jpr / news           Autumn 2003

Do you have a religious outlook, a secular one or perhaps something in between? JPR put this question to almost 3,000 Jewish adults in its survey of Jews in London and the South-east, published in summer 2002 in conjunction with the National Centre for Social Research. Ninety-six per cent felt able to answer the question, with secular outlook predominating. David Graham, JPR's Research Fellow in European Jewish Demography, has reviewed these data to see what light they can shed on London's Jewish population. His findings are published in JPR's latest report, Secular or religious? The outlook of London's Jews*.

British Jews are often perceived as being inconsistent in their attitudes and practices, as when families light Sabbath candles regularly on Friday night but go shopping or to a football match on Saturday afternoon (activities which are forbidden on the Sabbath). Why has previous research been unable to adequately explain this apparent anomaly? This is partly because past surveys have categorized Jews with labels such as: 'Non-practising', 'Just Jewish', 'Progressive', 'Traditional' and 'Strictly orthodox'. However, the differences between these categories are arbitrary and depend more on a household's synagogue affiliation than on the actual opinions and practices of the individuals themselves. In essence, we have so far failed to capture Jewish identity.

However, examining Jewish populations by outlook is different. It focuses on the individual, not the family or household. Just as Conservative and Labour voters may differ in their habits or views on issues such as privatization and taxation, there are also differences among groups within the Jewish population based on their outlook. By examining self-reported outlook, we can comment scientifically on these differences, making outlook an effective tool for measuring an individual's propensity to hold particular beliefs, to belong to certain organizations or to behave in specific ways: in other words, their Jewishness. By using these new categories, meaningful comparisons can be made between the two groups, since 'Religious' is, by definition, more religious than 'Somewhat religious' and 'Secular' is more secular than 'Somewhat Secular'.

More secular than religious
In London, the JPR survey found that Jews typically see themselves as being more secular than religious, the 'average' outlook type falling within the 'Somewhat secular' category (see diagram below).

Importantly, less than ten per cent of people consider themselves to be 'Religious'. A possible explanation for this is that the definition of 'Religious' is rather clearer than for the three other outlook types. In terms of outlook, 'Religious' seems to be universally interpreted as observing the Sabbath strictly, but for other outlook categories the boundaries between the categories are more blurred. For example, two Jews who define themselves as 'Secular', may, in reality, exhibit very different Jewish traits. This makes outlook a complex topic.

Sorting by outlook
This complexity is illustrated by the relationship between an individual's outlook and synagogue attendance. As expected, people with a religious outlook attend synagogue more frequently than those with other outlooks. Weekly synagogue attendance is almost the exclusive realm of the 'Religious' group, whereas half of the 'Secular' group never attends services. But anyone familiar with Anglo-Jewish practices and the varied reasons why people attend synagogue will know that any simple correlation between outlook and attendance will not provide a complete picture, as the data show (see table below). Almost seven out of ten 'Secular' and 'Somewhat secular' Jews attend services at least once a year.

More striking is the finding that 'Somewhat religious' people are over five times more likely than the 'Somewhat secular' to attend synagogue services on 'most Sabbaths or more often'. What outlook is doing here is sorting people, in this case separating the regular synagogue attendees who tend to be 'Religious' or 'Somewhat religious' from everyone else. Another example is the issue of eating only kosher meat outside of the home; this also clearly distinguishes 'Secular' and 'Somewhat secular' from 'Religious and 'Somewhat religious'.

However, one of the most interesting and significant findings concerns those opinions, practices and behaviours in which outlook failed to sort people into groups at all and which are present regardless of outlook type. Time and again, people who defined themselves as 'Secular' or 'Somewhat secular' actually participated in Jewish ritual practices and activities. Examples of such 'universals' include the statements: 'at least half of my friends are Jewish', 'I attend a Passover seder most years', 'I have visited Israel', 'I read Jewish books and newspapers, listen to Jewish radio programmes and watch Jewish-related TV programmes'. None of these items is the exclusive domain of any particular outlook type and none is especially religious in nature. In fact, these 'universals' tend to be 'Jewishly secular', yet they unify all the outlook types.

Activities that unite Jews

Moreover, further study of such non-religious activities as volunteering, charitable giving and socialising habits shows that London's Jews often behave homogeneously regardless of their outlook. These activities and habits not only unite all Jews but often distinguish Anglo-Jews from British society at large; Jews of all outlooks drink less alcohol, smoke fewer cigarettes and have a stronger educational and employment ethos than the wider British society.

These 'universals' or uniting items suggest that the real binding force or 'glue' that holds London's highly complex and segmented Jewish population together has a distinctly social and cultural flavour. The power of the 'outlook measure' to reveal the existence and appeal of these 'universals', and the ability of researchers to analyze them scientifically, should help communal workers to market and deliver activities and services more effectively in the future.

*copies are available from JPR at £7.50 each, or can be accessed on the website: www.jpr.org.uk

The National Census validates JPR's Leeds Survey

As reported in jpr / news Winter 2001/2, JPR undertook a survey of Leeds Jewish households in summer 2001. This work was a vital component of the Long-Term Planning Project for British Jewry and was the first stage of a survey of the needs and preferences of the potential clientele for Jewish social and educational services in the UK. The recently published Portrait of Jews in London and the South-east: a community study by Harriet Becher, Stanley Waterman, Barry Kosmin and Katarina Thomson (2002) replicated this study of Jewish public opinion. JPR received 1,496 completed responses to the questionnaires it mailed to households in the Leeds Metropolitan Area. These form the basis of the new JPR report, The Jews of Leeds 2001: portrait of a community by JPR's Director of Research, Stanley Waterman, to be published this autumn.

Coincidentally, in April 2001, just three months before the Leeds Survey was carried out, the 2001 Census of England and Wales was conducted by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). Fortunately for JPR's purposes, for the first time the Census included a voluntary question on religion. Because of the proximity of the JPR Survey and the Census, we included a specific question in the JPR Survey of Jewish households that asked whether respondents had ticked the 'Jewish' box in the question on religion in the Census. We asked this because we wished to evaluate the accuracy of the response to the voluntary question about religion in the Census.

When ONS announced that it would be releasing statistics for small areas and by religion this summer, we decided to hold back work on Leeds until after the publication of the Census statistics. We reasoned that, by comparing questions posed both in the JPR Survey and the Census, and by analyzing the Census results for Jews, we would be able to check on the reliability of our Survey results. This process would also indicate those sections of the population that we had failed to reach. Moreover, if there were a high degree of similarity between the two findings, this would add credibility to our results.

A cross-tabulation of these two social investigations, the Survey and the Census, reveals that the vast majority (82 per cent) of the JPR Survey sample reported that they had stated in the Census that they were Jews by religion. The remaining 18 per cent comprised respondents who did not report their religion as 'Jewish'. They fall into various categories:

All in all, 3,138 Jewish persons living in 1,417 Leeds households were counted both by the Census and by the JPR Survey three months later. In other words, with its limited resources, JPR managed to reach a sample of over one-third of the Jewish households enumerated by the Government Census. This degree of correspondence validates and legitimates our own Survey results.

Both the Survey and the Census agreed that there was a high tendency for the Leeds Jewish respondents to be married or widowed; they were not young; they were highly educated and tended to have professional occupations. The JPR Survey provides 'added value' by concentrating on matters of specifically Jewish interest. It reveals that Leeds Jews prioritize Jewish charities, are non-smokers and non-drinkers. A discovery of greater policy concern to the community is the finding that people are clearly being under-utilized when it comes to voluntary work, or to carrying out more voluntary work than they are currently doing.

The Times picks up JPR's concerns about undercounting of Jews by Census Some of the key issues raised by the Leeds Survey and the 2001 Census were discussed and elaborated upon by Professor Stanley Waterman in a paper (written with David Graham, JPR Fellow in European Jewish Demography), Estimating and locating the UK Jewish population in light of the 2001 Census, presented at the Annual Conference of The Royal Geographical Society / Institute of British Geographers at the Royal Geographical Society in London in September 2003. The Times singled out JPR's presentation for report as one of three covered in an article the following day entitled Jewish numbers undercounted by census problems. Stanley and David explained in their presentation how the number of Jews living in Britain were significantly underestimated by the 2001 Census (see jpr / news Spring 2003).

 

America-Israel-Europe: a triangle of complexes and divergent interests?

This is an abridged version of a lecture delivered in May by Professor Shlomo Ben Ami, former Foreign Minister of Israel and JPR Research Fellow, to a joint JPR and Royal Institute of International Affairs audience. The lecture was chaired by Richard Bolchover, JPR Board member.

Professor Shlomo Ben Ami

It would be wrong to assume that Ariel Sharon's rejection of Europe as an interlocutor for the discussion of the road map reflects only his own obsession with Europe. His attitude is the expression of a national state of mind. Europe's press in Israel is at least as bad as Israel's press in Europe. This is clearly unhelpful now that the foundations for an international solution have been laid down. What are the reasons for this tragic rift and how did it come about that Israel should be so close to America and so far away from Europe?

Israel-Europe is a dialectic of love and hatred that has its expression in current policies with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But perhaps the dilemma is also embedded in our collective conscience as Jews and Europeans. Europe, as Denis de Rougemont put it in 1946, is 'la patrie de la mémoire'. Just as the Europeans find it so difficult to separate their attitude to Israel from their broader Jewish dilemma and complexes, so the Israelis, who are proud that Jewish culture had its finest hours on European soil, can never forget that Europe has been a huge cemetery for the Jewish people.

If Europe is the continent of memory, America is not. Israelis feel more at ease with the American way. The American Manichean attitude of dividing the world into good and evil, with Israel as a nation of immigrants, is another meaningful affinity with the American civilization, fighting for its survival, almost invariably on the 'good' side of the divide (which can sometimes be Communism v. Anti-Communism, Terrorism v. Anti-Terrorism, Democracy v. Dictatorship) appeals to the Israeli mind.

Israelis find Europe's more nuanced approach difficult to digest. Relations between Israel and Europe have always been linked to the pendulous move of the Middle East between war and peace.

The old continent suffers from two guilt complexes: the colonial and the Jewish complex. The state of Israel was born out of a dramatic crisis of the European conscience. For Europeans it was supposed to be, in a way, a compensation for the sins committed against the Jewish people. However, the price supposedly paid by the Palestinians touched another nerve in the European mind. Israelis see Europe as trying to compensate for political ineffectiveness with an unbearably moralistic discourse, which the Israelis can neither understand, nor stand.

It took Europe many religious wars, two world wars, and one genocide to solve its endemic disputes over borders and nationalism. Its record in colonialism has written monstrous pages in human history, and now Israel feels that Europe is indifferent to its existential predicament. It perceives itself fighting for life against a most barbaric brand of terrorism, and accused of committing the kind of crimes so frequent in European history. Is there an attempt by some in Europe to get rid too easily of the guilt complex with regard to the Jewish question, and from the unbearable claim of the Jews to moral superiority, by applying to them all the metaphors of the Shoah? Israelis see this as antisemitism or ignorance.

Europe's betrayal
A nation fighting for survival is always hypersensitive. In Israeli eyes, Europe did not rise to the challenge of solidarity in difficult times. In 1967, Israel was left to fight alone. In 1973, America could not find a European country ready to allow planes to refuel on their way to supply Israel with vital war material; Europe then imposed an embargo on Israel. During the Gulf War, when Israel was terrorized by Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles, we could hardly find a country in Europe ready to sell us gas masks...

However, when I personally witnessed with dismay Europe's betrayal was in the early days of the Intifada. We had long been the darlings of Europe; we negotiated peace by coming to the outer limits of our capacity for compromise - we divided Jerusalem, we committed ourselves to withdrawal from the Territories and the creation of a fully viable Palestinian state, we spoke of evacuating hundreds of settlements to benefit returning Palestinian refugees. We came as close as possible to breaking the very genetic code of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Europe applauded us.

However, once the Intifada started, the onus was almost exclusively put upon us. This was Europe's moment of truth and it failed to meet it. Instead of using its extraordinary economic, political and moral leverage on the Palestinians, Europe focused its critique on the supposedly 'excessive' force that Israel was using in its defence. The Europeans were unwilling to see that Arafat intentionally preempted a possible peace deal by slipping into the comfortable role of victim afforded by the Intifada. He astutely cultivated, and continues to do so, this post-romantic trend which had made the Palestinian cause popular throughout Europe. Surfing on the waves of Palestinian martyrology has always been Arafat's formula for captivating the European mind.

At every junction of historical decision-making, the international community, with Europe's moral and political backing, gave the Palestinians the sense that they were entitled to a better deal and that Israel would eventually be put in the dock. This international pampering of the Palestinian movement is unparalleled in modern history and is an obstacle to a settlement.

So, when did the America-Europe-Israel triangle become such a violently tense equation? Probably in early 2002, with the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The gap separating Europeans from Americans on the question of Israel and the Palestinians is a major impediment to transatlantic understanding today, and hence to the capacity of Europe and America to work in harmony to implement the road map. For Europeans, Jerusalem, not Baghdad is the problem. And, if they are connected, it is only in the context of the Europeans asking for a repetition of the logic of the Gulf War where an Arab-Israeli Peace Conference followed the war in Iraq.

This may explain why anti-war demonstrations in Europe could sometimes hardly be distinguished from anti-Israel rallies. The slogans 'No to the war', 'Free Palestine' and 'Down with Sharon' were all synonymous. This is why many Jews felt so uncomfortable with the anti-war movement. American Jews were in general less supportive of the war than non-Jews. Yet in Europe and America, Jews were unwelcome in the anti-war movement, or felt that the anti-war demonstrations did not offer congenial company to Jews who might have opposed the war and Sharon's policies but nevertheless could not feel at ease where the Israeli flag was being burnt.

It is in Europe that the anti-war movement has been virulently anti-Israel. Israelis and Jews would argue that Europe's demonstrations for a free Palestine and not for a free Iraq or any other Arab country smells too much like a politically correct form of antisemitism.

In the eyes of the Europeans, America and Israel remain mired as anarchic powers relying on Machtpolitik rather than on international law. They are seen as operating outside the system, challenging and even deriding it. Many Europeans would consider the US and Israel as outlaws, with America the rogue colossus and Israel the rogue satellite, expressed in the Arab world as the big and small Satan.

Americans and Israelis share an obsession for total security, whereas Europeans will coexist with evil, rather than try to eliminate it. This was the essence of the policy of appeasement towards Hitler and their attitude to Saddam Hussein. Of course, the origins of America's and Israel's obsessions for total security are different. For Israelis, it stems from the deepest complexes of a persecuted people, the legacy of the loss of Jewish statehood twice in their history, the Holocaust and the fact that modern Israel lives in a region where there is no mercy for the weak.

Israeli and American notions about 'threats' also differ from those of Europeans. The latter seem to have moved to a post-historical world where threats are essentially civilian not military. Europeans prefer to speak of 'challenges', such as ethnic conflicts, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation.

Americans and their Israeli allies live in a different world and subscribe to a different discourse. Theirs is the language of the threats of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and rogue states, which, they believe, need a military response.

Europeans have developed a sympathy with the underdog, but only if he keeps his reaction to his predicament within reasonable limits. There was heartfelt European sympathy for America in the wake of 9/11, just as the European conscience overwhelmingly rallied behind Israel on the eve of the Six Day War. But when the Israelis moved from self-defence to a strategy of occupation and settlement, and the Americans moved beyond the legitimate task of fighting Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to broader strategic goals, the Europeans recoiled.

The lessons of history
When it comes to the role of memory in shaping the codes of behaviour in the present we find a rather intriguing phenomenon. The Americans, a nation with a shorter historical memory than the Europeans, now constantly remind their European allies, who are so eager to escape from the ghosts of their tormenting past, of the lessons of history, the blunders of appeasement: Munich, Hitler, Stalin. Europe pretends to have superseded that paralyzing memory. In an era of European internationalism we find an additional curiosity. Today America is perceived, exactly like Israel is seen by the Europeans, as a selfish nation-state breaking all the international rules in the name of sacred national egoism. Europe believes it has discovered a new mission civilisatrice embedded in international law and institutions, in compromise and reconciliation, and in a belief in universal peace.

To Israelis living in historical conditions where military threats abound, terrorism is the order of the day, and where the very legitimacy of our national existence is not yet accepted by our neighbours, no matter what concessions we would be ready to make, we find it extremely difficult to operate outside the law of the jungle imposed by the harsh realities of life. Europe refuses to accept that we and our Arab neighbours live in a totally different historical setting. Europe has moved to post-history; but we are stuck in history.

We have tried the European way, and it failed. During the Rabin years, we tried to build peace and trust through the development of economic spaces of cooperation and integration with our Arab neighbours. But this was rejected by the Arab world as a neo-colonialist drive by Israel.

The tension of Europe-America-Israel is not a matter of circumstantial policy, but a much deeper affair. So long as Israel's and America's commitment to nationalist unilateralism persists, the tension will continue, and with it the animosity and the frustrations of the Arab world where Israel and America will continue to be perceived as allies in an anti-Arab conspiracy. It is sometimes difficult to decide if the Jews and Israel are hated because of their close alliance with America, or America is hated because of its alliance with the Jews. To the Egyptian singer who won fame with his song 'I hate Israel' the question of the chicken and the egg is of no concern. He recently released a new song, 'I hate America'.

Europe is not hostile to Israel. Its commitment to Israel's right of existence is a profound moral imperative. But, knowing that the US will always guarantee the physical existence of Israel, the Europeans allow themselves the luxury of playing the 'Arab game'.

Interestingly, Israel and America are brought closer to each other by the religious ethos in their respective societies and political discourse as opposed to Europe's secular culture and politics. Europeans are uneasy with the missionary zeal and frequent evocation of God by American politicians. G K Chesterton defined America as a 'nation with the soul of a church'. If this is so, Israel is a nation with the soul of a synagogue, for the role of religion in Israeli life and politics cannot be exaggerated, and the resort to religious sources and documents of ownership has been a central pattern in the struggle for the land as much as it is the foundation of Jewish nationhood.

George W Bush's presidency is probably the most faith-based in modern times. His use of the term 'crusade' to define his war against Bin Laden shocked many Europeans. A European leader would neither have resorted to such a metaphor, nor subscribed to the thesis of a clash of civilizations. A continent with such a big Muslim population cannot endorse the American and Israeli religious sense of confrontation. The Biblical self-assurance in a transcendent destiny - an essential ethos of America and of the Jewish State -is a discourse that Europe will no longer accept.

However, Israel should not rejoice at being so distant from Europe. In the long run, Europe's way may not be so farfetched; the world cannot be allowed to operate for long outside an international system of laws. Sooner or later, the US will be forced to reconcile itself with the UN and other multilateral institutions. An assertive international effort for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have to be a central pillar of a post-war Middle East.

America is bound to mend its relations with Europe; the road map requires them to do so. America will be unable to maintain for long its expansive international engagements. Increasingly dependent on foreign investment to feed its deficit-laden economy, an integrated and prosperous Europe needs to be its ally. Sooner or later, America will avoid the sin of hubris, and learn to lead without having to dominate.

It is equally vital that Jews and Israelis avoid reverting to a fatalistic mood of paranoia and that Israel's self-perception as the victim of a rejectionist Arab world and an antisemitic Europe be superseded. Israel, like America, will have to reconcile itself to Europe. The thesis that being anti-Israel is what makes Europeans anti-Jewish is not self-evident. What is true is that Europeans are more likely to blame Israel than the Palestinians for the current cycle of blood and violence.

America's formidable military might can perhaps dismantle the dictatorships of the region one after another, but can hardly win the peace and restructure the region single-handedly. America will be forced to return to the vital legitimacy that only a multilateral enterprise can secure.

A role for Europe in building peace
There are those in Israel who believe in a European role in the Arab-Israeli situation. Instability is a threat to vital European interests, and with Europe becoming a cosmopolitan continent with huge Muslim populations, the Arab-Israeli conflict has a vital internal dimension for Europe. Israel should encourage a judicious role for Europe in building peace and cooperation in the region.

Maybe Europe knows something the Americans will have to learn the hard way. The real option of the Arab world is not between democracy and dictatorship, but between secular dictatorship and Islamic democracy. However, Europe's wisdom does not justify its way of appeasing dictators, nor make it moral. Europe's choice has been to retreat from the noble, albeit frustrating, enterprise of democratization. The Americans are left, as always, to lead with their characteristic missionary zeal.

Europe needs to have a more coherent foreign policy and be sustained by a more convincing military might which it lacks today. Currently, Europe neither inspires nor intimidates. Israeli leaders see their meetings with European emissaries as an exercise in going through the motions, not as an instrument of policy-making. There are so many lessons Europe can teach us. One is that nationalism, if respected, can become a responsible and benign basis for international cooperation. It degenerates into cultural and ethnic narcissism when denied its
fundamental rights. This is a lesson for the Middle East too.

The constellation created by 9/11 and the Iraqi crisis results in an uneasy dilemma for the Europeans. On the one hand, they carry the hopes of the Arabs and Palestinians who wrote off the US as a peace mediator ever since the Bush administration withdrew from Middle East politics. On the other hand, Europe needs to show Atlantic solidarity and may even have to consider closing of ranks with the US and Israel.

Need for improved relations
However, America's need for Europe's political support could result in a window of opportunity for the EU, which should bring all its influence to bear on the US, to facilitate a joint and active commitment to resolve conflict in the Middle East.

But this requires Europe to mend its relations with Israel. Europe needs to be an essential pillar in what is the only solution possible for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: an international mandate -some now prefer to call it trusteeship -in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Israelis must accept that no change in the international system, however radical, will spare them from painful choices. Internationally legitimized borders will offer Israel more deterrence power than F-16 raids. Only when a Palestinian state has a vested interest in respecting the regional order can peace prevail.

Israeli intellectuals and politicians bear a much greater responsibility than others in this volatile region, because of our high ideals, our tradition, and our use of reason, (both democratic and utopian) which have enabled us to recover our birthright.

For we have not survived all the horrors of extermination only to entrench ourselves behind the walls of our own convictions. We have survived to devise a solution to the apparently insoluble conundrum that will make Jewish statehood a legitimate reality in the eyes of those who consider themselves
its victims.

JPR gets its message out on Judeophobia: the impact of A New Antisemitism?

JPR's latest book, A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-century Britain* has made a great impact in the current debate about antisemitism in Britain. The ideas in the book have also struck a chord elsewhere, particularly in the United States. Edited by Dr Paul Iganski, JPR's Civil Society Fellow, and JPR Director, Professor Barry Kosmin, it was published in May (see jpr / news Spring 2003). Both pre- and post-launch publicity were extensive.

Prior to its publication, the book was featured in articles in The Economist, Jerusalem Post, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) and HaModia. Following its launch, a broad range of news reports and commentaries appeared in the Daily Express, The Times and on BBC's Today programme and BBC London, where the issue was debated. A particularly favourable report was published by the New York-based JTA, which was subsequently picked up by weekly Jewish newspapers throughout the United States as well as the Manchester Jewish Telegraph.

The book's editors have written lengthy guest columns in the Jewish Chronicle, Ha'aretz, the Forward in New York, the New Jersey Jewish News and the web-based Jewsweek magazine, and most recently, contributed the lead article on the op-ed page of the International Herald Tribune. Favourable book reviews also appeared in International Searchlight, the Yorkshire Post (including a direct mail book offer) and the Belfast Telegraph, where the reviewer put the book's thesis in a regional context and focused on the antisemitism of Ulster poet and BBC arts critic Tom Paulin. In addition, the Jewish Quarterly published one essay from the volume and offered to sell copies to its readers.

The editors of A New Antisemitism? argue against the use of the term 'antisemitism' to describe what is happening in contemporary Britain. They claim that the term, historically associated with a Nazi eliminationist and biological racism that is no longer credible, has now 'metamorphosed into a catch-all concept which has very little analytic value'.

Instead, the editors argue that what is taking place is a different phenomenon, Judeophobia-a fear of and hostility towards Jews as a collectivity. While not yet widespread in 'Middle England', what the editors call 'institutional' and 'globalized' Judeophobia does, however, reside among certain 'cognitive elites' within the news media, churches, universities, and trades unions. Left unchecked, the editors maintain, both these forms of Judeophobia will undermine aspirations for Britain to be a tolerant and pluralistic society.

This book is an indispensable tool for thinking critically about antisemitism. The generous support of a number of individuals has enabled JPR to disseminate complimentary copies to opinion-makers, universities, public libraries and schools in Britain, Europe and the United States, and to researchers and practitioners in fields such as race and ethnic relations, law, social services, public policy planning and law enforcement.

* copies are available from Profile Books at £14.99 and through Amazon.com

JPR initiates Jewish enrichment seminars
		Professor Menachem Kellner
The first of a series of Jewish enrichment seminars was initiated by JPR for its staff this autumn. Philosopher Menachem Kellner from the University of Haifa launched the series, which will be held approximately each month throughout the year for JPR staff, board members and invited guests. Professor Kellner holds the Sir Isaac and Lady Edith Wolfson Chair in Jewish Religious Thought, and is the author of Must a Jew Believe Anything? (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1999) and Maimonides on the Decline of the Generations and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority (SUNY Press,1996). The former dean of students at Haifa University previously served as visiting professor at the Sorbonne and at Northwestern University, Illinois. Professor Kellner spoke about 'Rabbinic Authority in non-halachic areas', focusing on the historical development of the concept of da'at torah (the totality of rabbinic knowledge and interpretation) from the nineteenth to twenty-first century, as well as its impact on political and religious life in Israel today. Seminar guests included JPR board member and publisher Peter Halban and Rabbi Dr Jeremy Rosen, director of Yakar Educational Foundation. JPR executive director Professor Barry Kosmin welcomed this new initiative as an excellent opportunity for JPR staff, who otherwise work in their own specialties, to come together and learn from experts in fields of Jewish studies.

 

Conference on Jews and racialization in Britain

A conference was recently organized by JPR in conjunction with the AHRB Parkes Centre for the Study of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations, University of Southampton, as part of the 'Race', ethnicity, identity and memory in twentieth-century Britain project.

A reception was held at King's College to mark the re-launch of the journal Patterns of Prejudice, now published by Routledge, followed by a lecture, including film clips, by Professor Greg Walker of the University of Leicester on Alexander Korda, Englishness and Jewishness. Professor Walker examined Korda's life and career from his early days in Hungary to the late 1930s, focusing particularly on his Jewish roots and their influence on his films, as well as on his attitudes.

In addition an academic conference on Jews and racialization in Britain was hosted by JPR. Among those delivering papers were Professor Tony Kushner (University of Southampton), Professor John Solomos (City University), Professor Todd Endelman (University of Michigan) and Dr Dan Stone (Royal Holloway, University of London).

The papers addressed topics ranging from the significance of racial thinking and categorization in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century science and social science to an exploration of 'racialized' identities in contemporary Jewish and Afro-Caribbean autobiography. Papers from the conference will be published in a forthcoming issue of Patterns of Prejudice.

Jewish spaces in European theatre
		Enrico Fink, Italian actor, musician and playwright
A European Performing Arts Forum took place in Prague in June, under the aegis of the European Association of Jewish Culture, JPR and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, with the support of the Rich Foundation. Convened by Lena Stanley-Clamp, JPR Director of Public Activities and EAJC Director, it was a think-tank seminar on 'Jewish Spaces in European Theatre' - the spaces being a metaphor for Jewish culture and creativity on contemporary European stages. The Forum brought together 35 theatre practitioners: playwrights, directors, producers, composers and actors from a dozen countries, most of whom met for the first time. The seminar explored the wider space of Europe's multicultural landscape and asked where Jewish themes fitted in and how the cultural boundaries could be transcended in the theatre. The spotlight then turned to the politics of representation: to what extent are artists responsible for the impact of the images of the Jews they project? What difference do they make to the audiences' perceptions? How do they deal with the real or imagined pressures of censorship and self-censorship? How should they engage with events in Israel? What insights can be gained from the experience of the Israeli political theatre? Two workshop performances shed additional light on the debates: an extract from a one-man show Patrilineare by Enrico Fink (Florence) and a 'world premiere' reading of Eva Hoffman's (London) new play The Ceremony: Anatomy of a Massacre. The Forum papers and biographies of the participants can be accessed on the European Association for Jewish Culture website:www.jewishcultureineurope.org

JPR mourns the death of Manja Leigh
It is with great sadness that we report the recent death of JPR Honorary Vice-President, Manja Leigh. Born in Berlin, she was educated in Germany and Belgium before moving to London in 1936. She was married for twenty years to Charles Stockler, until his untimely death in 1964. She later married a popular bandleader, Geraldo, and took an active interest in his career and in the music world. After his death in 1973 she took over his business, which provided musicians to hotels and cruise ships all over the world. Together with her third husband Morris Leigh, then chairman of Allied London Properties Plc, she devoted much of her time to charitable causes, including JPR, Tel Aviv University, the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, Nightingale House, the Royal College of Music and several cancer charities. She and Morris hosted several prestigious events in support of JPR, including a dinner with Henry Kissinger as guest speaker. After Morris' death in 1996, Manja generously endowed the JPR Morris Leigh Memorial Lecture series, which has featured such distinguished speakers as Baroness Susan Greenfield, the Rt. Rev. Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford, and Professor Anita Shapira of Tel Aviv University. The Trustees and staff of JPR will greatly miss Manja's gracious involvement in the Institute and her warm-spirited generosity.

 

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