalcitrant MPs and the British public behind him.

This led directly to dodgy dossiers, weapons that could be launched in 45 minutes, and an unhealthy reliance on raw intelligence reports. I don't doubt that Blair was sincere in his protestations. Disraeli's remark about Gladstone is very apposite. 'He could convince most people about most things and himself of almost anything'.

It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of the failure to find WMD and the resultant deep belief that the British and, to a lesser extent, the American public were misled on the supreme issue of peace and war. The failure to find WMD is also crucial to the credibility of the new US doctrine of pre-emption. There is nothing illogical, unethical or undesirable in hitting an enemy first who you know is planning to hit you. That is no more than a form of self-defence. But that must be subject to two major considerations. First, it cannot be a right for the United States alone. If it is valid it must be available to any member of the United Nations in comparable circumstances. That alone would make the world a very dangerous place. Second, a pre-emptive war would only be justified if either before or after you launch it, you are able to produce credible evidence of the intention of the other state to attack you or your allies. In the case of Iraq there has been no evidence of an intention by Saddam to attack the US. The failure to find WMD suggests that nor was there any intention to launch an early attack against any of his neighbours.

That does not mean that Saddam Hussein was not a dangerous and unpredictable menace. It does mean that, in the absence of significant international support the Americans and the British were unwise to launch an invasion of a sovereign state. The great casualty of that war has been Western unity. France, Germany and half of Western Europe have bitterly opposed the Americans and the British and been anathematized by them in return.

On the Israeli-Palestinian issue Britain is closer to its European neighbours than it is to the United States. There is no difference of view about Israel's right to exist behind secure frontiers. There is now an acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic that a Palestinian state must be created on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. There is a common detestation of suicide bombing and Palestinian terrorism.

But Britain is undoubtedly more sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations; more critical of Israeli settlement policy; and a supporter of the European Union attempts to deepen dialogue with the Arab countries and help be a bridge between them and the United States.


Three steps to peace
It is easy to be depressed by the failure to achieve peace. The history of this dispute has been two steps forward, one step back. Israel has made a permanent peace with Egypt and returned Sinai. It has a permanent peace with Jordan; it has withdrawn from Lebanon. Even Sharon has now accepted the principle of a Palestinian state and that the Israelis cannot be permanent occupiers. To make real progress the Americans and the British Government should now support the following:

First, they should call on the Egyptians, the Saudis, the Syrians and the Jordanians to use maximum pressure on Arafat and his colleagues to stop the suicide bombings. So far some Arab governments have made the right noises but they could be much more effective if they used their full weight to stop the bombers and those who assist them.

Second, the British Government should encourage both Washington and Jerusalem to drop its insistence that Arafat should be removed as Palestinian leader. I have met Arafat several times and have no illusions other than that he is a negative and flawed person. But for him the Palestinians could already have their own state on at least part of the West Bank. As has been rightly said his commitment has been to the Palestinian cause and not to the Palestinian people, who are suffering more than they need to because of his policy.

At least until the advent of Mr Blair, British Prime Ministers were the candid friends of American Presidents rather than unqualified admirers. When the Americans, under Reagan, invaded Grenada, Mrs Thatcher, of all people, went on the BBC and declared 'We in the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into other people's countries, independent sovereign territories...'

The candid friend receives respect when the unconditional admirer can often forfeit it. Together the United States and the United Kingdom can achieve much in the Middle East and in the world as a whole. It cannot be a relationship of equal partners because we are not equal but it will always work best when common policies reflect common interests and judgments.

We are fortunate that most of the time they do.

The role of the intellectual in the Middle East

A seminar was given at JPR in October by Dr Ramin Jahanbegloo, an Iranian academic and former head of the Department of Research on Contemporary Thought at the Cultural Research Bureau in Tehran, and Fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington DC. His books include Iran and Modernity and Conversations with Isaiah Berlin. His work centres around issues of democracy, human rights and non-violence. The seminar was attended by British writers and academics and was chaired by Professor Barry Kosmin.

Describing himself as a secular 'citoyen du monde' whose heart was in the Middle East, Dr Jahanbegloo traced the role intellectuals had played in society, from Socrates to the present. Particularly in these troubled times, he said, the potential impact of the intellectual was considerable.

In the past, Dr Jahanbegloo noted, the Middle East had suffered at the hands of certain intellectual elites who succumbed to destructive ideologies. Political parties and religious leaders routinely sought to exploit intellectuals in a bid to bolster or consolidate power. Corrupt moral climates continued for decades, breeding fanaticism, dogmatism and more recently, virulent strains of murderous fundamentalism.

Dr Jahanbegloo called this trend a tragedy, and stressed that intellectuals should position themselves outside the masses and act as a check against enforced beliefs. Their role should be to maintain integrity and independence against both religious authorities and the state, challenging thestatus quo and creating new standards of behaviour.

Dr Jahanbegloo called on Middle Eastern intellectuals to put morality ahead of politics and to accept an ultimate responsibility to history, where all actions would ultimately be recorded and judged.

Equally, Dr Jahanbegloo said that intellectuals should resist the allure of utopian thinking and the temptation to demonize 'the other'. The Middle East was a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multi-layered reality, he said. The role of the intellectual was to promote dialogue and understanding among all groups living in the region.

Forthcoming events

Faith Schools - Their Role and Future?
A panel discussion organized by The Jewish Museum in association with JPR and the Institute of Education.

Tuesday 24 February 2004, 6.30 pm
Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1

Panel:
Professor Barry Kosmin
Executive Director, JPR

Professor Gerald Grace
Director of the Centre for Research into Catholic Education

Dr Michael Hand
Lecturer in Education at the Institute of Education

Alastair Falk
Head of West London Academy,
former Head of King Solomon High School

For further information contact the Jewish Museum on 020 7284 1997.

Dinner in honour of

William Frankel CBE, JPR Vice-President

and

The Rt Hon The Lord Woolf of Barnes, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales

Wednesday 12 May 2004
from 7.15 pm

For further details please contact Judith Russell on 020 7563 9425 or by email to judith.russell@jpr.org.uk